


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# A Companion to Roman Imperialism

*Dexter Hoyos*

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## A Companion to Roman Imperialism

# History of Warfare

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VOLUME 81

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# A Companion to Roman Imperialism

*Edited by*  
Dexter Hoyos



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*Cover illustration:* Gemma Augustea (fragment) Inv. Nr. ANSA IX a79. A depiction of Emperor Augustus surrounded by goddesses and allegories. Collection of Greek and Roman Antiquities in the Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna. Roman, 9-12 CE. Two-Layered onyx. Setting: gold frame, reverse side in ornamented open-work; German, 17th century. © (Photo) Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna

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## ABBREVIATIONS

|                             |                                                                              |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <i>AE</i>                   | <i>L'Année Épigraphique</i>                                                  |
| <i>Aen.</i>                 | <i>Aeneid</i> (Vergil)                                                       |
| <i>AJA</i>                  | <i>American Journal of Archaeology</i>                                       |
| <i>AJPh</i>                 | <i>American Journal of Philology</i>                                         |
| <i>ANRW</i>                 | <i>Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt</i>                            |
| Amm., Amm. Marc.            | Ammianus Marcellinus                                                         |
| App. <i>BC</i>              | Appian, <i>Bella Civilia</i>                                                 |
| <i>Celt.</i>                | <i>Celtica</i>                                                               |
| <i>Ill.</i>                 | <i>Illyrica</i>                                                              |
| <i>Lib.</i>                 | <i>Libyca</i>                                                                |
| <i>Mac.</i>                 | <i>Macedonica</i>                                                            |
| <i>Mithr.</i>               | <i>Mithridatica</i>                                                          |
| <i>Praef.</i>               | <i>Preface</i>                                                               |
| <i>Syr.</i>                 | <i>Syriaca</i>                                                               |
| Arist. <i>Or.</i>           | Aelius Aristides, <i>Orations</i>                                            |
| Arrian, <i>Peripl. PE</i>   | <i>Periplus Ponti Euxeiini</i>                                               |
| Ascon.                      | Asconius                                                                     |
| ASNP                        | <i>Annali della Scuola Normale di Pisa: Classe di Lettere e di Filologia</i> |
| Aug. <i>RG</i>              | Augustus, <i>Res Gestae Divi Augusti</i>                                     |
| <i>BAR</i>                  | <i>British Archaeological Reports</i>                                        |
| <i>BGall</i>                | <i>de Bello Gallico</i>                                                      |
| <i>BICS</i>                 | <i>Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies</i>                        |
| <i>BMCR</i>                 | <i>Bryn Mawr Classical Review</i>                                            |
| Broughton                   | see <i>MRR</i>                                                               |
| ca.                         | circa                                                                        |
| Caes.:                      | Caesar                                                                       |
| <i>BC</i>                   | <i>de Bello Civili</i>                                                       |
| <i>BG, BGall</i>            | <i>de Bello Gallico</i>                                                      |
| <i>BAfr</i>                 | <i>de Bello Africo</i>                                                       |
| <i>CAH, CAH<sup>1</sup></i> | <i>Cambridge Ancient History</i> , 1st edn.                                  |
| <i>CAH<sup>2</sup></i>      | <i>Cambridge Ancient History</i> , 2nd edn.                                  |
| <i>C&amp;M</i>              | <i>Classica et Medievalia</i>                                                |
| Cassiod. <i>Chron.</i>      | Cassiodorus, <i>Chronica</i>                                                 |
| <i>CB</i>                   | <i>Classical Bulletin</i>                                                    |
| Cic.                        | Cicero                                                                       |
| <i>Arch.</i>                | <i>pro Archia</i>                                                            |
| <i>Att.</i>                 | <i>ad Atticum</i>                                                            |

|                              |                                                                                                                                             |
|------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <i>Balb.</i>                 | <i>pro Balbo</i>                                                                                                                            |
| <i>Brut.</i>                 | <i>Brutus</i>                                                                                                                               |
| <i>Cat.</i>                  | <i>in Catilinam</i>                                                                                                                         |
| <i>Corn. ap. Ascon.</i>      | <i>Oratio Cornelianiana apud Asconium</i>                                                                                                   |
| <i>de Imp. Pomp.</i>         | <i>de Imperio Cn. Pompei</i>                                                                                                                |
| <i>Deiot.</i>                | <i>pro Rege Deiotaro</i>                                                                                                                    |
| <i>De Orat.</i>              | <i>De Oratore</i>                                                                                                                           |
| <i>Div. in Caec.</i>         | <i>Divinatio in Caecilium</i>                                                                                                               |
| <i>Dom.</i>                  | <i>de Domo Sua</i>                                                                                                                          |
| <i>Fam.</i>                  | <i>ad Familiares</i>                                                                                                                        |
| <i>Flacc.</i>                | <i>pro Flacco</i>                                                                                                                           |
| <i>Font.</i>                 | <i>pro Fonteio</i>                                                                                                                          |
| <i>Leg.</i>                  | <i>de Legibus</i>                                                                                                                           |
| <i>Leg. Agr.</i>             | <i>de Lege Agraria</i>                                                                                                                      |
| <i>Leg. Man.</i>             | <i>de Lege Manilia [= de Imperio Cn. Pompei]</i>                                                                                            |
| <i>Lig.</i>                  | <i>pro Ligario</i>                                                                                                                          |
| <i>Mil.</i>                  | <i>pro Milone</i>                                                                                                                           |
| <i>Mur.</i>                  | <i>pro Murena</i>                                                                                                                           |
| <i>Off.</i>                  | <i>de Officiis</i>                                                                                                                          |
| <i>Phil.</i>                 | <i>Philippicae</i>                                                                                                                          |
| <i>Pis.</i>                  | <i>in Pisonem</i>                                                                                                                           |
| <i>Post red. sen.</i>        | <i>Post Reditum in Senatu</i>                                                                                                               |
| <i>Prov. cons.</i>           | <i>de Provinciis Consularibus</i>                                                                                                           |
| <i>Rab. Post.</i>            | <i>pro Rabirio Postumo</i>                                                                                                                  |
| <i>Rep., de Re P.</i>        | <i>de Re Publica</i>                                                                                                                        |
| <i>QFr</i>                   | <i>ad Q. Fratrem</i>                                                                                                                        |
| <i>Rosc. Amer.</i>           | <i>pro Roscio Amerino</i>                                                                                                                   |
| <i>Scaur. ap. Ascon.</i>     | <i>Oratio Scauriana apud Asconium</i>                                                                                                       |
| <i>Tusc.</i>                 | <i>Tusculanae Disputationes</i>                                                                                                             |
| <i>2Verr.</i>                | <i>In Verrem, Actio Secunda</i>                                                                                                             |
| <i>CIL, CIL</i> <sup>2</sup> | <i>Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum</i> [ <sup>2</sup> = 2nd edn. of volume]                                                                  |
| <i>CJ</i>                    | <i>Classical Journal</i>                                                                                                                    |
| <i>CP</i>                    | <i>Classical Philology</i>                                                                                                                  |
| <i>CQ</i>                    | <i>Classical Quarterly</i>                                                                                                                  |
| <i>CRAI</i>                  | <i>Comptes rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions</i>                                                                                        |
| <i>CW</i>                    | <i>Classical World</i>                                                                                                                      |
| <i>Diod.</i>                 | <i>Diodorus Siculus</i>                                                                                                                     |
| <i>de Vir. Ill.</i>          | <i>de Viris Illustribus</i>                                                                                                                 |
| ed., eds., edn.              | edited (by); editor(s); edition                                                                                                             |
| <i>EJ</i>                    | <i>V. Ehrenberg and A.H.M. Jones, Documents illustrating the Reigns of Augustus and Tiberius</i> (2nd edn., 1955; repr. with Addenda, 1976) |

|                       |                                                                                   |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <i>Ep.</i>            | <i>Epistulae</i> (Horace, Pliny, Seneca)                                          |
| <i>Epit.</i>          | <i>Epitome</i>                                                                    |
| esp.                  | especially                                                                        |
| Eutr.                 | Eutropius                                                                         |
| <i>FGrH</i>           | <i>Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker</i> (Jacoby)                             |
| Flor.                 | Florus                                                                            |
| fr., frg., fr.        | fragment(s)                                                                       |
| Front. <i>Strat.</i>  | Frontinus, <i>Strategemata</i>                                                    |
| Gell. <i>NA</i>       | Gellius, <i>Noctes Atticae</i>                                                    |
| G&R                   | <i>Greece and Rome</i>                                                            |
| <i>HA</i>             | <i>Historia Augusta</i>                                                           |
| <i>Ant.</i>           | Antoninus Pius                                                                    |
| <i>Comm.</i>          | Commodus                                                                          |
| <i>Hadr.</i>          | Hadrian                                                                           |
| <i>Marc.</i>          | Marcus Aurelius                                                                   |
| <i>Sev.</i>           | Septimius Severus                                                                 |
| <i>Sev. Alex.</i>     | Severus Alexander                                                                 |
| Hdn.                  | Herodian                                                                          |
| Hom. <i>Il., Od.</i>  | Homer, <i>Iliad, Odyssey</i>                                                      |
| Hor.                  | Horace                                                                            |
| <i>Ep.</i>            | <i>Epistulae, Epistles</i>                                                        |
| <i>HRR</i>            | <i>Historicorum Romanorum Reliquiae</i> (ed. Peter)                               |
| <i>HSCP</i>           | <i>Harvard Studies in Classical Philology</i>                                     |
| <i>IG</i>             | <i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i>                                                      |
| <i>IK</i>             | <i>Inchriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien</i>                              |
| <i>ILS</i>            | <i>Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae</i> (Dessau)                                    |
| <i>Ind.</i>           | <i>Indica</i> (Arrian)                                                            |
| <i>Inscr. It.</i>     | <i>Inscriptiones Italiae</i> (Degrassi)                                           |
| <i>ISE</i>            | L. Moretti, <i>Iscrizioni Storiche Ellenistiche</i> , 3 vols. Firenze.<br>1967–75 |
| Jerome, <i>Chron.</i> | <i>Chronicle</i>                                                                  |
| <i>JHS</i>            | <i>Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>                                                |
| Jord. <i>Get.</i>     | Jordanes, <i>Getica</i>                                                           |
| Jos. <i>BJ</i>        | Josephus, <i>de Bello Iudaico</i> [ <i>The Jewish War</i> ]                       |
| <i>JRA</i>            | <i>Journal of Roman Archaeology</i>                                               |
| <i>JRS</i>            | <i>Journal of Roman Studies</i>                                                   |
| <i>LIMC</i>           | <i>Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae</i> , 9 vols. (1981–<br>99)       |
| 1 <i>Macc.</i>        | 1 <i>Maccabees</i> (Old Testament)                                                |
| <i>MD</i>             | <i>Materiali e Discussioni per l'Analisi dei Testi classici</i>                   |
| <i>MRR</i>            | Broughton, <i>Magistrates of the Roman Republic</i>                               |
| <i>NA</i>             | see Gell. <i>NA</i>                                                               |

|                  |                                                                                 |
|------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Nep. Att.        | Cornelius Nepos, <i>Vita Attici</i>                                             |
| OGIS             | see Dittenberger (in bibliography)                                              |
| Or.              | <i>Oratio; Orationes</i>                                                        |
| ORF              | H. Malcovati (ed.), <i>Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta</i>                         |
| Paus.            | Pausanias                                                                       |
| PBA              | <i>Proceedings of the British Academy</i>                                       |
| PBSR             | <i>Papers of the British School at Rome</i>                                     |
| PCPhS            | <i>Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society</i>                        |
| Per.             | <i>Periocha</i> (Livy)                                                          |
| Philostratus, VA | <i>Vita Apollonii Tyrri</i>                                                     |
| V. Soph.         | <i>Vitae Sophistarum</i>                                                        |
| PIR              | <i>Prosopographia Imperii Romani Saeculorum I. II. III.</i> (1st edn.: Berlin)  |
| PIR <sup>2</sup> | <i>Prosopographia Imperii Romani Saeculorum I. II. III.</i> (2nd edn.: Leipzig) |
| Plaut.           | Plautus                                                                         |
| As.              | <i>Asinaria</i>                                                                 |
| Bac.             | <i>Bacchides</i>                                                                |
| Cas.             | <i>Casina</i>                                                                   |
| Cur.             | <i>Curculio</i>                                                                 |
| Epid.            | <i>Epidicus</i>                                                                 |
| Mil.             | <i>Miles Gloriosus</i>                                                          |
| Mos.             | <i>Mostellaria</i>                                                              |
| Poen.            | <i>Poenulus</i>                                                                 |
| Pseud.           | <i>Pseudolus</i>                                                                |
| St.              | <i>Stichus</i>                                                                  |
| Trin.            | <i>Trinummus</i>                                                                |
| Truc.            | <i>Truculentus</i>                                                              |
| Pliny, HN or NH  | <i>Historia Naturalis</i>                                                       |
| Pliny            |                                                                                 |
| Pan.             | <i>Panegyricus Traiani</i>                                                      |
| Ep.              | <i>Epistulae</i>                                                                |
| Plut.            | Plutarch                                                                        |
| Aem.             | <i>Aemilius Paullus</i>                                                         |
| Ant.             | <i>Antony</i>                                                                   |
| Caes.            | <i>Caesar</i>                                                                   |
| Cato Maj.        | <i>Cato Maior</i>                                                               |
| Cato Min.        | <i>Cato Minor</i>                                                               |
| Cic.             | <i>Cicero</i>                                                                   |
| Crass.           | <i>Crassus</i>                                                                  |
| Luc.             | <i>Lucullus</i>                                                                 |
| Mar.             | <i>Marius</i>                                                                   |

|                              |                                                                                  |
|------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <i>Mor.</i>                  | <i>Moralia</i>                                                                   |
| <i>Pomp.</i>                 | <i>Pompey</i>                                                                    |
| <i>Sert.</i>                 | <i>Sertorius</i>                                                                 |
| Ps.-Ascon.                   | Pseudo-Asconius (ed. Stangl)                                                     |
| <i>REL</i>                   | <i>Revue des Études latines</i>                                                  |
| repr.                        | reprint(ed)                                                                      |
| rev.                         | revised                                                                          |
| <i>RFIC</i>                  | <i>Riv. di Filologia e Istruzione Classica</i>                                   |
| RG see Aug. RG               |                                                                                  |
| <i>RhM</i>                   | <i>Rheinisches Museum für Philologie</i>                                         |
| <i>RIB</i>                   | <i>The Roman Inscriptions of Britain</i>                                         |
| <i>RIC</i>                   | <i>The Roman Imperial Coinage</i> (ed. C.H.V. Sutherland, R.A.G. Carson, et al.) |
| <i>RRC</i>                   | <i>The Roman Republican Coinage</i> (ed. M.H. Crawford)                          |
| s.a.                         | <i>sub anno</i>                                                                  |
| Sall.                        | Sallust                                                                          |
| <i>Cat.</i>                  | <i>de Bello Catilinae</i>                                                        |
| <i>BJ</i>                    | <i>de Bello Iugurthino</i>                                                       |
| <i>Hist.</i>                 | <i>Historiae</i> (Maurenbrecher or McGushin, editors)                            |
| <i>Sat.</i>                  | <i>Satires</i>                                                                   |
| SC                           | <i>Senatus Consultum</i>                                                         |
| <i>SEG</i>                   | <i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</i>                                         |
| Seneca, <i>Brev. Vit.</i>    | <i>de Brevitate Vitae</i>                                                        |
| <i>Apocol.</i>               | <i>Apocolocyntosis</i>                                                           |
| <i>SIG</i>                   | <i>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum</i>                                           |
| Statius, <i>Silv.</i>        | <i>Silvae</i>                                                                    |
| Steph. Byz.                  | Stephanus Byzantinus                                                             |
| Str.                         | Strabo                                                                           |
| Suet.                        | Suetonius                                                                        |
| <i>Aug.</i>                  | <i>Divus Augustus</i>                                                            |
| <i>Calig. or Gaius</i>       | <i>Caligula</i>                                                                  |
| <i>Dom.</i>                  | <i>Domitian</i>                                                                  |
| <i>Iul.</i>                  | <i>Divus Iulius</i>                                                              |
| Tac.                         | Tacitus                                                                          |
| <i>Agr.</i>                  | <i>de Vita Cn. Iulii Agricolae</i>                                               |
| <i>Ann.</i>                  | <i>Annales</i>                                                                   |
| <i>Dial.</i>                 | <i>Dialogus de Oratoribus</i>                                                    |
| <i>Germ.</i>                 | <i>de Situ et Moribus Germanorum</i>                                             |
| <i>Hist.</i>                 | <i>Historiae</i>                                                                 |
| TAPA                         | <i>Transactions of the American Philological Association</i>                     |
| Theophr. <i>Hist. Plant.</i> | Theophrastus, <i>Historia Plantarum</i>                                          |
| Thuc.                        | Thucydides                                                                       |

|                                 |                                                  |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| tr.                             | translated by; translator; translation           |
| Varro, <i>LL</i>                | <i>de Lingua Latina</i>                          |
| Val. Max.                       | Valerius Maximus                                 |
| Vell., Vell. Pat.               | Velleius Paterculus                              |
| Verg., Virg.                    | Vergil                                           |
| <i>Aen.</i>                     | <i>Aeneid</i>                                    |
| <i>Vita Thuc.</i> (Marcellinus) | <i>Vita Thucydidis</i>                           |
| VA see Philostratus             |                                                  |
| <i>V. Soph.</i>                 | see Philostratus                                 |
| Zon., Zonar.                    | Zonaras                                          |
| ZPE                             | <i>Zeitschrift für Philologie und Epigraphik</i> |

*Roman Praenomina:*

A. Aulus, Ap. Appius, C. Gaius, Cn. Gnaeus, D. Decimus, L. Lucius, M. Marcus, M'. Manius, Mam. Mamercus, N. Numerius, P. Publius, Q. Quintus, Ser. Servius, Sp. Spurius, Sex. Sextus, T. Titus, Ti. Tiberius



## NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

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## INTRODUCTION

The Roman empire still arrests the imagination. Even if the drama of Decline and Fall holds the greatest popular fascination (usually for the wrong reasons), the origins of the empire, the reasons for its centuries-long success, and its impact on subjects and neighbours are also questions of continuing and contentious interest.

*A Companion to Roman Imperialism* surveys the growth and fortunes of this historical phenomenon down to the reign of Trajan (AD 98–117), the emperor who took the empire to its greatest extent—only for some of his annexations to be cast off by his successor Hadrian. Territorial annexation is only one part of the story. Indirect or ‘informal’ dominance over some smaller states and frontier peoples always existed, though often fluctuating and sometimes ending in annexation. How Romans viewed their empire and how it figured in Latin literature over different periods is another feature, the more important because empire, one way or another, inspired some of literature’s most striking achievements—Cicero’s speeches and philosophical works, Caesar’s war commentaries, Vergil’s *Aeneid*, Horace’s poetry, Tacitus’ many writings, and Marcus Aurelius’ *Meditations*, to mention a few. Greeks of those eras had their own reactions to the phenomenon, from Polybius’ and Diodorus’ histories during Roman Republican times to the multifarious works in the early imperial centuries by Plutarch, Epictetus, Arrian, Cassius Dio, and their contemporaries.

What makes an empire, how it emerges, what it achieves, and why it ‘falls’—or dissolves—are questions of consistent fascination. Together they constitute the phenomenon termed imperialism. Modern imperialism-scholarship is especially interested in the European empires that rose in the nineteenth century and fell, or fell apart, during the twentieth. The imperialism of ancient Rome is another topic long studied, although, by contrast with the modern version, its scholarship does not as a rule tackle the thorny issue of decline and fall as well.

Our *Companion* assesses the setting, stages, and outcomes of the first empire in history to cover three continents and leave its mark on all of them. The twenty-two scholars who have contributed to the volume, and who represent four continents—Australia, Europe, North America, and Asia—offer their own perceptions of particular aspects, while at the same time their chapters come together in a powerful demonstration of

the breadth, variety, and ultimate cohesion of the theme. Accounts of the origins and growth of Rome's expansion, her Mediterranean rivals, and imperialism's impression on early Latin literature are followed by chapters on the impact of the widening empire on Roman internal politics—culminating in the replacement of the Republic with an undeclared monarchy, and new and grandiose conquests. Our volume in turn surveys the challenges of securing the now huge empire along its frontiers in Europe and Asia, the attitudes to empire expressed in Latin literature and revealed by Rome's subjects in east and west, together with their growing participation in its government. The *Companion* closes with an assessment of why expansion did finally stop, and of modern viewpoints (American and European especially) on the significance of Rome's rise, greatness, and fall.

A volume on this theme is necessarily a study of power and its effects. It explains how Roman power developed over time in different ways and differing circumstances, to have varied effects on both the Romans and the peoples they subdued. During the Age of Imperialism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 'the grandeur that was Rome' was commonly an inspiration to statesmen as well as scholars—as indeed it had been a millennium before to the medieval imperialist Charlemagne. Disruption and disillusion in the aftermath of the First World War, in alliance with the more sceptical mindsets of political radicalism (notably Marxism) and scientific methodology, then made admiration less automatic. The expansion of Rome, from city-state to Mediterranean world ruler, which used to be seen largely as a defensive response to outside dangers, now is more often put down to acquisitive greed or high-handed vengefulness. For moderns, the provinces' roads, baths, *fora*, and cultural studies, celebrated by Tacitus (and Monty Python), are counterbalanced by frequent oppression, savage treatment of dissidents, and an oligarchic social structure. That local ruling élites aped Roman ways and collaborated with their Roman rulers as 'a trans-Mediterranean kleptocracy' (in Neville Morley's words), fleecing their hapless provincials, has on the other hand been vigorously urged.<sup>1</sup> Our *Companion* will, we hope, help readers to make their minds up on this as well as other issues.

'Imperialism' originally meant a political system ruled, suitably, by an emperor. First applied in the nineteenth century to Napoleon I and Napoleon

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<sup>1</sup> 'Kleptocracy': Morley 2010, 69 (also terming the *pax Romana* 'the peace enjoyed by the domesticated animal'). For the Roman empire as a form of metaphorical rape of conquered lands see Mattingly 2011, 94–121.



III, then extended to other political régimes such as Tsarist Russia and Rome of the Caesars, late in the same century it had come to mean in essence the policy and practice of acquiring an empire: in particular, an overseas empire.<sup>2</sup>

Recent definitions vary greatly according to the taste and viewpoint of imperialism's investigators. The most economical definition, arguably, is 'imposition of rule by one state or people over others', but this is too succinct to satisfy most. Michael Doyle, in his celebrated study *Empires*, first defines 'empire' as 'a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society', then adds that 'imperialism is simply the process or policy of establishing or maintaining an empire'. But, dissatisfied, he later elaborates this as 'the political control exercised both one polity (the metropole) over the domestic and foreign policy and over the domestic politics of another polity (the periphery), resulting in control over who rules and what rulers can do'. The late Edward Said, from the viewpoint of a Palestinian exile, more concisely saw imperialism as 'the practice, the theory and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan centre ruling a distant territory', a formulation echoed in the definition of empire by C.J. Calhoun *et alii*—'a political unit that is large and expansionist (or with memories of an expansionist past), reproducing differentiation and inequality among people it incorporates'.<sup>3</sup> The lengthiest, though not perhaps the most digestible, definition is put by Robert Werner:

an expansionist mode of action, prompted by various causes, not directed to a precise end, resting on the conscious and programmatic disposition of a state, or interested parties authorised or recognised by it, with the aim of establishing and stabilising an *imperium* or *Reich* and of directly, in practice,

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<sup>2</sup> For a clear account of how the term evolved, see Flach 1976, 3-17; cf. Baumgart 1982, 1-3; R. Koebner and H.D. Schmidt, *Imperialism: The Story and Significance of a Political Word* (Cambridge 1964).

<sup>3</sup> The *Oxford English Dictionary*'s definition is, rather oddly, limited to Great Britain's and the USA's nineteenth-century imperialism. Other definitions: Doyle 1986, 45, and 130 Table 3 (which is further elaborated with appended sub-paragraphs on 'formal' and 'informal' empire); Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York, 1993), 9; C.J. Calhoun, F. Cooper, and K.W. Moore, *Lessons of Empire* (New York, 2006), cited by Pitts 2010, 213. Robert Aldrich, conceding that "Empire" is not an easy word to define, suggests that 'it may be seen at its most basic as the rule by a particular group in a political centre over a diverse and different set of other, often distant countries and peoples, generally as a result of military conquest' (in R. Aldrich, ed., *The Age of Empires* (London, 2007), 7); cf. J. Burbank and F. Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton and Oxford, 2010), 8-11, 16-17.

ruling conquered groups, peoples, and territories together with their institutions, with a tendency to world-rule in optimal conditions.

In this definition particularly, a Schumpeterian viewpoint (see below) is clear, though elsewhere in his discussion of Rome's Republican-era expansion Werner acknowledges economic factors, too.<sup>4</sup>

Greeks and Romans had their own views of imperialism. They took for granted that strong peoples would seek to dominate weak ones. Romans appreciated, like their foremost orator Cicero, 'how splendid it is to command foreign nations', and also chose to believe that all their wars had been forced on them, or had been undertaken to defend mistreated allies.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand Rome's Greek observer Polybius, who spent years there in the mid-second century BC, inferred that they had early on formed a plan to dominate the Mediterranean world, and judged that in the half-century between 219 and 167 they achieved precisely this; he identified both greed for booty and fear of aggressive rivals as their chief motivating influences. Indeed he ascribes the outbreak of the First Punic War in 264 BC partly to ordinary Romans' belief that 'great benefits' awaited them; and, according to Appian (probably drawing from Polybius again), much the same anticipation prompted enthusiastic volunteering for the expedition against Carthage in 149.<sup>6</sup>

In time some Roman historians, too, were willing to acknowledge—indirectly—the powerful rôle that acquisitive greed had played in Rome's expansion. Sallust, Cicero's and Livy's contemporary, gives a stinging attack on Romans' lack of imperial scruple to their great antagonist Mithridates, king of Pontus. More famously, in Tacitus' biography of Agricola, governor of Britain in the later first century AD, the Caledonian leader Calgacus vividly denounces the invaders of his land as 'robbers of the world' who

<sup>4</sup> Werner 1972, 523 (my translation); economic factors, 513–14, cf. 534–8.

<sup>5</sup> Cicero, *Against Verres II*, 2.2. On Athenian and Roman views of empire, cf. Finley 1978. The 'just war' notion: H. Drexler, 'Iustum bellum', *RhM* (1959), 97–140 (on Livy's treatment of it); Harris 1979, 163–75. An Athenian orator, according to Thucydides (*History* 1.76), averred that 'it has always been a rule that the weak should be subject to the strong'. Thucydides also gives the classic exposition of arguments for and against this axiom in the Melian Debate, between the aggressive Athenians and the small island-state of Melos in 416 BC (5.85–111).

<sup>6</sup> Polybius' view of Rome's world-plan: Pol. 1.3, 3.2 and 4; cf. 21.4. 'Great benefits': Pol. 1.11.2. Enthusiastic volunteering in 149: Appian, *Lib.* 75.351. On Polybius' treatment of Rome's imperialism, see Baronowski 2011.

'lyingly term looting, slaughtering, and thieving "empire" and, when they make a wilderness, call it peace'.

On the favourable side Tacitus offers, again indirectly, the only sustained argument by a Latin writer justifying Roman imperialism. He puts it into a speech that he ascribes to Petilius Cerealis, the general sent in AD 70 to put down rebellion in the Rhineland, at a gathering of northern Gallic notables:

Roman generals and officers originally set foot in your country and the rest of Gaul from no motives of ambition, but at the call of your ancestors, who were worn almost to ruin by dissension. Tyranny and warfare were always rife throughout the length and breadth of Gaul, until you accepted Roman government. Often as we have been provoked, we have never imposed upon you any burden by right of conquest, except what was necessary to maintain peace. You frequently command our legions yourselves: you govern this and other provinces yourselves. We have no exclusive privileges. Though you live so far away, you enjoy the blessings of a good emperor no less than we do, whereas tyrants oppress only their nearest neighbours. Vice will last as long as mankind. But these evils are not continual. There are intervals of good government, which make up for them. For if the Romans were driven out—which Heaven forbid—what could ensue save a universal state of intertribal warfare? During eight hundred years, by good fortune and good organization, the structure of empire has been consolidated. It cannot be pulled down without destroying those who do it.

The same positive themes of inclusiveness, peace, order, and prosperity are celebrated at much greater and indeed rhapsodic length by the Greek rhetor Aelius Aristides, in his panegyric *To Rome* (delivered around AD 144) honouring Rome and her world-rule. Aristides does not actually say that Rome created her empire in order to benefit mankind, but he virtually implies it.<sup>7</sup>

Modern theories about imperialist expansion naturally abound, in particular to explain European imperialism since the eighteenth century.

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<sup>7</sup> Sallust, *Histories* 4.69 (note too Jugurtha's complaints: *Jug.* 81); Tacitus, *Agricola* 30–32 (ending with the famous axiom 'ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant'); compare the grievances of the rebel Britons of Boudica's time, *Agr.* 15; and, more succinctly, the Gallic leader Critognatus in Caesar's time as reported by that master-imperialist himself (*Gallic War* 7.77). Cerealis' speech: *Histories* 4.73–74, translated by W.H. Fyfe (Oxford, 1912: abbreviated here). On Aristides' panegyric to Rome (sometimes dated instead to around AD 155), and other laudatory writings on Rome, see W.V. Harris and B. Holmes, eds., *Aelius Aristides between Greece, Rome, and the Gods* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), especially chs. IX–XI. On Roman critics of Roman imperialism see Griffin 2008.

These in turn have often influenced scholarly analyses of Rome's. They fall into perhaps four basic categories:

defensive—holding that most annexations occurred to prevent potential attack by hostile peoples or to extinguish defeated rivals, and so safeguard the Roman state;

economic—seeing Roman imperialism as driven by economic impulses such as greed for booty and territory;

social-dynamic (or, arguably, 'socio-pathological')—the argument that Rome was a state and society innately bellicose, violently assertive towards others, and materially acquisitive;

and, more recently, 'Realist'—a hardnosed assessment that Rome was responding, as any state does, to the harshly undisciplined nature (i.e., anarchy in its literal sense) of interstate relations, in which a state has to fight to maintain its security against rivals or else cave in to the dominance of a stronger one.

The second and third of these viewpoints can often of course overlap; and, up to a point, so too can the first and the fourth. Compatible with some or all of these is the theme of relations between metropolises and peripheries, with the question of whether imperialism was simply a metropole's choice, due to factors affecting it alone, or was caused equally by conditions (internal weaknesses, exploitative opportunities, strategic factors) in the territories that were taken over.

The metropole-periphery formula is also important in the issue of 'informal' and 'formal' imperialism, first formulated in these terms by the British historians John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson in the mid-twentieth century, when they studied the expansion of the nineteenth-century British empire. Opposing the argument that it was a response to surplus metropolitan capital, Robinson and Gallagher showed that more capital was invested in, and greater profits accrued from, regions and states that were not colonised—notably Argentina and China—than from any colony. The same held for the other colonial empires, especially France and Germany: the greatest single investment of French capital before 1914, for instance, was in Tsarist Russia. It was important, therefore, for the imperial powers to exercise influence, if not control, over weaker states in such relationships, even if annexing them was undesirable or impossible. Trade (preferably free trade) was the driving force in either case; in other words, economic factors were the impetus, with annexing territories as colonies

almost always only a last resort. For Robinson and Gallagher, such 'informal' imperialism existed, long before the scramble for Africa, wherever a more powerful state dominated a weaker without imposing direct rule: nineteenth-century India and Egypt are examples. In Rome's case the phenomenon is extensive and clear. Egypt, especially in the century before Augustus annexed it, was an obedient satellite, as were many internally self-governing countries under the Caesars: notably Judaea under the dynasty of Herod, the Iceni and Brigantes in Britain during the first decades of the province, and the Crimean Bosporan kingdom throughout the life of the empire.

Of theories to explain Roman imperialism the defensive one is perhaps the oldest, and is closest to the argument favoured by Romans themselves and their Greek admirers mentioned above. It was propounded by Theodor Mommsen in the nineteenth century and Tenney Frank in the early twentieth, and continues to have support. Facing powerful neighbours who threatened her security or even existence, Rome responded to ward off the peril: sometimes taking offensive action to do so, and sometimes afterwards taking control of the beaten enemy's territory to prevent a *revanche*. At best the theory works only in part. It depends on a Rome-friendly interpretation of what constituted a threat to her—for instance at the outbreak of the First Punic, Second and Third Macedonian, or First and Second Mithridatic Wars. It also runs into problems with several other instances of Roman expansion, most intractably perhaps Julius Caesar's Gallic conquests, and the emperor Claudius' invasion of Britain: only the most specious arguments could hold that either land was a threat.<sup>8</sup>

The economic explanation for Roman imperialism exercises a strong, or stronger, fascination not only over Marxist observers but over many other critics of imperial conquest and rule. Early in the twentieth century, the view that imperialism is primarily an economic force was powerfully argued by the liberal J.A. Hobson in England and, soon after, by the revolutionary Marxist Lenin. Concerned above all with the new European empires, especially in Africa and Asia, their central tenet—with wide differences in stress and detail—was that these were created to absorb the surplus capital generated in Europe's industrialised metropolises. This was a controversial and much criticised doctrine, for it could be pointed out that much more capital from metropolises was invested elsewhere than in

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<sup>8</sup> Defensive imperialism: e.g. Badian 1968; Errington 1971; Sherwin-White 1984.

their colonies, while the economic returns from colonies were commonly less profitable than returns from those other places.<sup>9</sup> Nor, in Rome's expansion at virtually any period, does exporting surplus capital fit the nature of the phenomenon. Rome worked matters largely in reverse: wars and annexations delivered often massive quantities of plunder, indemnities from beaten enemies, regular tribute-payments from annexed provinces, and from time to time rich windfalls—notably the accumulated treasures of the kingdom of Pergamum in 133, of the Egyptian Ptolemies a century later, and of Cappadocia in AD 18. Later, when Trajan annexed Dacia in AD 106 the Dacian loot was fabulous: half a million pounds' weight in gold and twice as much silver. Nevertheless the appeal of a theory focussing on economic and financial gains as the dominant impetus to empire has remained strong, especially since W.V. Harris' vigorous restatement in 1979—with 'economic' interpreted broadly to include the ingrained Roman keenness for war-booty (by definition a one-off benefit).<sup>10</sup>

The 'social-dynamic' explanation—it has differing names—of imperialism in history shares something of the Greek and Roman view of powerful states' invariable proneness to dominate weaker ones, but also was strongly influenced by social Darwinist views, which sought to transfer the concept of biological evolution to the workings, internal and external, of states and societies. The economist Joseph Schumpeter in the early twentieth century held that all societies—at least as far back as Pharaonic Egypt—possess an innate disposition for 'unlimited forcible expansion': partly to achieve glory and plunder for their ruling élites, and partly because the required military institutions (professional armies and commanders especially) soon developed their own momentum. In treatments of Roman imperialism, this view of innately expansionist societies is reflected, implicitly or explicitly, almost as often as permutations of the economic theory: strikingly, for instance, in the contributions of Paul Veyne, Harris

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<sup>9</sup> Hobson's major work is *Imperialism. A Study* (1902); Lenin's, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916). On Hobson's and Lenin's theories of economic imperialism, see (e.g.) Flach 1976, 27–36; W.J. Mommsen 1980, 28–69; Baumgart 1982, 91–135; Doyle 1986, 22–4, 148–50; A.M. Eckstein, 'Is there a "Hobson-Lenin thesis" on late-nineteenth-century colonial expansion?', *Economic History Review* 44 (1991), 297–318; more briefly Champion and Eckstein in Champion 2004, 2–4. An updated application of Marxist theory to imperialism is by H. Magdoff, *Imperialism: from the Colonial Age to the Present* (New York and London, 1978).

<sup>10</sup> Trajan's Dacian booty is ten times greater in our source, John Lydus, *On Roman Magistracies* 2.28 (citing Trajan's doctor, T. Statilius Crito), but the numerals were mistakenly inflated by a copyist (Bennett 1997, 101, 250 n. 83). In early 2012, half a million pounds of gold were theoretically worth \$US 13.4 billion. Economic imperialism in Roman terms: Harris 1979, 54–104; contested by Gruen 1984, 288–315.

(a blend of this theme and the economic-imperialism approach), and most recently Neville Morley. The fierce competition among Romans for office, renown, and—especially in the first century BC—foreign wealth was arguably one of Roman expansionism's most powerful factors. Such a factor did prompt plentiful attacks on foreign peoples for booty and military glory: Manlius Vulso's unauthorised campaign in Galatia in 187 BC, for instance, not to mention countless forays into unsubdued northern Spain throughout the second and first centuries. Yet for the same reason it should have precluded annexation, which closed off military razzias and plundering in provincial territory (except during a rebellion). Annexation forced ensuing generations of ambitious leaders to look elsewhere for their glory and loot: a paradoxical outcome if social-dynamic factors were its cause. Another objection to this explanation is that, just when Rome's war machine was at its most powerful and assertive—the first two centuries AD—her expansionism was limited. Peaceably annexed client-states like Cappadocia, Mauretania and Commagene apart, only Britain and a corner of southern Germany in the first century, Dacia together with ephemeral territories in Parthia early in the second, and Mesopotamia more lastingly in the 190s were fresh additions to the empire over almost two hundred years.<sup>11</sup>

Realist views of interstate relations as essentially 'anarchic' are prominent in modern analyses. The twentieth century's Cold War and the ensuing, if brief, 'unipolar' supremacy of the United States spurred influential developments of 'Realist' theory (so its proponents term it), most notably by Kenneth Waltz and his followers. That states are in permanent, often deadly rivalry, tend to be suspicious and wary of their equals, and need to strive for supremacy lest they succumb to a rival, is another view already present in ancient times. Thucydides' Melian Dialogue, set in 416 BC, is an elegantly unsentimental reflection of it, just as Polybius' history of Mediterranean affairs two hundred years later takes it for granted.<sup>12</sup> Hellenistic interstate relations and those of Rome with the eastern Mediterranean down to the mid-second century BC have been analysed from a powerfully and plausibly Realist point of view by A.M. Eckstein, and other scholarly

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<sup>11</sup> On Schumpeter's analysis see, for example, Mommsen 1980, 18-19, 21-8, 82-4; Doyle 1986, 23-4, 122-4, 155-9; cf. Harris 1979, 259-61; more briefly, Champion 2004, 2-5. Paradoxically, Schumpeter viewed modern imperialism as a degenerate offshoot—and as quite at odds with modern capitalism. Striking recent treatments: Veyne 1975, Harris 1979, Morley 2010 (especially ch. 1).

<sup>12</sup> Waltz 1979, 2000. Melian Dialogue: see n. 5 above. Polybius' ideas on great-power relationships are well explored by Eckstein 1995; Champion 2004; Baronowski 2011.

treatments can be expected in future.<sup>13</sup> At the same time Realism has Roman limitations. It cannot easily be applied to the conquest, for instance, of Gaul in the mid-first century BC, or of Britain a hundred years later, or indeed to Augustus' vast programme of annexations beyond the Rhine and up to the Danube between 15 BC and AD 6. After 146 BC, or at latest after the defeat of Mithridates in the 60s BC, Rome was no longer one of many more or less equal powers but had become the hegemon of the Mediterranean world. Parthia was her only remaining equal; but the successful imperialism of the Caesars in western and central Europe did not involve rivalry with Parthia.

Roman imperialism contrasts in other important ways with the European imperialisms that have risen and dissolved since 1500. Most obviously, Rome's subject territories did not lie across distant oceans, as did the Spanish and Portuguese empires and likewise England's, France's, and Germany's colonies. Nor were they scattered and discontinuous. Though many provinces were more quickly reached by sea than over land, and of course island territories had to be, the entire empire (save Britain) lay around the Mediterranean, most of it in three contiguous blocs: European, Asian, and North African. Being essentially a land-based empire was a feature that Rome shared with the Ottomans, Russia, and imperial China rather than with western Europe. Published scholarly comparisons between Rome and China are few, all the same, and between Rome and the Ottoman empire there seems to be none.<sup>14</sup>

The enemies whom she fought, and the peoples she ruled or influenced, or with whom she coexisted, again marked Rome's imperialism off from those of modern times. Europe conquered empires with armaments and technologies almost always superior to those of their opponents (even the makeshift semi-modern forces of the later Manchu state): in Hilaire Belloc's famous couplet, Europeans could triumph because

Whatever happens, we have got  
The Maxim Gun, and they have not.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Eckstein 2006, 2008; cf. Champion and Eckstein's comments in Champion 2004a, 5-7. On Rome's relations with Parthia and Persia, see Sherwin-White 1984; Edwell 2008.

<sup>14</sup> On imperial Rome and Han Dynasty China see now W. Scheidel (ed.), *Rome and China: Comparative Perspectives on Ancient World Empires* (Oxford, 2009) claiming to be the first systematic comparative analysis; but slightly anticipated by F.-H. Mutschler and A. Mittag (eds.), *Conceiving the Empire: Rome and China Compared* (Oxford, 2008).

<sup>15</sup> Belloc, *The Modern Traveller* (London, 1898), 41. Another couplet (p. 42) is imperially evocative in a different way: 'We shot and hanged a few, and then / The rest became devoted men.'



Where a seemingly vulnerable state, however, turned out to possess reasonably comparable military means—Japan against Russia in 1905, for example, and the South African Boers a little earlier against Britain—the result for the metropole was disaster or severe distress. In contrast, Roman military equipment and technology were not immensely superior at any period to those she conquered in the west (Spaniards, Gauls, Carthaginians), or to her militarily sophisticated Hellenistic and Parthian foes in the east. The equivalent of the Maxim Gun was the discipline, flexibility, and plentifulness of the legions.

Europeans founding empires in the Americas, Asia, and Africa took with them the unshakeable conviction that their religions, culture, and morality were immeasurably superior to all those they met; and very often they insisted on pressing their usages onto the peoples they subdued. This was another contrast with the Romans. Although these sometimes, though not always, flattered themselves on being on morally higher ground than their western opponents, and often liked to sneer at contemporary Greeks for alleged frivolity, they admired Greek civilisation and forthrightly appropriated much of it, from artworks (often as booty) to literature and philosophy. The first Roman historians, Fabius Pictor, Cincius Alimentus, and several others, wrote in Greek; so did the philosopher-emperor Marcus Aurelius; and the Augustan poet Horace was ready to celebrate how ‘captive Greece captured her wild conqueror’.<sup>16</sup>

Such differences show that Roman imperialism, while in some ways resembling modern versions, nevertheless also embodied qualities much at odds with them. Even the paces of annexation were in contrast. Spain was mistress of Central America and western South America within thirty years; Britain of India effectively after half a century of wars (from the 1740s to about 1800); Europe’s nineteenth-century ‘scramble for Africa’ began in the 1870s and was done by 1914; and the Manifest Destiny of the United States took it from the Appalachians to the Pacific within that same century. Rome’s first annexation, of Sicily, occurred in 241 BC, but the Mediterranean was not a wholly Roman lake before the 60s BC. Even then, the empire took another hundred and seventy years to attain its maximum lasting extent with Trajan’s conquest of Dacia. It then endured for another three hundred years, even if with some losses, before the western half started to dissolve.

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<sup>16</sup> Horace, *Epistles* 2.1.156: ‘Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit’.

The fullest (or at any rate most obvious) form of empire, annexation, occurred intermittently. When it did, it could be large-scale: half of Spain after 205 BC; swathes of the Mediterranean East and of Gaul in the 60s and 50s; and under Augustus the rest of Spain, the lands between the Adriatic and the Danube, and, more briefly (between 12 BC and AD 9), much of Germany beyond the Rhine. Over unannexed lands and peoples 'informal' dominance could be exerted. Athens and Sparta, for instance, were for centuries technically independent powers in alliance with Rome. So were Judaea under Herod the Great, and the Iceni in Britain before Boudica's rebellion. Most such states within the empire's borders were eventually annexed as provinces. By contrast, once the borders were more or less firmly fixed along great rivers, mountain ranges, and deserts, the peoples beyond were subject at best to 'informal' Roman influence. Much weaker than over satellite states within the empire, it waxed and waned; some external states, Parthia above all, were impervious. After Augustus, despite important conquests such as Britain, Dacia, and (much later) Mesopotamia, Roman imperialism's history largely turned on the constant and taxing demands of maintaining the far-flung frontiers against the recurrent pressures from beyond.

This imperialism was not a seamless advance. Pullbacks and losses occurred; the loss of Germany beyond the Rhine in AD 9, after its governor Varus' occupying legions were destroyed by Arminius in the Teutoburg Forest, is merely the most famous. In Spain after 205 BC, a century and a half of warring beyond the rivers Tagus and Ebro earned triumphs for one general after another, but the lasting conquest of its north and west came about only in the 30s and 20s. Caesar's much-touted expeditions to Britain in 55 and 54 BC were futile. A century and a half later, Agricola's alleged subjection of Scotland was soon relinquished, to Tacitus' disgust. In Tacitus' own lifetime, Trajan's Parthian conquests, unlike his annexation of Dacia in Europe, quickly proved untenable.

Provincial resistance to Rome imposed other stresses, even if resistance in arms by conquered peoples was chronologically intermittent. The revolt of Boudica ('Boadicea') in Britain and the even greater rising in Judaea, both in the 60s AD, are well known but were only two among many. As well as Arminius' success in Germany in AD 9, the Spanish provinces erupted in 197 BC and again in the 70s BC; so did Augustus' new Balkan acquisitions in AD 6–9, parts of Gaul more than once over the next fifty years, and Jewish populations within or outside Judaea several times in both the first century and the second. All save Arminius' were crushed, but the costs to

Rome in lives, finances, and devastation were always heavy. The biographer Suetonius thought the Balkan revolt the gravest crisis since Hannibal, and Boudica came near to prompting Nero to abandon Britain—so Suetonius claims, at any rate. Whatever the propaganda (touted especially by poets either patriotic or patronised) of boundless empire and a world obedient from Britain to China, intelligent Romans cannot have believed either notion.<sup>17</sup>

In the empire, regional and local cultures continued to thrive despite the powerful influence of Roman civilisation. The symbiotic patterns thus created have commonly been termed ‘Romanisation’, at any rate for the western half of the empire, including North Africa and the Balkan lands. The east developed similar symbioses but the blends there were chiefly between local cultures and the vigorously many-sided forms of Hellenistic civilisation. Romanisation, and to a more limited degree Hellenisation under Rome, have long been strenuously debated by scholars. Once assumed to be inevitable and all-pervasive, thanks to the roads, baths, *fora*, Latin language, and other cultural amenities, ‘Romanisation’ has been qualified, thinned out, or even denied. That there was a standard and conscious policy imposed from Rome of overlaying local cultures with Roman civilisation, ultimately obliterating them, is scarcely believed any longer. Developments were far more nuanced.

The patterns varied. Southern Gaul, the extensively urbanised province of Narbonensis—‘more truly Italy than a province’, as Pliny the Elder commented—produced not only Roman senators but also emperors, notably Antoninus Pius.<sup>18</sup> In contrast, the rest of Gaul and the province of Britain, populous and prosperous as they became, accounted for far fewer senators; and when they gave rise to would-be emperors in the third century AD and after, these tended to be rebels like Postumus in the 260s and Magnus Maximus in the 380s. Roman ways were much less in evidence in the more distant parts, such as north Britain and Armorica (Brittany). In North Africa, Phoenician-Carthaginian culture and even the Punic language remained pervasively coexistent with Roman cultural usages and with Latin. St Augustine, not long after the year 400, heard the local country folk still speaking Punic—and calling themselves ‘Chanani’ (‘people of Canaan’),

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<sup>17</sup> Suet. *Tib.* 16; *Nero* 18. On the Romans’ terminology of empire, see now Richardson 2008; very useful collections of translated sources on imperialism are Champion 2004a; Erskine 2010.

<sup>18</sup> ‘Italia verius quam provincia’: Pliny, *Natural History* 3.31.

recalling the eastern origins of old Carthage.<sup>19</sup> Similarly Greek culture in the eastern provinces coexisted with those long-established there and still speaking tongues such as Aramaic, Phoenician, Coptic, even Pisidian.

In modern popular conception, the Romans always remained a race apart, ruling and misruling a myriad of subject peoples from whom they kept themselves separate. This has been convenient for moralisers, for it absolves non-Romans—western ones at any rate—from the cruelty and degeneration equally popularly ascribed to the master race.<sup>20</sup> The reality was that from the start the Romans were un-homogeneous, as they themselves were happy to assert. Not only their history but also their legends insisted on how they kept accepting others—communities and individuals—into their state. Romans in 218 BC, when Hannibal invaded Italy, were not the ethnic and geographic descendants merely of the Romans of 509, for the republic now comprised a large part of the peninsula. Early in the first century BC it would (if reluctantly) incorporate the rest. And by then there were Romans settled in every province, not to mention beyond, while a growing number of favoured provincials were becoming Romans in their turn.

Foreigners from abroad began to receive citizenship long before all non-Roman Italians did: perhaps the earliest being Hannibal's turncoat cavalry officer Mottones in 210 BC, immortalised not only in Livy but in his own later dedication to Apollo at Delphi as M. Valerius Mottones, with his four sons Publius, Gaius, Marcus, and Quintus. While all Italy gained Rome's citizenship by 80 BC, this was being given to provincials as well. By AD 14 it extended not just over peninsular and continental Italy, but also over much of the western Mediterranean provinces. Numerous communities and individuals elsewhere, too, enjoyed it. 'Enjoyed' is a just term, for it brought privileges above ordinary provincial status: St Paul's well-timed cry 'I am a

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<sup>19</sup> Augustine, *Epistulae ad Romanos incohata Expositio* ('Incomplete Commentary on [Paul's] *Epistle to the Romans*') 13; cf. G. Bunnens in *Dictionnaire de la Civilisation phénicienne et punique*, ed. E. Lipiński et al. (Brepols, 1992), 87. On the impact of Roman imperialism in Britain and Spain cf. now Revell 2009.

<sup>20</sup> In the notorious *Gladiator* film (2000), the oddly named title character Maximus Decimus Meridius is a 'foreigner'—a Spaniard—who has never been to Rome despite being Marcus Aurelius' leading general. On the film, and more generally on Hollywoodian concepts about gladiators, see M.M. Winkler, *Gladiator: Film and History* (London and New York, 2004); and, for misconceptions, K.M. Coleman's chapter especially (*ibid.*, 45–52; cf. Winkler's, 16–30).

Roman citizen' spared him the flogging routinely inflicted on fractious subjects.<sup>21</sup>

As Rome's citizenship moved out across Italy and the Mediterranean, numbers of her newer citizens moved in: ambitious and wealthy oligarchs from provincial communities in particular, eager to join the metropolitan élite in ruling the world. Senators from western, and later also eastern, provinces came to play important—often decisive—rôles in imperial politics and administration. Even though it was not until the third century AD that they came to equal Italian senators in numbers, the heights of power had been scaled long before then, and not only by senators but also by non-senatorial aristocrats (*equites Romani*) in the emperor's service. The Spanish-born Trajan was the first provincial Roman emperor, but Nero's chief counsellors in the first half of his reign, from 54 to 62, were the senator and philosopher Seneca, another Spanish Roman, and Burrus, commander of the Praetorian Guard, an *eques Romanus* from southern Gaul. By AD 100, moreover, the citizen legionaries of the imperial armies were largely provincial-born; Rome's empire was now defended by the descendants of Rome's conquered.

In this multicultural and often internally stressed empire, the growth nevertheless of an acceptance of 'Romanness', in later Latin *Romanitas*, is an especially striking aspect of Rome's imperialism. Roman imperialism involved not only wars and exploitative conquests but, over time, the political and—to varying degrees—cultural assimilation of growing numbers of the conquered to the ruling state. The grants of citizenship exemplified the development. One hundred years after Trajan, in 212, the emperor nicknamed Caracalla—son of the North African emperor Septimius Severus and his Syrian empress Julia Domna—issued a decree making citizens of all remaining freeborn provincials. The Romans of Cato the Censor's or even Cicero's day would surely have been startled, perhaps shocked, at the idea: but it was the logical culmination of Rome's form of imperialism. It could even provocatively be held that the Roman empire proper ended in that moment: after all, 'empire' should at least mean rule by a dominant state over others that are its subjects.<sup>22</sup>

Of course the Roman state was far from ended. The empire-wide resilience that had evolved over centuries would be both harshly tested and

<sup>21</sup> Mottones, from Hippou Acra in North Africa (modern Bizerte): Livy 26.40, 27.5, 38.41; SIG<sup>3</sup> 585 lines 86-7. St. Paul: *Acts of the Apostles* 22.24-29.

<sup>22</sup> Caracalla's *constitutio Antoniniana* (his official name was M. Aurelius Antoninus): Ulpian, *Digest* 1.5.17; Dio 78.9; P. Giessen 40 is a Greek version of the *constitutio*.


vividly illustrated amidst the civil wars, invasions, and plagues that tormented the rest of the third century. It would also implant in European memory an enduring, if idealised, memory of a grand supranational entity that, in the words of the fifth-century poet Rutilius Namatianus, had ‘made a City of what formerly was a world’: a memory which would have influence, good and bad, down to the present.<sup>23</sup>

It has been a privilege, arduous, challenging, and rewarding, to be the editor of this *Companion* which ranges over such broad fields. I owe thanks first of all to Brill and Julian Deahl, Brill’s Senior Acquisitions Editor, for inspiring the concept of the work and supporting it in its extended gestation. Equal thanks is due to the scholarly colleagues whose enthusiastic and able responses to being invited to participate have made our *Companion* possible, and who have borne with generous patience the laborious and, rather too often, pedantic ministrations of their editor. Finally and above all, my thanks and devotion go to the two persons who with no less patience, and at much closer range, put up with me in my lengthy work on this book: my wife Jann and our daughter Camilla.


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<sup>23</sup> Rutilius Namatianus, *de Reditu Suo* 1.63-66 (his salute to Rome, recently sacked by the Goths in 410): ‘Fecisti patriam diversis gentibus unam: / profuit iniustis te dominante capi; / dumque offers victis proprii consortia iuris, / Urbem fecisti quod prius orbis erat.’—‘You have made one fatherland for differing peoples: the unjust benefited to be subdued under your rule; and in offering to the conquered partnership in your own rights, you have made a City of what formerly was a world.’









## LIST OF CITIES

- |                                     |                                     |                                   |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1 Londinium <i>London</i>           | 47 Brundisium <i>Brindisi</i>       | 93 Byzantium <i>Istanbul</i>      |
| 2 Eburacum <i>York</i>              | 48 Beneventum <i>Benevento</i>      | 94 Chalcedon <i>Kadiköy</i>       |
| 3 Deva <i>Chester</i>               | 49 Pompeii                          | 95 Nicaea <i>Iznik</i>            |
| 4 Castra Vetera <i>Xanten</i>       | 50 Neapolis <i>Naples</i>           | 96 Heraclea Pontica <i>Eregli</i> |
| 5 Colonia Agrippinensis <i>Köln</i> | 51 Capua                            | 97 Sinope <i>Sinop</i>            |
| 6 Augusta Treverorum <i>Trier</i>   | 52 Ancona                           | 98 Amasia <i>Amasya</i>           |
| 7 Moguntiacum <i>Mainz</i>          | 53 Florentia <i>Florence</i>        | 99 Ancyra <i>Ankara</i>           |
| 8 Lutetia <i>Paris</i>              | 54 Ariminum <i>Rimini</i>           | 100 Iconium <i>Konya</i>          |
| 9 Lugdunum <i>Lyon</i>              | 55 Ravenna                          | 101 Caesarea <i>Kayseri</i>       |
| 10 Nemausus <i>Nîmes</i>            | 56 Bononia <i>Bologna</i>           | 102 Amisus <i>Samsun</i>          |
| 11 Arelate <i>Arles</i>             | 57 Mutina <i>Modena</i>             | 103 Artaxata <i>Artashat</i>      |
| 12 Massilia <i>Marseille</i>        | 58 Genua <i>Genoa</i>               | 104 Melitene                      |
| 13 Narbo <i>Narbonne</i>            | 59 Augusta Taurinorum <i>Turin</i>  | 105 Tigranocerta(?)               |
| 14 Tolosa <i>Toulouse</i>           | 60 Mediolanum <i>Milan</i>          | 106 Samosata <i>Samsat Hüyükü</i> |
| 15 Burdigala <i>Bordeaux</i>        | 61 Aquileia                         | 107 Edessa <i>Urfa</i>            |
| 16 Emporiae <i>Empuries</i>         | 62 Siscia <i>Sisak</i>              | 108 Carrhae <i>Harran</i>         |
| 17 Tarraco <i>Tarragona</i>         | 63 Poetovio <i>Ptuj</i>             | 109 Hatra                         |
| 18 Numantia                         | 64 Lauriacum <i>Enns-Lorch</i>      | 110 Ctesiphon                     |
| 19 Legio <i>León</i>                | 65 Vindobona <i>Vienna</i>          | 111 Seleuceia                     |
| 20 Olisipo <i>Lisbon</i>            | 66 Carnuntum <i>Petronell</i>       | 112 Tarsus                        |
| 21 Toletum <i>Toledo</i>            | 67 Aquincum <i>Budapest</i>         | 113 Antioch <i>Antakya</i>        |
| 22 Emerita Augusta <i>Mérida</i>    | 68 Sirmium <i>Sremska Mitroviča</i> | 114 Laodicea <i>Latakia</i>       |
| 23 Saguntum <i>Sagunto</i>          | 69 Sarmizegetusa                    | 115 Apamea                        |
| 24 Valentia <i>Valencia</i>         | 70 Naissus <i>Niš</i>               | 116 Palmyra <i>Tadmor</i>         |
| 25 Corduba <i>Córdoba</i>           | 71 Serdica <i>Sofia</i>             | 117 Damascus                      |
| 26 Hispalis <i>Seville</i>          | 72 Dyrrhachium <i>Durazzo</i>       | 118 Berytus <i>Beirut</i>         |
| 27 Gades <i>Cádiz</i>               | 73 Apollonia                        | 119 Sidon                         |
| 28 Carthago Nova <i>Cartagena</i>   | 74 Delphi                           | 120 Ptolemais <i>Acre, Akko</i>   |
| 29 Tingis <i>Tangier</i>            | 75 Thebes                           | 121 Caesarea Maritima             |
| 30 Volubilis                        | 76 Athens                           | 122 Gaza                          |
| 31 Cirta <i>Constantine</i>         | 77 Corinth                          | 123 Jerusalem                     |
| 32 Hippon Regius <i>Anaba</i>       | 78 Patrae <i>Patras</i>             | 124 Petra                         |
| 33 Utica                            | 79 Olympia                          | 125 Alexandria                    |
| 34 Carthage                         | 80 Megalopolis                      | 126 Pelusium                      |
| 35 Zama                             | 81 Sparta                           | 127 Memphis                       |
| 36 Hadrumetum <i>Sousse</i>         | 82 Cydonia <i>Chania</i>            | 128 Oxyrhynchus                   |
| 37 Thapsus <i>Ras Dimasse</i>       | 83 Cnossus                          | 129 Antinoopolis                  |
| 38 Thysdrus <i>El-Djem</i>          | 84 Halicarnassus <i>Bodrum</i>      | 130 Thebes <i>Luxor</i>           |
| 39 Lambaesis                        | 85 Miletus <i>Balat</i>             | 131 Cyrene <i>Shahat</i>          |
| 40 Oea <i>Tripoli</i>               | 86 Ephesus <i>Selçuk</i>            | 132 Attaleia <i>Antalya</i>       |
| 41 Lepcis Magna                     | 87 Smyrna <i>Izmir</i>              | 133 Paphos                        |
| 42 Syracuse                         | 88 Sardis                           | 134 Trapezus <i>Trabzon</i>       |
| 43 Agrigentum <i>Agrigento</i>      | 89 Pergamum <i>Bergama</i>          | 135 Tomis <i>Constanța</i>        |
| 44 Panormus <i>Palermo</i>          | 90 Adrianople <i>Edirne</i>         | 136 Chersonesus <i>Sebastopol</i> |
| 45 Rhegium <i>Reggio</i>            | 91 Philippi                         | 137 Olbia                         |
| 46 Tarentum <i>Taranto</i>          | 92 Thessalonica <i>Salonica</i>     |                                   |

PART ONE

THE IMPERIALISM OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC



## THE GENESIS OF ROMAN IMPERIALISM\*

*Martin Stone*

### 1. *Writing Roman Imperialism*

It is necessary to distinguish the phenomenon of imperialism from the mere expansion of the Roman city-state. Expansion, an historical fact, can be traced largely from the first ten books of the Augustan historian Livy. These books cover the years from Rome's foundation in the nominal year 753 down to 292, shortly before Rome's takeover of Italy. By 270 the resources and military manpower of *Italia* were at Rome's disposal. The concept 'Italy' was more than a summary of wars fought, triumphs celebrated, treaties entered into, war-leaders chosen, censuses taken, and settlements founded (*res gestae populi Romani*), listed year by year in Livy's narrative: it represents the intention of the rulers of a city-state. The formation of that intention begins the history of Roman imperialism.

Ideology is pervasive in Livy's text, a rhetorical elaboration of the skeletal structure indicated above. It is designed to celebrate the virtues of the Roman People and their leaders and specifically the resolute wisdom of their governing council (*senatus*), a tale of the pragmatic supremacy of concord over discord and the relevance of the virtues that win empires to the government of empires. It is not an accident that other elaborated Roman histories of Rome vanished before the end of antiquity. Livy did it best. A Greek equivalent of Livy's first fifteen books partly survives in the (also Augustan) *Roman Antiquities* of Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Edifying biographies of some famous Romans of early times are to hand in Plutarch's *Lives*. And there are numerous short works abridging the longer; others are non-chronological compilations of moral examples; and all serve the same ideology.

Among surviving ancient historians only the Greek Polybius analyses Roman expansion as a process of imperialism, explicitly seeing the relevant period as 220–167 (*Hist.* 1.1), later extended to 146, while encapsulating

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\* Dates before 300 BC are the conventional ones and are up to four years out going back.

in a prefatory book the period from 264 on. So he problematises Rome's relations with Carthage but takes expansion within Italy as a natural response to Rome's *defeat* by the Gauls in 390. He goes on to list summarily Roman conquests there, and their encounter with Pyrrhus of Epirus. Yet Roman supremacy over all Italy he dismisses as a 'surprise' (*paradoxōs*: 1.6). He simply does not focus on it. Polybius like other ancient writers saw no problem worth addressing in Rome's advance from a moderately sized city-state on the Tiber to hegemon of Italy. The modern interpreter of Roman imperialism must work against the ideological grain of writers who saw the non-existence of the empire as unthinkable. And yet enough survives to provoke inquiry behind it.

For historical inquiry, therefore, the real question must be how one city-state, however well resourced or virtuous or simply large, could acquire control over the whole peninsula. Geographically 'Italy' had once applied to its toe as 'cattle country'. The Late Republican catchcry *Tota Italia* ('All Italy', 'United Italy') affirms a dialectical construct by Roman and non-Roman statesmen who in the 290s to the 270s saw the peninsula as a hegemony that ought or ought not to exist. So vast an area under the leadership and control of one republican city-state had never been seen. No Greek state or even Carthage had ever in their primes achieved a comparable solid zone of control.

Within this Roman Italy can be seen glimpses later of the ongoing conceptual struggle to enact mentally and legally a unified idea. Cato the Censor wrote a history of Rome's past under the title *Origines*, i.e. the origins of *all* the cities of Italy; Cicero formulated the 'two fatherlands' principle—one by ancestry, the other by Roman citizenship (*Leg.* 2.5); from the Gracchi and the younger Livius Drusus down to Augustus statesmen wrestled with the problem of Rome in Italy. It has been no easier for statesmen since 1945 to bring 'Europe' into being or to reconcile it with a military alliance led by the United States.

Livy himself has little confidence in the record from 753(?) to around 390. After the Gallic sack of Rome in this year he contrasts the next stage of his account with the earlier period (6.1): 'From now on clearer and more certain reports of events at home and abroad will be unfolded from the second origin of the reborn city as from roots renewed more abundantly and fruitfully.' But well after this he proclaims his despair (8.40) à propos the events of 322: 'It is not easy to prefer item to item or one authority to another. I think the record has been corrupted by funeral eulogies and false notices attached to portraits, as families draw the historical record each to

serve its own interests by a deceitful misreport of services performed and offices held. Hence confusion about what everyone did. No author contemporary with those times is extant to give a reliable version.' He is still complaining of the situation in his account of the 290s in Book 10.

The modern interpreter of Rome's empire-creation must therefore work not only against the ideological grain of patriotic writers but against their frank no-confidence vote in their own records. Livy knows what he wants to build, but understands, and shares with us, the shoddiness of the constituent materials of his architectural triumph. A modern account of early Rome is necessarily a compilation; it is historiography by deduction and reconstruction, and several academic disciplines are in play.

## 2. *Just Another City-state*

Rome was, like many other city-states, a coming together of villages ('synoecism'): in this case, the inhabited 'Seven Hills' and the marshy flats between them and the River Tiber—the Forum was a civic space over a drain—and the Capitoline fortress was its protective and controlling citadel. It was a prolonged process arguably going back to the 8th Century. In the two generations before 500 Rome had become an important local phenomenon, the largest city in the Latin plain, under an Etruscan dynasty (the Tarquins) and ruling smaller cities nearby. It was a proudly multi-ethnic society, mostly Latin-speaking, though powerful Sabine clans from the highlands kept up their Sabellian (Osco-Umbrian) speech in the city that drew in them and their clients. The Capitoline fortress represented the ideology as well as the power of the State in being dedicated to an Etruscan triad (Jupiter, Juno and Minerva), an issue of identity neatly solved by the later Romans' memory(?) that the great temple to Jupiter was built by the Etruscan L. Tarquinius Superbus but inaugurated under the free society (*res publica populi Romani*) that followed. Many ethnicities including Greeks settled on the Aventine Hill, at first as resident aliens.

The Roman city-state was territorially larger than Veii just across the Tiber, its Etruscan rival for control of the river's lower reaches. Rome was also considerably larger than any of its sister cities (even Tibur and Praeneste). These were members of the Latin League with which Rome was alternately at war or in alliance; they had social links like intermarriage and religious ceremonies like the Latin Festival, and, of course, the majority language. Relatively Rome was well placed to be number one in its own geographical area: its relations with Veii in the 5th Century frequently took

the form of internecine warfare; its relations with the Latins usually took the form of *equal* alliance with the League, as expressed in a treaty (*Foedus Cassianum*, a text still on public view in the Late Republic).

Roman territory perhaps a little after 500 BC reached about 822 sq. km.—not so very extensive on a Mediterranean scale. City-states which aspired to hegemonies, like Syracuse, Carthage, Sparta, Athens, Argos, and federal Thebes, were several times larger in area and estimated population. Even as near to Latium as the Campanian plain a little over 100 km. to the south, Livy was in no doubt that Capua was the largest and wealthiest city in Italy in the mid-4th Century (7.31). Greek colonies like Tarentum had an urban area and a territory larger than Rome's. Some Etruscan cities may once have been comparable. For centuries, Rome's hegemonic potential seemed strictly local.

Rome was located where trade-routes crossed: one ran north and south between developed Etruria and developed Campania; the other received sea-borne trade and also conveyed it into the more backward mountainous hinterland and vice versa. Rome was never a purely peasant economy. The importance of sea-borne trade is demonstrated by the very existence of the coastal pirate citadel of Antium nearby to prey on it, and by evidence of Rome's long-term good relations with the trading centres of Carthage, Cyme (Cumae), Syracuse, Massilia and others. Crafts flourished in the larger cities including Rome: slaves, freedmen, and immigrants were integral to prosperity and social amenity. Conquest accumulated labour and fostered upward mobility. Inland, predatory highland confederacies, notably the Aequi to the east and the Volsci to the south, united the cultivators of the plain in purely defensive arrangements: the terms of the equal alliance of Rome with the Latins, allegedly in the 490s, and later with the small highland confederacy of the Hernici, unlocked its strength *only under attack*.

The self-sufficient community of primitive smallholders was a later utopian myth. The society that cultivated the Latin plain was class-based: the very existence of a horse-riding aristocracy, known at Rome as the patrician order controlling the magistracies, the governing council (*patres*), and the state religion, puts paid to idealist notions ancient or modern. Only patrician priests could serve at the altars of Jupiter, Mars, and Quirinus and take auspices on behalf of the State. The reciprocal status of the peasantry—but not perhaps the trading and industrial community—as clients of this aristocracy was treated by the Romans as original. It was based on law not theory, for obsolescent legal features of patronage were extant but no



longer understood even in Cato the Censor's time. We may compare the vague understanding and misunderstanding in modern Europe of the feudal system which still intrudes here and there into modern legal activity. As Rome prospered, upwardly mobile families or aristocratic immigrants, strangers to Rome's gods, native cavalry, and government, emerged from the so-called masses (*plebs*) and claimed horses and public office. This 'plebeian' movement, beginning in the 5th Century and successful in the 4th, must be associated with the appearance of imperialism.

### 3. *'Ready, steady ... Wait a bit!'*

Well into the 4th Century, the threefold alliance of the city-state of Rome with two federations or leagues, the Latin and the Hernican, defended the plains against the Aequian and Volscian highlanders and eventually turned the tide. The Battle of Mons Algidus in 431 against both mountain peoples is treated as definitive, though it did not put an end to anything. Battles and truces with them and with Rome's own enemy, Etruscan Veii, should be taken as a constant. A real development is Rome's increasing prosperity and population after around 450: both these factors are integral to increasing hoplite (heavy-armed infantry) and cavalry capacity. This is evidenced by an increase in officers called 'military tribunes with consular power', each notionally commanding 1,000 infantry, from three in the 440s to four in the 420s to six around 400, and a possible increase in cavalry from 300 to 600 at the same time (Livy 5.7). Three 'posterior' tribal horse-squadrons, doubling the original three for a make-or-break war with Veii, point to a patrician-plebeian parity in the cavalry additional to plebeian preponderance in the infantry. The years from 400 on repeatedly witness the modified acceptance of plebeian consular tribunes. Only a recourse to 'Little Rome-ism' or to all the risks of patrician dictators could put the genie back in the bottle. But the elimination of Veii in 396 as a city-state, with its territory confiscated for distribution to old and new citizens, was a major step toward a further, irreversible opening up of Roman society. A larger society now controlled a larger territory, having a now uncontested monopoly of the lower Tiber region.

A memorable disaster, a blip in history, was Rome's occupation by a band of Gauls in 390—a blip because they had come to loot and destroy but not to settle. They merely distorted the flow of consequences out of Veii's elimination from the face of the earth. This underlies Polybius' taking Rome's expansion as a given. But the process was not rapid: the 380s to

360s, a generation, see Rome at war most of the time, certainly, but more or less stuck around Satricum in Volscian country up to 60 kilometres to the south and at Nepete and Sutrium even closer to home in the north. The alliance with the Latins was stalled in non-compliance. It was a generation of apparent stagnation at home as well. Politics took the form of bearing down on popular insurgency; the plebeian successes around 400 seemed to be getting rolled back. The inherent potency of the absorption of Veii was still latent. Yet the elimination of Messenia, Orchomenus and Olynthus by Sparta, Thebes, and Philip of Macedon respectively are true parallels. Already an energised future was foreseeable in the huge programme of tax-funded wall-building in the 370s (Livy 6.32); mistakenly called 'the Servian Wall' and wrongly attributed to a 6th-Century king. This wall of excellent quality, enclosing 427 hectares, gave Rome an urban area comparable with the largest in Italy, though not yet indisputably greater than Tarentum and Capua. Returning Gallic marauders would not find the city unprepared. During this same 'quiet' period the fine port of Ostia began to be built at the mouth of the Tiber.

#### 4. *An Invitation to Rule*

The appeal of Capua in 343 launches Roman imperialism. The volcanic Campanian plain was the most productive in Italy, the urban areas the most industrially developed. The 'amplitude' of Capua itself and its advanced agriculture are rhetorically proclaimed to be inferior only to Rome's (Livy 7.30.6), but in Livy's own assessment it was then the greatest and richest city in Italy (7.31.1). Capua had a permanent cavalry establishment of 1,600 at a time when Rome's was much smaller (still perhaps 600, though more in a crisis). Only Syracuse, Thessaly, Macedon, and arguably Carthage maintained more cavalry. Capua stood as hegemon of the Campanian cities, yet was unable to handle the aggressive potential of the cantonal but incipiently urbanised Samnite Confederacy in the mountainous hinterland, by far the largest of the highland leagues that bore down on Rome and Capua and many other cities on the coastal plains. (On the Samnites, see now S.P. Oakley, *A Commentary on Livy Books VI–X*, 2.274 ff.) The structurally parallel case of Rome and the Latins versus Volsci and Aequi had gone in favour of the urbanised plainsmen; in Campania it was going the other way.

The juncture held both opportunity and serious risk for Rome. The integration of Rome and Capua, two regional nuclei, would have pan-Italian

implications. Not that Roman control of Italy was any more inevitable than Germany's unification in the nineteenth century entailed German control of Europe. Although the immediate need was Capua's and not vice versa, such a connection might swallow Rome up in an entity too large to be controlled. But leaving Capua to the Samnites was an even greater risk. Roman statesmen must choose one of two futures.

Livy's complex narrative of the years 343–338 shows how Rome sledgehammered the problem and then reworked the fragments into an architectural design of great delicacy. Only by binding her old and restive allies the Latins in such a fashion as to control them completely could Rome make herself decisively the major partner in a Roman-Campanian axis. With the Latins, and only them, Rome had linguistic, cultural and historic links that simply required an appropriate structure. The Great Latin War (340–338) was hard-fought but its outcome was benign: Rome annexed roughly half the strength of the Latin League as new Roman citizens, and political rights were so rapidly conceded to this assimilable population that a Fulvius of Tusculum could be elected consul at Rome for 322. The remaining Latin cities could function henceforth, as in the Latin War, as reliable dependent allies of the incipient superstate. Former Latin rivals, Tibur and Praeneste, were now isolated and controllable. The settlement with Capua was correspondingly intricate: the cavalry aristocracy of Capua was integrated into Rome. Capua was to fund a cavalry component 1,600 strong in the Roman army; its reliability was guaranteed by incorporation of this cavalry alone as full Roman citizens. Inter-marriage between Roman and Campanian élites commenced at once. And Rome annexed a small territory to be a watchpoint over Capua, eventually settling it with some of her own citizens. The Roman alliance now consisted of four components: (1) old citizens (*Quirites*), (2) newly annexed citizens (*cives Romani municipes*), (3) allies of 'the Latin name' (*nominis Latini*), and (4) Campanian and other allies (*socii*) but with the Campanian cavalry attached to Rome (probably to class 1). The manpower deployed after 338 was between 30,000 and 40,000 soldiers and represents a multiplication of pre-war Roman manpower by about four. This structure would soon be tested in war.

At this point evidence begins to appear of a hegemonial style in the managers of the Roman state. Even after a defeat Rome disliked treating with other powers as an inferior. The ideology of this conquering and even predatory power continued to entrench within it the maxim: 'No wars of aggression!' Rome's interstate relations remained quasi-legal. Roman religion and diplomacy recognised conflict not as a natural state but as a

breakdown of *rerum repetitio*, i.e. a just settlement of claim and counter-claim. Even war was mere banditry (*latrocinium*) unless formally declared and conducted within rules (*iustum bellum*). The credibility (*fides*) of Rome was closely observed by the gods and was public policy. A war ended by negotiation and punishment of offences. Hegemonism involved no change except Rome's increasing arrogation of the right to dictate terms in war, peace, friendship and alliance. This was as yet no universal claim but one asserted within stated (or even understated) boundaries. Later Rome exercised a quasi-divine authority (*maiestas populi Romani*), in which *maiestas*, expressing the relationship of gods to mortals, was adapted to Rome's diplomacy and public law. The Roman Senate would exercise judicial rights within a defined area (i.e. Italy: Pol. 6.13.4-5); later still a universal imperialism entitled the Senate to act as a world authority (*consilium publicum orbis terrae*). In our current world the catchcry 'democracy' now justifies armed interventions without declaring war, and extradition of citizens of sovereign states to the hegemon's jurisdiction as part of an unlimited war on terrorism. Rome's imperialism in any new region was by invitation. Once in, however, Rome was there of right.

### 5. *Doing the Maths*

The deeply thought-out and delicately arithmetical solution to Rome's problems around 340 seems to require not only statesmanship of a high order but a statesman. Q. Publilius Philo belonged to a plebeian family of some prominence in the struggle against the patrician monopoly and for the relief of lower-class indebtedness. He was four times consul, he was the second plebeian to be named dictator, he was the first plebeian praetor, the second plebeian censor, the first Roman proconsul. Such circumstantial evidence is supported by circumstantial chronology. He was consul first toward the end of the Great Latin War in 339 and named dictator by his colleague in what Livy rightly considers a *coup d'état* (8.12); as dictator he legislated to break features of the patrician monopoly. As consul and proconsul in 327–326 he was involved in the events at Naples leading to the Great Samnite War. He was consul in 320, immediately after the Caudine disaster; and in 315 as the war with Samnium got going again. In 314 he was prosecuted by his noble enemies but acquitted (Livy 9.26.21). He unites the plebeian movement with imperialism. He had descendants in lower-level public life but the family never produced another consul. The dynastic theory as applied to plebeian statesmen, above all reformers, is gravely

flawed. But in this man Rome's Bismarck is to be sought: he is one of the most interesting historical figures of whom virtually nothing is known.

The implications of Roman control of the rich territory running from southern Etruria along the Latin and Volscian littoral, part flat, part mountainous, to Campania, and the combination of two of the three largest urban entities in Italy, should have sent shockwaves provoking intervention through the Western Mediterranean. The great powers—the Carthaginian thalassocracy, the Syracusan empire in Sicily, and the largest Greek centre in Italy, Spartan Tarentum—were obviously affected. The Samnite Confederacy was vitally involved, through a brief war, in preventing the Roman-Campanian axis (342–341), but then tolerated the new situation. In 342 Rome itself was nearly thrown into civil war by the march on Rome by a Roman army infected by democratic ideas at Capua, but the plebeian movement was appeased by largely non-violent reform (Publilius). The Etruscans and the Gauls to the north were also affected by an incipient Roman hegemony. And yet nothing ensued until Rome was ready.

From time to time in the 4th Century Carthage was locked in life-and-death struggle with Syracuse. In the 340s Timoleon of Corinth overthrew the Sicilian tyrants and defeated the Carthaginians in the great battle of the Crimisus. There resulted a league of moderate democracies under Syracusan hegemony. This process was of much greater interest to Roman statesmen of the time—once again Publilius is to be thought of—than Roman aggrandisement was to Sicilians and Carthaginians. Both regarded Rome benignly. Carthage renewed treaty relations in 347 (Livy 7.27.2) and congratulated Rome on her victories in 342 (7.38.2). The Samnite leadership was far more alarmed by Greek adventurers coming to Italy to assist the Greek cities, notably Tarentum. Rome was of peripheral interest to Archidamus of Sparta in 343–338, and Alexander of Epirus made a treaty with her in 332 (Livy 8.17.9–10). These adventures represent only ripples from the great new fact that focused all minds: Philip II's unification of Greece (except Sparta) under Macedonian hegemony. He and Alexander the Great turned east but they could turn anywhere. The mendacious rhetoric of the Romans produced a discourse of beating Alexander (Livy 9.16–19). Luckily they never had to try. None of the powers seems to have actually welcomed Rome into their ranks, except Carthage which formally acceded to each new step in Rome's expansion. But well into the 320s each power acquiesced, and the outbreak of the Great Samnite War in 326 was essentially Rome's choice: founding Fregellae (328) and intervening at

Naples (327) were provocative acts, and once again Publilius is intimately involved.

Tarentum did intervene at Naples in 327 and was at odds with Rome over the submission of Lucania and Apulia to her in 326, but essentially because these peoples, not Rome, were longstanding enemies of the Italian Greeks. Rome undercut would-be overseas protectors of the Greeks by generous terms of alliance with Naples, a paradigm-case for her standing with the Greeks. Over two hundred years later some in Naples preferred their old treaty to Roman citizenship itself. A diplomatic reversal in Lucania removed all grounds for hostility between Tarentum and Rome for two generations: only in 280 did Pyrrhus, last of the Greek *condottieri* in Italy, challenge Rome and then Carthage to be protector of the western Greeks. Tarentum's intervention in 320 after the Roman disaster at the Caudine Forks was probably as benign mediator; Livy's hegemonial Roman response is retrospective fiction (9.14). As to the North, the Etruscans moved against the new Roman order only in 312; while the Gauls made a thirty-year truce with Rome around 330 which was observed throughout the Great Samnite War (Pol. 2.18.9). All the powers that might have stopped Rome only moved when it was too late. Carthage and Syracuse did not even do that.

#### 6. *'They have got to be stopped!'*

In these circumstances, during half a century (326–272, minus four 'unreal' years 333, 324, 309, 301), Rome fought a series of wars, interrupted for only brief intervals, with the Samnite Confederacy; the Samnites throughout were the only serious rivals of the Roman-Campanian complex. For decades the only outcome was the *increased* power of *both* alliances. The huge battles with terrible losses, the battles in which time and place and even the name of the Roman general were up for grabs in Livy's despairing narrative, were curiously affectless: the following year unfolded another battle of the same kind. A largely satisfactory set of consular lists survives; it is dictatorships, triumphs and proconsulates that allow mendacious intrusions. The national memory of great men, however, rests on multiple consulates and provides a substratum for the fame of (e.g.) M. Valerius Corvus (six consulates), L. Papirius Cursor (five), Q. Fabius Rullianus (five), generations of Decii (one with four), above all the arch-imperialists Q. Publilius Philo (four) and Ap. Claudius Caecus (two, plus many other offices). The Roman electorate of that time was not opposed to repeatedly

promoting individual merit. These heroes, for their part, while not as bland as tradition makes them, never threatened the structure of Republicanism while the classically balanced system was still being formed.

The 'Great Samnite War' (326–304) is really two wars separated by a peace of uncertain duration (320–316?). Rome launched the struggle with two strategically aggressive approaches in distant places. (1) In 334 Rome initiated a programme of colonisation by allocating land to citizen and allied volunteers along the weak and permeable frontier between the Roman-Campanian axis and the Apennine highlands under Samnite control (Cales, Fregellae). The landholding citizens of these strongpoints were in the same privileged legal relationship to Rome as the members of the old Latin League (hence *coloniae Latinae*). But though autonomous, these city-states were subject to the Roman high command (*imperium*). The second of these foundations, Fregellae in 328, was a calculated provocation to the Samnites. (2) At the very outset of the war in 326–325 the Romans reduced the Samnite allies, the Vestini, across the mountains on the Adriatic side of the peninsula. How did the Roman armies get there? The other Sabellic mountain cantons, Marsi, Paeligni, and Marrucini, might as easily follow the cognate Vestini into alliance with the Samnites and block the way (Livy 8.29). This did not happen. Roman audacity and speed established a friendly route to the Adriatic side and then southward to Apulia where the Romans set up a base in the rear of Samnium, at allied Luceria.

This awe-inspiring beginning bore no immediate fruit: the Samnites did not behave as though encircled. It was as if a small python sought to encompass a dinner too large for it. The enemy kept meeting the Romans in force despite famous 'victories' of Roman heroes over them and—this at least was real—trapped the invaders of their country at the Caudine Forks in 321. A peace ensued that amounted to a strategic stalemate. Ensuing events are debated, but outright war recommenced by 316. In 315 the Samnites broke the axis linking Rome and Capua in a great battle at Lautulae and got through to the coast near Tarracina. Capua wavered in its allegiance to Rome and the elder statesmen of the plebeian leadership—again Publilius appears, alongside C. Maenius, victor in the Great Latin War over twenty years before—set up an inquisition into defeatism at Capua and Rome (Livy 9.26–27). The war went on; the Romans reversed the battle of Lautulae, again near Tarracina; but winning the war was still all to do when the Etruscans joined the Samnite side in 312, grouped around the leading northern cities (*capita*) of Perusia, Cortona, and Arretium.

In the decade 314–304 Rome's lacklustre implementation of its impressive strategic aims was turned around. Some obscure political notices, deriving from the annalistic record underlying Livy, here need to be pressed into service. Somehow Roman society was suddenly turned upside down to bring success in a war on two fronts. (1) Five new Latin colonies were established (314–311) to strengthen the frontier with Samnium on both sides and reinforce coastal security. (2) In 311 sixteen military tribunes were elected to command an army of four legions—a sudden jump in numbers. (3) In 311 *duumviri navales* were elected to run a small fleet. Henceforth, despite the mythology, Rome was not shipless. (4) Recruitment of senators and *equites* was twice reformed, in the censuses of 312 and 304. It was a society ready for renewal and a city ready to take its place as a major centre, as shown by the initiation of the *Aqua Claudia* aqueduct and the *Via Appia* to Capua. Fresh water and communications were the key to greatness. Ap. Claudius Caecus, the patrician successor of the plebeian statesman Publilius, was found too radical or too complicated, and in 304 the censors Q. Fabius Rullianus and P. Decius Mus placed limits on innovation. Nevertheless, the end of patrician monopoly of the civil law (304) and a little later (300) of patrician monopoly of the major religious colleges followed. The catchcry was *concordia*, but it was to be on plebeian terms. And the countryside would clamp down on the burgeoning city: Rome was not to be Carthage.

The most significant event in this age of reform is the most obscure. In 326 according to Livy (8.28), but better in 313 (Varro attributes it to the dictator C. Poetelius Libo: *LL* 7.105), the *nexi*, freeborn Romans held as indebted labourers and subject to servile treatment, were emancipated by law under popular pressure. 'It was, as it were, the second birth of freedom for ordinary Romans.' Livy is evocative, if uninformative. The sudden availability of recruits for the army in 311, settlers for *five* Latin colonies in 313–311, and manpower for a new navy is to be linked with this emancipation. It was a good bargain: slaves captured in war or otherwise acquired would fill the gap, enlarge the economy, and enrich the culture without controlling the society. Something not evidenced at all may also be reasonably hypothesised: that colonies and allies adopted the *lex Poetelia* (*fundi facti*) with similar energising consequences. The Roman alliance had been struggling: from this point on its success against Etruscans and Samnites makes sense. By 308 the Etruscans and by 304 the Samnites sued for peace.

Rome did not claim a hegemony over Italy in 304. She did not venture to break up the Samnite Confederacy either and by 298 Samnium showed



renewed capacity for war. (Were there social reforms there too?) But from 306 the now highly successful Roman alliance had to guard against any outside intervention to redress the balance of power. Carthage made peace with Syracuse in 306 and renewed her treaty with Rome, no doubt recognising her gains but possibly not wishing them any greater. Tarentum would not recognise a Roman hegemony over Italy; she still had hegemonial aspirations of her own and connections with Greece: in 302 the Spartan Cleonymus was active in Italy. Rome used the interval before the next clash with Samnium to reduce the Central Italian highlanders faced with a new road through their territories (*Via Valeria*), and to plant four new colonies (303–298). Sora, Alba Fucens, Narnia and Carseoli were aggressively located to deepen Rome's control of the central highlands but not to encircle or encroach on Samnium.

The so called Third Samnite War (298–290) developed into an insurgency of all the free Italian peoples that saw Rome as a menace. Samnites, Etruscans, Umbrians and Gauls combined to pre-empt a hegemony over Italy which Rome did not claim. Under the Samnite general and statesman Gellius Egnatius a Samnite army broke through central Italy, still clearly not under full Roman control, to unite with the Gauls. Sentinum in 295 was a bloody (Pol. 2.19.6) and decisive battle. The veteran hero Q. Fabius Rullianus in his fifth consulate and his plebeian colleague and long-time friend P. Decius Mus in his fourth were recalled to command in Rome's hour of need. Decius famously sacrificed his life to Rome's decisive victory and its exemplary historiography. This was the turning point but not the end (compare El Alamein and Stalingrad). The war itself went on to 290. After 292 Livy's full narrative is missing; the terms of the peace-settlement of 290, let alone the politics at Rome between the new man M'. Curius Dentatus and the patrician P. Cornelius Rufinus and others of interest in this formative generation, are to be pieced together by deduction from fragments.

This time Rome did tighten the encirclement of Samnium through the unusually large colony of Venusia, which also created a Roman presence not far north of Tarentum, the only power in Italy not injured by the warfare of the 290s. But *neutrality* was hardly an impressive expedient for the champions of a continuing independent Greek presence in Italy. Even now Rome did not break up the Samnite Confederacy, which remained responsive to every opportunity. In the 280s the hegemony of Italy was still too big a thing for Rome to claim.

7. *Hegemony by Exclusion*

Without Livy's and Dionysius' continuous narratives Rome's activity in the 280s is easily regarded as 'mopping up'. A fragmented historiography may be misinterpreted as fragmented activity. The large-scale annexation of territory across the peninsula to the Adriatic in 290 and then northward along the coast in ensuing years, annexations solidified by the ongoing foundation of Latin colonies, is nothing less than empire-building. The territory incorporated, strung out along thin axes like the original line from Rome to Capua, gave the Roman city-state itself (not just the alliance) an extent and manpower unparalleled by earlier or current city-state entities like Sparta or Syracuse or Carthage. In the 220s, Roman military manpower would be roughly a quarter of a million and equal to over a third of the peninsula's allied manpower (Pol. 2.24). It did not produce huge armies: that was logistically impossible under ancient conditions. It produced huge reserves. It was in the 280s to the 260s, a miniature Dark Age for evidence, that the structure was built that Hannibal could not break.

A phenomenon of even greater interest was the incipient incorporation of the toga-wearing peoples (*gentes togatae*) into Rome. The unfriendly *Italici* of the Central Highlands were compelled to be Roman citizens without political rights (*municipes sine suffragio*), subject to confiscations and the plantation of Roman settlers and Latin colonies in their midst. And yet there was a glimmer of hope for the future, not only in a stable free-trade area, but in voting rights at Rome being conferred on peoples non-Latin by ethnicity and language. The franchise given to some Sabines in 268 points the way to progressive extensions probably complete in 179, and eventually to *Tota Italia* after 90. Over the years those non-voting citizens who were not enfranchised in one enactment could look forward to the next, e.g. Fundi, Formiae and Arpinum in 188, Cumae in 179 (Livy 38.36.7-9; 40.42.13).

During the 280s the great city of Tarentum was becoming irrelevant as protector of the Italian Greeks from Lucanians and other highlanders. In 285 Thurii and others appealed to Rome, not Tarentum: a tribune of the *plebs*, C. Aelius, responded to the burdensome invitation. (Did the Romans know their risk? The sequel is ambiguous.) In 282 a Roman fleet passed the Lacinian Cape, transgressing the boundary-zone set by an earlier treaty with Tarentum. Whether this breach was in good faith or done to bring international realities up to date is unknown. Certainly Rome did not treat the Tarentine attack on her ships as *ipso facto* an act of war. A Roman em-

bassy was charged simply with a diplomatic *rerum repetitio*, i.e. Rome was professedly willing to negotiate and settle on agreed terms. Tarentum was not and appealed to Pyrrhus, king of Epirus.

Pyrrhus, in fact a military ally of Tarentum and its allies including the Samnites, diplomatically presented himself as arbitrator in good faith between competing claims at law. His assertion in 280 of a hegemonial claim to adjudicate the Romans would not accept, and now at last Rome formally asserted the right of the Senate to decide all issues of war and peace in Italy (Dionysius 19.9, 10 [17.15, 17]). Two defeats by the best army in the world at that time led the Romans to waver, but a famously dramatic appearance by the aged imperialist Ap. Claudius Caecus persuaded the senators to keep a cool head: this took the form of a refusal to deal with Pyrrhus while he was present in arms on the soil of Italy (extant in many versions). It is not always borne in mind that this declared Italy a zone of exclusion *for all extraneous powers*.

Pyrrhus failed politically in Italy and Sicily, outmanoeuvred by Rome and Carthage and even the democratic politicians of Syracuse. Rome's truculence toward Pyrrhus was immediately transferred to her old friend and patron Carthage, and the hegemony of Italy was soon transformed into a protectorate over Italians *wherever they might be*. It revealed the pressure Roman society had been under since the 340s. Rome's claim to hegemony in Italy was all the more intransigent for having been so long delayed. The powers had always tolerated Rome's victories but not any claim to hegemony; it was paradoxically Roman *defeats* by Pyrrhus that were the catalyst for success. After 272 Samnium and Tarentum could not put up any claim to independence, and Rome was arbiter of all the free and allied states of the peninsula. The hegemon's good faith and pragmatic ability to *export* tensions would be the test of the new system.

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## DEFINITIONS OF ROMAN IMPERIALISM

*Peter Edwell*

### 1. *Introduction*

It is well known that the Romans possessed no specific term for imperialism, which has itself only been a part of our language for 150 years. The Latin word, *imperium*, from which the modern term imperialism derives, was a term with a number of meanings in antiquity which changed over time. Indeed, imperialism's ancient linguistic ancestor bequeathed a similar quality to its modern descendant, demonstrated over a century ago in the words of J.A. Hobson:

A certain broad consistency in its relations to other kindred terms is the nearest approach to definition as Imperialism admits. Nationalism, Internationalism, colonialism, its three closest congeners, are equally elusive, equally shifty, and the changeful overlapping of all four demands the closest vigilance of students of modern politics. (Hobson 1902, 1)

Imperialism can be defined simply as 'the process of establishing and maintaining an empire', and in analysing imperialism we focus on the motives, processes and outcomes of this endeavour (Richardson 2008, 2). The term, however, has taken on a number of connotations since its invention. As a word, imperialism was first coined in the 19th Century when theories involving imperial expansion abounded, especially with reference to Marxism and Liberalism. Very few scholars these days see the motivation for Roman imperialism in 19th-Century terms of class struggle, or as a means of accessing new resources and markets; but modern interpretations of Roman imperialism are still strongly influenced by ideas about modern imperialism.

Roman literature is awash with references to *how* Roman imperial expansion took place, but there is comparatively little surviving on why or what the Romans themselves thought they were doing as their empire expanded. The Romans appear not to have undertaken self-conscious theoretical analyses of their own imperialism; and it is perhaps for this reason that a Latin terminological equivalent was never invented. John Richardson states that the questions of what the 'Romans (thought) they

were doing as their power changed and expanded, and were they aware of those changes?' are 'apparently impossible' to answer based on a straightforward reading of the ancient texts (Richardson 2008, 2). Considerable scholarly analysis has been undertaken, therefore, to try and address such questions but it has been unavoidably influenced by our own ideas about imperialism and empires.

Modern European empires, especially, partly modelled themselves on the Roman Empire; Germany had a Kaiser, Russia a Tsar, and Mussolini's Italy attempted to once again establish the Mediterranean as *Mare Nostrum*. Roman imperial expansion from the Late Republic to the High Empire was an obvious and desirable antecedent of European imperialism as it included the acquisition of a vast array of different territories, nations and tribes just as European and British empires did across the globe. There is a strong sense that Roman imperialism can teach us about modern empires and that the development of modern empires consciously derived in some way from the example of the Romans. In the words of Susan Mattern: 'Perhaps we can learn, from our study of the Roman mind, not only something about the forces that shaped the boundaries of one of the world's great empires, but something about ourselves as well' (Mattern 1999, 210). The American empire of the 20th Century is perhaps more like the Roman empire of the middle-to-late Republic when it 'was seen in terms of increase of power, not increase of land occupied or possessed' (Richardson 2008, 62). Roman imperialism, therefore, can be seen as shaping modern European and American ideas about imperialism.

Further to this, the term 'imperialism' has taken on an increasingly negative connotation since its invention, especially since the middle of the 20th century. Once the European powers (including Britain) began divesting themselves of their non-European possessions, focus on the negative effects of imperialism grew and this in turn has had an effect on the analysis of Roman imperialism.

Is it appropriate, therefore, to use the term imperialism when investigating the expansion and maintenance of the Roman Empire? Perhaps hegemony is a better choice as it might allow better consideration of the various indirect means by which Rome exercised imperial control and it is a less loaded term. Further to this, hegemony might be more appropriate to what the Romans themselves thought about their empire as it expanded out of Italy and across increasingly vast tracts of territory from the 3rd Century BC.

## 2. *Imperium*

As the linguistic ancestor of the term imperialism, the use of the term *imperium* in the Roman sources needs some investigation and explanation. *Imperium* is used in different ways in the Roman sources and its meanings developed and changed over time. John Richardson has undertaken the most detailed analysis of *imperium* and its meanings in the Roman sources. The origins and development of the term are difficult to grasp but from the 3rd Century BC, Richardson sees *imperium* as pertaining mostly to the establishment of laws and the prosecution of wars, and he concludes that up to the early empire, it is used primarily, but not exclusively, to refer to the power of Roman magistrates (Richardson 1991, 1-2, 6). During the 3rd and 2nd Centuries, as Rome's power came increasingly to extend outside Italy, a larger number of individuals received *imperium* and a distinction grew between *imperium militiae* (*imperium* 'in warfare'), which was used outside of the city and *imperium domi* ('at home') which applied within it (Richardson, 1991, 3). By understanding better the development of the terms *imperium* and also *provincia*, Richardson proposes that we have some possibility of understanding what the Romans themselves thought they were doing.

For Richardson, *imperium* only began to take on the meaning of the English term 'empire' in the last century of the Republic and it was not until the end of the reign of Augustus that the 'full development' of the 'territorial connotations' of the term took shape (Richardson 1991, 6; 2008, 57-62). The term *imperium populi Romani* was first used in its earliest extant form in *Rhetorica Ad Herennium* 4.34, dating to the early years of the 1st Century BC, in the context of the dominance of Roman power over the whole world:

Quis hoc credet, tantam amentiam quemquam tenuisse ut imperium populi Romani temptare auderet nullis copiis fretus?

Who will believe that any one has been so mad as to dare, with no forces to depend on, to challenge the sovereignty of the Roman people?

Similarly Caesar (*BG* 7.1) used the term to express the corporate power of the Roman people over the Gauls who were *populi Romani imperio subiectos*, 'subject to the *imperium* of the Roman People'.

The most prolific surviving author of the age, Cicero, used *imperium* most commonly to refer to the power of magistrates and pro-magistrates but he used it also as part of expressing corporate Roman power—

especially over other people (Richardson 2008, 67-8). In *De Oratore* 1.196, for example, Cicero refers to Rome as:

quae una in omnibus terris domus est virtutis, imperii, dignitatis!  
 Standing alone among all lands as the home of excellence, imperial power  
 and good report!

Here *imperium* refers to power in a corporate sense rather than the power of an individual magistrate. In four other passages from the works of Cicero we see a similar expression of *imperium* in terms of power, but one which might be an early indication of the development of a territorial meaning of *imperium* which later came to fruition during the reign of Augustus:

Sed, quoniam C. Caesar abest longissime atque in iis est nunc locis, quae regione orbem terrarum, rebus illius gestis imperium populi Romani definiunt...

But since Gaius Caesar is so far away, and is at present in places which by location mark out the limits of the world and, by his exploits, the power of the Roman people ... (*Balb.* 64)

ut imperii nostri terrarumque illarum idem esset extremum.

that the limits of our power and of those lands (Gaul) are one and the same. (*Prov. cons.* 33)

duos terrores huius imperii, Carthaginem Numantiamque.

(He (Scipio Aemilianus) had destroyed) those two threats to this government, Carthage and Numantia. (*Mur.* 58)

imperii nostri magnitudo.

The greatness of our power. (*Mil.* 83)

In all of these passages Roman power is expressed with some regard to territory and indicates that Romans came to conceive of their power more in territorial terms as it extended further and further, and especially as individuals such as Sulla, Pompey and Caesar became increasingly dominant over the state itself. A much debated passage in Tacitus (*Ann.* 12.23), which claims that the *pomerium* was enlarged following military victories under Sulla, might also be indicative of this idea in the Roman mind of the late Republic.<sup>1</sup>

The term *imperium Romanum*, which later came to mean Roman Empire in territorial terms, was first used by Sallust in the late 40s BC: 'Carthago

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<sup>1</sup> See also Seneca, *Brev. Vit.* 13-14.



aemula imperi Romani' (Carthage the rival of Rome's sway: *Cat.* 10.1). Richardson holds that *imperium* in this case, as with the examples referred to above, focusses on the power of the Roman people as a whole, not just that of the magistrates, but that its focus appears not to be on physical territory (Richardson 1991, 6; 2008, 56). While this is a convincing argument, it does not mean that the Romans had no conception of the extent of territory in which their power was dominant.

For Richardson, the key development in the meaning of *imperium* is seen in the poems of Ovid written in exile late in the reign of Augustus. Augustus' immense individual power expressed partly in the reorganisation of the provinces was key to the clear addition of a territorial meaning to the term by the end of his reign. 'In five passages, four from the *Tristia* and one from the *Epistulae ex Ponto*, we find *imperium* paralleled with "lands" (*terrae*), possessing a "body" (*corpus*) or an "edge" (*margo*), and being the object of the verb *regere*, "to rule over"' (Richardson 2008, 133).<sup>2</sup>

It was the reign of Augustus which saw *imperium* fully develop the territorial meaning of empire, especially in the term *imperium Romanum* which effectively came to mean 'Roman Empire'. The meaning of *imperium populi Romani* also took on more of a territorial aspect during Augustus' reign but retained its expression of corporate Roman power (Richardson 2008, 145). The *Res Gestae Divi Augusti*, inscribed around the empire after Augustus' death in AD 14, provides some of the clearest evidence of this (Richardson, 117-18).<sup>3</sup> The text of Livy, dating to the earlier part of Augustus's reign, demonstrates the use of *imperium* in terms of power but not territory, and this contrast with the *Res Gestae* further suggests that the significant territorial addition to the meaning of *imperium* specifically took place in the latter years of Augustus' reign (Richardson, 126-31).<sup>4</sup>

### 3. *Provincia and Imperium*

The origins of the word *provincia* are as shrouded in uncertainty as those of *imperium* but it is clear that developments in the meanings of the two

<sup>2</sup> See also Richardson 1991, 7.

<sup>3</sup> *RG* 13: 'cum per totum imperium populi Romani terra marique esset parta victoriis pax' (when over the whole *imperium* of the Roman people by land and sea peace had been gained by victories). Compare *RG* 27: 'Aegyptum imperio populi Romani adieci' (I added Egypt to the *imperium* of the Roman People).

<sup>4</sup> For example Livy 2.26.11: 'I, lictor, colliga manus quae paulo ante armatae imperium populo Romano pepererunt' (Go, lictor bind the hands which but now, with sword and shield, brought power to the Roman people).

terms were related: and this becomes important to the development of Roman ideas about a physical empire. Lintott analyses the term *provincia* and how changes in its meaning came to reflect territorial boundaries. He defines the primary meaning as 'post' or 'appointment' but that it also came to mean 'an area with precise geographical limits' (Lintott 1981, 54; 1993, 22). Richardson relates *provincia* directly to *imperium* and concludes that, in the 3rd and 2nd Centuries, the primary definition of *provincia* was the responsibility given to a holder of *imperium* (Richardson 2008, 8). It is in the writings of Cicero and others of his time that *provincia* came to mean a specific piece of territory while retaining the older definition of responsibility of a magistrate or pro-magistrate (Richardson 2008, 80, 115). Lintott sees an earlier development in *provincia* coming to mean a demarcated and administered territory, and for him this began with the Roman organisation of the Spanish provinces in the early years of the 2nd Century (Lintott 1981, 55; 1993, 23).

For Lintott, the boundaries of *provinciae* during the Republic were flexible, often not clearly marked, and governors of *provinciae* were legally able to operate outside of their provinces to intervene in the affairs of *amici et socii* and to fight wars (Lintott 1993, 24-7). Perhaps this is indicative of Richardson's suggestion of *provincia* developing two senses in the literature of the late Republic. The power of the governors of *provinciae* as it extended outside of these often loosely defined geographical entities, was an important element in the extension of Roman power before the Roman imperial period, and as this power expanded it contributed to the term *imperium* taking on a more geographical sense by the beginning of the reign of Augustus. Augustus' division of the provinces into those of Caesar (the emperor) and those of the people emphasised the division of the empire into physical geographical units and this saw the emphasis on the meaning of the term *provincia* develop even further in the direction of territorial division.

In the 1st and 2nd Centuries AD, a new use of *imperium* developed with reference to 'the power and office of the emperor' and the meaning of *provincia* in this period shifts even further to a geographical division of the empire (Richardson 2008, 178-9). Importantly, Richardson points out that the older meaning of the word to express the corporate power of the Romans and also of magistrates can still be found, but it is not as predominant as the newer meanings (Richardson 2008, 180).

Lintott argues that the changes in provincial organisation throughout the imperial period, which included the abolition and incorporation of

allied kingdoms, especially in the 1st Century AD, 'were not so much extensions of control as changes in administration and developments in exploitation'; and this was an important driver in the changing emphasis on the meaning especially of *imperium* (Lintott 1981, 66). Those areas outside of the provinces which were previously allied to Rome had been part of the older Roman *imperium*, that is people subject to Roman power as *amici et socii*, and were now incorporated into the provinces, becoming part of the *imperium Romanum* in territorial terms.

It is important to bear in mind that while *imperium* is more related to physical territory and while most of the territories containing people subject to Roman power as *amici et socii* in the Republic were now formally brought into the provinces, Roman power extended beyond these physical territories and the Romans knew it. It is in this sense that *imperium* was still used to express the power of the Romans, expressed perhaps in its most vivid form by Jupiter himself according to Virgil (*Aen.* 1.279): 'imperium sine fine dedi', I have given them power without limit.

#### 4. *The Limits of Empire*

Attempts at defining *imperium* tend to be metrocentric; but what was actually going on in the frontier regions of the empire? (Champion 2004a, 16) The debates surrounding this question are important when defining the nature of Roman imperialism and they include the archaeology much more than the analyses focussing on language. Firstly, the debate about the nature of Roman frontiers has ramifications for how the Romans thought about their empire and its expansion; and secondly, the debate about whether Rome's acquisition of an empire was motivated by defensive or offensive factors is also important in defining Roman imperialism.

Debate in scholarship about the nature of Roman frontiers has been significant for some time and has centred on the question of whether the frontiers changed from being locations from which Rome's aggressive imperialism might be extended in the Republic, to heavily defended lines in the imperial period which reached their height in the mid-2nd Century AD (Whittaker 2004, 6). Debate about the definition of the Latin term *limes* (plural *limites*) is important in this discussion and, until relatively recently, it was accepted that the term describes a defended border which came to exist around the empire in the 1st and 2nd Centuries AD. The frontiers were essentially the *limites* as there is no specific term in Latin which matches the modern term 'frontier'.

Most scholars now see the frontiers during the Republic and Empire as primarily focussed on expansion rather than military defence. The boundaries of power or empire were more to do with administrative issues than defensive ones. Isaac argues that the definition of *limes* in the imperial period should be 'a demarcated land border of the empire' rather than a 'defended boundary' (Isaac 1988, 137). Frontiers and boundaries, therefore, should be separated from each other to develop a more complex understanding of how Rome conceived of its empire. *Limites* were boundaries which primarily served administrative purposes, and even they were not clearly defined in all areas, while frontiers were dynamic areas on the edge of the empire which were not clearly defined and invited expansion and exchange with people and lands beyond them. Another significant contributor to the debate on Roman frontiers concludes: 'Frontiers and boundaries are now perceived as historically less permanent and geographically more complex than once thought, without any necessary evolution from one to the other' (Whittaker 2004, 191).

The emergence of the term *limes* to mean 'land boundary of the empire' in the 1st and 2nd Centuries, if Isaac's definition is right, could be used to support Richardson's conclusion that the term *imperium* came to be increasingly associated with physical territory during the same period by further indicating Roman interest in demarcating the empire due to the changes instituted by Augustus. The suggestion, however, that *limes* did not mean defended boundary and that the frontiers were zones which in reality promoted further expansion, suggests an ongoing expression of the *imperium populi Romani* of the late Republic. *Imperium* was used to describe both power and territory in the 1st and 2nd Centuries AD, but the focus on territory became more common.

One of the key debates on Roman imperialism in the 20th Century is related closely to the debate about the nature of Roman frontiers. This is the question of defensive and offensive imperialism. The desire to get into the Roman mind to analyse the purposes and drivers of Rome's establishment and maintenance of empire has been strong in these analyses. For this reason, it is important to consider developments in the debate as part of defining Roman imperialism and it is in this debate that we see most clearly the influences on modern analysis of Roman imperialism.

Imperial expansion up to the late Republic had been seen in modern scholarship as primarily defensive, until the 1970s when W.V. Harris published a landmark study, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327–70 B.C.*, which brought Roman aggression to the fore as the main motivator

for imperialism. The defensive imperialism argument suggested that Rome had gone to war with Carthage twice in the 3rd Century BC due to Punic threats to Italy and Rome's allies; and that provinces such as Sicily and the two Spains were only acquired for protective purposes and as a result of the Romans' attempts to defend themselves. The war with Philip V after the conclusion of the Second Punic War was Rome dealing with Philip's treachery in 215 BC when he sided with Hannibal, and so on.

There were clearly some defensive motives for Roman imperialism but those who saw them as the primary explanation had always needed to explain away the contemporary perspective of Polybius who portrayed the Romans as aggressive in their extension of power. (See for example Pol. 1.1.5-6, 3.6, 63.9; 6.50.3-5.) While the primarily offensive motive has found general acceptance, there has been considerable debate on the specifics. Harris saw economic motives such as plunder and taxation as the primary ones but others, such as John Rich, propose that there was a range of motives, mostly offensive and aggressive, which need to be taken into account (Rich 1995).

Ideas about Roman motives for imperialism in the Republic can be encapsulated by thinking of them in military, economic, political and social terms. Rome and Italy required defence from enemies such as the Celts to the north and the Carthaginians to the south so provinces such as Sicily, the Spains and Cisalpine Gaul were established as buffers.<sup>5</sup> At the same time, Rome's dominance of the Italian peninsula contributed to war becoming a fundamental part of Roman society and politics, so the Roman élite required military victories for social and political success. In economic terms, Roman victories over enemies such as Carthage, in the Second and Third Punic Wars especially, and Macedonia in 167 BC saw huge amounts of resources and booty pour into Rome and Italy and contributed further to the desire for imperial expansion.<sup>6</sup> The state benefitted increasingly from taxation receipts while generals and soldiers grew privately wealthier.<sup>7</sup> A psychological motive was also present which Badian and Gruen demonstrate in Roman ideas of *gloria*, honour, and *virtus* which all contributed to the Roman motive to dominate other peoples and feel

<sup>5</sup> See, e.g., Pol. 1.10.5 ff regarding Roman fears of the Carthaginians potentially surrounding and threatening Italy; Caes. *BG* 1.10.33 expresses concern that the Gallic and Germanic tribes might threaten Italy.

<sup>6</sup> Carthage: Pol. 15.18.1-8. Macedonia: Cicero, *Off.* 2.22.76; Plut. *Aem.* 38.6. This motive finds particular resonance in the moralising work of Sallust, *Cat.* 10.

<sup>7</sup> This is demonstrated no more clearly than in the reports of benefits to the treasury from Pompey and Caesar's campaigns: Plut. *Pomp.* 45.3-4; Pliny, *NH* 33.55-6.

superior to them: a motive that finds particular resonance in the writings of Polybius (Badian 1968; Gruen 1984).<sup>8</sup> On these assumptions, Roman imperial motives were largely offensive rather than defensive and in the Republican period they fit with *imperium* taking on the meaning of power.

By Cicero's day, Roman power came to dominate the peoples of the known world commonly referred to as the *orbis terrarum* (Polybius' οἰκουμένη of a century earlier) and, in fact, Virgil referred to *imperium sine fine* as a way of expressing the same notion (Brunt 1978, 167). Over the following two centuries, the much talked-about reluctance to annex territory during the Republic, at least in the eastern Mediterranean, gave way to the incorporation of the territories of *amici et socii* into provincial territory in cases such as Commagene, Cappadocia, Judaea and Nabataea. As we have seen, *imperium* took on an increasingly territorial focus during this period and can be linked to Rome's formal annexation of many of its *amici et socii*.

The slower expansion of the empire in the imperial period is used to explain a greater focus on territory because of a greater focus on consolidation and stabilisation of a physical empire. This perceived change in Roman ideas about its empire has been used to support the idea of linear border defences in the 1st and 2nd Centuries AD, which represented 'scientific frontiers' primarily designed to secure and consolidate what Rome already had. This idea was expressed most clearly by Edward Luttwak, in what he saw as a Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire (Luttwak 1976).

There have been many reactions to Luttwak's ideas but, increasingly, modern scholars have sought to reject them. An increased focus on territory and administrative division need not indicate that Roman ideas about the expansion of empire were less grandiose than in the Republic. Rome was dealing with the long-term practicalities of empire and of power being concentrated in a much smaller group of the élite. There might have been practical ecological limits to how far large armies could be marched and stationed, but there was nothing in the Roman will to indicate an inherent defensiveness when it came to its empire, and there are plenty of examples to indicate the contrary in the 1st and 2nd Centuries AD.<sup>9</sup> The invasion of Britain in AD 43, Dacia in 106 and three invasions of the Parthian empire in the 2nd Century are good examples. The archaeological evidence which might suggest lines of defence, such as Hadrian's Wall and the *Strata Diocletiana*, focussed more on the swift movement of troops, the establishment

<sup>8</sup> For example, Pol. 1.3.6; 1.63.9; 6.50.3-6.

<sup>9</sup> See Whittaker 2004, 11-12 for discussion of the ecological limits to Roman power.

of bases for further military expeditions, and as part of the process of establishing Roman dominance over the landscape, than on defence.

The most strident critic of Luttwak's approach has been Isaac, but many others have joined him in suggesting that Roman ideas about empire were largely expansionary through the imperial period as well. Isaac sees no coherent defensive strategy in Roman imperial thinking and, to the contrary, concludes that emperors were driven mostly by the desire for military glory and an identification with the generals of Rome's great past (Isaac 1990, 387). Whittaker agreed, suggesting along with Isaac that Luttwak's analysis was heavily influenced by modern thinking about empires (Whittaker 2004, 46). Studies of the Roman ideology of empire by Brunt and Mattern confirm these ideas. Brunt identified a range of Roman imperial ideologies which were designed to justify and establish the legitimacy of imperial dominion. 'The glory of imperial expansion, the predestination of the Roman Empire, the idea of a Roman empire that encompasses the world' were among them (Champion 2004a, 162). Mattern emphasises a constant Roman desire to assert dominance over enemies as a way of justifying the empire's dominance and guaranteeing its security: 'But for the Romans, their hegemony and their very security depended on universal recognition of their empire's *maiestas*, its "greatness". Their policy depended on perceived and acknowledged military superiority, on the terror and awe of the enemy; and if this image was challenged by invasion, defeat or revolt, the Romans asserted it with the maximum possible brutality and ferocity' (Mattern 1999, 209-10).

Finally, it is worth briefly considering the use of other terms to describe Roman imperialism, given that the word imperialism has no parallel in Latin. The most obvious choice is hegemony, and this term derives from the ancient Greek word ἡγεμονία, a term sometimes employed by Greek writers for the Latin term *imperium*, especially with regard to magistrates. (e.g., Plutarch, *Marius* 36; Dio 60.17). Like *imperium*, ἡγεμονία is also used to refer to corporate Roman power, as can be seen in the Augustan-period geographer, Strabo (6.4.2, C286 and 288):

Εἰ δὲ δεῖ τῷ περὶ τῆς Ἰταλίας λόγῳ προσθεῖναι τινα λόγον κεφαλαιώδη καὶ περὶ τῶν Ῥωμαίων τῶν κατασχόντων αὐτὴν καὶ κατεσκευασμένων ὀρμητήριον πρὸς τὴν σύμπασαν ἡγεμονίαν ...

Now if I must add to my account of Italy a summary account also of the Romans who took possession of it and equipped it as a base of operations for the universal hegemony ...

χαλεπὸν δὲ ἄλλως διοκεῖν τὴν τηλικαύτην ἡγεμονίαν ἢ ἐνὶ ἐπιτρέψαντας ὡς πατρί.

But it would be a difficult thing to administer so great a hegemony otherwise than by turning it over to one man, as to a father.

Polybius uses hegemony when referring to power or supremacy in Greece. For example:

Λακεδαιμόνιοι πολλοὺς ἀμφισβητήσαντες χρόνους ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμονίας...

The Lacedaemonians, after having for many years disputed the hegemony of Greece... (Pol. 1.2.3)

γνόντες ὡς οὐχ οἷόν τε κατὰ τὴν Λυκούργου νομοθεσίαν οὐχ ὅτι τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμονίας, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πραγμάτων ἀντιποιεῖσθαι τὸ παράπαν.

As they recognised that under the legislation of Lycurgus it was impossible to aspire, I will not say to hegemony in Greece, but to any position of influence. (6.49.10)

Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν γὰρ ὁρμήσαντες ἐπὶ τὸ κατακτᾶσθαι τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμονίαν...

For when the Lacedaemonians endeavoured to obtain hegemony in Greece... (6.50.5)

Polybius uses hegemony with reference to Rome in terms of the exercise of power over the world:

ἐξ ὧν δῆλον τὸ προτεθεὶς ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὡς οὐ τύχη Ῥωμαῖοι, καθάπερ ἔνιοι δοκοῦσι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οὐδ' αὐτομάτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ λίαν εἰκότως ἐν τοιούτοις καὶ τηλικούτοις πράγμασιν ἐνασκήσαντες οὐ μόνον ἐπεβάλλοντο τῇ τῶν ὅλων ἡγεμονίᾳ καὶ δυναστείᾳ τολμηρῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθίκοντο τῆς προθέσεως.

This confirms the assertion I ventured to make at the outset that the progress of the Romans was not due to chance and was not involuntary, as some among the Greeks think, but by schooling themselves in such vast and perilous enterprises it was perfectly natural that they not only gained the courage to aim at universal hegemony, but executed their purpose (1.63.9).

Polybius demonstrates here that Rome's hegemony throughout the known world (οἰκουμένη) was similar to the hegemony that various city-states had exercised throughout Greece. For Polybius, this was one of the legacies of Greece to the new Roman superpower of the 2nd Century BC.

In the above examples, hegemony is primarily used to refer to Roman power or supremacy but not the Roman state or empire. In a famous passage Polybius (1.1.5-6) claims nothing could be more important than understanding how the Roman state (ἀρχή) came to be so dominant over the



inhabited world (οἰκουμένη) in only fifty-three years. This is not a reference to empire but to a positioning of Rome vis-à-vis other states. In the Greek texts of the Roman imperial period, ἀρχή is clearly used to describe the Roman Empire. Dio (73.14.4) describes the effects of a plague early in the reign of Commodus 'throughout almost the entire ἀρχή'. Herodian (1.1.5) sets out to describe 'a period of sixty years (when) the Roman ἀρχή was shared by more rulers than the years warranted...' ἡγεμονία is still used by Dio to refer to power in terms of imperial power (72.24.4) when Marcus Aurelius says, 'I would gladly have yielded the supreme ἡγεμονία to him without a struggle.' The primary meaning of ἡγεμονία in these examples is power, while when Greek authors refer to the Roman Empire or state, they use ἀρχή. The modern English term which descends from the Greek word, ἡγεμονία, is itself used more to express the power of a state or individual over other states and people rather than empire. It would seem then that for reasons of both ancient and modern usage, hegemony is not the most appropriate term to describe Rome's establishment and maintenance of an empire.

### 5. Conclusion

Analysis of additions to the meaning of *imperium* from Republic to Empire potentially provides some illumination of what the Romans thought their empire was and how it was changing. On Richardson's analysis, the addition to the meaning of *imperium* of the corporate power of the Roman people during the Republic followed by its development in the imperial period to also mean the territorial entity of the empire itself, illuminates Roman thinking about what their empire was and how this changed. Essentially, by the imperial period, *imperium* was used on its own or as a part of phrases to express not only the power of magistrates and the exceptional power of the *princeps* himself but also the power of the Roman people and the territory controlled by Rome. The Roman Empire was, then, a physical entity which wielded power not only within its boundaries but well beyond them.

The debates over the nature of frontiers and whether Roman imperialism was defensive or offensive in nature are driven partly by ideas about British, European and American imperialism of the last 150 years. The British and European empires of the 19th and 20th Centuries were heavily focussed on specific territories. World maps from this period often show colour-coding of countries across the globe indicating the empires they

belonged to. This territorial notion of imperialism fits more with conceptions of the Roman Empire from the reign of Augustus onwards, and British and European empires partly modelled themselves on the ancient Roman Empire. The additions to the meaning of *imperium* through the late Republic and early Empire demonstrated by John Richardson are suggestive of a more territorial notion of empire in the Roman mind.

The American Empire (or even American *Imperium*), especially as it emerged in the 20th Century, is somewhat different to the territorial empires of Britain and Europe. While American power has become increasingly stronger over the past century, the American Empire is not especially focussed on permanent acquisition of territory. Global military and economic power have been its hallmarks and in this way, the American Empire is more resemblant of the middle to late Republic. The now defunct Soviet Empire focussed on both territory and power, by directly controlling territory in Eastern Europe and Central Asia while wielding power in regions further away like Africa and South America. This type of imperialism displayed both of the definitional elements added to the term *imperium* through the late Republic and early Empire. Modern definitions of Roman imperialism are inescapably linked to developments in modern imperialism but, at the same time, analysis of the changing definitions of terms like *imperium* help us to understand something of how ancient Romans might have seen the nature of their power changing. The perceived and real political and cultural links between modern 'western' empires and the Roman Empire will always be strong in defining the imperialism of both entities.

## SICILY AND SARDINIA-CORSICA: THE FIRST PROVINCES

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### 1. Introduction

The moment when the Romans crossed the narrow straits of Messina in 264 BC is consistently seen as one of the most important in the history of Roman imperialism. Polybius chose to begin with this (Pol. 1.5.1); for Theodor Mommsen, 'It was a moment of the deepest significance in the history of the world'. But, as Polybius and Mommsen also saw, one of the principal results, the development of the provinces of Sicily and Sardinia-Corsica, was in no way foreseen in 264. For Polybius (1.20.1-2) it was only in 261, after the sack of Agrigentum, that the Senate decided on driving Carthage from Sicily and thereby increasing their own power; for Mommsen, what had begun as a continuation of the expansion of the 'Italian confederacy' ended instead with 'the extension of Italy to its natural boundaries'. This chapter will focus upon why, and how, these islands were transformed into what can reasonably be called the first 'regular' provinces of the developing empire: in other words, the beginnings of formal territorial annexation outside Italy.

The concept of the *provincia* before the 1st Century BC was primarily that of the task or responsibility of a magistrate or promagistrate (usually *cum imperio*). Precisely when the term acquired a distinct territorial or geographical sense continues to be a subject of debate. The word *provincia* does not, for example, constitute part of the description of the Roman empire as found in a law of the Roman people of 122 BC: '[*quoi socium no-minisue Latini exterarumue nationum, quouiue in arbitratu dicione potestate amicitiau[e populi Romani...*]', '[from whomever of the allies] or of the Latin name or of the foreign nations, or from whomever within the discretion, sway, power or friendship [of the Roman people...]'.<sup>1</sup> What is certain is that

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<sup>1</sup> Mommsen 1894, 2.165, 167, 203-5. First Punic War: Lazenby 1996; also de Sanctis 1967 (= *Storia dei Romani* 3.1). The causes: e.g., Hoyos 1998, 5-115; Eckstein 1987, 73-101; Harris 1985, 63-7, 182-90; Heuss 1970; cf. Loreto 2007. Richardson 2008, 2-4 on modes of imperial control in relation to the development of Rome's empire in this period. *Provincia*: Lintott 1993, 22-42; Kallet-Marx 1995, 18-29; Richardson 2008; Bertrand 1989. Quotation from *Lex Repetundarum*, I, line 1 = Crawford 1996, 65; contrast Cic. *Mil.* 87; cf. Richardson, 44-5, 79-80.

ca. 227, the Senate decided to double the number of praetors from two to four and to assign the third and fourth to Sicily and Sardinia (with Corsica); and that, thereafter, *imperium*-bearing magistrates or promagistrates, usually praetors, were allotted these two provinces on a regular basis. However, beyond that basic fact (and even the exact conception/mechanism of the regularity of the assignment is a matter of debate), much remains to be understood. Examination of the first two regular extra-Italian provinces may help us to understand both the role of the 'regular' province in Republican imperialism, and at least some aspects of its development.<sup>2</sup>

## 2. *Leaving Terra Italia*

Livy and others claim that the Romans sought out grain from Sicily from the very beginnings of the Republic. While the details may be questioned, there is little reason to doubt that the Romans were aware of Sicily as a potential source of grain (and other things) from well before 264. The first treaty between Rome and Carthage (ca. 509), as reported by Polybius, specifically refers to Roman rights to trade in both Sardinia and the Carthaginian-controlled western part of Sicily (Pol. 3.22.7-10); the second (? 348), while explicitly excluding Romans from trading or founding a city in Sardinia, grants equal rights with Carthaginians for those trading in Carthaginian Sicily (Pol. 3.24.11-12). It is tempting, if not strictly necessary, to link the Sardinian exclusion clause to the scattered reports of Roman attempts to found colonies (or naval yards, prompted by the wealth of timber) on both Sardinia and Corsica during the fourth century. Various texts imply interaction across the Tyrrhenian basin in this period.<sup>3</sup>

Archaeological evidence also indicates interaction and interest, especially from the 3rd Century onwards. In addition to the visible presence of Campanian wares in western Sicily in the period ca. 310–270, there is

<sup>2</sup> New praetors ca. 227: Solin. 5.1; Livy *Per.* 20. C. Flaminius was the first Sicilian praetor: Livy 33.42.8; the first Sardinian praetor, M. Valerius: Brennan 2000, 2.655. 227 is the conventional date: Brennan 2000, 1.91-3. Regular provincial allocation: Brennan 2000, 187-90; Ferrary 2008, 9-10; and *contra*, Richardson 2008, 17-25. Provincial development: Crawford 1990; Ferrary 2008, 2010; Richardson 1986 (on Hispaniae), Kallet-Marx 1995 (Macedonia and Asia).

<sup>3</sup> Sicilian grain: Gallo 1992; Garnsey 1988, 167-81; Northwood 2006; cf. Zevi 1999. On the treaties: Scardigli 1991. Roman colonisation attempt in Corsica: Theophr. *Hist. Plant.* 5.8.2; Amigues 1990, Zucca 1996, 74-9. In Sardinia: Diod. 15.27.4; Meloni 1990, 20-3; *contra* Harris 1990, 501 n. 20, cf. Bispham 2006, 123. Interaction across the Tyrrhenian: Livy 5.28, with App. *Ital.* 8.1-3, Diod. 14.93.3-5 (394 BC); Diod. 15.14.3 (ca. 384); Livy 7.25.4-26.15 (ca. 349); Diod. 16.82.3 (ca. 339).

extensive evidence for the movement of Greco-Italic amphorae (as wine containers), of which many were produced in Sicily, around the western Mediterranean basin; this trade expanded rapidly in the aftermath of the first two Punic wars. There is also material evidence from both Corsica and Sardinia of Italian connections in the 4th and 3rd Centuries. It is increasingly clear that we should imagine some degree of economic motivation for Roman imperial behaviour in the 3rd Century, beyond the basic stimulus of booty. Perhaps of more immediate relevance, however, for the Roman decision to aid the Mamertines in 264 is the presence of Campanians in Sicily from the later 5th Century onwards, mostly serving as mercenaries; by the 3rd Century some of these could well have been Roman citizens.<sup>4</sup>

This last point brings us to 264. It has rightly been emphasised that the initial Roman aim in the 'Sicilian War' was to secure Messana (modern Messina), and primarily against Syracuse not Carthage. In the light of Pyrrhus' recent campaigns against Rome and Carthage (and the concomitant Roman pact with Carthage of 279), and the extension of Roman interests into southern Italy, it is quite understandable that the Romans should have been wary of a resurgent Syracuse: Syracusan interests had previously extended well into southern Italy and the Adriatic. The Mamertines quite rationally appealed to both Rome and Carthage in the face of Syracusan attacks. The surviving later tradition, beginning with Polybius and produced in full knowledge of the subsequent escalation, naturally accepts a war directed primarily against Carthage. The historically unparalleled alliance between Syracuse and Carthage (cities at war, on and off, for the last 200 years) late in 264 transformed the situation. When Hieron II of Syracuse then yielded to the subsequent pressure of a double consular army in 263 and concluded friendship with Rome, the war moved on to a very different footing, and even more so in the following 18 months with the successful sack by Rome of Agrigentum.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Trade: Bechtold 2007, esp. 60; Tchernia 1986, esp. 49-51; Vandermersch 2001, esp. 173-4; Perkins 2007, esp. 43-5. Corsica, Sardinia and Italians: Zucca 1996, 80, cf. Van Dommelen 1998, 115-59; more generally, Mastino *et al.* 2005, 107-12. Third-Century Roman imperial behaviour: e.g., Willing 1998, esp. 794-8; Tchernia 2007. Campanians: Tagliamonte 1994; Ampolo 2001.

<sup>5</sup> Initial aims in 264: e.g., Eckstein 1987, 76-7; 2006, 164-9; Hoyos 1998, 53-7; cf. already Badian 1958, 34-5. On Hieron II's rise: de Sensi 1977, 9-62; Hoyos 1985; Zambon 2008. On the pact of 279: Hoyos 1984; Scardigli 1991, 163-203. I do not consider the so-called 'Philinus Treaty' to have a serious part in this discussion, despite another recent argument (Serrati 2006); see Hoyos 1985; Eckstein 2010. Sicily and Magna Graecia: Purcell 1994. Syracuse and Carthage in 4th Century: Anello 2004; Huss 1985, 100-215. Hieron's treaty with Rome: Schmitt

The original appeal to Rome came from the Campanian Mamertines occupying Messina. Significantly, in Polybius' account (1.10.2), the Mamertines appealed on the grounds of *homophylia*; that is, they claimed to be of the same race. As has been observed from Mommsen onwards, the Roman response follows previous Roman practice throughout the Italian peninsula, including granting a *foedus* to Messina which required naval contributions to future Roman war-efforts. Roman acceptance of their appeal, after the punishment of a similar group of Campanians in Rhegium some six years earlier, invited accusations of hypocrisy in Roman claims of *fides*, and places this particular action in a long line of Roman diplomatic moves with the potential to invite further war. Significantly, acceptance of the kinship appeal suggests some idea of shared Italic origins (hence not applicable to either Carthaginians or Syracusans); one major shift which seems to accompany the First Punic War is that the concept of 'Italia' was now realised in practice, the original development of which scholars tend to place in the later 4th or early 3rd Century.<sup>6</sup>

Several Roman actions during the war look relatively unusual compared with later provincial practice. For instance, Messina seems to have been the only city in Sicily to receive the standard *foedus* at this stage (see further below); the building of a provincial road (Agrigentum to Panormus) is unparalleled for another century. Arguably, this implies that when the Romans first crossed to Sicily they saw little reason to treat Messina any differently from Rhegium (a mere 7 km away, port to port), but that by 241 alternative approaches were being actively considered. Other developments likewise imply this conceptual shift, such as the second praetorship instituted in 242, with responsibility for the interaction between Romans and non-Romans (the *praetor peregrinus*), or the prohibition on Carthaginian recruiting of mercenaries from Italy in the Lutatius-treaty of 241 (the latter perhaps intended to guarantee supply of Italian manpower, itself consolidated under the *formula togatorum* around this time). Similarly, after the abortive attempts to found colonies in Sardinia and Corsica in the 4th Century, in line with Roman practice in Italy in that period, there was no further attempt to found colonies or distribute land in Sicily, Sardinia, or Corsica before the mostly unsuccessful proposals of the political com-

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1969, 137-40; de Sensi 1977, 101-12; Eckstein 1980; Hoyos 1998, 100-15 for a convincing portrait of steady escalation. Hieron II as a client king: Eckstein 1980.

<sup>6</sup> Mommsen 1894, 2.167; Crawford 1990. Messina's treaty: Schmitt 1969, 135-7; Messina: Pinzone 1999a, 121-72.. Hieron criticises Roman *fides*: Diod. 23.1; Eckstein 2010, 414; Harris 1985, 189. Rhegium: Bleckmann 1999. Mamertine kinship with Rome: Pinzone 1983, 89-137; Battistone 2010, 113-15; Russo 2010, esp. 74-9. Italia, recently Harris 2007; Bispham 2007, 53-73.

petition at the end of the 2nd Century. On the other hand, direct taxation, in clear contrast to Roman practice in Italy, seems to have been an early consideration. For Italians aiming to exploit the opportunities which these lands presented, the difference seems to have been quickly apparent: what may be the first of many inscriptions set up around the Mediterranean by Italian businessmen, identifying themselves explicitly as *Italici*, comes from one of the privileged communities on the north coast of Sicily, ca. 193.<sup>7</sup>

### 3. Geopolitics

But as questions of exploitation remind us, focusing upon conceptual developments may obscure some more fundamental truths. Why did Rome wish to drive Carthage out of Sicily? Why did Rome decide to seize Sardinia in 237? Why the new praetorships in 227? The earlier contacts provide some clues, and we shall come back to that aspect below. The fundamental Roman imperial imperatives of booty and glory also applied: the *populus* was persuaded to vote for war in 264 by the prospect of enrichment (Pol. 1.11.2); triumphs were plentiful in the early part of the war, in turn a key period for the development of Roman triumphal art. But geopolitics also apply, and were, in Polybius' version (1.10.3–11.3), the primary consideration in 264.

The early Roman-Carthaginian treaties illustrate quite clearly the focus of Carthaginian interest: North Africa, western Sicily, and Sardinia. Corsica's place is mostly obscured by silence: it is absent from the treaties, and rarely mentioned except when the object of direct Roman military intervention; there is some debate as to when the island had fallen under Carthaginian control; it has also been suggested that the island was considered 'conquered' by Rome already in 258. If we imagine Carthage standing at the apex of a triangle formed by the Tyrrhenian basin, and bounded on two sides by Sicily and Sardinia-Corsica, then the third side is the Italian coast, and it was Roman interests here that the early treaties sought to define.

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<sup>7</sup> Republican roads: Wiseman 1970; the Sicilian road: Prag 2006. Alternative approaches by 241: Crawford 1990, esp. 122; Pinzone 1999, 53–6; Brennan 2000, 85–9. Prohibition on mercenary recruiting (Pol. 3.27.4, App. Sic. 2.1). *Formula togatorum*, Brunt 1987, 545–8; Ilari 1974; Lo Cascio 1991–94, esp. 325; Prag (forthcoming, a), 5–7. Colonisation proposals: App. BCiv. 1.35.156 (Sicily, 91 BC; cf. earlier 1.23.101; 1.29.130; *de Vir. Ill.* 73.5); Seneca, *Dialogi (ad Helviam)* 12.7.9 (Corsica, by Marius ca.100), Pliny, *HN* 3.80 (Corsica, by Sulla, 81). First inscription by *Italici*: *ILLRP* 320. Italians in Sicily: Frascchetti 1981; Torelli 2008; Prag 2012, on the parallel development of a Sicilian identity.

From this perspective, it becomes rather easier to understand Carthaginian concern at Roman involvement in Sicily, having repeatedly struggled with Syracuse for control of the island. Tellingly, at the moment when Rome moved against Agrigentum in 262, Carthage's principal base in south Sicily, Carthaginian naval raids are reported on the Italian coast, launched via Sardinia (Zon. 8.10–11, Pol. 1.20.6–7); in the following years, Rome not only took to the seas in force, but in two consecutive years (259 and 258) mounted campaigns against Carthaginian holdings in Sardinia and Corsica. By 256 Rome was even taking the war to North Africa (as Agathocles of Syracuse had done some fifty years before).

But for either attack or defence, some degree of control of either Sardinia or Sicily is necessary, since they govern the principal maritime approaches (hence Hannibal's land march in 219/8). Roman fear of the potential striking power of Carthage is notoriously encapsulated in Cato's gesture, a century later, of dropping a ripe African fig on the floor of the Senate house (Plut. *Cato Maj.* 27.1; Pliny, *NH* 15.74). Economic perspectives are no less relevant; the early treaties indicate a clear desire to control markets in the Tyrrhenian basin on the part of Carthage; as noted, the wide circulation of material goods is very clear in the archaeological record (as is its increase in the 3rd Century); the substantial presence of Italian traders in North Africa in the immediate aftermath of the First Punic War (Pol. 1.83.7) highlights this second motivation for 'breaking' Carthaginian control of the region.<sup>8</sup>

However, one must not be too Carthago-centric: Roman campaigns in Sardinia and Corsica frequently coincided with military activity on the Italian mainland, in particular against the Ligurians, not only in the 230s BC, but again in the 180s/170s. In particular, the first Roman campaign after the First Punic War, against the Ligurians, provides much the best explanation for the notorious decision to seize control of Sardinia and Corsica in 238/7 (Livy, *Per.* 20; Pol. 1.83.11, 88.8–12). Sardinia and Corsica also control naval traffic westwards, and Sicily the traffic eastwards, including traffic into and across the Adriatic. In the past, Syracuse (under Dionysius I) had founded colonies in the Adriatic at several locations including Issa, a key location in the First Illyrian War of 229; the gift from Rome to Hieron II of

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<sup>8</sup> Triumph-patterns: Rich 1993, 49–50 with fig. 2.2; triumphal art and monuments in this period: Picard 1957, 138; Pietilä-Castrén 1987; Hölscher 1994, 17–51. Corsica: Debergh 1989, 43–4; Scardigli 1991, 152; Zucca 1996, 80–2. Carthaginian imperialism: Whittaker 1978; Barceló 1989; Ameling 1993, 141–54, Van Dommelen and Gómez Bellard 2008, 10. Roman attacks on Sardinia and Corsica, 259–258: Debergh 1989; Meloni 1990, 23–30. Italy-Carthage sea-routes: Arnaud 2005, 149–71; Mastino *et al.* 2005, 37–42; Mosca 2002. Cato's figs: O'Gorman 2004.



Illyrian spoils in the 220s (Livy 24.21.9) suggests ongoing Syracusan interest in the region. The so-called *coloniae maritimae* illustrate the Adriatic's relevance to Rome since the later 4th Century.<sup>9</sup>

There were, therefore, sound strategic reasons for annexation. The additional decision ca. 227 to create praetors for Sicily and Sardinia also belongs in context: Carthaginian activities in Spain were increasing (the so-called 'Ebro treaty' dates to 226 BC); Rome had just consolidated control over the Adriatic in the First Illyrian War; and the state was preparing a concentrated campaign in northern Italy against the Gauls following recent expansion into the *ager Gallicus*. The military conquest of Sardinia, between 237 and 231, appeared to have achieved some stability: the only military presence attested between 230 and 218 is a consular army in 225, after the islanders apparently revolted against the new praetor (Zonar. 8.19). The first attested Roman military force in Sicily after 241 is a 'reserve' legion in 225 (Pol. 2.24.13). The sending of the first praetors in 227 *may* therefore suggest a decision to maintain a military presence in western Sicily (and Sardinia?), confronting Carthage (in Spain)—an action which, as is usually maintained, implies the beginnings of a standing army overseas. However, by the early 2nd Century Sicily, and probably also Sardinia-Corsica, were apparently garrisoned principally by local troops, so even that general fundamental principle is hard to sustain.<sup>10</sup>

#### 4. *Exploitation*

If changing circumstances following the First Punic War provide one explanation for the decision of 228/7, there is still a need to consider what Roman intentions/expectations may have been in driving Carthage out of each of Sicily and Sardinia-Corsica. Of relevance to this is the triumphal return of T. Manlius Torquatus, after the initial seizure of Sardinia, in 235, which prompted the only (if brief) closing of the Gates of Janus in the middle Republic, symbolic of the Roman state at peace. This suggests limited Senatorial fear of immediate Carthaginian reprisals, even if

<sup>9</sup> Ligurian campaigns: Feig Vishnia 1996, 16-17; cf. Mastino *et al.* 2006, 311. Seizure of Sardinia: Dubuisson 1979, Dyson 1985, 245-6; Brizzi 1989; Carey 1996; Hoyos 1998, 132-43; Ameling 2001; Brizzi 2001. Sea-traffic: Arnaud 2005, 158-9, 164-5, 176-82, 217. Dionysius I: Lombardo 2002; Hieron, Rome and the Adriatic: Millino 2003. *Coloniae maritimae*: Salmon 1969, 70-81.

<sup>10</sup> Feig-Vishnia 1996, 13-25, links campaigns in Sardinia-Corsica, Liguria, the Po Valley, and the Adriatic. Roman conquest of Sardinia in the 230s: e.g., Dyson 1985, 246-51; Meloni 1990, 43-52. Local garrisoning: Prag 2007a.

subsequent rebellions in Sardinia and Corsica may have influenced the revised approach of 227. What is also striking is that the Senate did not impose similar arrangements upon the east coast of the Adriatic, then or indeed anytime during the Republic. To make sense of this, it may be helpful to turn to other, more economic reasons for Roman interest in the islands, and to the actual settlement imposed on them.

Sicily was to become proverbial as a granary for Republican Rome. Our fullest and most detailed information comes from Cicero's prosecution of the governor C. Verres in 70. As early as 262, Hieron II was assisting Roman forces on the island with supplies; in 237 he visited Rome, bringing substantial quantities of grain; and he provided further help early in the Second Punic War. Although there is no evidence for a grain tax exacted by Rome in the inter-war period (despite modern assertions to the contrary), immediately after the fall of Syracuse in 211 the Senate took an interest in the island's potential as a source of grain and the proconsul M. Valerius Laevinus (210–207) took direct action to revitalise agriculture. In 209 and thereafter we hear repeatedly of tithes of Sicilian—and Sardinian—grain being despatched both to Roman armies in the field, and occasionally to Rome itself. Cicero is explicit that the system was based upon Hieron II's. The case has been persuasively argued that, in the 3rd and 2nd Centuries, Roman interest in such grain was primarily for provisioning armies in the field. Arguably, too, such regular taxation of Sicily by Rome evolved directly from the *ad hoc* needs of armies on the island from 264 on.<sup>11</sup>

However, the exact sequence of the development of Roman taxation in both provinces remains vexed. The answer is bound up with why the Roman Senate resolved to assign these *provinciae* regularly to magistrates or, in other words, chose formally to occupy these islands—the question of what makes a 'province' necessary or desirable. The sources are inevitably less than satisfactory: inferring developments of the 3rd Century from Cicero's rhetoric in the *Verrines* is not without its difficulties. Most plausibly, a system of grain tithes, developed by Hieron II (died 215), was

<sup>11</sup> Closing of Janus: refs. in MRR 1.223; alternative interpretation, Harris 1985, 190–1. Sicily the granary: Cic. 2*Verr.* 2.5; Strabo 6.2.7. C273. Hieron's aid: Eckstein 1980. Grain tax system: Carcopino 1919; Pritchard 1970; Rickman 1980, 36–42. Interwar period: Gallo 1992, 394 n. 53 with 397 n. 60; cf. Nāco del Hoyo 2003a, 73–4. Encouragement of Sicilian agriculture: Livy 26.40.15–16, 27.5.2–5, 27.8.18–19, 27.35.3–4, 28.11.8. Grain sent to Rome or armies: Livy 27.8.19, 30.3.2, 33.42.8, 36.2.12; 37.2.12, 37.50.9, 42.31.8 (cf. 23.41.7 from Sardinia). Hieron's tax-system: Cic. 2*Verr.* 3.14; Eckstein 1980. Grain primarily for armies: Erdkamp 2000; note Cic. 2*Verr.* 3.73. Hieron's tax-system: Cic. 2*Verr.* 3.14; Eckstein 1980. Evolution of Rome's Sicilian grain-tax: Serrati 2000; cf. Pinzone 1999b, 485.

extended across the entire island by the proconsul M. Valerius Laevinus in the period 210–207 (a classic example of Rome's adoption and adaptation of existing structures); very possibly the same period saw a similar system instituted in Sardinia. The existence of a Sardinian grain tithe already in the 190s at least seems well-attested, and is regularly mentioned by Livy in conjunction with the Sicilian tithe. Of Corsica, almost nothing can be said.<sup>12</sup>

The evidence for the initial settlement of Sicily in 241, a fragment of Appian, states that a Roman official was sent annually (to Lilybaeum?) and taxes (*phoroi*) were imposed on the three-quarters of the island not then in the kingdom of Syracuse; Livy also indicates that both Sicily and Sardinia were paying some form of taxation (*vectigal*) prior to 218. It is worth bearing in mind that a senatorial decemvirate was in Sicily in 241 to assist with the treaty terms (and perhaps to organise Sicilian communities, as in later settlements). Any taxation was probably a monetary exaction (distinct from *ad hoc* requisitioning of grain); and Appian also appears to record the establishment of customs dues (*portoria*) in western Sicily. Whether the Roman official prior to 227 was a quaestor, or the *praetor peregrinus*, or an extraordinary promagistrate is much disputed. On this reading, one of the principal rationales for the initial Roman presence would be taxation. The obvious comparison is with Macedonia in 167, when taxation was imposed, but without regular Roman presence. Perhaps not coincidentally, the five Sicilian cities described by Cicero as tax-exempt (*civitates immunes ac liberae*) all lie in western Sicily, in what Livy calls the *vetus provincia*.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Cic. 2*Verr.* 3.12–13 is a fundamental passage fraught with problems of interpretation; see Genovese 1993; Pinzone 1999b, 2008. On Roman taxation: Naco del Hoyo 2003a (86–95 on Sicily); cf. France 2007. Sicilian grain taxation established ca. 210 (the standard view): e.g., Marino 1984. Alternatives: use of a pre-existing Carthaginian model (wholly unattested) in western Sicily from 241: Serrati 2000, 122–6; the Hieronian system extended across Sicily by the first praetor in 227 Pinzone 1999, 1–37; the entire system seen in Cicero's *Verrines* only instituted by Rupilius in 132/1: Carcopino 1919 (founded on unsupported assumptions about a hypothetical *lex provinciae*; cf. Crawford 1990). Sardinian tithe: Livy 36.2.12 with 37.2.12; 42.31.8; Naco del Hoyo 2003a, 95–104, and 2003b (excessively sceptical). Spain: Richardson 1976, 1986, 93, 115–17 (5% grain tax from the 170s); Naco del Hoyo 2003a, 127–93, 259–61 (a more varied and *ad hoc* system). Corsica: Livy 40.34.12, 42.7.1–2; Naco, ib., 100–1; Zucca 1996, 125–7..

<sup>13</sup> App. *Sic.* 2.6, Livy 23.48.7. Appian's στρατηγὸς ἐτήσιος is commonly dismissed as an anachronism; but see Luce 1961, 21–22, and Brennan 2000, 87–9 ('annual commander', not necessarily a praetor). The view outlined here will be argued more fully in a forthcoming article. Senatorial decemvirates: Pol. 1.63.1–3; cf. Greece 196 (Pol. 18.44–47; Eckstein 2008, 283–302) and Africa 146 (App. *Lib.* 135.639; *Lex Agraria*, lines 77, 81, in Crawford *et al.* 1996,

The gradual development of taxation would sit well alongside the gradual diversification of administrative treatment from the Italian peninsula. Direct taxation is not in general a feature of Rome's relationship with the *socii et nomen Latinum* of Italy; vice versa, Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica were not part of the *formula togatorum*, the list of Italian peoples providing the allied half of most Roman armies (although they did provide auxiliary forces, both terrestrial and naval). The need to administer taxation and the disputes that inevitably arise from it (one context for the later *Lex Rupilia's* regulation of legal disputes) provides one obvious motive for a Roman magistrate's presence (military concerns the other).<sup>14</sup>

### 5. Constituting a Province

Several aspects of Rome's settlement and organisation of Sicily deserve comment, since they prefigure subsequent developments in Roman imperial behaviour.<sup>15</sup> The first of these is 'kinship diplomacy'. After the Mamertine appeal in 264 claiming *homophylia*, two of the subsequently tax-exempt Sicilian cities, Segesta and Centuripae, are known to have claimed kinship with Rome (the former on the basis of shared Trojan origins). We cannot be certain whether these claims were first made on their surrender in 263 (as Zonaras claims), during the settlement of 241, or later (Cicero's evidence is the earliest); or whether their privileged status is directly connected to such claims. Elymian Segesta had made such claims in dialogue with the Greek world centuries earlier.<sup>16</sup> A group of the 17 'most

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no. 2 with pp. 176-7). *Portoria* (τέλη τὰ θαλάσσια): Crawford 1985, 104; Ferrary 1988, 19; cf. Naco del Hoyo 2003a, 89-90. The Roman governor: Kienast 1984, 119-21; Richardson 1986, 7-8; Crawford 1990, 93; Brennan 2000, 91; contrast Dahlheim 1977, 44-53, esp. 48 n. 94. Cf. Harris 1976; Loreto 1993 (quaestorship). Macedonia: Livy 45.18, 45.29; cf. Kallet-Marx 1995, 13-14; Ferrary 1988, 179-80. *Civitates immunes*: Cic. 2Verr. 3.13; Pinzone 1999b; Calderone 1964-5, 98; Prag 2010, 67-71 (First Punic War context). *Vetus provincia*: Livy 24.44-4.

<sup>14</sup> Military contributions: Cic. 2Verr. 5.60; Prag 2007a for Sicily; cf. forthcoming, a. The *Lex Rupilia* (not a 'lex provinciae', but a governor's *decretum*): Crawford 1990, 112-13, 119-20; cf. Hoyos 1973. Provincial edicts and legal structures in Sicily: Maganzani 2007; Dubouloz 2007. Provincial government: generally Cic. *QFr.* 1.1; Lintott 1993, 54; Richardson 1994, 568.

<sup>15</sup> On Republican Sicily generally: Holm 1898; Manganaro 1980; Wilson 1990, 1-32; Pinzone 1999a, 1-234 1999b; Wilson 2000; Campagna 2006; Prag 2007a, b, c; Survey articles: Campagna 2003; Prag 2009; Dubouloz and Pittia 2009.

<sup>16</sup> 'Kinship diplomacy': Jones 1999, 81-93; Erskine 2001, esp. 168-85; Battistoni 2009; cf. Gabba 1976, 94-101 (3rd Century). Rome and Sicily: Prag forthcoming, c; Battistoni 2010, 115-27; De Vido 2000. Segesta: Zonar. 8.9; cf. Diod. 23.5; Cic. 2Verr. 4.72, 5.83, 5.125. Centuripae: Cic. 2Verr. 5.83 (cf. 2.163; Diod. 23.4); *AE* 1990, no. 437 = *SEG* 42.837; Manganaro 1963, 2006 (cf. *SEG* 26.1123; Battistoni 2006).

loyal' cities in Sicily is also attested, which contributed to a garrison at the temple of Venus Erycina in western Sicily (modern Erice)—this may constitute an early attempt to control western Sicily through a league of cities, prior to the decision to send a regular praetor.<sup>17</sup>

A second notable element is the use (or otherwise) of formal treaties (*foedera*). Only two cities, besides Messana, received them: Tauromenium and Netum, both probably receiving their treaties during the Second Punic War. We know almost nothing about Netum's treaty, but both Tauromenium's (perhaps ca. 213/2) and Messana's (originally 264/3) contain unequal provisions that go beyond standard clauses of neutrality and defensive alliance. As such they are among the earliest examples of treaties between Rome and cities outside Italy, and, as the treaty of Tauromenium includes a positive privilege (more commonly associated with late Republican treaties), they serve to illustrate the perils of an overly schematic approach to Roman *foedera* in general. The one secure point is that, at least outside Italy, formal written treaties were only infrequently employed by Rome.<sup>18</sup>

A third element is the significance and status of Sicily's five *civitates immunes ac liberae*. Ernst Badian argued with the grounds for suggesting that the 'free city' as a Roman imperial tool was 'born' in Sicily, and not, as is more commonly accepted, with Flamininus' declaration at Corinth in 196. The discourse of the 'freedom of the Greeks' in Sicily goes back to the 5th-Century conflicts with Carthage, and was still alive in the 3rd Century, as the Romans surely knew. However, the only evidence for the use of such language by Rome in Sicily comes from Livian reports of a claim to liberate Syracuse from tyrants during the Second Punic War. Incidentally, not one of the five privileged cities in Sicily could seriously claim that it was 'Greek'. More fundamentally, it is probable that their special status was one of tax exemption alone; local autonomy was, it seems, common to all Sicilian cities—they were all *socii*—and in this Rome's treatment of cities in Sicily, Sardinia, and Illyria may not have looked so very different in the 3rd

<sup>17</sup> Lampsacus: Moretti, *ISE* 3, no. 188; Segesta: Thuc. 6.2.3. The seventeen: Diod. 4.83.4-7; Cic. 2*Verr.* 5.124; cf. *CIL* 10.7258, *IG* 14.282, 355; Kienast 1965; Erskine 2001, 198-205; Prag 2007a, 82; forthcoming, c, 12-14.

<sup>18</sup> Messana: Schmitt 1969, no. 478 (ship required); Pol. 1.10.2; Cic. 2*Verr.* 5.50-1, cf. 3.13, 4.21, 5.43. Tauromenium: Schmitt, no. 534 (no troops or ships); App. *Sic.* 5; Cic. 2*Verr.* 2.160, 3.13, 5.49-50, 5.56. Netum: Schmitt, no. 535; 2*Verr.* 5.56, 5.133. Roman treaties: Ferrary 1990 (NB 235 n. 59); Mitchell 2005 (esp. 185-9); Rich 2008 (esp. 58-65).

Century. The status of the five is not comparable to the developed *civitas libera* of the Greek East in the later 2nd Century.<sup>19</sup>

Sardinia (and Corsica) by contrast possessed no 'free cities', or formally allied communities, at least by Cicero's day (we know very little about the islands' organisation in general). What makes these islands different in one regard is that they continued to suffer military campaigns irregularly throughout the Republic, comparable to the two Hispaniae.<sup>20</sup> The more urbanised status of Sicily arguably made its organisation and self-regulation by local élites more straightforward; taxation was primarily based upon pre-existing mechanisms, and encouraged the participation of local élites (the Sicilian tithe was leased locally in Syracuse, and did not therefore become the domain of Roman *publicani*, in contrast to the later Asian tax-system). Roman triumphs were celebrated for campaigns in Sardinia in 175, 172 (Corsica), 122, 111, irregularly in 106, and in 88; by contrast, there were only ovations following the Slave Wars in Sicily (M. Aquilius in 99, perhaps M. Perperna in 132 and P. Rupilius in 131). The Sardinian campaigns of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus in the 170s stand out, not only because they are one possible moment for further (re)organisation of the island—although this chapter would suggest that regular taxation was already established—but also because in his triumph of 175 a *tabula*, bearing both an inscription and an *insulae forma* (a map?), was paraded through Rome and permanently displayed in the temple of Mater Matuta. This particular gesture is frequently seen as significant for Roman geographical conceptions of conquest, territory, and empire: Sicily and Sardinia, as discrete, bounded geographical entities, must have played a significant rôle in the development of the *provincia* as geographically conceived.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>19</sup> 'Free city' in Sicily: Badian 1958, 33-43; *contra* Gruen 1984, 144-5; Ferrary 1988, 5-23. 'Freedom of the Greeks in Sicily': Prag 2010, esp. 67-71. Liberating Syracuse: Livy 31.29.7; cf. 24.33.6, 25.28.7, 31.31.8; Gruen 1984, 144, with Prag 2010, 70; Jaeger 2003. Segesta and Halicyae were Elymian; Centuripae and Halaesa were Sicel; Panhormus was Punic: Calderone 1964/5, 98; De Vido 2000, esp. 391 n. 8, 393 n. 18. Tax status is Cicero's *only* concern in 2 *Verr.*, 3.12-13, a point often ignored: Ferrary 1988, 5-23; cf. Pinzone 1999b. Compare the debate over the Illyrian cities' status: Derow 1991; Eckstein 1999. The *civitas libera*: Ferrary 1991; 1999.

<sup>20</sup> No 'free cities' in Sardinia-Corsica: Cic. *Scaur.* 44. Cf. Richardson 1986, 177-8 for the dichotomy of Roman control maintained either through 'constant warfare' (e.g., Hispaniae), or through 'a combination of continuous diplomacy and occasional open war' (e.g., Macedonia) Republican Sardinia: Portale et al. 2005; Van Dommelen 2007. Corsica: Zucca 1996, esp. 123-7.

<sup>21</sup> Sicilian élites: Campagna 2007; Deniaux 2007; Pittia 2004; Prag 2003; Rizzo 1980. Prosperity of Republican Sicily: Wilson 2000; Campagna 2006. Sardinian/Corsican triumphs: Mastino 2005, 100. Sicilian ovations: *Inscr. It.* 13.1.558, 562; sources in *MRR*. Gracchus' triumph: Livy 41.28.8. Forma could alternatively be a personification: for Sicily personified: *LIMC*

Of course a great deal more could be said. Subsequent developments in both islands offer considerably more information on Republican provincial government and exploitation: the *Verrines* in particular provide a wealth of information on both behaviour and attitudes; recent archaeological work in Sardinia throws no less important light, albeit of a different kind, on the nature of relations between the imperial power and imperial subjects. Other episodes, such as the Sicilian Slave Wars, are likewise instructive, and Sicily offers an interesting but little-studied example of Roman provincial coinage in the 2nd Century BC. But for a discussion of Roman imperialism the primary interest of the two great islands of the Mediterranean lies in seeking to understand the Roman decision in the 3rd Century to treat them as *provinciae* and what that entailed, for they lie at the beginning of a long tradition which became ever more central to the Roman conceptualisation and organisation of Empire. As Cicero said, Sicily (and, we might add, Sardinia) 'first out of all of them was named a province, the very glory of empire; and first taught our ancestors what a splendid thing it is to rule over foreign peoples.'<sup>22</sup>

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7.1.759-61, s.v. 'Sikelia'; for Sardinia there is only the eponymous divinity, Sardus Pater: *LIMC* 7.1.692-4, s.v. 'Sardos'; cf. Ostrowski 1990, 44-9. For Sicily and the developing concept of *provincia*: Prag 2012; cf. Purcell 1990; Lintott 1993, 22-42; Richardson 2008.

<sup>22</sup> Cic. 2*Verr.* 2.2: 'prima omnium, id quod ornamentum imperi est, provincia est appellata; prima docuit maiores nostros quam praeclarum esset exteris gentibus imperare.' The *Verrines*: papers in Dubouloz and Pittia 2007, and Prag 2007d. Sardinian archaeology: esp. Van Dommelen 1998, 2007; Bernardini 2006. The Slave Wars: sources in Shaw 2001; see Bradley 1989; Manganaro 1982. Romano-Sicilian coinage: Crawford 1985, 103-115; Frey-Kupper 2006, 42-3.





## THE SPAINS, 205–72 BC

*José Luis López Castro*

### 1. *A Long Conquest*

#### *The Beginnings of the Roman Domain up to 197 BC*

When the Second Punic War finished in the Iberian Peninsula, the territory controlled by the Roman armies was quite limited. With its main bases in Emporion and Tarraco they controlled the territory north of the Ebro up to the Pyrenees and a narrow corridor parallel to the Mediterranean coast in the eastern part and the south of the peninsula. The principal towns in those areas were Saguntum, Carthago Nova—the former Carthaginian capital—and the western Phoenician cities of Baria, Abdera, Sexi, Malaca, Carteia, and Gadir (Gades) on the Atlantic coast on the other side of the Straits of Gibraltar. In the interior of Hispania the Roman domain consisted mainly of the Baetis (Guadalquivir) valley from Castulo to Hispalis and Italica and down to Gadir/Gades on the coast.

But the Roman domain was not secure: Scipio himself, before returning to Rome in 206 BC had to subdue the Iberian Lacetani situated north of the river Ebro (Livy 28.32), and we know that there were Carthaginians caught in Saguntum while trying to recruit mercenaries (Livy 30.21.3). The control of Hispania stayed in the hands of L. Cornelius Lentulus and L. Manlius Acidinus (28.38.1), proconsuls at the head of two armies. From 205 until 200 they had to fight against Ilergetes and Ausetani in the northeast, which, once having submitted, paid taxes to Rome (Livy 29.2; 39.1; App. *Iber.* 38).

Also in the east there was resistance to the Romans, such as that of the Edetani conquered by C. Cornelius Cethegus (Livy 31.49.7). Between 200 and 198 the Roman commanders Cn Cornelius Blasio and L. Stertinius placed big exactions on the subjected Hispani. The year 197 marked the Roman intention of consolidating the domain in Hispania and of regulating administration by means of the establishment of two new *provinciae*, according to the current interpretation of the increase by the Senate from four to six praetors (Livy 32.27.7). C. Sempronius Tuditanus and M. Helvius dealt respectively with Hispania Citerior and with Hispania Ulterior, each with an army of 8,000 infantry and 400 cavalry.

*The Consolidation of the Provinces of Hispania: 197–155 BC*

The situation of the Hispani, subjected to taxes and constant exactions and supporting occupation garrisons, precipitated a new conflict that exploded in 197 (Livy 33.21.6) and involved the whole of the limited territory then dominated by Rome: the army of Hispania Citerior was defeated and its praetor Sempronius Tuditanus killed (Livy 33.25.8), whereas in *provincia* Ulterior, two Iberian kings, Culchas and Luxinius, and Turdetanian and Phoenician cities such as Carmo, Sexi, and Malaca also defied the Romans, forcing the retreat of the praetor Helvius.

In spite of the fact that the praetors of 196, Q. Fabius Buteo and Q. Minucius Thermus, came with reinforcements and obtained partial victories over the Iberian kings, attaining triumphs (Livy 33.44.4), the situation was far from being under control. In 195 Rome sent the consul M. Porcius Cato to Hispania with a strong army consisting of a fleet, two legions and 15,000 Italian *auxilia*, besides the reinforcements of the praetors of the year, Ap. Claudius Nero for Ulterior and P. Manlius for Citerior (33.43.5–8).

Cato initiated a long campaign in Hispania that developed firstly in the north-east, turning Tarraco into his operational headquarters. From there he organised expeditions against several cities which he subjected and forced to dismantle their walls, or they were besieged and conquered as was Segestica (Livy 34.17.2; site unknown: perhaps Segobriga?). Meanwhile, the praetors of both provinces joined their armies to face the Turdetani in Ulterior province, whose army was reinforced by Celtiberian mercenaries (Livy 34.17). As the praetors were defeated, the consul Cato drove his army to the south of Hispania where he undertook a victorious campaign, completing his work with the crushing of the last resistant Lacetani in the north-east (34.19–20). After restoring the Roman domain and assembling a large booty, of which he took nothing, Cato obtained a triumph in 194 (34.46.2).

In later decades, hostilities were constant in both Hispanic provinces, and the Roman domain spread progressively. The Senate annually designated governors belonging to the most aristocratic families of the Republic. During their commands they looked to the provinces for glory and booty. At the same time, the Lusitanians and other peoples of Hispania constituted a factor of destabilisation in their hostility to the Romans and continuous assaults on the southern regions already subjected to Rome, where the wealth was concentrated (cf. Livy 39.7.6). The praetor of *provincia* Ulterior in 193, L. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, defeated Lusitanians when

the province was attacked, and his successor in 192, M. Fulvius Nobilior, organised an expedition against the Vaccaeii, Vettones and Oretani, conquering the city of Toletum (34.43.6–7; 35.7.8).

We have news of the campaigns of 190 and 189 conducted by the praetor of Hispania Ulterior L. Aemilius Paulus (Livy 37.46.7) against the Lusitanians, possibly mercenaries of the Turdetani of Hasta Regia, as well as the campaigns of 188–187 of the praetor C. Atinius, who died during the siege of the city. The decade of 180 is brought to a close with the victory of L. Postumius Albinus in his campaign in the area of Munda and Certima (39.21; 40.47.1–2).

Concerning Citerior province, the praetor Q. Fulvius Flaccus undertook campaigns against the Celtiberians in 191 as well as against the Carpetani, that finished with the subjection of the area of Celtiberia south-west of the river Ebro as far as the Sierra Morena, conquering cities as important as Contrebia (Livy 40.30–39, App. *Iber.* 42). Livy (39.21.6–10; 39.30–31; 39.56.1) narrates the victories obtained against the Celtiberians and Carpetani in the decade of the 180s by praetors such as L. Manlius Acidinus Fulvianus, C. Calpurnius Piso, L. Quinctius Crispinus, and M. Terentius Varro.

A decisive stage in Roman dominion was the *praetura* in 180–179 of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus who, at the head of a new army of 14,000 men, conquered an important number of Celtiberian and Carpetanian cities (Livy 40.35.10–36). He established agreements with the defeated that included the payment of taxes to Rome, the contribution of auxiliary troops to the Roman army and the prohibition of extending fortifications (App. *Iber.* 43–44).

He also came to peace agreements with the non-subject Arevaci. Gracchus' campaigns meant the extension of the province to the regions of the upper Duero and the upper Tagus up to the Ebro. In spite of these agreements, we have word of new clashes with the Celtiberians in 175, defeated by Ap. Claudius Centho (Livy 41.26.1, 28.3) and in 170, whereas in Ulterior fighting continued against the Lusitanians in 163 (Livy, *Per.* 43, 46; Flor. 1.33.13).

### *The Lusitanian and Celtiberian Wars, 155–133*

A series of hard conflicts with the Lusitanians and Celtiberians marked the central years of the 2nd Century, culminating in a war of sizable proportions. In 155, a chief named Punicus was at the head of the Lusitanians. He established an alliance with their neighbours the Vettones, and they together attacked the Iberians of the south in the Roman Ulterior province.

In their expedition they advanced to the Mediterranean coast and defeated the praetors M'. Manilius and L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, who lost 6,000 men, though Punicus also died in the combat (App. *Iber.* 56).

The new leader of the Lusitanians called Kaisaros was initially defeated by the praetor L. Mummius in 153, but he moved back into the northern region after inflicting a defeat on the Romans. Mummius chased the Lusitanians and managed to recover the standards and part of the booty (Diod. 31.42; App. *Iber.* 56). Another Lusitanian group commanded by Kaukainos conquered the city of Conistorgis in the south-west, and then crossed to Zilis in the north of Africa (*Iber.* 57). Crossing the Straits of Gibraltar, Mummius defeated this Lusitanian army and celebrated a triumph in Rome for his victories.

In 152 the new praetor, M. Atilius Serranus, defeated the Lusitanians and took a city Appian names Oxthrakai (*Iber.* 58). Though immediately afterwards peace was established, in 151 the Lusitanians again attacked the cities in the south of Hispania. The praetor of Ulterior, Ser. Sulpicius Galba, had to shelter in Carmo when his army was defeated (*Iber.* 58). In the following year (150) Galba offered lands to the Lusitanians, who, after surrendering their weapons, were massacred in great number (*Iber.* 59–60).

The war with the Celtiberians began in 154 when the city of Segeda, contrary to the agreement with Sempronius Gracchus, constructed fortifications and attacked the territory of the Titthi with the support of the Arevaci. Rome decided to send the consul Q. Fulvius Nobilior with 30,000 soldiers who faced the Segedenses and Arevaci under the command of their chief Karos. The Romans were unable to defeat them (*Iber.* 45) and the Arevaci moved back to their city of Numantia, which was besieged fruitlessly by the army of Nobilior during the winter. The Romans received reinforcements of 8,000 men of infantry and 500 of cavalry, sent to the province under the command of the consul M. Claudius Marcellus. Several Celtiberian cities surrendered and agreed a truce in order to send ambassadors to Rome to negotiate peace. Meanwhile, Marcellus in coordination with the praetor of Ulterior, attacked the Lusitanians, taking the city of Nertobriga (*Iber.* 48–50).

In Rome the Senate agreed finally to continue the war and a new army was sent under the command of the consul of 151, Licinius Lucullus. Nevertheless, Marcellus had already agreed peace terms with the Celtiberians and with Numantia, after receiving 600 talents of silver (*Iber.* 50). For this reason Lucullus, having found the Celtiberians at peace on his arrival, attacked the Vaccaeii. These concentrated in Cauca, and though they agreed

to the peace with the Roman consul, the city was plundered and the inhabitants massacred. Lucullus later blocked the cities of Intercatia and Pallantia (*Iber.* 51–53), though without success. Then he went to Lusitania to conduct a campaign during the winter of 151–150.

In 147 the Lusitanians returned to plunder Turdetania and resumed the war under the command of Viriathus, who had survived the slaughter arranged by Galba (*App. Iber.* 62). They defeated the praetor C. Vetilius, who had to shelter in Carteia until he received reinforcements (*Iber.* 63). In 146 Viriathus plundered Carpetania and defeated the praetor C. Plautius Hypsaesus twice, forcing him to withdraw to the southern region. The situation created by Viriathus resulted in Rome sending a consular army to Hispania in 145 commanded by Q. Fabius Maximus Aemilianus. In the following year he obtained partial successes in Ulterior, but the Lusitanian war was by no means at an end (*Iber.* 65).

In 143 Viriathus managed to unite Celtiberians and Lusitanians against Rome, in a war that would reach large proportions. This year Rome sent a Laelius or Nigidius to Citerior, and Quinctius to Ulterior, as praetors, the latter obtaining some successes over the Lusitanians. Viriathus then attacked the region of Bastetania forcing Quinctius to withdraw to Corduba. The Roman Senate again sent a consul to Hispania, Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, at the head of an army of more than 30,000 soldiers. He managed to divide the Celtiberians from the Lusitanians and conquer the city of Contrebia in 142 (*Livy, Per.* 53).

In 141 the consul Q. Pompeius went against Numantia and was initially defeated. His command was extended in 140 and he tried to surround the city, though again he failed (*App. Iber.* 78). The same year Q. Fabius Maximus Servilianus came to Ulterior at the head of an army of approximately 20,000 men. Fabius went against Viriathus at Tucci, in Bastetania, but he was beaten by the Lusitanians in the first combat (*Iber.* 67). The Roman proconsul continued the campaign in the south-west, defeating groups of Lusitanians and chasing Viriathus. Finally, Fabius reached a peace agreement with him, recognising the independence of the Lusitanians (*Iber.* 69).

Nevertheless, the praetor of 140, Cn. Servilius Caepio, brother of Fabius, did not recognise the agreement and reinitiated the war, chasing Viriathus towards Carpetania and then to the north of Lusitania. The consul M. Popillius Laenas also attacked Viriathus' army from Citerior in 139. The Lusitanian chief requested a peace agreement and, while it was being negotiated, Caepio persuaded Viriathus' deputies, Audax, Ditalco, and Minurus to murder their chief (*Iber.* 74).

After Viriathus' death and the defeat of the Lusitanians, the Romans could initiate the conquest of the north-west regions. In 138 the expedition of the consul D. Iunius Brutus began, who for several years commanded an army whose mission was to quell the Lusitanians and the Callaeci, from the basin of the Tagus up to the river Miño in a hard campaign (*Iber.* 72). Brutus obtained a triumph and the title of Callaicus.

The Celtiberians continued the resistance against Rome at Numantia. The consul Popillius Laenas was defeated by the city in 139, as was his successor C. Hostilius Mancinus in 137, who was forced to sign a peace by the inhabitants of Numantia recognising its autonomy (App. *Iber.* 80). The treaty was annulled by the Senate, which brought Mancinus to trial, sending meanwhile his colleague M. Aemilius Lepidus Porcina to Hispania. But Lepidus attacked the Vaccae, disobeying the orders of the Senate, and was defeated, for which he was recalled and later fined (App. *Iber.* 80–81). The senators agreed to deliver Mancinus to the Numantines before the doors of the city in 136. The war continued with a new defeat of the consul of 135, Q. Calpurnius Piso (Obsequens 26).

The setbacks in the Numantine war caused Rome serious political problems. Acclaimed by the *plebs*, but without the explicit support of the Senate, Scipio Aemilianus was elected consul again for 134, his mission being to finish the war. Scipio called on to his Italian and African *clientelae* to assemble troops and money, and even brought elephants under the command of the Numidian prince Jugurtha. Besides his brother Q. Fabius Maximus Aemilianus, a retinue of friends accompanied him in his campaign, including the historian Polybius, the poet Lucilius, and the young C. Gracchus and C. Marius.

After restoring discipline in the Roman army that was surrounding Numantia, he plundered and destroyed the fields of the Vaccae, who were supplying the Numantines. His aim was to obtain the Numantines' surrender by starvation: he established seven camps around the city, surrounding it with pits, palisades and a wall with towers and blocking the river Duero that flows close to Numantia. After fifteen months of siege the Numantines were in a desperate situation and they asked for a conditional peace, but Scipio was only ready to accept an unconditional surrender. Driven to cannibalism, the survivors had to surrender and the city was destroyed (App. *Iber.* 84–89).

A separate chapter in the domain of Hispania was the conquest of the island of Majorca, the most important of the Balearic islands, famous for its mercenary slingers. It was not dominated by Rome and was serving also

as a refuge for pirates; the Senate entrusted its conquest to the consul of 123, Q. Caecilius Metellus. After a year of campaigning, he obtained a triumph and the title of Balaricus (Livy, *Per.* 60; Flor. 1.43).

In spite of the victory of Rome over Viriathus and Numantia, there were still wide zones of the western plateau and of the north-west of Hispania unconquered. We have an isolated report of a war against the Lusitanians at the end of the 2nd Century that possibly extended even until 93. In 114, when C. Marius served as praetor of Hispania Ulterior, there was a campaign against the Lusitanians (Plut. *Mar.* 6.1) and a little later, in 112, the praetor of the same province, L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi, died fighting against them (App. *Iber.* 99).

In 109 Servilius Caepio obtained a triumph over the Lusitanians (Val. Max. 6.9.13), though some years later, in 105, a Roman army was destroyed fighting again against them (Obsequens 42). The *Tabula Alcantarensis*, a bronze inscription of 104, reports the *deditio* of an *oppidum* of the Lusitanians or the Vettones, testifying to the slow progression of the Roman domain (AE 1984, 495). We have also isolated information of fighting against Celtiberians between 97 and 93, especially the campaigns of T. Didius, with the capture of the Arevacan city of Colenda (App. *Iber.* 100). Therefore, it would not be until the beginning of the 1st Century that Roman rule was definitively imposed on the Lusitanians and Celtiberians and guaranteed the control of the Tagus and Duero river basins.

### *The War of Sertorius*

After more than one century of Roman presence, the Hispanic provinces turned into a place of refuge and supply for Romans involved in the civil wars of the 1st Century. In 87, M. Licinius Crassus sheltered in Ulterior. There he was able to recruit an army of 2,500 men, and plundered the city of Malaca (Plut. *Crass.* 4–6). But apart from this episode, a long conflict took place in Hispania: the Sertorian War. Q. Sertorius, who had taken part in the campaigns of T. Didius against the Celtiberians, played an important role in the civil war in favour of Marius. He was praetor of Citerior in 83, and on the occasion of the coming to power of Sulla the dictator, sheltered in Hispania in 81, from where he was chased by the Sullans, to flee to the north of Africa (Plut. *Sert.* 6–7).

He returned to Hispania the following year, assembled a new army with Lusitanians and Romans and defeated the Roman governors supporting Sulla. Rome sent Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius in 79 with an army, but Sertorius kept him blocked in Ulterior fighting against the Lusitanians, while he

managed to attract many Celtiberians who saw in the Sertorian cause a possibility of going against Rome.

Many Hispanic cities embraced Sertorius' cause, because of which he was able to control a good part of Citerior as far as the Mediterranean coast (Plut. *Sert.* 12–16). In 77 the Senate sent a new army to Hispania under the leadership of Cn. Pompeius Magnus, to join forces with Metellus against the Sertorians. After some initial successes by Sertorius' army, Pompeius finally crushed the rebellion in 72 (Plut. *Pomp.* 17–20). The Hispanic cities were divided in feelings and some of them held out even after Sertorius was murdered by some of his supporters.

## 2. *The Administration of the Hispanic Provinces and the Exploitation of Resources*

During most of the 2nd Century a complex administrative structure did not exist, and the administration of the Hispanic territories dominated by Rome was left to the praetors and their personal retinue. The functions of the praetor, a magistrate with *imperium*, consisted essentially in the control of the army assigned to the province, the administration of justice, and the collection of the taxes fixed on the subject communities. He had absolute power during his annual command, and in the course of the military campaigns he established the conditions of surrender of defeated peoples, and sealed agreements and treaties.

Only a later decision of the Roman Senate could deprive him of his authority. The praetor was helped in exercising his power by the quaestor, a junior magistrate without *imperium*, entrusted mainly with administering the economic resources, but he could substitute for the praetor and take occasional command of troops. Every province received the governor in cities that were the capitals of the provinces: Corduba was the capital of Ulterior, and Carthago Nova and Tarraco the capitals of Citerior.

Rome imposed the conditions of dominion on the cities and communities of Hispania as a consequence of the vicissitudes of the conquest. Most of them surrendered to the Romans in *deditio*, an unconditional surrender, for which they were called *dediticii*. Though Rome respected their laws and customs, the territories and resources of the subject peoples were considered juridically as Roman *ager publicus* inside the *solum provinciale*. The subjected communities could continue enjoying possession in exchange for the payment of taxes to Rome. Inscriptions such as the bronze of Lascuta (CIL 2.5401: 189 BC) and the *Tabula Alcantarensis* (AE 1984, 495: 104 BC)



show how the Roman commanders returned the properties to the subjected peoples 'as long as the people of Rome wishes'. During times of war, they had to maintain Roman garrisons under the orders of a *praefectus*.

The obligation of the payment of the *stipendium*, a tax destined for the payment and maintenance of the Roman troops in every province, was met by the communities who were called *stipendiarii*. There were exceptions; the Romans established agreements with Hispanic allied cities termed *foederati* who were exempt from the payment of taxes. The *civitates liberae* (free from tax-payment) were also an exception. Besides the *stipendium*, the subjected cities had to pay other taxes on the crops: the *decima* or the *vicesima* (10 or 5%), as well as the *vectigal* on other resources like mines or salt mines belonging to the Roman *ager publicus*.

There are differences between modern historians on the moment in which the payment of the *stipendium* became fixed, whether at the beginning of the conquest with Scipio, or later under the command of Roman governors such as Cato or Ti. Sempronius Gracchus. In any case the sources report detailed quantities of the booty taken to Rome by the governors during the first decades of the conquest. The immense power they exerted could cause not a few situations of abuse of the vanquished, some of which have been transmitted by the sources. We know about the embassy sent to the Roman Senate by the Gaditanes in 199 to ask for the withdrawal of the *praefectus* of the city and probably of the garrison under his command (Livy 32.7).

Likewise Livy (43.2) reports the Hispanic embassy sent in 171 that complained about the treatment received from the Roman governors. Two of them, P. Furius and M. Matienus, were seriously accused for their abuses, but the Senate only punished them with exile near Rome. The Senate decided to name as *patroni* of the Hispani, to represent them, Cato, Scipio Nasica, Aemilius Paulus and C. Sulpicius Galus. It also limited the prerogatives of the praetors to dispose in Hispania of the collection of the *vicesima* in wheat.

The sources also record, on two occasions at least, the sending of senatorial commissions to Hispania to arrange administrative matters. The first one, formed by ten senators, came after the Numantine war in 133 BC (App. *Iber.* 99), in order to arrange the new territories incorporated into the province after the Celtiberian and Lusitanian wars. The second one has been placed by modern scholars towards 93 in relation to the ending of the war recorded in the previous decades against Celtiberians and Lusitanians (App. *Iber.* 99–100). By then the Roman domain had already spread to most

Hispanic territory except the extreme north, occupied by the Callaeci, Astures and Cantabri, who would not be subjected until the Augustan period.

The main resources exploited by Rome during the conquest were mining. Diverse ancient authors notice the importance of the mining resources of Hispania and its exploitation by the Phoenicians up to the arrival of Italians with the conquest (Diod. 5.36–38, Pliny, *HN* 33.31.96–97). Forty thousand people worked at the mines near New Carthage which yielded 25,000 drachmas a day for Rome (Strabo 3.2.10, C147–8). The big mining areas of Sierra Morena, Carthago Nova, and the south-west of Hispania soon became property of the Roman state which regulated their exploitation, especially by means of *locationes*: hiring mines to companies of *publicani* (contractors) who paid a part of the revenues or *vectigal* to the Roman state, using a massive slave workforce. Likewise there were small individual exploitations for *possessores* in the 1st Century (Strabo, *ibid.*).

Italian trade had an increasing role in Hispania during the 2nd Century and especially in the 1st. From the beginning of the conquest it contributed to the supply of the numerous military contingents established permanently in Hispania. The sources record the early presence of *mercatores* and *redemptores* accompanying Roman armies in diverse episodes of the Second Punic War (Livy 28.22), Cato's campaign of 195 (Livy 34.9.12), and in the Numantine siege (App. *Iber.* 85).

They traded with Hispanic products such as metals, or buying war booty from the soldiers, including the numerous slaves captured in military campaigns, as recorded in the Second Punic War (Livy 27.19), Cato's and Terentius Varro's campaigns of 195 and 184 (34.21.1–6; 39.42), and at Numantia (App. *Iber.* 98). The archaeological record shows the increasing importation of Italian wine, documented by *amphorae* and wares from the principal Hispanic ports: Emporion, Carthago Nova, Ebusus, and Gades, from where the Italian products would be redistributed to the rest of the provincial territories. In the same way, Hispanic products like the salt fish of the southern littoral and the incipient production of Hispanic wine are recorded in Italy and other regions of the Empire, especially in the 1st Century.

### 3. *Italic Immigration*

The combination of the military and economic activities had consequences at a social level: with the extension of the clientelism between the senatorial Roman families and the local élites we must add the increasing

immigration of individuals of Roman and Italian origin to the Hispanic provinces. The sources document in particular some agreements *in fidem* or *deditiones in fidem* that linked figures as prominent as Scipio Africanus with cities like Gadir/Gades (Livy 28.23.8), or with the Iberian prince Cerdubelus of Castulo (28.20.11), as well as the political agreements of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus with the Celtiberians. Officially the Roman Senate promoted these relations since the appointment of *patroni* for the Hispanic provinces came from among the senators who had governed formerly.

Besides the individual episodes of immigration, which are more difficult to find in the literary and epigraphic sources, we have information about colonial settlements in the Hispanic provinces in different historical circumstances. There is a first group of settlements whose colonial status in juridical terms is doubtful or non-existent. It is made up of ancient Hispanic cities in which the Roman commanders established groups of veterans, in several cases giving their names to the new settlements, on the occasion of the ending of military campaigns.

Italica, according to Appian (*Iber.* 38), was founded in 206 by P. Cornelius Scipio, consisting of veterans from Italy. The foundation of two cities is attributed to Ti. Sempronius Gracchus: Iliturgi in Ulterior, after his campaigns of 180–179, according to an inscription from the imperial period (*CIL*<sup>2</sup> 2.7, no. 32), and Gracchuris in Citerior after his campaigns of 179–178 (Livy, *Per.* 41). In the same way Strabo would link the foundation of a colony in Corduba with M. Claudius Marcellus (3.2.1, C141) also on the occasion of one of his governorships in Hispania: in 169–168 or else in 152–151. The foundation of other colonies like Brutobriga (Steph. Byz. 87 Meineke) and Valentia in Citerior (Livy, *Per.* 55, cf. App. *Iber.* 71–73) have been attributed to D. Iunius Brutus on the occasion of his campaigns in the province between 138 and 133. However, there is no substantiated information on the existence of colonial status confirmed by the Roman Senate in the cities mentioned.

The colonies founded in the 2nd Century with a real colonial status are small in number. The most ancient of which we have sure information is Carteia, which was founded in 171 by a decision of the Senate (Livy 43.3). This was the response to the emissaries of approximately four thousand sons of Roman soldiers and autochthonous women, who addressed the Senate asking for 'a city in which to live'. Together with the former Phoenician inhabitants of Carteia, they constituted the first colony of Latin right (*ius Latii*) founded outside Italy. We possess also verified information on

the colonies of Palma and Pollentia, founded on the island of Majorca by Metellus Balearicus, with 3,000 colonists coming from Hispania after the conquest of the Balearics in 123–122 (Mela, *Geography* 2.124–25; Strabo 3.5.1, C167; Pliny, *HN* 3.77).

For the colonial foundations of the 1st Century the same problems are raised: they would be contingents of veterans settled in autochthonous cities on finishing military campaigns, which often adopted the name of the Roman commander. The doubtful foundation of Valeria in Citerior has been associated with C. Valerius Flaccus and his campaign of 92 against the Celtiberians, without any proof other than that of the name of the Roman commander. Two other foundations of the Sertorian war were Metelinum, which owes its name to Q. Caecilius Metellus, on campaign in the Lusitanian region in 80–79, and Pompaelo, founded by Cn. Pompeius in the north of Hispania in 75–74. Both must have been *civitates peregrinae* at the time of the settlement of Roman veterans.

During the 1st Century increasing numbers of Romans and Italians settled in Hispania, the development of the *clientelae* between the provincial élites and their desire for complete integration into the Roman state placed Hispania at the heart of the civil confrontations that were going to determine the end of the Republic and accelerate the process of Romanisation.

## HEGEMONY AND ANNEXATION BEYOND THE ADRIATIC, 230–146 BC

*Arthur Eckstein*

### 1. *Introduction: Empire, Hegemony, Sphere of Influence*

Did the Roman Republic establish an empire in the Greek East from the 180s BC, with the defeat of the great Hellenistic monarchies of Macedon and Syria—or, on the contrary, did empire take long to develop? For hundreds of years, the ancient Mediterranean was a world of multipolar anarchy, the prevalent form of international life since organized polities first came into existence. Polybius, the Greek historian of the rise of Rome, asserted that with the destruction of the Macedonian monarchy in 168/167 the entire Mediterranean came under Rome's universal rule (*arché*), for this removal of its last serious competitor radically changed the distribution of power in Rome's favour (cf. Pol. 1.1.5). Cato the Elder said something similar in a public speech in 167: the destruction of Macedon had transformed a situation where Rome was predominant among other large powers into a situation where there was only one overwhelming power—Rome. Yet in 167, and when Polybius was writing ca. 150, there existed not a single Roman-administered province in the East, not a single Roman army—not even any Roman diplomats. Polybius' Roman *arché* consisted entirely of legally independent states. And with the vast majority Rome had only informal 'friendship' (*philia* in Greek; *amicitia* in Latin), not even treaties.<sup>1</sup>

Unlike in the West, Rome clearly had no formal empire in the East in this period; but did it have an 'informal empire'? So modern scholars claim, some of whom push its creation-date back into the early 180s or even 190s. The basic elements of 'informal empire' are clear: annexations and direct political control are avoided; power is extended subtly—via prestige, influence, persuasion, intimidation (backed by the occasional military expedition). In this manner weaker states are drawn into what Robinson and

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<sup>1</sup> Multipolar anarchy: Waltz 1979. Cato's speech: Gellius 6.1.3 = Cato, *ORF*, frg. 164; Kallet-Marx 1995, 26–7. Situation in 150; Gruen 1984, ch. 2.

Gallagher call 'an invisible empire of informal sway.' A striking phrase: but what exactly is meant by it?<sup>2</sup>

Michael Doyle defines 'empire' as one state's effective political control over both a subordinate state's external and internal policies. Anything less is not empire, but something less. Thus when a metropole seeks to continuously control weaker neighbors' foreign relations but leaves their internal policies and politics alone, Doyle argues that this should not be categorised as empire but as mere 'hegemony'. And when a metropole merely sets occasional limits to the foreign relations of weaker neighbors, this should be categorised as mere 'sphere of influence'. Doyle's analytical distinctions are little known among modern students of antiquity, but have been very influential among theorists of international relations. Jack Donnelly emphasises that: 'The political life of a hegemonized state that controls its own internal policy is very different from that of an imperialized polity that does not.' Moreover, '*influence* is simply not *rule*', and it is analytically misleading to confuse the two.<sup>3</sup>

Another interstate power-configuration is called 'unipolarity' by political scientists, in which 'the sole remaining superpower' has become the center of an interstate system. Rome had achieved this by 188, becoming the sole remaining Mediterranean superpower. But unipolarity, too, does not equal empire—and not necessarily even hegemony. It is both ambiguous and fragile.

'The essence of empire is control.' But as a description of relationships in the real world, the meaning of 'control' is not always clear. The situation becomes especially complex if such 'control' is said to be exercised only informally. Yet modern scholars of antiquity use the term as if its meaning is obvious, uniform, and all-encompassing. We will need to be more careful.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Mandell 1989 and 1991 (creation-date of 196 BC); Derow 2003 (188); Robinson and Gallagher 1961, 9 (on Britain's 'informal empire' in the mid-19th Century).

<sup>3</sup> Doyle 1986, 30-47, with chart on p. 44. Doyle's impact: Watson 1992, 16-18, 27-8, 122-8; Donnelly 2006, 156, 158 (quoted, with my emphases).

<sup>4</sup> Unipolarity theory: Kapstein and Mastanduno 1999; Ikenberry 2002; Mowle and Sacko 2007. Unipolar Rome: Eckstein 2008, ch. 9. 'Empire is control': Thornton 1965, 36; cf. Doyle 1986, 30; Miles 1990, 639-40. Assertions of Roman direct or indirect 'control' over other states (total control is implied): Badian 1968, 11; Dahlheim 1977, 122; Harris 1979, 162; Will 1982, 421; cf. Derow 2003, 65-6.

## 2. *Rome and Illyria (230–217)*

Roman military expeditions across the Adriatic in 229 and 219 to suppress piracy and aggression from the Illyrian Ardiaei were, for Polybius, harbingers of the *symploké*—the growing ‘interconnectedness’ between the eastern and western Mediterranean. This is one of the two great themes of his History; the other is of course the growth of Roman power.

With the defeat of the Ardiaei in 229/228, Rome sent embassies to major states in Greece that had been threatened by the Illyrians: the Aetolian League, the Achaean League, and Athens. But the Romans did not pursue these contacts; and after both expeditions no Roman troops or ships were left in Illyria.

Prominent scholars have posited, however, that these expeditions resulted in a ‘protectorate’ in Illyria, stretching some 400 miles from south to north and reaching 75 miles inland. A term derived from 19th Century European imperialism (hence, perhaps, its attractiveness), its definition—‘a bordered political space that has lost both its sovereignty as a whole and its internal administration into the control of an imperial power’—does not, however, describe Illyria. The seven polities coming into informal ‘friendship’ with Rome were in no case bound to Rome by treaty, were widely separated along a rugged coast (in fact three were islands off the coast—Corcyra, Pharos, and Issa), and worried about whether Rome would protect them from continuing Ardiaean aggression (Pol. 2.11.5)—which from the mid-220s the Romans, distracted by war with the Celts in northern Italy, did not do. It seems that the Roman expeditions led (in Doyle’s terminology) to an informal sphere of influence among polities on the Illyrian coast—but nothing more developed than that.<sup>5</sup>

## 3. *The first War between Rome and Macedon (214–205)*

The Romans had no previous dealings with Macedon; their actions in Illyria did not infringe upon Macedon, which had never controlled that coast, and the war was caused by startling Roman weakness. King Philip V was the aggressor, seeking to exploit the disasters inflicted on Rome by

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<sup>5</sup> Polybius’ *symploké*: Walbank 1975/1985. Roman-Illyrian affairs: Eckstein 2008, ch. 2. ‘Protectorate’: Abernethy 1986, 109; Taylor 1994, 151–62 (meaning); Holleaux 1928, 836–7; Hammond 1968, 7–9, and 1989, 23; Wilkes 1992, 162. Despite Derow 1991, it is clear that none of these places ever possessed a formal treaty of alliance with the Romans: see Eckstein 1999. Doyle’s terminology: Doyle 1986, 44.

Hannibal. This was the harsh nature of Hellenistic interstate politics. Indeed, while Polybius is clear that the Roman Republic was militaristic and aggressive, he is equally clear that the ferocious expansionism of Philip played a major rôle in his confrontations with Rome—and thus in the *symplokê*.

Becoming king in 221, aged seventeen, Philip proved to be an outstanding general against the Aetolian League, but Hannibal's victory at Lake Trasimene turned his thoughts from Greece to expansion in the West—and even, we are told, to world domination (Pol. 5.101.10, 102.1, 104.7, 108.5; 15.24.6). Polybius views his decision as world-historical. First, it attracted Rome's negative attention to Macedon and Greece (7.11–14). Second, a major policy decision in the East was for the first time made on the basis of events in the West. To Polybius, this marked the moment (summer 217) when the *symplokê* began to develop.

The verbatim text of Philip's treaty with Carthage in 215 (Pol. 7.9) shows that he primarily wanted Illyria. Polybius stresses the Romans' fear that he would attack Italy (5.105.8). In fact the *Patres* in autumn 215 doubled the size of the fleet that guarded the Adriatic coast—which fended off Philip. Philip then invaded Illyria by land, and by 212 had seized the port of Lissus and begun to build a fleet. The Romans, fearful, responded by creating a war against him in Greece, drawing the Aetolians into alliance in autumn 211. That the Aetolians had sworn a peace with Philip in 217, a peace which he had not broken, was evidently of little moment.<sup>6</sup>

The Roman-Aetolian alliance, known from literary sources and from an inscriptional copy, shows the continuing lack of Roman interest in territorial dominion east of the Adriatic: Aetolia would keep any cities taken from Philip while Rome got merely the moveable loot. Rome's primary gain was strategic: diverting Philip from the Adriatic (Livy 26.24.16, 28.1–2). But Philip defeated the Aetolians in 206, and in 205 made a compromise peace with Rome in which he kept much of his inland Illyrian conquests.

That either side desired to renew the conflict is unlikely. Rome's revived power made the West unattractive for Philip. Nor, despite some scholars, was the Senate after 205 eager to renew war. It did not plot long-range strategies but, like any ancient government, lurched from crisis to crisis in a harsh world; and if the *Patres* foresaw another clash, why allow Philip time to rebuild his army, treasury and a more powerful fleet—all of which occurred? In fact the Peace of 205 prevented Philip's involvement in Italy,

<sup>6</sup> Illyria and Macedon: Dell 1970, 119–22; Errington 1989, 91; Eckstein 2008, 63–4. Punicisms in Polybius' version of Philip's treaty with Carthage: Bickerman 1952; Barré 1983.



and, with this limited goal achieved, the Romans again withdrew all their forces from east of the Adriatic.<sup>7</sup>

#### 4. *The Crisis in the Greek State-system and the Second War between Rome and Macedon*

The fragile balance of power existing since the 280s between the eastern Mediterranean's three great Greek monarchies—the Antigonids based in Macedon, the Seleucids based in Syria and Mesopotamia, and the Ptolemies based in Egypt—began to shift after 207 as the Ptolemaic régime began to fall apart. Philip V and Antiochus III of Syria allied to dismember and destroy it utterly (winter 203–202). There is every reason to accept Polybius' report of their treaty, including a newly-discovered inscription from Asia Minor showing their military cooperation. Second-tier Greek states, confronting this bid for hegemony and desperate for help, turned to Rome. In autumn 201, envoys from four Greek states appeared before the Senat, appealing for Roman intervention in the East.

It was an extraordinary scene. These embassies—from Pergamum, Rhodes, the Ptolemies, and Athens—were the catalysts of a new world. Without them, Rome would not have got involved in the crisis. When the proposal for intervention came before the people's assembly, it was attacked as an unnecessary war—and the populace voted it down. P. Sulpicius Galba, one of the consuls of 200, pleaded for the assembly to reconsider, arguing not on the basis of Roman glory, or booty, or expansion, but on the threat posed by Philip's Macedon engorged with new power. The assembly reluctantly agreed to warn Philip and Antiochus against further aggression. This, then, was a preventive war of choice. Antiochus went along with the Romans and by 196 was a Friend of the Roman People (*amicus populi Romani*). Philip refused the ultimatum—and the result was war.

The war took the form of a Roman offensive against Philip; it was not an easy one, although Rome gained both the Aetolian League and the Achaean League as allies, and in the end led a very large coalition of Greeks against the Macedonian king. Defeated badly at Cynoscephalae in 197 by

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<sup>7</sup> Roman-Aetolian alliance: Schmitt 1969, 258–66. Senate after 205 eager to renew war: Harris 1979, 207–9; Rich 1984, 151; Errington 1989, 106; Derow 2003, 58. Against this: Astin 1968; Eckstein 1987, especially xix–xxi, 319–24.

T. Quinctius Flaminius (with significant help from the Aetolians), Philip eventually sued for peace.<sup>8</sup>

### 5. *'The Freedom of the Greeks'*

Flaminius' relatively moderate settlement with Macedon cost the kingdom only its outlying provinces. The Aetolians, whose own power would thus still be balanced by Macedon, were furious. The crucial question was what to do with European Greece proper. To make it into a province seems never to have occurred to anyone; nor did the Senate consider establishing a permanent and multi-tasked alliance in Greece with Rome at its head—a tool used by Macedon in Greece since the 330s. Flaminius instead convinced the Senate to proclaim the freedom of all Greek states—and then to withdraw from Greece completely. We saw this pattern above in Illyria and again after the First Macedonian War. And so at Corinth in summer 196 Flaminius announced the Isthmian Declaration: 'the Freedom of the Greeks', not only from Macedonian hegemony but from all foreign garrisons, from all taxes imposed by any foreign great state, and freedom to live under their own traditional constitutions (Pol. 18.46.5).

We should not think this mere hypocrisy, or the numerous honours which followed to Rome and Flaminius as servility from frightened Greeks. Polybius, while critical of Roman oppression after 168/167, judged that in the 190s 'it was a wonderful thing that the Romans incurred the risks and expense of war for the sake of the liberty of the Hellenes' (18.46.14). Attalus I of Pergamum died in 197 'while engaged in the most noble enterprise of fighting for the cause of Greek freedom' (18.41.9, cf. 21.20.5). Such statements make no sense if Polybius thought that the Greeks simply exchanged one master for another. And above all there is the Roman withdrawal in 194: no Greek great power had ever done anything similar in such circumstances.

The 'Freedom of the Greeks' meant that the Romans would rely on Greek goodwill for security in the East—a dangerous policy. The Senate did expect that Roman wishes in Greece (assuming there were any) would be accommodated, and soon made it clear to Antiochus III that it would brook no competitor for influence there. European Greece, like

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<sup>8</sup> Philip's and Antiochus' treaty: Dreyer 2003; Eckstein 2008, ch. 4. Pergamum and Rhodes: Eckstein 2008, ch. 5. The embassies to Rome: Pol. 15.20.5-6; 16.30-34; Livy 31.16-19; Eckstein 2005; 2006b, ch. 7; and 2008, ch. 6. Galba's speech: Livy 31.6-7; its historicity: Quillin 2004.

Illyria, became (in Doyle's terms) a Roman sphere of influence—but no more.<sup>9</sup>

### 6. *The War with Antiochus and Its Consequences (192–188)*

Antiochus III was as warlike and adventurous as Philip—and had been much more successful. Calling himself Antiochus the Great and (Persian-style) 'the Great King', by 194 he dominated the vast territory from Afghanistan to the west coast of Asia Minor (except for Pergamum), and had crossed into Europe and was conquering Thrace. And he had Hannibal as a military advisor.

The Roman withdrawal from Greece was thus a major strategic mistake—as Scipio Africanus warned (Livy 34.43.4–5). It created a power-vacuum, and talks with Rome failed to establish recognized spheres of influence. Then in 192 the Aetolian League, dissatisfied with its gains from the war with Philip, called Antiochus to Greece as its champion. This typically ruthless Hellenistic conduct led to the collapse of the system set up by Flamininus and the Isthmian Declaration. Many Greek polities went over to Antiochus; only the Achaean League, Athens, and Philip remained aloof. Soon a Roman army arrived in Greece—for the Senate was not going to allow Antiochus' action to go unanswered. Philip now sided with Rome, as did Achaea. Antiochus was driven from Greece; during 191–189 Philip—with Roman consent—seized many polities in central Greece that had sided with Antiochus; meanwhile, the Achaeans conquered the entire Peloponnese, including Sparta.<sup>10</sup>

Both the Aetolian League and Antiochus III were defeated by 189. The period of system-wide crisis and system-wide war originating ca. 207 with the collapse of the Ptolemies ended, replaced by the new geopolitical structure in the Hellenistic East: Roman military and political preponderance. The decisions in the peace treaty sworn at Apamea in 188 rested fundamentally with the Romans. Antiochus lost his warfleet, and his western frontier was pushed back to the Taurus Range. But the Greek allies' strenuous and significant military contributions, and the Senate's uninterest in

<sup>9</sup> Rome's alleged 'Hellenic Symmachy': Ferrary 1988, 88–91, cf. Mastrocinque 1983, 103. See, rather, Larsen 1935, 205; Eckstein 2008, 285–7. Greek servility: e.g., Mandell 1989; Derow 2003, 62. Roman withdrawal in 194: Eckstein 2008, 283–302; Pfeilschifter 2005, 278–302.

<sup>10</sup> Hannibal at Antiochus' court: Grainger 2002, 121–2. Negotiations with Rome: Grainger 2002; Dreyer 2007; Eckstein 2008, ch. 8. Collapse of Flamininus' system: Eckstein 2008, 325–7. Philip's victories: Walbank 1940, 200–17.

territorial expansion east of the Adriatic, meant that, while the Roman Republic now emerged as the sole remaining superpower in the Mediterranean, its allies all became more powerful themselves. Pergamum gained a large swathe of Asia Minor, Rhodes an enlarged dominion along Asia Minor's southern coast. The Achaean conquest of the Peloponnese was accepted at Rome. Macedon received significant territory, including the important city of Demetrias on the Aegean—though Philip was not satisfied. The Senate again ignored the opportunity to convert its grand *ad hoc* coalition into a permanent organization, and only the Achaean League received a formal treaty of alliance. The rest, including Macedon, Pergamum, Rhodes and Egypt, remained linked to Rome merely by informal ties of 'friendship'—a loose bond, as recent events had shown. Nevertheless in late 188 the Romans withdrew all their forces—once more—to Italy. They would not reappear for almost twenty years.

### 7. *Unipolarity and Sphere of Influence: From Apamea to Perseus*

What are we to make of this peace settlement, or subsequent events? The Roman armies left behind only a constellation of legally-independent Greek polities, some with greatly increased *de facto* power. We now face the question of whether there resulted nevertheless an 'informal empire' in the Greek East—'an invisible empire of informal sway', in Robinson's and Gallagher's formulation. This is held by scholars who assert that from 188 onwards Rome was 'the controller of the Greek states'.

In my view, such statements are exaggerated as to the facts and, considering the political scientists' definition of empire, simply incorrect in concept. This is not a description of Roman relations with the Greek East after the Peace of Apamea. Without Rome's approval the Achaean League warred against rebellious Messene, and Eumenes II against Bithynia and Cappadocia. The Senate's letter to Rhodes in 177, complaining about Rhodian oppression in Lycia, was ignored. Nor did Rome interfere in internal Greek politics—which is why the Achaean politician Callicrates complained to the Senate in 180 that men such as himself, who were willing to do whatever Rome wanted, received no Roman support for gaining political ascendancy (Pol. 24.10).<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> 'Controller' of the Greeks: Hammond 1988, 502-3 (quoted). Independent behaviour of Achaeans and others: Pol. 25.4.1-5; Livy 41.6.8-12; Eckstein 2008, 353-4.

An additional ambiguity is that a state holding a paramount position, but informally, as Rome did after 188, needs to assert its paramountcy repeatedly. Otherwise the metropole's informal dominance becomes unstable. But the Roman Republic, like all ancient states, did not have continual diplomatic interactions with any foreign polities—not even the most powerful. True, the Romans sent occasional embassies to Macedon and Achaea, in response to local complaints, but there were long stretches without any official communication between Rome and the majority of European Greek states. The Seleucid régime did not see a Roman ambassador for sixteen years after 188, except for a brief courtesy call by Flaminius in 183. For twenty-seven years, between 200 and 172, the Senate sent not a single embassy to Alexandria. This is why Apollonidas of Sicyon could say to the Achaean League Council in 185 that ‘most of our deliberations, and the most important of them, concern our differences with the kings’ (Pol. 22.8.6-7). To Greek statesmen, the world after 188 was not yet Rome-dominated.

The *Patres* were satisfied with the general status quo—and, locally, with just about any status quo. Indeed, the occasional senatorial embassies or letters were always responses to Greek initiatives—Greek complaints against their neighbours. And we know that smaller Greek states with powerful neighbors complained not about Roman oppression in this period, but about lack of Roman interest in their problems. The fact is that (as in all city-states) there was no bureaucracy in Rome tasked with on foreign affairs; there was hardly any bureaucracy at all. There were no ‘area specialists’ for Greece. Roman aristocratic culture did assume an all-round competence—but only a minority of senators had even been outside Italy (in the army, or on diplomatic missions). One result of the situation: the Senate had to be given a lesson in the basic geography of Greece in winter 198/197, when Rome was already fighting its second major war there (Pol. 18.11.2-12). Again—as Polybius points out (24.10.11)—the Senate tended to agree to most requests from Greek embassies simply because it was aristocratic ethos to agree to suppliants’ requests, even if only as a gesture.

The Roman goal in the East after 188 was minimal and simple: to prevent the rise of a peer-competitor, a state powerful enough to challenge Roman power and security there. Rome was more belligerent in the West, with wars and conquests in northwestern Italy and in Spain; and this fighting, which consumed large military resources, worked in turn to constrain Roman goals east of the Adriatic. This setting of limits on foreign relations by a metropole, without continual control of foreign relations, let alone of

internal policies and politics, is by Doyle's definition a 'sphere of influence', and nothing more intense. Thirty-two consuls were elected at Rome between 188 and 172, and 64 praetors as well, and not one of these high officials received from the Senate an assignment or *provincia* east of the Adriatic. The Senate certainly sought occasionally to influence events: for instance, pressing Achaëa repeatedly to treat Sparta more gently, or reproving Rhodes about the Lycians, or repeatedly attempting to mediate the large wars in Asia Minor. But to repeat Donnelly, 'influence is not rule', and these efforts were far from universally successful.

The Greek governing élites were willing to cooperate partly because Roman goals in the East were so limited; cooperation appeared both honourable and responsible. Politicians soon emerged willing to accede to all Roman interests and wishes, but the Romans at first gave them little support—as Callicrates complained in 180. Callicrates is a harbinger of a darker and imperialised future, but Polybius judged that in this period Greek governments with a history of good relations with the Romans (such as the Achaean League) could still speak to Rome on a basis of equality (*isologia*: 24.10.9). That was Cato's judgment too: in this period the Greeks were in possession of *libertas*. To Romans, such *libertas* did not contradict an interstate hierarchy with Rome at the top.<sup>12</sup>

#### 8. Macedon as Peer-competitor, and the Third Macedonian War

Macedon's spoils in the victory against Antiochus were significant, but then, in response to complaints about Philip's tyrannical behavior, the Senate deprived him of most of the polities he had seized during the war. Polybius argues that Philip now began to plan a war of revenge against Rome (22.14.7-12).

Scholars have doubted Polybius' assertion. It seems too schematic: Philip II's planned war against Persia was carried out by his son Alexander the Great and established Macedonian world power (Pol. 3.6), Philip V's planned war against Rome was carried out by his son Perseus and led to the destruction of Macedonian power. Moreover Philip's large conquests

<sup>12</sup> Continual interaction required for 'informal empire': Schwabe 1986, 14-16; Keal 1986, 135-6; Abernethy 1986, 105. Greek complaints about Roman non-involvement: Livy 39.25.11; cf. 39.36.10-11, both from Polybian material. Rome's passive stance and lack of senatorial experts: Gruen 1984, 203-49. Rome's minimal goal: Eckstein 2008, 352-5; cf. Sherwin-White 1984, 7-12. Unthreatening unipolarity: Wollforth 2002. Cato on Greek *libertas*: Gellius, *NA* 6.1.3 = Cato, *ORF*, frg. 164 (speech for the Rhodians).

after 185 in inland Thrace aroused no Roman reaction or complaint. His conquests increased Macedon's population and he also opened numerous gold mines in the rich Mt. Pangaeum region. Despite the tyrannical tenor of his last years, Polybius praises his rebuilding of Macedonian power—it was the mark of a statesman in a difficult world (25.3.9-10). On his death in 179 the Senate immediately renewed *amicitia* (friendship) with his son, so we can say that in 179 the *Patres* were not hostile to Perseus.

The problem was that between 179 and 173 Perseus engineered a stunning expansion of Macedonian power and influence. He became popular with Greeks because of his moderate rule (Pol. 25.3.1-8; Livy 42.12.1, 14.5). He defeated the Thracians, continued the expansion of Macedonian mines and population, used marriage-ties to repair relations with the Seleucids and Prusias II of Bithynia, repaired relations too with Rhodes, Aetolia and the Thessalians, and struck a military alliance with Boeotia. By the late 170s Perseus' army was larger than any Philip had ever possessed, some 43,000 soldiers (Livy 42.51.11). In 174 he led it through central Greece in a demonstration of Macedonian power. As Derow says: for those who wished not to look towards Rome, or not to have to look only to Rome, another focus was increasingly available.<sup>13</sup>

The eventual Roman response was a new war—sometimes depicted as the result of paranoia, sometimes as ruthless Roman aggression. Yet the prime mover was not Rome, but Eumenes of Pergamum. Before the Senate in summer 172, he depicted Perseus' growing power as a threat to the stability of the Greek world, and listed Perseus' alleged violations of good faith with Rome, such as the war with the Thracian prince Abrupolis (an *amicus* of the Roman People), the expedition into central Greece, the summoning of barbarians from beyond the Danube (perhaps to march on Italy)—and the threat he posed to Pergamum. Eumenes ended with criticism of Rome: Perseus' rise had occurred because the Senate was not supporting Rome's friends and allies vigorously enough.

The profound impact of Eumenes' speech is confirmed by an inscription the Romans set up in 171/170 at Delphi: it repeats most of Eumenes' accusations verbatim. Although arguably Rome was again being drawn into conflict by a second-tier state, just as in 200, larger issues were also at stake: Rome as the sole remaining superpower (a position achieved through great sacrifice) would not accept Macedon as an equal, let alone a competitor

<sup>13</sup> Mt. Pangaeum mines: Livy 39.24.2; Hammond 1988, 460-4. Macedon under Perseus: Hammond 1988, 484, 497, 515, 541; cf. App. *Mac.* 11.1-3.

(Livy 42.39.7: explicit). Yet for almost twenty years the Senate had given no thought to military operations in the Greek world. Similarly, a Roman embassy now had to make intensive efforts to gain the support of Greek states. That is: Rome could not count on automatic 'obedience' from the Greeks; a coalition of the willing had to be constructed anew.

Nevertheless, a new harshness in Roman attitudes is now visible, what the political scientist Christopher Layne terms 'the hegemon's temptation'—the temptation towards harsh assertiveness. The Roman envoy Q. Marcius Philippus deceived Perseus in late 172 into accepting a months-long 'standstill' for peace negotiations—which the Senate used to complete the military buildup. In spring 171 the *Patres* went through the motions of hearing Perseus' peace envoys—then banished them from Italy. Polybius' criticism is reflected strongly in Livy's depiction of the ensuing senatorial debate (40.47.4-8). Marcius' deception won the approval of a majority, 'but not that of the older men and those mindful of traditional ways'. They 'disapproved this new and over-clever wisdom'. These older senators were in fact the men of the generation that had defeated Hannibal, Philip V and Antiochus III. They had treated their enemies as enemies to be beaten openly in the field, and their allies as allies, not as subjects. They were the architects of Roman military-political preponderance in the Mediterranean, but also of a situation where friendly Greek governments could still talk to Rome as approximate equals (Pol. 24.10.9), where (as Cato said) *libertas* was possible. But men now ran Roman politics for whom Roman preponderance was a given, and they were determined to meet the challenge of Perseus' power not with any compromises but with overwhelming force. They thus redefined Rome's relations with the Greek states. It worried Cato, as it did Polybius (31.25.4-5, quoting Cato).<sup>14</sup>

### 9. *The New World Order*

The Third Macedonian War lasted four years, and was fought with extraordinary harshness. The Romans ruthlessly plundered not only enemy but even allied cities, and enslaved tens of thousands in Epirus. The power of

<sup>14</sup> Roman paranoia, aggression: Harris 1979, 227-33; Derow 2003, 67-8; cf. Errington 1990, 214-15. Eumenes' speech: Livy 42.13 (from Polybian material), cf. App. *Mac.* 11.2. Delphi inscription: *SG* <sup>3</sup> 643. Intensive diplomatic efforts: Pol. 27.7.5-6; Livy 42.47.2; Gruen 1984, 411. 'Hegemon's temptation': Layne 1993, 28; cf. Walz 2000, 29. Perseus' envoys, and Senate debate: Livy 42.40-43, 47 (Polybian); cf. App. *Mac.* 11.5-8; Walbank 1974, 10-11, 23; Gabba 1977, 68.



the predominant state thus appeared to have reached a 'threshold' of asymmetry such that the risks in opposing it became prohibitive. Polybius certainly saw the situation that way.

The peace imposed in 168/167 after the Roman victory over Macedon at Pdyna was far more harsh than previous settlements. The *Patres* even thought about making Macedon into a permanent Roman province—the kind of direct Roman rule east of the Adriatic never even considered before. Instead, they divided Macedon into four separate republics. The abolition of a polity in Greece was an unprecedented Roman act—and the Macedonian monarchy was 500 years old. The Senate also imposed on the republics a permanent annual tribute—the first such arrangement east of the Adriatic. Perseus was led in chains in Paullus' triumphal parade—an unprecedented act against a Greek king. So was his ally King Genthius of the Ardiaei—and that kingdom too was abolished, replaced by three indigenous states.

Roman commanders also intervened deeply now in the internal politics of Greek polities, supporting politicians they deemed fervent supporters of Rome, while purges of 'anti-Romans' were widespread. The initiative came from Greek politicians seeking to destroy rivals—and Polybius bitterly denounces these men, Callicrates among them (30.13.4); but the Romans willingly acted upon such accusations. Among hundreds of 'anti-Roman' Greek politicians deported to Italy were Polybius himself and his father Lycortas. Others committed suicide; some were executed outright.

The anger of the Senate also fell upon Rhodes and Pergamum. The Rhodians in spring 168 had offered mediation of the war. The Senate viewed this as an insult, since Rome, like all Hellenistic great powers, was unwilling to submit to mediation, and especially not by an (informal) ally—who should have been supporting the war-effort. The Senate deprived Rhodes almost all its mainland territories and, in addition, made the island of Delos a free port, undermining Rhodian finances. When the Senate consented to a formal alliance in 164, thus assuring Rhodian survival, the Rhodians erected an enormous statue of the Roman People, showing how eager they were now to acknowledge Roman hierarchy.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>15</sup> 'Threshold theory': Wohlforth 2002, 103–6; see Pol. 1.1–5; 38.1–4. Treatment of Macedon: Gruen 1982, 258, cf. 1984, 428 n. 169; Hammond 1988, 564–7; Baronowski 1988, 460 (Appendix 1); Kallet-Marx 1995, 13–14. Perseus' treatment: Livy 45.40.6; Plut. *Aem.* 33.3–34.2, 37.1–2. Deportees: Pausanias' figure of 1,000 from Achaea alone (7.10.11) is too high to believe (Gruen 1984, 516 and n. 168), but the numbers were nevertheless very large. Rhodes: Eckstein 1988; Berthold 1984, ch. 10. Statue: Mellor 1975, 34–5.

Eumenes, accused of accepting a huge bribe from Perseus to mediate an end to the war which he himself had provoked, was forbidden to appear in Rome to offer congratulations for the victory; some senators wanted to overthrow him. In 164 the Senate sent an embassy to Asia Minor to solicit complaints against Pergamum; but the embassy failed in its purpose. The Pergamene monarchy was made of stronger stuff than Rhodes.

The Senate also bluntly ended the Seleucid Antiochus IV's on-going conquest of Egypt. Antiochus had rejected a Roman offer of mediation (Pol. 29.25.4); but after Pydna the ex-consul C. Popillius Laenas arrived with a demand that he leave Egypt immediately. When the king came to greet Popillius, Popillius handed him a scroll with the Senate's order and drew a circle around him with his vine-staff, telling him not to step outside it until he had decided on friendship or enmity with Rome. Antiochus and his army went home.

Popillius's action was a striking and arrogant assertion of Roman authority. As Polybius says, neither Popillius nor Antiochus could have acted thus without the implications of Pydna (29.27.12-13). That is: the previous geopolitical situation, with a powerful Macedon, had allowed Antiochus significant freedom of action, but power in the interstate system had now shifted so sharply towards Rome that even he, with an army that had brought the Ptolemies to their knees, acceded to Roman demands.<sup>16</sup>

#### 10. *Ambiguities of Asymmetry: Rome and the Greeks, 167–150*

Many scholars follow Polybius in concluding that the Greek states both in Europe and in Asia had now come under Roman rule. Yet the Roman goal in the East remained minimal, to prevent the rise of a powerful challenger. The Senate naturally expected the Macedonians and Greeks to obey Roman orders—but there were few. Even after 167 the official Roman position was that the Macedonians still possessed *libertas*; all the more so the rest of the Greeks. Over the next eighteen years we know of only one Roman communication to the Macedonians, and it benefited them; in 158 the Senate allowed the re-opening of the gold and silver mines. The four republics in fact preferred more involvement from Rome, not less, to mediate their tensions—but they could not get it (Pol. 35.4.10-12).

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<sup>16</sup> Treatment of Eumenes: Hansen 1971. Embassy in 164: Pol. 31.1.6-8, 31.6.1-6. Rome and Antiochus IV: Lampela 1998, 124-35. Popillius forced withdrawal from Cyprus as well: Pol. 29.27.9-10.

In 168/167 Roman control in Greece was total and enforced by an army; this was empire as modern political theorists define it. But the arrangements made after the war were not meant to enforce 'control', but rather to (re)establish a situation whereby the Romans would not have to come back in force anytime soon. Romans were almost totally absent from Greece for the next two decades. The Greeks felt it best to obey Roman orders (Pol. 3.4.3), but the reality is that the Romans left them very much alone. Only two Roman embassies to polities south of Mt. Olympus are known in the eighteen years after Pydna, and both were part of larger tours of inspection focused primarily farther east. When the self-proclaimed pro-Romans left in charge of many European Greek states in 168/167 passed from the scene after a decade in various ways (including assassination), and were replaced by different governments (and sometimes by their opponents), there was no Roman response. A startling example is Charops in Epirus, who ca. 158 asked for Roman help to shore up his position, and received none. And it was still possible to defy Rome: after Athens in 164 sacked its neighbour Oropus, the Senate appointed the Achaean city of Sicyon to arbitrate the dispute, but the Athenians protested to the Senate over the 500-talent fine imposed, and in 155 proposed a 100-talent fine instead—which apparently they never actually paid. This is not empire.<sup>17</sup>

In the seventeen years after Apamea in 188 Roman contacts with the Greek powers further east had been infrequent: there are six known Roman embassies. By contrast, in the eighteen years after Pydna, the Senate sent 15 embassies—almost one a year. Conversely, even the scanty sources after 167 suggest a stream of embassies to the Senate from states east of the Aegean. Many were headed by royal family members, or even by the rulers themselves. Some envoys performed unprecedented acts of abasement: Ptolemaic envoys in rags in 169 begged for aid against Antiochus IV; Prusias II in 167 bowed down on hands and knees before the *Patres*.

But despite increased diplomatic interaction (more evidence of Polybius' *symploké*) and more overt Greek acknowledgment of hierarchy, Roman interventions were often simply investigatory and many (as previously) had inconclusive results. The major Eastern polities did not now become Roman puppets. Pergamum is a good example. Its rise continued

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<sup>17</sup> Greeks *de facto* subjects: Niese 1893, 312; Errington 1972, 222; Dahlheim 1977, 117; Derow 1989, 318, and 2003, 68–9. The Roman position: Livy 45.18.2, 50.1–2; cf. Diod. 31.8.2, 8.4. Mines re-opened: Cassiod. *Chron.*, s.a. 158 BC. Embassies from 167 to 149: Broughton 1951, 435–57. Changes in leaderships: Pol. 30.11.6, 32.4.1 and 5.1; 32.54.6–9; 32.5.3 (gleeful comments); Gruen 1984, 518–19. Oropus arbitration: Gruen 1976, 51–3.

unabated under Attalus II (159–138) at the expense of Bithynia and Syria. Even more strikingly, Attalus helped place Ariarathes V on the throne of Cappadocia, despite the Senate having explicitly decreed that kingdom should be divided. The story in Ptolemaic Egypt is similar. In 168 Roman pressure saved the Ptolemies from Antiochus IV (above). But in 163 Ptolemy VI simply refused the Senate's demand that his younger brother and rival Ptolemy VIII, ruling Cyrene, be given Cyprus also. Despite a sixteen-year break in relations with Alexandria (161), the Senate failed to support Ptolemy VIII's efforts to take Cyprus (Pol. 33.11.7). Ptolemy VI adopted an increasingly assertive policy in the Levant against Syria, acquiring Coele Syria (Lebanon) in 146 and even seizing Antioch and taking the title 'King of Asia' (Jos. *AJ* 13.112–13; *1 Macc.* 11.13; cf. Pol. 39.7.1), although his death from battle-wounds put the entire realm into the hands of Ptolemy VIII and the enormous gains were soon lost.

If there was a moment of empire in 168/167 as modern theorists define it (that is, control over both the internal and external politics of weaker states), that moment soon passed. What, then, of hegemony as defined by Doyle: continual control over foreign relations of weaker states, although internal politics is left alone? The answer is that rulers such as Eumenes II, Attalus II, and Ptolemy VI were not merely technically or legally independent of Rome, they were powers in their own right.<sup>18</sup>

### 11. *The End of Greek Freedom? 150–145*

Despite peace reigning after 167 among the Macedonians, there was bitterness over the destruction of the Macedonian state, desire for reunification and the old monarchy—and the old glory. Nothing else can explain the startling events of 150–148. Out of nowhere, 'dropped from the skies' as Polybius says (36.9–10), Andriscus, a pretender to the Antigonid throne, appeared. He claimed to be Perseus' son, took the royal name Philip, gathered an army in Thrace, invaded Macedon—and easily swept away the republican régimes. When a Roman army arrived in Greece in 149, the

<sup>18</sup> Embassies to East 168–151: Broughton 1951: 435–60. Royal envoys: Pol. 30.18; 31.1.2–5; 31.10; 31.32.1; 32.1.5–6; 32.10; 33.11.1–2. Val. Max. 5.1.1–2; App. *Mith.* 4, cf. Zon. 9.28; Diod. 31.7.2. Abasements: Livy 44.19.6–12; Pol. 30.18; cf. 30.4.3–5. Eastern 'puppets': Rostovtzeff 1941, 801–3 and 827; Magie 1950, 20, 202, 315–17; Dahlheim 1977, 118. Against: Sherwin-White 1977, and 1984, ch. II. Pergamene accomplishments: Hansen 1971, chs. IV–V. Egypt as vassal or protectorate: Winkler 1933, 25; Otto 1934, 88; Manni 1950, 229; Will 1982, 273. Ptolemies' rivalry: Lampela 1998, 176–82, with sources.

result was the greatest victory of Macedonian arms since the smashing of Sparta at Sellasia in 222—the army and its commander were annihilated. Polybius was stunned that the Macedonians would not only give up their republican freedoms but fight so well for a man he viewed as an imperialist tyrant (36.17.14). But in 148 a much larger Roman army, supported by Pergamum's warfleet and by the Achaeans, defeated and captured Philip VI. Yet such was the depth of Macedonian feeling that both in that same year and in 143 fresh pretenders had to be put down.

Macedon now became a Roman province with a permanent governor and occupation army. Clearly this was a last resort. The Senate had previously tried to manage Macedon in several other ways and all had failed. Almost a century after the initial Roman military expeditions to Illyria, the Senate was thus finally prepared to maintain forces permanently east of the Adriatic. Yet most places in Macedon retained local self-government. The Roman military commander's duties were seemingly quite limited and mostly military—to protect Macedon (and hence all of Greece) from barbarian invasion, and to prevent internal disorder. The governor's force—one legion—was minimal, and bespeaks a reluctance even now to commit large permanent military resources in the East. Indeed, it was often too small for the task, and the Romans would suffer significant barbarian defeats.<sup>19</sup>

In Achaëa in the 140s, after fifty years of alliance with Rome, political disaster originated from a different source. Within many Greek states' élites a grave new issue—how far to collaborate with the Romans—led to increased instability in factional struggles. Callicrates, whose position was total cooperation with the Romans, always faced resistance in Achaëa. Moreover, Callicrates' dominance led in time to an opposite tendency among some of his rivals: to be rid of the Romans and their Quisling. It was a political process Polybius understood, worried over, and underlined for his audience.

Polybius demonstrates this danger via his portraits of the Achaean politicians Diaeus and Critolaus, and of Hasdrubal at Carthage, in the 140s. They were hostile to and rivals of other politicians whom they judged too accommodating towards Rome. But these policies led not to increased

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<sup>19</sup> On the early onset of the *pax Romana* in many regions—a fact not often realized—see Cornell 1993. Macedonian bitterness: denied by Gruen 1984, 432, but see McGing 2003, 78. Andriacus: Gruen 1984, 431-2. Further pretenders: Morgan 1969, 430-1. Macedon annexed: Kallet-Marx 1995, 30. Significant barbarian defeats: e.g., with deaths of the governors Sex. Pompeius (119) and M. Porcius Cato (114).

independence but to destruction. Robinson and Gallagher have similarly emphasized that, in weak polities in the 19th Century, the emergence of collaborationists with European powers often gave rise to 'proto-nationalist' or 'neotraditionalist' movements and violence, often leading in turn to the replacement of 'informal empire' by direct European rule.

The *Patres'* decree in 147 that Sparta should be free—how seriously this was meant is unclear—vastly increased Diaeus' and Critolaus' influence. There were riots when Roman envoys appeared at Corinth, and when Sparta sought to implement the decree the League declared war on Sparta. The ultimate result was Rome's defeat of the Achaean army, the sacking of Corinth, and the breakup of the League. Though Polybius' intervention was able to save something from the wreck, most of Achaea was transformed into individual independent city-states.

Did this mean the end of Greek freedom? The cities in the Peloponnese, and in central Greece too, now took care never to offend the Romans—not with the example of ruined Corinth before their eyes. They were not paying tribute, and were legally independent. But in political science terms, we see a shifting in Greece from sphere of influence towards hegemony. And the governor in nearby Macedon also exercised a certain informal influence in Greece. But one should not exaggerate: this was a gradual and haphazard process, and there was no constant Roman interference even after ca. 145. Moreover, what interference there was always came at Greek initiative (appeals to the commander in Macedon). Nevertheless, the governor's presence must have subtly reduced the scope of Greek freedom.<sup>20</sup>

East of the Aegean the situation after 146 remained much the same as before, as outlined above. The result was the usual Hellenistic chaos, but one may doubt that the *Patres* much cared. There was no Roman involvement in the Seleucid and Ptolemaic civil wars in the 140s and 130s. When Attalus III in 133 bequeathed his prosperous kingdom to the Roman People, Rome sold off large parts of it to nearby local rulers to raise money for the Gracchan land reform. Only the rise of an Attalid pretender led to Rome's second permanent *provincia* east of the Adriatic (ca. 129), and coastal Greek cities were rewarded for their support with exemptions from taxes. The province of Asia received a minimal permanent garrison, again one legion—not enough to resist a serious threat, as proven by Mithridates VI of Pontus ca. 90, who was able with ease to throw the Romans out completely.

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<sup>20</sup> Polybius on the anti-Roman leaders: Eckstein 1995, 199, 221-5. 'Proto-nationalists' etc.: Robinson and Gallagher 1961; Robinson 1972. Outbreak of Achaean War: Gruen 1976.

Nevertheless, by that time there had been a sea-change in Roman relations with Greek Asia. In 122 C. Gracchus' law letting out the taxes of Asia Province to tax-farmers bidding only at Rome, who paid up-front and then made their profits from taxes actually collected, began the age of economic exploitation of regions east of the Adriatic. The tens of thousands of Romans permanently, and unprecedentedly, domiciled in Asia Province resulted from the discovery that political power at Rome could be gained by offering the Roman People not merely security from foreign threats (as before), but also the *commoda* (benefits) provided by subordinated peoples and polities. But this required greatly increased control over them—in fact, the imposition of empire as the political scientists define it. In the 60s BC, there were as many as seventeen legions east of the Adriatic. And at that point one can speak of 'control' in a meaningful manner.

But this control was characteristic of the 1st Century. We should not retroject it into the 3rd or the mid-2nd Centuries. It is not the case, despite Nietzsche, that 'what things are called is incomparably more important than that they are.'<sup>21</sup> Nevertheless, what things are called is important, and we should be careful about the evocative term 'empire.' In the earlier period, much less commitment of manpower (or even attention) was needed in the East, because the Romans' fundamental goal was a minimal one—the avoidance of the rise of a peer-competitor. This led to unipolarity and the creation of a sphere of influence in European Greece, influence which faded away further east. But nothing more intense or ambitious in terms of Roman control was attempted for a long time, because nothing more was thought to be needed. And not even 146 marked the total end of Greek freedom. That came later.

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<sup>21</sup> Nietzsche 1974, 121. *Asia provincia*, and *commoda populi Romani*: Kallet-Marx 1995, chs. 4–5. The increasing democratisation of Roman politics, increasing exploitation of the subordinated polities, and hence the increasing military commitment to the East: Kallet-Marx, ch. 11 and Conclusion.





ENTER THE MUSE: LITERARY RESPONSES TO ROMAN IMPERIALISM  
(240–100 BC)

*Paul Burton*

Long before Horace famously declared (*Ep.* 2.1.156–7):

Graecia capta ferum victorem capit et artes  
intulit agresti Latio

Captured Greece captured its fierce conqueror and brought the arts to rustic Latium

and Juvenal observed, with significantly less equanimity (*Sat.* 3.62):

iam pridem Syrus in Tiberim defluxit Orontes

For a long time now the Syrian Orontes has flowed into the Tiber,

a late second-century BC Latin poet called Porcius Licinus observed (*Gell. NA* 17.21.45):

Poenico bello secundo Musa pennato gradu  
intulit se bellicosam Romuli in gentem feram.

During the Second Punic War the warlike Muse with feather-light step entered the savage nation of Romulus.

Licinus may have mistimed the Muse's arrival, however: the earliest known Latin poetry, that of Livius Andronicus, appeared at the very latest shortly after the First Punic War ended, in 240 BC, and even before that the Romans had had long experience of Greek culture which emanated from the *poleis* of Magna Graecia in the Italian peninsula itself. Licinus' central point, nevertheless, can stand: the earliest Republican phase of Roman transmarine imperial expansion, beginning not with the Second but the First Punic War (264–241 BC), witnessed—and indeed may have been the catalyst for—the birth of Latin literature.<sup>1</sup>

Imperialism and the arts were indissolubly linked at Rome. Second only to the influx of wealth, the flood of literature, art, philosophy, rhetoric and their various practitioners onto Italian shores during the middle and late Republic signalled, in the surviving Roman literary tradition, the corrup-

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Habinek 1998, 35; earlier Greek influence from Magna Graecia: Sciarrino 2006, 451. For a defence of Licinus' chronology, see Goldberg 2005, 23 and Courtney 1993, 84–5.

tion and decline that invariably attend imperial success.<sup>2</sup> Cato the Elder indeed feared the worst: 'once the Greeks give the Romans their literature,' he asserted, 'all will be lost' (*quandoque ista gens suas litteras dabit, omnia conrumpet*: Pliny, *NH* 29.14; cf. Plut. *Cato* 23.2). Yet despite all the dangers and periodic measures taken by the state to control their influence, artists and their arts, like wealth, continued to flow into Rome during the first phase of Roman transmarine expansion, generating anxieties and disputes as well as interest and enthusiasm.

The purpose of the present chapter will be to trace this process by examining the texts of the earliest Latin poets and playwrights for evidence of authentically Roman responses to the imperial experience. To merely state the intention thus, however, is to raise immediately a whole host of methodological and procedural problems. First and foremost, of course, is the fragmentary state of most of the earliest Roman literary texts: often the contexts of these free-floating lines of verse are totally obscure, their purposes even more so.<sup>3</sup> Second, the earliest Roman poets worked mostly in Greek genres—comedy, tragedy, epic—whose forms and conventions had long since become fixed and stereotyped. Finally, the early Latin poets and dramatists were most often working from Greek models. Whether they were simply translating these works or modifying them significantly cannot be established in the absence of their Greek templates. So, in the context of this chapter, one cannot simply point to the predominance of slaves in Plautine comedy, for example, or the prevalence of *milites gloriosi* and military metaphors in Roman comedy generally, or even the occasional POW comedy (like Plautus' *Captivi*) as having been specifically inspired by the influx of slaves and war captives into Italy during the Middle Republic, or the pervasive militarisation of Roman society as a whole during that period.<sup>4</sup> That such themes and metaphors may have resonated with a Roman audience immersed in the imperial experience cannot be doubted, but authorial intent is another matter entirely, and almost always impossible to recover in the absence of supporting contemporary documentation.

So one must tread cautiously and approach the target obliquely. The nature of the evidence has compelled me to privilege Roman historical epic and comedy over tragedy and satire, and within the genre of comedy,

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<sup>2</sup> Cf. Habinek 1998, 62–3 on the link between sumptuary legislation and the periodic expulsions of intellectuals from Rome.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Gruen 1990, 95.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. the cautionary remarks of Goldberg 2005, 151; Hanson 1965 shows less restraint.

to feature over fragmentary poets and the highly stylised comedies of Terence the plays of Plautus, whose topicality has long been recognized.<sup>5</sup> Even in these works, however, explicit discussions of imperialism, its nature and attendant anxieties are disappointingly rare. In lieu of such evidence, I have identified a few broad areas of focus that may shed some light, if only indirectly, on our subject and that seem least susceptible to falsification on the sort of methodological grounds outlined above. These include the provenance of the early poets and the nature of their intellectual engagement with their primarily Hellenic literary models, as well as their literary responses not just to the imperialised other, but also to the imperialising self in light of this response. More could be, and indeed has been done in other areas related to our theme, but full recapitulation of these approaches cannot be undertaken here.

One of the more striking aspects of the extant biographical information on the early poets is the fact that almost all of them had non-Roman origins: they were outsiders whose journeys into the Roman cultural mainstream traversed the same pathways that the Romans used to enter the broader Mediterranean environment in the third and second centuries BC.<sup>6</sup> The earliest Latin poet, Livius Andronicus (ca. 284–204 BC), was a Greek, probably from Tarentum, and perhaps originally came to Rome as a prisoner of war.<sup>7</sup> Cn. Naevius (ca. 270–200), who wrote Rome's first historical epic on the First Punic War, may have been a Campanian (or perhaps a Latin, or even a Roman citizen) and was a veteran of the war he immortalised in verse. The dramatist Caecilius Statius (ca. 220–166) hailed from Milan in Insubrian Gaul, but composed his plays in Latin from Greek models. The great epic poet Q. Ennius (239–169) famously asserted that he had 'three hearts' (*tria corda*): Oscan, the language of his home town of Rudiae in Messapia; Latin, the language he chose to work in; and Greek, the source of his inspiration. The tragedian M. Pacuvius (ca. 220–131), Ennius' nephew, was born at Brundisium into an Oscan family; all but one of his thirteen known tragedies were based on Greek material, particularly the Trojan cycle. Of our two earliest fully extant Latin writers, Plautus (ca. 254–184) hailed from Sarsina in Umbria and Terentius Afer (ca. 195/4 or

<sup>5</sup> Harvey, Jr. 1986, and below, text at n. 15 (but note that Plautus' topicality is often in the eye of the beholder: Gruen [1990], 124; cf. Richlin [2005], 37 and Leigh [2004], 20). On Terence, see most recently Brown 2006, xv: 'we cannot easily detect ... precise engagement with issues of the day in [Terence's] plays'; the plays 'show no awareness of a world outside the theatre, no hint of the expansion of Roman power that had taken place so recently.'

<sup>6</sup> Habinek 1998, 38; Goldberg 2005, 166.

<sup>7</sup> Disputed by Gruen 1990, 82.

185/4–159), as his name suggests, was of North African origin and first came to Rome as a slave (of the Roman senator Terentius Lucanus).<sup>8</sup> The bewildering variety of place and pedigree the tradition assigns to the early Latin poets is in itself indicative of the exuberant cosmopolitanism and diversity that the first wave of Roman transmarine expansion sparked.

All of the early Roman poets drew their inspiration from literary forms created by the Greeks. Livius Andronicus inaugurated Roman drama in 240, when he was commissioned to stage a Greek tragedy in Latin as part of the state celebrations for Rome's victory in the First Punic War (Cic. *Brut.* 72–73). Unfortunately, the title of that play does not survive. The content of the performance, however, is less important than its context, for the event internationalised the Roman achievement by giving it a Hellenic aspect and 'announced Rome's participation in the intellectual world of the Greeks'—particularly to those in the newly conquered territory of Hellenistic Sicily.<sup>9</sup> Livius was called upon again to serve the imperial state in 207 on the eve of the battle of the Metaurus river and at a low point in Rome's fortunes in the war with Hannibal, when the senate commissioned him to compose a special supplicatory and expiatory hymn for a choir of 27 maidens (Livy 27.37.7).

Perhaps Livius' most significant achievement, however, was his condensed translation of Homer's *Odyssey* into Latin. A staple of Roman primary education for a long time thereafter, Livius' *Odusia* was no mere crib, but a thoroughly original work in native Saturnian verse, as comparison of the forty-odd extant fragments with Homer's text shows. Note, for example, the opening lines of both poems (Hom. *Od.* 1.1.; Andron. *Od.* fr. 1 W):

Ἄνδρα ἔννεπε, Μοῦσα, πολύτροπον, ὃς μάλα πολλά ...

Tell me, Muse, of the cunning man who many things ...

Virum mihi, Camena, insece versutum

Tell me, Camena, of the cunning man

In his translation Livius has not just preserved in his Latin version the word order and sense of Homer's original—a significant feat in and of itself—but has also dressed Homer's Muse in the indigenous clothing of the Latin nymphs, the Camenae, and manipulated the Latin language to match Homer's own quixotic choices: *insece* and ἔννεπε are both rare words in

<sup>8</sup> Sources and discussion: Warmington, ed., 1935, xvii–xxix, and 1936, viii–xxiv; Kenny and Clausen, 1982, 53–171; Conte 1994, 39–117; Gruen 1990, 79–123 (on Livius, Naevius and Ennius); Goldberg 1995, 28–37 (Livius and Naevius).

<sup>9</sup> Gruen 1990, 84.

their respective languages, and *versutum* bears precisely the same metaphorical sense of turning in Latin as *πολύτροπον* does in Greek.<sup>10</sup> But even more significant for the present purpose is Livius' choice of subject: by composing an *Odyssey* as opposed to, say, an *Iliad*, the Roman poet was responding to precisely the same cultural stimuli as inspired, in an earlier period, Homer's Greek contemporaries during the first great age of Greek imperial expansion and colonization in the seventh century. In both cases the conquest and colonization of western parts of the Mediterranean inspired a popular taste for tales of exploration and derring-do on the high seas and in faraway lands. Another factor behind Livius' choice may have been contemporary legends that associated Odysseus—in addition to or instead of Aeneas—with the foundation of Rome and other Italian cities.<sup>11</sup> Engagement with Hellenism on the literary level was thus well underway at the same time as the Roman state was engaging with Greek and Hellenistic powers on the military level. And like this latter engagement, the assertion of Roman superiority was crucial: more than a simple act of appropriation or even homage, Livius' Latin *Odusia*, composed in the verse and language of the hegemon, 'signified the cultural hegemony' of Rome.<sup>12</sup>

Mystery surrounds the life of the next great exponent of Latin literature, Cn. Naevius. Most of his biography currently retailed in the handbooks is built upon a tissue of speculation and conjecture. So, for example, the notion that the outspoken Naevius so offended important personages (the Metelli and Scipio Africanus in particular) in the closing decades of the third century that he was once thrown into prison and was forced to end his days in exile at Utica in Africa (Gell. *NA* 3.3.15; Jerome, *Chron.* Olymp. 144.3) is 'not even an ancient conjecture, but a purely modern concoction'.<sup>13</sup> For the present purpose, the truly significant aspect of Naevius' career is his invention of the Roman historical play—the *fabula praetexta*. His *Clasidium* celebrated Rome's victory over the Gauls in the battle of the play's title in 222, and, more particularly, the exploits of M. Claudius Marcellus, the consul who fought in that battle and won the *spolia opima*—one of only three commanders in Roman history to have done so—for personally slaying the opposing Gallic leader. This new form of indigenous drama was certainly informed by Greek tragic and epic precedents (Naevius wrote in both these latter genres) but it also marked the beginning of new

<sup>10</sup> For a more detailed analysis, see Goldberg 1993, and 1995, 58–73.

<sup>11</sup> Sources and discussion: Gruen 1990, 82 and 1992, 9–21 and 30–1; cf. Goldberg 1995, 50–1.

<sup>12</sup> Sciarrino 2006, 458.

<sup>13</sup> Gruen 1990, 96–106 (quotation: 104); Goldberg 1995, 33–7.

historical consciousness for the Romans, which is even more marked in what must have been Naevius' masterpiece, Rome's first historical epic, the *Bellum Punicum*, on the subject of the Republic's first struggle with Carthage. Enough survives of the work to show that Naevius addressed *in extenso*, evidently in flashback, Rome's Trojan origins through Aeneas (*Pun.* fr. 1-20 W). The implications of this are striking: not only does it point to the Romans' ongoing cultural engagement with the larger Hellenic world (and their attempt to carve out a distinct cultural space for themselves within that world), it also indicates that a sense of Rome's imperial destiny was beginning to take hold in the minds of the poets and their audiences. The presence of the past in recent historical events and the parallels Naevius apparently discerned between Rome's initial imperial moment and its first major extra-Italian war of conquest laid the foundation for the aggressively nostalgic epic and historiographical traditions at Rome. The poetry of Naevius thus prefigures the work and concerns of Republican Rome's greatest epic poet, Ennius.

The *Annales* of the latter poet were intended to celebrate the Roman imperial achievement from the city's Trojan beginnings to the wars of Ennius' own day, but they did so in a thoroughly Hellenic mode. Unlike Naevius' *Bellum Punicum*, which Ennius criticised for its provincial Saturnian metre (*Ann.* 206-9 S) and whose rustic Italiote Camena and Latinate *car-men* Ennius replaced with the properly Hellenic Muses and Greek *poemata* (1, 12 S), the *Annales* were composed in the metre of Greek epic (dactylic hexameter) and replete with the paraphernalia of the genre: councils of the gods, extended similes, oracular pronouncements, catalogues of troops, divine intervention, personification of natural phenomena, and so on. The language of the *Annales* also owes much to the Greeks: Ennius frequently calques Greek parallel terms (cf. *omnipotentis*, 'all-powerful' [447 S] =  $\pi\alpha\chi\chi\rho\alpha\tau\eta\varsigma$ ), transliterates others (*machaeris*, 'swords' [519; cf. 603 S] from  $\mu\acute{\alpha}\chi\alpha\iota\rho\alpha$ ), borrows Greek syntax (*dia dearum*, 'holy among the holy goddesses' [19 S] from  $\delta\iota\alpha\ \theta\epsilon\acute{\alpha}\omega\upsilon\upsilon$ ), morphology (the Greek genitive *Mettoeo Fufetioeo*, 'of Mett[i]us Fufet[t]ius' [120 S]), and even makes etymological puns on Greek terms (*clamore bovantes*, 'noisily mooing' [594 S], playing on  $\beta\omicron\acute{\alpha}\nu$ , 'to shout'). For the benefit of his Roman audience, Ennius will occasionally explain his Latin coinages (140 and 211 S):

vento, quem perhibent Graium genus aera lingua  
on the breeze, which the Greek race calls 'aer' in its language

...

sophiam, sapientia quae perhibetur  
'sophia', which is rendered 'wisdom'

Even more significant is Ennius' extensive literary debt to particular Greek authors and thinkers, still easily traceable in the fragments of the Ennian corpus. Echoes of Hesiod, the tragedians Aeschylus and Euripides, Herodotus, Callimachus and the philosophers Pythagoras, Empedocles and Epicharmus are all detectable in the extant text of the *Annales* (see indices to Skutsch [1985] s.v.)—as is, of course, the voice of Homer, who, so it is claimed by Ennius, appeared to him in a dream and reported that his soul had been transferred into Ennius' body (2-11 S). The *Annales* were probably originally packed with Homeric jingles, similes and phraseology, all of which are still represented in the fragments; so the invocations of Zeus in both poets (444 S = Hom. *Il.* 8.31):

O genitor noster Saturnie, maxime divum  
 ὦ πάτερ ἡμέτερε Κρονίδε, ὕπατε κρείόντων  
 Our father, son of Cronos, greatest of the gods

The formulaic attribution of Zeus as 'father of the gods and men' (*divomque hominumque pater*: 591-2 S) recalls, right down to the enclitic connective particles, the Homeric *πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε*. Several similes borrowed directly from Homer are also still visible in the extant fragments (cf. 535-9 S ~ Hom. *Il.* 6.506-11 = 15.263-8), as are lengthy descriptive passages (cf. 391-8 S ~ Hom. *Il.* 102-11).<sup>14</sup>

Of broader significance for the present topic are Ennius' several extant comments on Rome's enemies and the creeping militarism in Roman society in his day. For all Ennius' Hellenism, he stigmatises Rome's first major Hellenic foe, Pyrrhus of Epirus, and his troops as 'stupid' and 'more mighty in war than in wisdom' (*stolidum genus Aeacidarum: bellipotentis sunt magis quam sapientipotentis*: 197-8 S). Pyrrhus, however, is not an entirely untrustworthy enemy—but only when compared to Hannibal (*at non sic dubius fuit hostis Aeacida Burrus*: 474-5 S with Ekkehart's scholion on Oros. 4.14.3).

Speaking of Carthaginians (214-15 and 287 S):

Poeni soliti suos sacrificare puellōs  
 the Carthaginians customarily sacrifice their little sons;  
 Poeni stipendia pendunt  
 the Carthaginians pay mercenaries;  
 his pernas succidit iniqua superbia Poeni  
 the Carthaginian's wicked arrogance hamstrung these men.

<sup>14</sup> Translations and discussion: Goldberg 1995, 86-8.

Ennius' characterization of the Carthaginians thus amounts to a catalogue of taboo-violation and sacrilege, indolence and cruelty. Another fragment attests to the origin of the Carthaginians from Dido (*Poenos Didone oriundos*: 297 S). If Skutsch is correct that this fragment comes from a speech delivered by a Roman, the comment was probably intended to contrast negatively the Carthaginians' female origins with the Romans' own origins from those paragons of male *virtus*, Romulus and Aeneas. Charges of Carthaginian effeminacy also lurk behind Ennius' Carthaginian 'youth in tunics' comment at *Ann.* 303 S (cf. Plaut. *Poen.* 975-6 and below).

Finally, two passages stand out in the extant fragments for their explicit commentary on Rome's rise to power in Ennius' lifetime. The first is *Ann.* 96-97 S:

Nam vi depugnare sues stolidi soliti sunt  
 Astu non vi sum [*i.e.*, eum] summam servare decet rem  
 For to fight it out with brute force is the manner of stupid pigs:  
 He should save the state by craft, not violence.

Unfortunately the context for this fragment is unknown, although it may belong to the Romulus and Remus or the rape of the Sabine women episode. Whatever the case, the pacifist thrust of the comments echo nicely another Ennius passage, whose sentiments are undoubtedly those of the author (247-53 S):

<proelia promulgantur:>  
 Pellitur e medio sapientia, vi geritur res;  
 Spernitur orator bonus, horridus miles amatur;  
 Haud doctis dictis certantes, nec maledictis  
 Miscent inter sese inimicitias agitantes;  
 Non ex iure manu consertum, sed magis ferro—  
 Rem repetunt regnumque petunt—vadunt solida vi.  
 War is declared, wisdom is driven from the field, and deeds are carried out through violence. The good spokesman is scorned, the rude warrior is loved. Contending not with learned speeches nor harassing each other with insults men stir up enmities. They rush to begin the fight not according to law but by the sword—seeking satisfaction and pursuing supremacy—and they proceed with violent determination.

If the current placement of this fragment in Ennius' account of the Hannibalic War is accurate, it captures a more complex attitude towards war on the part of the poet than a straightforward triumphalist reading of his poetry allows. Nor is this surprising: Ennius himself was a foot soldier in this Roman war to end all wars. But the passage also points to a thoroughgoing militarisation of Roman society in the period and its consequences



for civilian life in Rome. It seems a remarkably prescient anticipation of the troubles of the Late Republic, when the consequences of world empire manifested themselves in factional strife, dynastic struggles and civil wars.

From Calliope to Thalia. As mentioned earlier, warfare and militarism were never far from the mind of the comic Muse either. Hence the problem, already anticipated, when confronting the only fully extant texts covered by this chapter: are warfare and militarism mere conventions carried over from Greek New Comedy or are they more context-specific? Erich Gruen has seen, in the slave Chrysalus' comment at *Bac.* 1072–3:

sed, spectatores, vos nunc ne miremini  
quod non triumpho: pervulgatum est, nil moror  
but, spectators, lest you wonder why I am not triumphing: it is too common  
these days, and I care nothing for it

and in the soldier Stratophanes' reference at *Truc.* 486 to trials *falsis de pugnis* ('for fabricated battles'), contemporary debates over triumph-hunting by the Republic's generals. Cynical manipulation and escalation of international conflicts for personal gain also lie behind the wily slave Epidicus' comment (*Epid.* 159–60):

iam senatum convocabo in corde consiliarium  
quoi potissimum indicatur bellum unde argentum  
auferam  
now I shall summon the advisory senate inside my chest to determine whom  
it is most advisable that I make war on and carry off their money

The obsession with booty by the wily slave-as-general is echoed by Toxilus in the *Persa* (757), and Pseudolus in his eponymous play (*Pseud.* 588):

nunc ob eam rem inter participes dividam praedam et participabo  
now for this reason I shall divide the spoil amongst my comrades and take  
my share ...  
inde me et simul participes omnis meos praeda onerabo atque opplebo  
after that I'll weigh down and fill up with booty myself and likewise all my  
comrades.

Gruen is probably right that such remarks resonated with contemporary audiences and reflected, consciously or not, contemporary political issues. Other studies have sought even tighter connections between individual plays and specific middle-Republican imperial experiences and episodes. George Franko has argued that the Aetolian setting of the *Captivi* will have had a particularly ironic resonance for a Roman audience since the play is more or less about *fides*—something few Romans of the period, through

long experience, will have associated with the Aetolians they knew. Matthew Leigh uses the same play to argue that Plautus echoes contemporary controversies over the repatriation of Roman prisoners of war via *postliminium* and sympathizes with the popular desire to restore former POWs to citizenship. William Owens sees in Plautus' sympathetic depiction of the parasite Gelasimus in the *Stichus* the poet's political alignment with the *plebs* in the crisis of 200, when the exhausted Roman populace, fresh from the war with Hannibal, refused to grant the senate a declaration of war on Philip V of Macedon. More generally, Holt Parker points to a contemporary fear of slave rebellions to account for the prevalence of torture jokes in Plautus.<sup>15</sup>

These studies have all offered valuable insights and intriguing readings; to recapitulate them here would serve little purpose. Instead our focus for the remainder of this chapter will be on ethnicity and the encounter with the Other in Plautus. Again, in some aspects this is well-trod ground, particularly after Amy Richlin's recent translations of and essays on Plautus' *Persa*, *Poenulus* and *Curculio*. Richlin was preceded by important work on the *Poenulus* in particular and how this play reflects Rome's historical imperial experience with the Carthaginians.<sup>16</sup> Again, there would be little point in recapitulating this material *in extenso*, except to observe that despite all of the fairly predictable orientalising humour—from the diminutive *Poenulus* of the play's title itself, to the incomprehensible 'pig Punic' in the script (*Poen.* 930-49), and clichés about Carthaginian deceit (*subdolos*, 'cunning': 1032, 1108; *praestrigiator*, 'great trickster': 1125), passive homosexuality (*cinaedus*: 1318) and effeminacy (*mulier*, 'woman': 1305)—the lead Carthaginian character Hanno, a bereaved father in search of his kidnapped children, is remarkably sympathetic. Scholars have remarked on the play's unusual 'liberal and cosmopolitan premises': a sympathetic portrayal of a Carthaginian family in the post-Hannibalic War period—set in faithless Aetolia, no less, and while Hannibal was still alive and at large—would be akin to 'a play dealing sympathetically with the Germans and Japanese ... in Britain in the early fifties.' Clearly Plautus'—and his

<sup>15</sup> Gruen 1990, 137-9; cf. Goldberg 1995, 111-12, and Moore 1998, 17-18 (triumph-hunting and booty); Leigh 2004, 24-56 (wily slave-as-general [informed by Roman memories of Hannibal]) and 57-97 (the *Captivi* and *postliminium*); Franko 1995 (the *Captivi*, Aetolia and *fides*); Owens 2000 (*Stichus* and the war vote of 200 BC); Parker 1989, esp. 236-8 (fear of slave rebellions). For caveats on these approaches, see above, nn. 3-5.

<sup>16</sup> Richlin 2005; Leigh 2004, 24-56; Starks 2000; Franko 1996.

audience's—encounter with the adversarial other was neither simple nor one-dimensional.<sup>17</sup>

The same sort of analysis can be applied to Plautus' engagement with the Greek Other—a theme of crucial importance, given the provenance of the plays and the high cultural stakes in play during Plautus' lifetime.<sup>18</sup> The focus here is on the interpenetration and intersection of Roman and Greek in the comedies, how the plays and characters become Roman and stay Greek, or stay Roman and become Greek, as it were.<sup>19</sup> It is perhaps not surprising, given the Romans' cultural chauvinism generally and their frequent battlefield victories over Greek armies in the period, that Greeks and Greek culture are often mocked and belittled in the plays of Plautus. As is widely recognized, *pergraecari* ('to play the Greek') and its cognates are terms of abuse in the plays, usually signifying intemperate revelry or a hedonistic lifestyle.<sup>20</sup> 'Straight Greek' even appears in the scripts in the mouths of low characters—a reflection, perhaps, of the demotic language of the street in an increasingly cosmopolitan Rome.<sup>21</sup> The plays occasionally echo contemporary critiques of Greek philosophers. So Curculio in his eponymous play complains about 'those cloaked Greeks' (*isti Graeci palliati*) walking around with their heads covered, clothes stuffed with books, getting in one's way while muttering sage opinions and drinking themselves into depression (288–98). The Cynic philosophers come in for especially cruel mockery in the *Persa* (123–125; line 125 Nixon, trans.):

cynicum esse egentem oportet parasitum probe:  
 ampullam, strigilem, scaphium, soccos, pallium,  
 marsuppium habeat, inibi paullum praesidi.  
 it is fitting that a parasite be a poor cynic: let him have his flask, his strigil,  
 his cup, his sandals and cloak, and a purse garrisoned with next to nothing.

Plautus also attacks the Greek institution of the palaestra (*Bac.* 68–72):

ubi ego capiam pro machaera turturem,

<sup>17</sup> Kenney and Clausen 1982, 94 (quotations); cf. Leigh 2004, 36; Starks 2000; Franko 1996.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Gruen 1990, 152–7 and Moore 1998, 50–66.

<sup>19</sup> See Woolf 1994.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. *Bac.* 813; *Mos.* 22, 64 and 960; *Poen.* 603; *Truc.* 88. Discussion: Richlin 2005, 262; Gruen 1990, 153–54; Moore 1998, 55; Segal 1987 33–42.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Shipp 1953, with examples, followed by MacCary and Willcock 1976, 180; Kenney and Clausen 1982, 112 and n. 1; Habinek 1998 43; other interpretations: Gruen 1990, 156, and 1992, 263 and 232 and n. 39; Leigh 2004, 5 n. 18. Hough 1934 discusses Plautus' Latin transliterations of Greek words and phrases.

ubique imponat in manum alius mihi pro cestu cantharum,  
 pro galea scaphium, pro insigni sit corolla plectilis,  
 pro hasta talos, pro lorica malacum capiam pallium,  
 ubi mi pro equo lectus detur, scortum pro scuto accubet  
 where I'm bound to take a turtle-dove instead of a sword, and where some-  
 one else puts a drinking-cup into my hand instead of a sword belt, a tankard  
 instead of a helmet, the wreathed garland instead of the crest, dice instead  
 of the spear, a soft cloak instead of a breastplate, where a couch is given me  
 instead of a horse, and a whore lies beside me instead of my shield.

There may be an implied contrast here between Greek and Roman notions of acceptable activities for young men; if that is so, then this is one of the few passages that unambiguously and in a non-generic way points to a militaristic mindset on the part of Plautus' Roman audience. But note too how saturated the passage is with Greek loan words (*machaera*, *cestus*, *cantharum*, *scaphium*, *pallium*, etc.), which, ironically, has the effect of subverting the speaker Pistoclerus' entire argument.

More generally there appear occasionally in the plays vitriolic rants against the *mores* and vices of 'this place' (cf. *hic*: *Trin.* 28), which is to say Athens, 'the vice capital of Hellas.'<sup>22</sup> Things go on in Athens that a Roman audience should properly regard as shocking or taboo, as the comments of Stichus indicate (*St.* 446-8):

atque id ne vos miremini, homines servolos  
 potare, amare atque ad cenam condicere;  
 licet haec Athenis nobis.  
 and lest you be too surprised to see slaves drinking, making love and ban-  
 queting—we're allowed to do these things at Athens.

The foregoing is a mere sampling of the available evidence, but suffices to show that the plays of Plautus engage in crude ethnic stereotyping of Greeks and Greek culture in a variety of ways. But it should be remembered as well that these were Greek characters in Greek dress representing Greek domestic situations in Greek locales. So Curculio, who rails against *isti Graeci palliati*, would have done so wearing the Greek *pallium* himself. Such paradoxes are usually resolved by assuming that 'Athens,' 'Epidauros' and other Greek settings are metaphorical Romes, and that the seemingly self-loathing Greeks have actually become Romans.<sup>23</sup> But perhaps the ideological work of these passages aims at something more complex. If the plays reflect the authentic content of their exemplars, then the

<sup>22</sup> Gruen 1990, 154.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Moore's readings of *Curculio* and *Truculentus*: 1998, 126-57.

self-deprecation in Plautus' presentation is, in fact, *Greek* self-deprecation. On the other hand, by indulging in crude stereotypes of the Other, Plautus is perhaps lampooning mainstream Roman racism of the crudest type. The 'cultural cringe' or inferiority complex interpretation is also available: the droll and sophisticated tongue-in-cheek self-mockery of Greek characters may in fact reveal (and in so doing, subvert) the Romans' own coarser, less self-aware sense of humour; similarly, mockery of Greek behaviour and philosophers may actually take aim at contemporary Roman philhellenes whose pretension and unbridled enthusiasm for all things Greek was all too often unaccompanied by an appreciation of the finer points of Hellenic learning and culture.<sup>24</sup> It is almost as though Plautus is trying to assure his sophisticated cosmopolitan audience (which doubtless included a few Greeks) that the Romans are not as crass and boorish as some might suppose.

The 'cultural cringe' interpretation, in fact, may find further support in the construction of barbarism and barbarity in the plays. As has long been recognized, *barbarus* in Plautus is code for 'Roman' or 'Italian.'<sup>25</sup> Ridiculed are Roman/Italian body odours (*Poen.* 1313–1314), food (*Cas.* 748), agricultural practices (*Poen.* 598), dancers (*Cur.* 150), building methods (*Mos.* 828) and legal practices (*St.* 193). Italian regions and locales are often mentioned for their comedy value: Apulians are notoriously untrustworthy and boorish (*Cas.* 71–78 and *Mil.* 648); Praenestini are rustics who speak a strange patois (*Trin.* 609 and *Truc.* 691). Even writers of Latin, like Plautus himself, are barbaric: *Mil.* 211 mentions a *poeta barbarus*, while the prologues to two plays assert that Plautus *vortit barbare*, 'translated [the play] into barbarian language' (*As.* 11; *Trin.* 19).

It matters little whether such sentiments appeared in Plautus' Greek exemplars; if so, that he chose to include them at all is surely the significant point. But what does his decision signify, exactly? An inferiority complex, perhaps;<sup>26</sup> but the comic mode is rarely so clear-cut. Plautus' inclusion of disparaging remarks about Romans and Italians may also indicate cultural confidence, an imperviousness to the kinds of mockery meted out to *barbary* by Greek characters on the stage. The characters themselves, of course, are comic types and often figures of fun, so perhaps the remarks about

<sup>24</sup> Gruen 1990, 155–6 for the latter point (cf. Moore [1998], 56 and 59); Gruen also favours the straight Roman chauvinistic reading of these passages: 1990, 154–5 and 1992, 262–3.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Gray 1897, xl, and Segal 1987, 36 (Roman); Gruen 1990, 155 and n. 167 (usually Roman); Leigh 2004, 5 and n. 16, and Moore 1998, 54 (Roman or Italian); Richlin 2005, 40, 99, and 262 (Italian). Cf. also Merrill 1972, 98 (where *barbarus* = 'Greek').

<sup>26</sup> *Contra* Gruen 1992, 227.

Italian barbarity comprise 'an inside joke, through which Romans were able to laugh off Greek pretensions to superiority'.<sup>27</sup> All of these readings of the Roman Self, like the readings of the Greek Other explored earlier, are available to Plautus' audience, and it is perhaps futile to try to choose between them. The poet left it up to the individual audience member as to how he would process these cultural mash-ups and slippages.

The Greek-inspired literature of the middle Republic opens a window, a fragmented and opaque window to be sure, onto responses to Rome's earliest transmarine imperial expansion. Through the haze can be discerned attempts to apprehend and control the non-Roman Other, a growing Roman cultural self-assurance in tandem with the Republic's military rise, as well as the first stirrings of those anxieties and tensions that would compel later generations of Romans into partisan rancour and all-out civil war. All that was in the future, however. The texts under examination in this chapter have revealed, for the most part, a remarkable exuberance and a keen interest in Rome's expanding cultural and literary horizons as well as pride in her imperial achievement.

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<sup>27</sup> Owens 2000, 397; cf. Anderson 1993, 133-51, esp. 139-40.

## RIVALS FOR EMPIRE: CARTHAGE, MACEDON, THE SELEUCIDS

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### 1. *Setting: The Mediterranean Powers after Alexander*<sup>1</sup>

Livy, following his narrative for 318 BC, digresses to ponder: what would have been the outcome had Alexander lived on and marched on the West? His conclusion is unsurprising: a sad fate for Alexander at the hands of the great Roman fathers of the era, especially if the fearsome republic of Carthage ‘joined to Rome by an ancient treaty’ had been brought into play (9.17–19). The annalist’s confidence in the strength of an as yet adolescent Roman empire need not concern us; the striking thing, in terms of the ancient Mediterranean’s international relations, is that he thinks of just three great powers. If such a simple situation did exist in 323, it disappeared quickly, only to reappear briefly at the beginning of the 2nd Century. From 323 the Macedonian-cum-Persian empire disintegrated into five major parts, then reconsolidated to the three I will discuss in this chapter (under the Antigonids, Seleucids, and Ptolemies); eventually the last of these collapsed, and Carthage was eliminated. This left Rome, Philip V, and Antiochus III to confront each other after 200.

Of the three eastern powers, that of Ptolemaic Egypt was the earliest to emerge. Alexander’s general Ptolemy ruled initially as governor after Alexander’s death, but afterwards as king (304–281). Just three further Ptolemies spanned the rest of the century down to 204, giving an impression of great stability, whose underlying fragility was exposed only in the late years of Ptolemy IV.

Antigonus ‘the One-Eyed’, by 315, held Asia and Syria, provoking the other successor-generals into coalitions to contain him. His opponents included Ptolemy and Seleucus, satrap of Babylonia.<sup>2</sup> Antigonus then concentrated on western expansion, and in 306 proclaimed himself and his son Demetrius kings, a move soon imitated by the other successors. After

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<sup>1</sup> Important literary sources for the period from Alexander’s death to the ascension of Philip V and Antiochus III are: Appian, *Syrian Wars*, 55–66 (brief); Diodorus Siculus 18–20 (323–302 BC, full) and 21–27 (301–205 BC, fragmentary); Justin 13–18 and 22–28.

<sup>2</sup> Diod. 19.55–56; Wheatley 2002.

the octogenarian Antigonos' death in battle at Ipsus in Phrygia in 301, further struggles over Asia Minor and Macedon climaxed with Demetrius' defeat by Seleucus in 285, but his son, Antigonos II Gonatas, exploited the chaos following the Gauls' eruption into Greece in 279 to establish the dynasty in Macedonia, his status secure by 271. As to the third of the powers, Seleucus was king following Antigonos' example from 304, but the Seleucids dated their new era from their earlier recapture of Babylon, making 312 Year 1. A pact with Antigonos in 308 enabled Seleucus' consolidation and reconquest of the depths of Asia; ca. 305–303 he forged a marriage alliance with Chandragupta, and received war elephants which he employed at Ipsus.

Ipsus brought Seleucus' territory to the Mediterranean: on the one hand this established a highly contentious frontier with Ptolemy; on the other it brought under control the area which Seleucus would most transform with cities (below). Seleucus also seems at the end of his life to have cherished the idea of ruling over Macedonians in Macedonia proper. He found a pretext to invade Asia Minor, and in 281 defeated his rival Lysimachus at Corupedium. Though he himself was assassinated before he could make good his aspirations, he brought about (1) the greatest extent of the Seleucid empire, stretching from the Aegean to the Hindu Kush; and (2) a Macedonian kingdom confined mainly to Europe, and soon to be under Antigonid control.

What of Rome and Carthage in the generation after Alexander? Roman expansion was tentative at best: in 321, the Samnites were sending the Romans under the yoke at the Caudine Forks; and in 315, they devastated Latium. However, the years 315–312 saw a change of fortunes across the world, so that by the time Seleucus regained Babylon, the Romans had started constructing the Appian Way into Campania, and were confident enough to fight on other fronts as well.<sup>3</sup> With the conquest of Etruria and Umbria, Roman control of peninsular Italy was in sight, save the cities of Magna Graecia in the south.

If Rome was quickly acquiring a compact land empire, the empire which Carthage had more slowly accumulated was the opposite: far-flung, although communications were facilitated by the sea she commanded. Libya (i.e. the broader hinterland of Carthage) and Sardinia she asserted to be her private property: thus Polybius on her Roman treaty of 348 (3.24.14). But his claim that by 264 she had reduced 'a great part of Spain

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<sup>3</sup> Cornell 1995, 354.



to subjection' (1.10.5) is likely a great exaggeration.<sup>4</sup> Nonetheless, the Phoenicians there, on the lesser islands, and on the Algerian and Moroccan coasts were her allies or colonies. Their degree of subordination no doubt varied. In western Sicily Punic colonies lay hard up against those of the Greeks in the east, bitter opponents since their arrival.

The years following Alexander's death were dominated by a struggle with Syracuse under its tyrant Agathocles. Roundly defeated in battle in 311, he invaded Libya whilst the Carthaginians besieged Syracuse. The invasion, though damaging, ultimately failed, and peace was made on terms of the *status quo ante* in 306. Agathocles' death in 289 was the Carthaginians' opportunity for a resurgence: they 'crossed over with a great force, and reduced several cities' (Justin 23.2). Pyrrhus answered Greek appeals and entered Sicily in 278, prompting the treaty between Rome and Carthage which Polybius counts (3.25.1-5) as the third, and also introducing the Carthaginians to elephant warfare. Although Rome and Carthage made common cause against Pyrrhus, it was the instability of these wars in Sicily which finally provided the flashpoint between them.

## 2. Carthage: History, Resources, Problems

The scene for Graeco-Punic conflict was set in the earlier first millennium by two great waves of *apoikiai* (migrants setting up new independent communities, as opposed to 'colonisation' properly so-called, with colonies politically tied to their original community). The first of these was Phoenician, between the 10th Century BC and the 8th. It reached as far west as the Atlantic coasts of Spain and Africa; Carthage itself reportedly was founded in 814 (archaeologically plausible), and Motya, in Sicily, around then or a little later; Ebusus (Ibiza) had a Phoenician presence from the mid-7th Century. Greek *apoikiai* came later, to Sicily ca. 730, and to southern France and Spain ca. 600. These later settlers were resisted, mostly unsuccessfully, by Carthage.<sup>5</sup>

Around this time we get our first glimpse of Carthaginian military expansionism. A certain Malchus fought unsuccessfully in Sardinia and Sicily. Leadership then passed to three generations of the Magonid dynasty. Mago himself is noted as a military reformer; of his sons, Hasdrubal died

<sup>4</sup> Whittaker 1978, 71.

<sup>5</sup> Foundation of Carthage: Lancel 1995, 22-34; Ibiza: Lancel 1995, 82; Carthaginians resist Greeks: Thuc. 1.13.

fighting in Sardinia, the other (Hamilcar) in a significant defeat in Sicily in 480. It was then under this Hamilcar's sons that Carthage took control of its hinterland, Libya.<sup>6</sup> Libya became a great resource to Carthage, whose aristocracy had large estates there. The territory was demarcated and protected by structures comparable with the later Roman *limites*: the 'Punic ditches' surrounding the whole, and surveillance outposts, intervisible with troop bases, around the sensitive Cap Bon, in use by the end of the 5th Century. By the end of the 4th, Carthage was 'the front-rank agricultural power in the Mediterranean West', administering and economically exploiting an area strikingly larger than the contemporary Roman territory.

The other great resource was tax and tribute. The city exacted tribute (or perhaps temporary war-indemnities) from defeated Greeks in Sicily in the 5th Century (e.g., Selinus in 409). At the empire's height, state revenues can be speculatively estimated at 2,000 talents per annum (before the clash with Rome) or at times perhaps even 3,000 (after Sardinia was lost, but Spain was won). Roman state revenue is not thought to have been in this range until the first decades of the 2nd Century BC.<sup>7</sup>

Extracting large revenues from a relatively small population meant a harsh régime, passionately hated by the subject peoples. Revolts often followed military reversals overseas, and always accompanied invasions of Africa: inciting such a revolt was in 310 Agathocles' explicit strategy (Diod. 20.3.3), and also a consequence of Regulus' invasion in 256–255 (Pol. 1.31). During the First Punic War, the share of produce that Libyan cultivators had to hand over had reached 50 per cent (Pol. 1.72.2). Moreover these very peoples provided the bulk of the manpower for the city's land forces; hence the total collapse in capacity to project power outside the continent during the exceedingly brutal Mercenary War of 241–237, and the ruthless exploitation of this situation by the Romans.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Justin Bk 19 is unfortunately a key source. Hasdrubal son of Mago must be contemporary with the Roman treaty of 509, which identifies Sardinia as under Punic control, and Sicily as containing a Carthaginian *eparchia* ('domain': Pol. 3.22). The defeat of 480 (Herodotus 7.165–7, and Justin 4.2; 19.2) seems to have ended, for the time being, Carthaginian attempts to control the whole island.

<sup>7</sup> Defences (e.g. Ras ed-Drek, Kelibia, Ras el-Fortass) and resources of Africa: Lancel 1985, 262–70. 'Punic ditches' (mentioned by App. *Lib.* 54) are archaeologically unknown. Tribute (or indemnities?), Whittaker 1978, 72–3; scale of Carthaginian revenues, Hoyos 2003, 27–8; Roman revenues, Frank 1933, 1.126–41.

<sup>8</sup> Harshness: Plut. *Mor.* 799d. Another revolt after a failed expedition to Sicily in the 390s: Diod. 14.77.

By the time of the Punic Wars, Carthage was forced to try to punch above her weight. Her cash revenues may have been larger, but the population base of her empire was smaller, than that of the Roman republic. In the Roman tradition Hannibal's rampage in Italy appears a climactic episode, but by objective measures Carthage was in decline. Her territory was invaded roughly every fifty years from 310 onwards: by Agathocles, Regulus, and then the two Scipios successively. Of these four invasions, the first two were damaging, the third shattering, the fourth fatal. Hannibal's strategy, an attempt to detach Rome's allies, was not a feat of great imagination, but rather a projection onto the foe of Carthage's own key vulnerability. It was an attempt at asymmetric warfare which recalls the German U-boat campaign: audacious, but relatively inexpensive, offensive tactics by a power whose inferior resources put them strategically on the defensive, and had already determined their defeat.<sup>9</sup>

### 3. *Resources and Problems of the Antigonids and Seleucids*

#### *Resources*

Prussia under Frederick the Great was called 'not a country with an army, but an army with a country', and this is no less true of the Hellenistic kingdoms.<sup>10</sup> Indeed, the case can be still more starkly formulated: after 288 the Antigonid Demetrius was leader of a military which did not even have a country. Such men's royal style (always, for example, 'King Antiochus', without specified territory or people) also betrays the highly personal nature of their rule. When they did secure territory, they thought of it and called it 'spear-won territory'. The monarchy's power was based on the armed forces, and this affected everything about how the state was organised. Colonisation, for example, was carried out very much with immediate security objectives in mind.

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<sup>9</sup> Population: Hoyos 2003, 226, postulates 2.2–2.8 million in the 220s (excluding newly won Spain), but refers to lower estimates by other scholars; compare the Roman republic's three million (Lazenby 1996, 11). Asymmetric warfare: 'the U boat peril was the only thing that really frightened me during the war'; Churchill's confession, quoted in Keegan 1997, 83, could perhaps sum up Hannibal's exceptional effect on the Romans.

<sup>10</sup> Diodorus' books 21–30 cover the period 301–168; they are, however, fragmentary (cf. n. 1). Epigraphy is vital, but scattered; Austin 2006 is an excellent and readily available collection. Polybius covers the Roman collisions with Carthage, Philip V, then Antiochus III. The comment on Prussia is variously attributed: Mann 1968, 34, makes it Mirabeau's.

Plutarch remembers Alexander as the founder of numerous cities (*de Alexandri Fortuna* 1.5 = *Mor.* 328E). In reality, with the exception of Alexandria in Egypt, these were usually military colonies aimed at controlling new territory as much as self-commemoration. The achievement belongs in part to the successors, particularly Seleucus I, who also aimed at both fame and control. Seleucus made use of true city-foundations (*poleis*) and troop-settlements (*katoikiai*). Foundations (or re-foundations) were made throughout the Seleucid realm, but the heartland was in Syria and Mesopotamia. There was a Seleucia-on-Tigris, a capital which looked east. In the west the royal centre was a kind of 'little Macedon', the area of Seleucis, also called Tetrapolis for its four chief cities Antioch, Seleucia (an important port), Laodicea and Apamea (the military centre). Although early Seleucid foundations were of Graeco-Macedonian soldiers, later on we see population transplants, e.g. from Magnesia to bolster Antioch under Antiochus I (281–261), and Jewish families from Mesopotamia and Babylonia to rebellious Lydia and Phrygia under Antiochus III (223–187). The Seleucids also made some use of the institution whereby soldiers (who retained liability to serve) were settled on individual plots (*kleroi*).

Rulers in Macedon faced a rather different situation, for they had an already settled population from which to draw soldiers, and Greece proper was already full of *poleis*. Thus the emphasis was on garrisoning existing centres rather than founding new ones. The 'Fetters of Greece', Demetrias, Chalcis and Acrocorinth, were key fortresses, and Athens was subject to a Macedonian garrison for most of the period down to 229.<sup>11</sup>

The cornerstone of all Hellenistic armies was the pike phalanx. To this were added various elements of infantry and cavalry, drawn from territories under control or from the cosmopolitan pool of Greek mercenaries. These came from nearly everywhere, though Cretans followed by Aetolians feature most prominently. Elephants also figured, particularly among the Seleucids, who first procured them from Chandragupta. Strabo's report that Seleucus' elephant-corps was five hundred strong is consistent with Diodorus' account of the Ipsus campaign (20.113.4). This figure has been contested, as it is much more than twice the size of any other reported elephant

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<sup>11</sup> App. Syr. 57 attributes 59 different cities to Seleucus. Apamea as 'Pella': Strabo 16.2.10. Population drafts: to Antioch, Dittenberger 1903–5, 233 = Austin 2006, no. 160); to Lydia and Phrygia, Jos. *AJ* 12.147–53. For instability of tenure of the cleruchies see the Mnesimachos inscription: text and translation in Atkinson 1972. For a recent discussion of Hellenistic garrisons, see Chaniotis 2002.

force: for example at Raphia (217), Antiochus III's 102 elephants faced Ptolemy IV's 73.

In personnel, the Seleucid field army was typically in the region of 30,000 to 35,000 (as on Antiochus III's eastern expedition). A full mobilisation could double this number (as in the campaigns of Raphia and Panion [200]), but it was a costly and disruptive effort. At Magnesia (189), Antiochus would face the Romans with 45,000 men (despite Livy 37.37.9: 60,000 infantry and more than 12,000 cavalry), but he needed to leave Syria and Judaea well garrisoned against the Ptolemaic threat.<sup>12</sup>

The Macedonian army was always much smaller: Livy's figures, if anything again rather exaggerated, show this. At Cynoscephalae, Philip V led about 25,000, mostly native Macedonians (33.4.4-5), though we should bear in mind that up to 15,000 mercenaries were holding garrisons elsewhere. Perseus' army in the final confrontation with Rome was larger, but still unimpressive by Seleucid standards: a review at Pella in 171 involved 43,000 troops (Livy 42.51). Discipline was less stern than in the Roman army: for example, Philip's penalty for sleeping on guard was a one-drachma fine. Compare this to execution by beating, inflicted by a Roman soldier's comrades. Philip's relative laxity was probably due to the need to procure foreign soldiers economically, along with their fickleness (when Demetrius captured 3,000 Ptolemaic soldiers in 306, he was surprised that they would not change sides).<sup>13</sup>

Maintaining the king, his friends, and the soldiers required money, and revenue was gathered towards this end and little else. (In turn, conquest meant revenue, a powerful stimulus to war.) Revenue came, first and most obviously, from taxes: the poll tax, general and specific sales taxes, and tolls on the movement of goods. Neither 'freedom' nor 'autonomy' meant exemption from tax and tribute. Communities within the various empires also had the further burden of providing hospitality and billeting for the court and soldiers when they were at hand. Second, and perhaps the bulk, was that from the royal estates: worked by 'royal peasants' (effectively serfs) and constituting huge tracts of territory. Third, booty windfalls from

<sup>12</sup> Polybius' army lists for the Raphia campaign: 5.65 (Ptolemy's), 5.79 (Antiochus', which is diverse). See Griffith 1968, ch. 9, 'Provenance and recruiting'; also Chaniotis 2002, 100. Bar-Kochva 1976, 76-9 favours the higher number for Seleucus' elephants, but gives the contrary bibliography. Seleucid army strengths: Grainger 2002, 37 (eastern expedition), 321-3 (Magnesia).

<sup>13</sup> Philip's strength and strategy in campaign of Cynoscephalae: Griffith 1968, 71-2. Military discipline: Macedonian, Hatzopoulos 1996, 2, no.12 = Austin 2006, no. 90; Roman, Pol. 6.37.2-4. Unusual loyalty of mercenaries in 306: Diod. 20.47.3-4.

successful war-making: e.g., the Ptolemaic capture of a Seleucid war chest of 1,500 talents in 246/5. Whilst kings needed revenue for war, we can safely suppose that this very competition with their rivals put them under pressure to remit taxes and tribute to important communities as a way of securing their cooperation: as in, e.g., Antiochus I's or II's letter to Erythrae, or the treaty of one of these with the city of Lysimachea.<sup>14</sup>

The populousness and fabled wealth of the areas occupied by the Seleucids at their height give every impression that their revenues greatly exceeded those of the Romans and Carthaginians, and were comparable only to those of the Ptolemies. Certainly when Antigonos was occupying the Seleucids' later heartland before 315, his annual revenue is reported as 11,000 talents (Diod. 19.56.5). Besides the Macedonian kings' smaller armies, their revenues seem much smaller too: the land tax brought in little over 200 talents a year in 168 (Plut. *Aem.* 28.4; cf. the income of the 'small' power Rhodes, below).

### *Problems for the Seleucids*

The Antigonids' fewer resources at least were balanced by the advantage of a relatively homogeneous ethnic base in Greece and Macedon; the Seleucids piled problem on problem, with a geographically huge empire and rule over diverse nations. They undertook to rule the former Persian empire, but also tried routinely to involve themselves in Mediterranean affairs as the Persians seldom had. It is easy to see how the available resources could be consumed by such a fissiparous empire. Indeed, the overall trajectory of Seleucid history—a steady, two-and-a-half centuries' crumbling away after the high-water mark of Corupedium—suggests that the books never quite balanced.

In Asia Minor Seleucus I had taken over a combination of Hellenised non-Greek territories (e.g., Bithynia, Pontus, Cappadocia), and Greek *poleis*; the territories all soon became kingdoms, and the more powerful *poleis* (e.g. Miletus and Samos) could assert varying degrees of real independence. To complicate the picture further, in 278/7 the Celts arrived in Asia Minor. They posed a problem as they did not fix themselves in one spot, but roamed around demanding tribute. Their presence necessitated (or was used to justify) a special tax by early Seleucid rulers; later, in the reign

<sup>14</sup> Capture of war chests: Austin 1986, 465, citing *FGrH* F160, as well as Diod. 18.52.7 (600 talents), 19.57.5 (1,000 talents), 19.61.5 (500 talents), 20.108.3 (3,000 talents). Remission of tribute by Seleucids: Engelmann and Merkelbach 1973, no.31 = Austin 2006, no.170; Frisch 1975, 45(B) = Austin 2006, no.171.

of their king Cavarus (ruling until after 220), certain Celts were extracting 80 talents a year from Byzantium (Pol. 4.46–52). Despite the efforts of the Attalids of Pergamum, they remained problematic until defeated by Cn. Manlius Vulso in 189, in a campaign following Rome's war with Antiochus III.

Attalid power had at its source the war of Corupedium (282–281) and one of those 'windfalls' of treasure previously mentioned: Philetaerus, steward of Pergamum and the 9,000 talents stored there, was one of the nobles whose rebellion against Lysimachus precipitated Seleucus' invasion. After the war, he pursued an understated independence: it was only with his adopted son (Eumenes I, 263–241) that Pergamum's rulers styled themselves kings. Under Attalus I (241–197), Pergamum was the biggest beneficiary in Asia Minor of a civil war between Seleucus II and Antiochus Hierax.

Secure alongside Pergamum as a second-rank power, and another problem not just to the Seleucids but also to the Antigonids, was Rhodes, with her considerable fleet. In the time of Antigonus I, she had defeated a year-long siege by Demetrius. Mainly threatened by the Seleucids, she allied with the Ptolemies, but as a highly autonomous ally. When the Romans arrived, she worked against Antiochus III; in this period her revenues were notable for a 'small' power, including 167 talents from harbour dues, and 120 talents from Caunus and Stratonicea on the mainland (Pol. 30.31.6–13).

Eastern problems also saw a flaking away of territory. As far back as Seleucus, territory up to the Indus appears to have been ceded (though the settlement with Chandragupta is otherwise very unclear). Bactria went in the mid-3rd Century, while the Iranian regions began to be overrun by the Parthians. These losses cut communications with India, and thus probably contributed to the decline of the Seleucid elephant force. Antiochus III (223–187), later on 'the Great', had by 213 reclaimed some of the old possessions in Asia Minor, and from 212 to 206 campaigned in Media, Parthia, Hyrcania and Bactria; but the best that can be said is that he stemmed, for a time, the Parthian tide.<sup>15</sup>

In addition to problems in Asia Minor and the east, the Seleucids had also to contend with the Ptolemaic kingdom. This was the only other power to rival the Seleucids. In the period 282–200, there were no less than six wars, fought not just over Coele-Syria, but also in Asia Minor, where the Ptolemies had allies and possessions. Some highlights: the Third Syrian

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<sup>15</sup> Bar-Kochva 1976, 77.

War (246–241) left Seleucia in Ptolemaic hands, for Antiochus III to regain only in 219; the campaign of Raphia (217) in the ‘Fourth’ Syrian War was fought between armies each seventy thousand strong. Possession of Coele-Syria allowed the Ptolemies defence in depth on the crucial north-east invasion route; it also yielded ship-building timber, which Egypt lacked. Cyprus gave similar advantages. Hence the Ptolemies fought determinedly to retain them.

### *Problems for the Antigonids*

After the passing of the main Celtic threat, and the demise of the phenomenal Pyrrhus, the Antigonid kings in Macedon experienced a half century of only relative tranquillity. Although Thessaly was under firm control, Antigonus Gonatas (ca. 277/6–239), Demetrius II (239–229), and Philip V (229–179, with Antigonus Doson until 221) wielded a tenuous hegemony over the rest of the Greek peninsula. Major problems were two territorial leagues, the Achaean and the Aetolian, and the independent cities Athens and Sparta, all generally hostile to Antigonid power, though Pella could sometimes take advantage of conflicts between them. Had the Antigonids been less overbearing, they might have found readier allies in Greece against Rome; unfortunately for them, such behaviour was inconceivable.<sup>16</sup>

Straight after Alexander’s death, and again sixty years later, Athens and other Greek states fought wars against Macedon. In the Chremonidean War (ca. 267–261) Athens and Sparta used the terminology of an alliance which hearkened back to their defence of Greece against Xerxes, ‘those who are currently flouting justice and breaking the treaties with the cities’.<sup>17</sup> They hoped for the support of Ptolemy II, ‘[showing] zeal for the common freedom of the Greeks’. If Ptolemy’s zeal existed, he was unable to transform it into adequate material help: the war was a disaster for Athens, which had to accept a Macedonian garrison (Paus. 3.6.6), and it ended Spartan-Athenian pretensions to defend Greek liberty. Still, Athens remained a thorn in the Macedonian side, and, along with Rhodes, Pergamum, and Egypt, her appeal to Rome in 201–200 helped to bring about the Second Macedonian War.

The Achaean League was refounded ca. 280. Its territory was basically Peloponnesian, hence tension with Sparta. The League was an alternative

<sup>16</sup> Thus Briscoe 1978, 147. Thessaly as part of the Macedonian heartland: witness the indignation at the Roman proposal to emancipate it (Livy 32.10.7).

<sup>17</sup> *SIG* 434–5 = Austin 2006, no.61.



to Macedonian power in the region: Antigonus Gonatas' unpopular policy economised on garrisons by supporting local tyrants. In 243 the League scored the notable coup of capturing the fortress of Corinth. Later the Cleomeneic War testifies to Sparta's continuing strength, for in 225 the Achaeans felt pressed enough to call in the Macedonians; subsequently Corinth would be back in Antigonid hands.

The other mainland league, the Aetolian, enjoyed a vigorous century before the Roman arrival, if the uncomplimentary remarks of the Achaean Polybius can be taken as a yardstick of its success. Of the two leagues, the Aetolian had had a longer continuous existence. The League was also a prominent defender of Greece from the Celts in 279, extending its core territory eastwards over much of central Greece in the following decade. Thereafter *isopoliteia*, without deliberative rights, was extended to communities as far off as the Bosphorus and Crete. Despite common cause with the Achaeans and Antigonus Doson against the Spartan Cleomenes, in the Social War of 220–217 the Aetolians found themselves allied with Sparta against the Achaeans and Philip V.

#### 4. *The Ptolemies and the Collapse of the Tripolar System*

The minor powers presented problems to the Antigonids and Seleucids that paled by comparison with the threat from the Ptolemies. The sources attribute to them revenues with which only the Seleucid realm can begin to compare: under Ptolemy II, Jerome (albeit a late source) reports 14,800 talents and 1.5 million artabas of corn annually.<sup>18</sup> Translated into military assets, this wealth gave Ptolemy the greatest fleet of the Mediterranean in antiquity: ninety of his ships were 'sevens' or larger, including four 'thirteens', a 'twenty', and two 'thirties' (Athenaeus 5.203d)). Land forces were on a par with the Seleucids: the armies at Raphia were approximately the same size.

The mode of settling reserves in Egypt was through *kleroi*, used much more extensively than in the Seleucid realm. (The cleruchies do not appear to have been entirely self-sustaining; we hear of new foundations in Egypt in 253;<sup>19</sup> shortages perhaps led to the ultimate large-scale employment of native troops.) Only one Greek city proper was founded by Ptolemy I: Ptolemais, in Upper Egypt. Mercenary garrisons were maintained in Crete,

<sup>18</sup> *Commentary on the Book of Daniel*, 11.7–8.

<sup>19</sup> F.W. Walbank, in *CAH*<sup>2</sup> 7.1.18.

Cyprus and Coele-Syria, which as already mentioned, provided a defensive glacis around Egypt. As with the Seleucids, great resources had to meet great liabilities: apart from anything else, recurrent warfare with the Seleucids themselves. Hence the fragility underlying the early Ptolemies' apparent stability.

Ptolemy IV made great use of native Egyptian troops in the campaign of Raphia. He prevailed over Antiochus III, but at great subsequent cost. An emboldened indigenous population almost immediately rose in revolt (Pol. 5.107.1-3), a revolt and secession which was to last until 186 in Upper Egypt; in the Aegean Rhodes would take over as the premier naval power. To make matters worse, in 204 Ptolemy IV was succeeded by the six-year-old Ptolemy V. Philip V and Antiochus fell upon the boy's kingdom. Polybius, with delicious outrage, denounces the kings for their handling of the 'orphan', but in Realist terms, their behaviour was a matter of course.<sup>20</sup> Neither could allow the other exclusive rights to gobble up Ptolemy's kingdom with its vast resources, rightly fearing a rival thus fortified. A similar apprehension can easily account for Roman intervention. The eventual outcome (thinking of events down to 167) Polybius found most edifying: both [Philip and Antiochus] were very soon vanquished in battle, and they were not only prevented from lusting after the property of others but were compelled to submit to pay tribute and obey the behests of Rome. And, finally, in a very short time Fortune re-established the kingdom of Ptolemy, while as for their dynasties and successors she in one case brought utter destruction upon them and in the other calamities very nearly as grave (15.20.8).

The Macedonian kingdom was destroyed, and the Seleucids driven permanently behind the Taurus. Polybius would not witness the rest of their gradual grinding down between Rome and the Parthians, and Syria's eventual annexation by Pompey in 64, but he draws the contrast with the Ptolemaic fate too strongly. In this he betrays, as very often, a Roman perspective. Whilst Aemilius Paullus was conquering Perseus in 168, the envoy Popillius Laenas was in Alexandria, compelling Antiochus IV to withdraw his invading army. That the Ptolemies now clearly depended on the Romans for protection made their condition not much less abject.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>20</sup> For a Realist treatment of the crisis see Eckstein 2006b, 104-115.

<sup>21</sup> The excruciating (for Antiochus) scene: Livy 45.12. The Ptolemaic appeal: 44.19.

5. *Rivals for Empire?*

Although the above has been a sketch, it nonetheless seems reasonably clear that neither the Carthaginians nor any of the Macedonian successor kingdoms was a realistic contender for Mediterranean hegemony. I argued that Carthaginian resources were not quite adequate; their moment—if they had had one—was past. The Macedonians (in the wider sense) seemed too focussed each upon each other, until the deadly moment was upon them; and why, after all, would they not be mesmerised by the image of Alexander, and aspire above all to reunite that empire? Roman dynasts too would one day catch a hint of Alexander-fever. The political-economic-military organisation of the Carthaginian and all of the Macedonian empires had common weaknesses which the Roman Republic avoided (though it would be familiar to the later emperors): the need to raise money for troops, but also having to pamper them, and use many of them up in policing the taxpayers.<sup>22</sup> The Republic's elegant solution was to demand tribute in the direct performance of military service; doing so, to paraphrase Camille Jullian, she assured herself of useful auxiliaries and deprived the conquered of their defenders.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Eckstein 2006b, 245–57, rightly stresses Roman integrative capacity, but unnecessarily attempts to downplay exceptional Roman bellicosity. He does not deal with passages like Livy 31.34.4, an account of the shock of Macedonian soldiers in 199 at having to fight against ‘such weapons *and such men*’ as the Romans (emphasis added, as in Harris 1979, 52 n. 5). Carthaginian harshness to their subjects was a weakness. Roman harshness was an inwardly-directed asperity and a different matter.

<sup>23</sup> Jullian 1909, 572, referring specifically to the 10,000 cavalry Caesar supposedly drew from Gaul for the Civil War.



## CHOOSING FRIENDS, FOES AND FIEFDOMS IN THE SECOND CENTURY BC

*Tom Hillard and Lea Beness*

In 146 BC, watching Carthage in flames, Scipio Aemilianus famously shed tears. He had reason enough to meditate upon the significance of the moment and the place he had just carved for himself in any future retelling of Rome's history, but Polybius, an eyewitness, makes it plain that Scipio also contemplated Rome's destiny (*App. Lib.* 132.629-30). In the lead-up to the Third Punic War (in 149), debate had apparently been intense—and not just with regard to whether hostilities were to be declared. In the wake of Cato's insistent demands that Carthage be destroyed, senatorial debate had ensued, concerning what would happen when Carthage was taken. Was such anticipatory vision a new element in Roman foreign policy—witnessing to a readiness to envisage Rome's place in a world which Rome would help to fashion?<sup>1</sup>

It went only so far. The silence of our sources for this era does not constitute a sound basis for any *argumentum e silentio*, but it seems that such foresight did not embrace the idea of annexation. In the event, Rome seems—at first sight—to have gained a new province (in the sense that this is usually understood), its border delineated by a trench (partly, at least, a pre-existing dyke): Rome's first recorded attempt, as Badian pointed out, to mark out an artificial frontier. This would have been no insignificant step in the development of a Roman empire that could be mapped in a way that moderns illustrate it. Annexation, however, which it should *not* be assumed was predetermined, was—to the extent that annexation occurred—the decision of a commission of five or sometimes ten *legati* such as the Senate customarily despatched after a great victory to liaise with the commander on dealing with a subdued enemy and captured territory.

The Senate sent ten of the noblest of their own number as deputies to arrange the affairs of Africa in conjunction with Scipio. These men decreed that if anything was still left of Carthage, Scipio should raze it to the ground,

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<sup>1</sup> Debate: Dubuisson 1989; Welwei 1989. Other works utilized but not cited in this chapter include Miles 1990; Rich 1995; Champion 2004a; Eckstein 2006b; Erskine 2010.

and that nobody should be allowed to live there. To those who had aided the Romans there was an allotment of lands won by the spear, and first of all the territory extending from Carthage on one side to Hippo [Diarrhytus] on the other was given to the Uticans. Upon all the rest a tribute was imposed, both a land tax and a personal tax, upon men and women alike, and it was decreed that a yearly praetor (*strategos etesios*) should be sent from Rome to govern the country (App. *Lib.* 135.639-41; Loeb tr., modified).

This would seem a straightforward piece of evidence, and this is customarily labelled annexation. It has been recently suggested, however, that when Appian speaks of 'etesian' praetors he is using merely formulaic language born of anachronism—and that the subsequent history of Africa *provincia* does not indicate a regular gubernatorial presence. At this stage, the *fines* or borders of a *provincia*, although geographical in nature, were boundaries on the exercise of a particular magistrate's *imperium*, rather than the frontiers of an administrative area.<sup>2</sup>

The debates that took place in 149 concerning Carthage should prompt an enquiry into the Roman mentality of this period. As pivotal as the year 146 was, it does not as a matter of course signal the birth of a new way of thinking (Florus 1.47 [3.12] regards it as a midway point in Rome's third age). Some of those engaged in the debate had lived through the challenge of the Hannibalic war. Scipio Aemilianus, on the other hand, is representative of a generation born to the expectations of Rome as a world power: a generation that embraced, contemplated and debated Rome's cultural transition. Scipio's 'advent' was on the battlefield of Pydna (Plut. *Aem.* 22) in a war that was seen as a watershed—even at the time. Polybius (1.1.5) judged that this conflict completed a process which began in 220: the subordination of nearly the whole *oikoumene* in scarcely more than a half-century. Later he reiterates this belief that, with the fall of the Macedonian monarchy, Rome's supremacy had been established beyond dispute (31.25.6).

Nor was the mentality of destiny newborn. Many of the soldiers who participated in the third Macedonian war had seen multiple campaigns. When they had entered the ranks, they quite likely met veterans who had

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<sup>2</sup> Legations (and varying procedure): Hoyos 1973; dyke: Badian 1958, 138-9. According to Pliny, Scipio drew up a boundary for Africa *provincia*, the so-called *fossa regia* (NH 5.25; cf. ILS 5955 for its existence in Flavian times). As the editor points out to us, since the allied kingdom of Numidia was Carthage's immediate neighbour and was by 146 a fairly well-administered state, arguably it was necessary to lay down clear *fines*. Challenge: Gargola (forthcoming). For a discussion of the early conceptualization of *fines*, Richardson 2008, 4; 8; 26-31; on the perils of anachronism: Richardson, 7.

heard Scipio Africanus' exhortation to his troops before the battle of Zama. According to Polybius, Scipio had predicted that victory at this point would bring not only mastery of Africa, but the undisputed leadership (*hegemonia*) and mastery (*dynasteia*) of the whole world (*oikoumene*: 15.10.2). The precise wording might be doubted; but Polybius was either drawing from Scipionic sources or repeating a commonplace inoffensive to Scipionic ears. He had already commented that victory in 202 emboldened the Romans to reach out and have a tilt at the rest of the world (3.2.6, cf. 1.3.6; Harris 1991, 108-9). Undoubtedly Polybius saw Roman instincts as aggressive, and his observation is all the more telling because it is not hostile. As Harris emphasises, annual ritual marked the importance of warfare to the community.<sup>3</sup> After Pydna, the general benefits were immediately apparent. With tribute from realms previously Macedonian topping up the state's annual revenues, the taxing of Roman citizenry was no longer required (Plut. *Aem.* 38.1).

Whatever the origins of Roman imperialism, the patent effects of Rome's successful expansion must be factored in. And success can constrain as much as liberate. Rome's new status brought demands as well as opportunities, its Mediterranean stature recognized by the procession of embassies that visited the city to pay their respects, and made manifest on the Roman side by the senate's expectation that Roman will would prevail beyond the frontiers of Rome's *imperium*—or, to be more exact, beyond the boundaries of Rome's individual generals' *imperia*. (See also Chapter 5.)<sup>4</sup>

But there was another complicating aspect. As Rome transformed the Mediterranean world, it was itself transformed. Plutarch's life of Cato the Elder is an essay on the tensions between Rome's old world (perhaps no more ancient than the austere years of the Hannibalic war) and the new—though it remains very much a secondary source. Polybius witnessed the flood of wealth into Rome, emphasising its social impact and effects both public and private. Again, he pinpoints the victory at Pydna as pivotal—and he records public debate on the subject (31.25.2-7). It is as if there was a conscious tussle for Rome's very soul.

Carneades the Academician who visited Rome in 155 as ambassador for Athens, and the Stoic Panaetius, who was frequently in the company of

<sup>3</sup> Harris 1991, 9-10; *pace* Rich (forthcoming). On Polybius, Baronowski 2011, 5-13.

<sup>4</sup> Pol. 30.17-20; Livy 45.19-20; 45.42.6-11; 45.44.4-21; procession of embassies: Livy 45.17.6. For the experience from the supplicants' perspective, *SIG* <sup>3</sup> 656 (Teian ambassadors to Rome, ca. 166 BC); exertion of Rome's will (168 BC), Pol. 29.2; Livy 44.19.13; 29; 45.10-12; 13.2-3, with other references in *MRR* 1.430, to which add Plut. *Mor.* 202F; App. *Syr.* 66. See also demands on Delos ca. 164, *SIG* <sup>3</sup> 664; *RDGE* 5.

Scipio Aemilianus, addressed themselves to the issue of world power. Such contemplation, it cannot be doubted, left its mark on some members of the Roman élite, and the debate which Cicero places in 129 may well reflect discussions in the mid-2nd Century, though through a Ciceronian filter (*Rep.* 3.24). Debate concerned whether the expansion of Roman power was either self-interested or morally justifiable. The case for the subjection of others on moral grounds is twofold: that some peoples are better off being ruled by superiors, and that an imposed rule is justified if benign. Rome was beginning to consider, as well as feel, the effects of its success, and Rome did not speak with one voice.<sup>5</sup>

Increasing wealth can be relied upon to exacerbate existing social and political differences. For the *nobiles* and those aspiring to *nobilitas*, success meant a triumph, and that required merely a significant victory. Personal enrichment and the opportunity to enrich the community (so as to ensure the immortality of one's name) followed almost as a matter of course. Those who put their lives on the line to achieve this were becoming more demanding. The troops who followed L. Aemilius Paullus home in 167 did not feel that their honorary reimbursement was satisfactory—though, by senatorial decree, seventy towns in Epirus had been given over to systematic looting in an operation of great precision, so that after the sale of plunder and 150,000 persons 400 *denarii* apiece were distributed to the cavalry and 200 *denarii* apiece to the infantrymen (*Pol.* 30.15; *Livy* 45.34.1-7). Back in Rome these men were seriously ructious (*Livy* 45.35-39; *Plut. Aem.* 30-31). Recalcitrance could take different forms. In future years Rome would witness—to an extent never seen before—a readiness to evade the levy.<sup>6</sup> This, we are told, affected the young officer class as much as the rankers (*Pol.* 35.4).

Differences also widened over the objectives of warfare. Those who looked to the commercial exploitation of military success clearly sought more than a succession of triumphs. One's mind runs immediately to the equestrian order—though the *equites* were neither marked as such, nor should they be thought of as a unified class discrete from their kinsmen, friends and associates in the Senate. The great *publicani*, who equipped and supplied the armies, might have been content with continuous warfare; those who competed for farming Rome's revenues would probably have looked to exploitation. So too the businessmen and merchants engaged directly and indirectly in long-distance trade. The profits for the

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Erskine 1990, 192-200.

<sup>6</sup> Evans 1988.



Roman state were significant (see Diod. 5.36.4, 38.1, on the mines of Spain) and, it must be assumed from the competition for these contracts, that so were the contractors' percentages. The ideological superstructure, though still favouring Rome's traditional leaders, was under threat from the social realities of an increasingly enriched, and thus empowered, commercial sector.<sup>7</sup>

Such internal politics, one can speculate, also played a part in foreign policy. Following the Third Macedonian War, ten senatorial *legati* were sent out to Macedonia and five to Illyria to assist the commanders in settling affairs (Livy 45.17.1), but Rome did not annex either. In Macedonia it instituted four autonomous republics, under severe restrictions. Some modern scholarship has put this down to practical considerations; Rome, it is thought, lacked the manpower to occupy another foreign territory permanently.<sup>8</sup> Ideologically, too, Rome's new Mediterranean stature demanded justification. Rome could claim to have brought freedom. In 168/167, halving Macedonian taxes could be said to be liberating. Moreover, banning trade between the new republics meant that the Roman treasury would not receive custom dues, *portoria*—but nor would anybody profit from farming these. More to the point, Macedonia's gold- and silver-mines, 'a source of immense revenue' (*ingens vectigal*), would not be worked. In this last instance, if Livy can be trusted, it was actually observed that, where there were *publicani*, there could be no *libertas* for 'the allies' (as the Macedonians were now cast: 45.18.4). The decision can be seen as ideological, but it directly denied access to commercial interests—and this, in the immediate context, can be seen as serving narrower senatorial interests.<sup>9</sup>

It might be said that the above arrangements were annexation without the name. What had been Macedonian and Illyrian realms became virtually Roman appanages supplying a steady revenue to Rome and thus contributing to the fundamental transformation of Rome's economy. Yet Macedonia was not a Roman 'province'.<sup>10</sup> It is therefore better perhaps to characterise Rome's expanding sway in three stages: penetration, exploitation, and occupation (avoiding the more problematic 'annexation'). The first represents military incursion; the second covers a multitude of activities (predicated upon an unequal relationship in terms of Roman

<sup>7</sup> Various episodes make clear a growing rift between those who determined the stages and the pace of expansion and those who would commercially profit from it; cf. Badian 1972, 26-47; Hill 1952, 87-90.

<sup>8</sup> Harris 1979/1991, 143-6, 160-2.

<sup>9</sup> A theme explored by Badian 1972, 40-3.

<sup>10</sup> For this argued at length, Kallet-Marx 1995, 11-21; cf. Gruen 1984, 423-9.

superiority). The third represents commitment. The first stage was effectively limited only by logistical considerations and the need for a formal justification. The second stage, exploitation, was it seems readily entered upon in most instances, but also ought not to be taken for granted if disadvantages were perceived by those who made Rome's foreign policy (sometimes the Senate, sometimes the commanders in the field). It is the third stage that was marked by Roman hesitation.

Scipio's exhortation to his troops in 202 (as transmitted by Polybius in the mid-2nd Century), focussed on the opportunity for *hegemonia* and *dynasteia*. What would have been his words? *Dominatio*? *Maiestas*? *Imperium*? It is clear that there was no reluctance (if the circumstances were propitious) to establish military superiority; but an influential school of modern scholarship would temper any facile explanation of Roman expansion. Gruen would see Rome as increasingly drawn into the way things were 'done' in the Hellenistic world; Rome became a Hellenistic *hegemon*. Kallet-Marx forces us to take into account, alongside Harris' demonstration of Roman aggression, a hesitation on Rome's part: the absence of a conscious expansionism—in the Greek East, at least. Slowness to annex should, however, not be taken as benign. In the Macedonian case, Roman retrospective analysis would claim that Paullus' settlement had been laid down with such great care (*cum tanta cura*) that it served future generations. From the Macedonian perspective, the Romans are to be seen as spoilers: 'The extent to which Macedonia had been devastated and despoiled,' Hammond observed 'should not be underestimated.' Rome was not slow in inflicting damage, simply slow to take up the responsibilities of success. Interventions came at Rome's pleasure. Kallet-Marx argues that the Greek states *sought* alliances (to advertise their connection to Rome) and *sought* to involve Rome in arbitrating Greek disputes. This is a facet of what Craig Champion has called 'empire by invitation.' Rome was in fact, relatively speaking, militarily quiescent following Pydna—though Rome's 'presence' in the East was strong. High-handed diplomacy and the issuing of fiats would suffice. This form of pretension was based on the peculiarly Roman concept of the *maiestas populi Romani* (majesty based on Roman superiority). The presence of Rome abroad was thus sufficiently real without occupation or permanent administration. And in the late 160s and early 150s, there seems to have been a *rapprochement* between those in Rome favouring constraints and those favouring further exploitation. Certainly the Macedonian mines were reopened in 158. All the same, when a

Dalmatian war began in 157, Rome was content with military success; no territorial gain followed.<sup>11</sup>

At the other end of the Mediterranean, Spain provides an interesting contrast because of the *continued* Roman military presence. Here there was never a reluctance to exploit captured territory—gold and silver left Spain for Rome in tens of thousands of pounds in the decade after Zama, the exploitation of the peninsula's wealth inevitably demanding further penetration of the upland interior. But, initially, the Roman military presence had been largely reactive. Even the *provinciae Hispania Citerior* and *Hispania Ulterior* were not fixed spheres of military authority, let alone closely defined territorial units of administration. Only around 180–178 (and the administration of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus) does something like a model emerge of regular taxation of the areas under Roman control. In the 150s, however, whatever system was in place came unstuck, and at the heart of the crisis was the fundamental uncertainty as to what Rome had set in place. The Celtiberian Belli, taking advantage of an alleged imprecision of Roman demands, resolved to fortify the 'large and powerful city of Segeda' (its fortifications would extend for 40 stades). When the Senate 'forbade' this, and demanded tribute and troops for the Roman army as per their treaty with Gracchus, the Spaniards responded that they had been forbidden, by that treaty, to build new cities, but not to fortify those already existing; and that, as to the tribute and the military contingent, they had been released from these by the Romans themselves. Appian reports that this was true, but that the Senate, in granting exemptions, always added that this was at the pleasure of the Senate and the Roman people (*Iber.* 44.183). The Romans give every impression of being *annoyed* by being tied down to the details of what their superiority demanded—'annoyed' to the point of belligerency.<sup>12</sup>

From now until 132, Roman action in Spain would be determined by military needs. At the same time, the relatively stable occupation of a

<sup>11</sup> Gruen 1984, *passim*; Kallet-Marx 1995 *passim*; Hammond 1988, 567; cf. 568–9; Champion 2007, 255–75. Diplomacy: see, e.g., the embassy of 165 to monitor the attitudes of various kings and states (Pergamum, Cappadocia, Syria, Rhodes). For references to this (and other such missions), *MRR* 1.438–48 (covering the years 165–154). *Rapprochement* and mines: Badian 1972, 44–5 (necessarily speculative). Dalmatia: *Pol.* 32.13; *App. Illyr.* 11.

<sup>12</sup> Exploitation: Richardson 1976; North 1981, 2–3 ('this suggests ... that there is more room than Harris allows for muddle, confusion and unclear thinking. It seems certain that the Romans' capacity to conquer did for a time outrun their will or capacity to devise means of regularly extracting a surplus from the conquered peoples. This in turn defines the extent to which we can attribute economic imperialism to the decision-takers'); Dyson 1985. *Provinciae*: Sumner 1970, 92 ff.; 1977, 126–30; Gracchus: Richardson 1986, 112–25.

growing area of foreign territory had brought an awareness of imperialist responsibilities. In 171, a Spanish embassy had arrived in Rome complaining of abuses. The Senate's response was *ad hoc* but the first occasion on which Rome dealt judicially with complaints of this nature. Such developments must have transformed how Rome thought of itself as an occupying power. In 149, after a particularly blatant case, the *lex Calpurnia de rebus repetundis* set up a standing senatorial court to hear cases of maladministration by Roman magistrates abroad. For whatever reason (and motives are debated), Rome would now monitor more carefully the administration of its possessions.<sup>13</sup>

In even more dramatic theatres, Roman policy can again be seen as a response to challenge. In Macedonia, it was the revolt of Andriscus, or Pseudophilip, attempting to revive the Macedonian monarchy. The shock felt in Rome in 148, when it was learned that a Roman army in Thessaly had been destroyed, can easily be imagined. In that same year Q. Caecilius Metellus was despatched with consular *imperium*; he was successful, and Florus (1.30.5) reports, imprecisely, that the Macedonians were now 'enslaved', while the chronicles report that the Macedonians were made 'tributary'. It should also be noted that 148/147 marks in coinage the beginning of a new 'Macedonian Era'; the establishment of Macedonia as a province, then, is customarily dated to 148. Yet from 167 Macedonia had already been paying tribute. Thus some reject altogether the idea that Macedonia was a new province. Quibbles aside, the outcome of this war, coupled with the immediately following developments (below), established Roman authority over the states to the south.<sup>14</sup>

On occasions, Rome did not need to be confronted with challenge or injury to create a situation in which a challenge arose. When Rome intervened in a dispute between the Achaean League and Sparta, it became clear that its aim was a weakening of the League. The League leadership insufficiently appreciated what deference Rome expected, and after two Roman embassies were rebuffed (one with insult) war was Rome's solution. L. Mummius was to have the 'honour' of destroying Corinth. For some former states of the Achaean League, Year 1 of the 'Achaean Era' was 145/144.

<sup>13</sup> 171 BC: Richardson 1986, 114 (for references and discussion); 149 BC: Rotondi 1966 292-3; Alexander 1990, 3 (for references).

<sup>14</sup> Eusebius' *Chronicle* records that the Macedonians were 'made tributary' (*hypophoroi*); cf. Jerome's version (incorrectly dating the event to 150 = Olympiad 157/4): 'The Romans, having killed Pseudophilip, made the Macedonians *tributarii*.' Cf. Tod 1918-19, 1919-21, 1953. Urging a cautious reading of the evidence: Kallet-Marx 1995, 11-41. Roman authority: Habicht 1997, 270.

Cicero (2*Verr.* 1.55) speaks of Mummius subjecting many states of Achaea and Boeotia to the *imperium* and dictate of the Roman people (*urbesque Achaiae Boeotiaeque multas sub imperium populi Romani dicionemque subiunxit*). Again, Kallet-Marx argues against 'provincialisation'. Cicero might well be saying Mummius simply brought 'many cities of Achaea and Boeotia under the sway of the Roman people', and it is true that tribute is not a sufficient condition of 'provincialisation'. The Romans, it seems, declared again that Greece was 'free', though the nature of that freedom must be open to question. When insisting that the Greeks did not concede 'formal sovereignty', skeptical scholarship runs counter to the spirit and sometimes explicit statements of ancient testimony. Mummius gave the Greeks laws and a *politeia*, which must surely be read as a (new) constitution—and that state of affairs was recognised epigraphically. It was 'the constitution given to the Achaeans by the Romans' (and it stood alongside the 'freedom given in common to the Greeks'). After the ten *legati* sent to assist Mummius had completed their task, Polybius was dispatched to tour cities explaining the new state of affairs 'until people became accustomed to the *politeia* and the laws' (39.5.2-3). Pausanias provides an even fuller statement (7.16.9-10):

Mummius razed the walls of all cities that had made war against Rome, disarming the inhabitants, even before the commissioners were sent from Rome. When they arrived, he proceeded to put down democracies and set up governments based on property qualifications. Tribute was imposed on Greece, and individuals with property were prohibited from acquiring property in another land. Ethnic confederacies, whether of Achaeans, or Phocians, or Boeotians or any other Greeks, were all disallowed.

It is true that some of these injunctions were overturned 'a few years later', but Kallet-Marx must argue that Pausanias has anachronistically misread the evidence or been led astray by his immediate sources. It can scarcely be denied that the Roman commissioners 'settled affairs' in Greece. It is important not to lose sight of basic Roman aims or of the reality of what was happening to the victims of Roman success: the aim was profit in one form or another and the weakening of former foes. The chief aim was Roman dominion in whatever form that was best served.<sup>15</sup>

Around the same time, another senatorial commission applied itself to the settlement of 'Africa'. The territory was rendered tributary, and Appian

<sup>15</sup> For the citation of evidence and an argument different from that proffered here, Kallet-Marx 1995, 42-96. Mummius' declaration and 'Greek freedom': *SIG*<sup>3</sup> 684 (= Sherk, *RDGE* 43 [*Rome and the Greek East*, 50]), esp. lines 9-10, 15; Appian *Mith.* 58; Zonaras 9.31.6; cf. Ferrary 1988, 197-209, 345.

asserts a regular gubernatorial presence from that point on. As we have seen, the last item has been questioned—as is the definition of ‘annexation’. The important question remains how the imposition of Roman will worked in practice.

When the people in Rome saw the ship and heard of the victory early in the evening, they poured into the streets and spent the whole night congratulating and embracing each other like people just now delivered from some great fear, just now confirmed in their supremacy, just now assured of the permanence of their own city, and winners of such a victory as they had never won before (App. *Pun.* 134.633).

Appian’s narrative, almost certainly drawing upon the contemporary report of Polybius, chooses to diverge significantly in its triumphalism from Scipio’s reflective tears which Polybius also records. Twin themes emerge, as we shall see.

The recent gains did not assuage Roman concerns or quench Roman thirst. Around 140 BC a three-man embassy of Scipio Aemilianus, L. Metellus and Sp. Mummius toured the East to observe conditions, particularly in Egypt, Rhodes, Pergamum and Syria. This fact-finding mission took them beyond any Roman *imperium*, but the exercise was ‘imperial’. Their procession was formal, their behaviour often high-handed, their manner superior, and their expectations imperious. In the period that followed, as previously, foreign kings courted individual Roman luminaries: but now the implications were more significant. Attalus III of Pergamum and/or Antiochus VII of Syria sent ‘extravagant gifts’ (*magnificentissima dona*) to Scipio when he was campaigning in Spain (Cic. *Deiot.* 19; Livy, *Per.* 57). It had been the custom, Livy’s epitomator reports, to conceal such gifts. Scipio accepted them formally, and had them entered in the public accounts. The development of expected foreign obeisance can be traced back to 167. Many of the generation that had celebrated their maturity on the battlefield of Pydna now occupied the highest offices. Scipio was called upon again (in 134) to prosecute what might be termed a war of retention. The Spanish war, characterised by a marked degree of incompetence and corruption and by a growing and unusual lack of enthusiasm among Roman recruits, dragged on until Scipio destroyed Numantia in 133. Appian then addresses himself to the settlement:

The Romans, as was the custom, sent out to the acquired parts of Iberia—which Scipio had taken and which Brutus before him had subjugated or mastered—ten men from the Senate to arrange matters for peace (*Iber.* 99.428).

Again Appian inserts an anachronistic tone and a misleading scenario. Scipio had not added to Roman territory (though D. Brutus had certainly penetrated areas not previously entered by Roman arms). The picture perhaps once again reveals Appian's readiness to impose a scenario more appropriate to his own age. Yet the image of Rome applying itself formally to newly re-conquered territory can be seen to be characteristic. And the pattern is one of response to challenge.

In 133 Rome responded rather to unexpected opportunity. Attalus III died, willing all that was his to the Roman People. Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, tribune of the *plebs*, took the matter directly to 'the People', inaugurating a new phase in Roman foreign policy-making (below). If the solemnly inscribed senatorial resolution found at Pergamum (*OGIS* 435) dates to the last months of 133, Rome is shown ready to act quickly, and, notably, the regular dispatch of 'praetors' (*strategoi*) to Asia is envisaged (line 7). The *Senatus Consultum*, however, may belong to 129, after Rome had attended to local resistance. In the meantime, Rome had to attend to a challenge closer to home. Following an extended slave revolt in Sicily, P. Rupilius (cos. 132) could, with the help of a senatorial commission, effect a settlement (still in force more than sixty years later: Cic. *2Verr.* 2.13-16). Again, the organisation of pacified territory results from a direct response to challenge. The so-called *lex Rupilia*—it was, in fact, a *decretum* (Rupilius having been charged by decree of the Senate to supply Sicily with laws, on advice from the ten-man commission)—did little more than reinstate pre-existing arrangements, some going back to the Second Punic war, and some individual treaties to the First. It resembles nothing so much as a patchwork quilt.<sup>16</sup> Sicily is dealt with in another chapter; here we need only note that Rome was ready to knuckle down to steadily administering (and extracting resources from) what was clearly Rome's domain, yet still in a characteristically *ad hoc* fashion.

Such an approach is the quintessence of how Rome chose, as the default option, to replicate pre-existing systems for administering an area under its control. History and current expedience both played their part. The 65 or more cities of Sicily were classified according to their individual relationships with Rome, their judicial status reflecting either reward or punishment: *civitates foederatae* (allied cities enjoying, by treaty, their own laws and governmental process), *civitates sine foedere immunes ac liberae* (cities that, without a treaty-guarantee, were also independent and

<sup>16</sup> On the 'lex Rupilia', Cic. *2Verr.* 2.32, 40; cf. Val. Max. 6.9.8. For much of what follows, Lazzaretti 2006, 16-25.

'immune': they too were free from the tithe), *civitates decumanae* (the greater number) paying as tax a tenth of their produce, and *civitates censoriae* (states conquered but restored to the inhabitants with lands subject to censorial contracts). Cicero (2*Verr.* 3.13-15) specifically comments on the sapience of the elders in refraining from imposing any new taxes; these were conditions to which the locals were accustomed. In convenience, there was wisdom. The less irritation caused to subjects (and Cicero speaks of Sicily as a resource and as 'adjoined' to the Republic) the more consenting the latter. The accent was on exploitation.

With Asia, offered as part of the Attalid bequest to the Roman People, what was offered, and what was accepted? If our sources are reliable, the decision was to accept the implicit income for subsidising the land-distribution scheme proposed by Ti. Gracchus, who also proposed this foreign-policy initiative. Events overtook that plan—a revolt that would not finally be stilled until 129. Challenge had prompted a more definite intervention, and Strabo offers an apparently straightforward observation: 'M'. Aquillius, arriving as consul with ten commissioners, organized the province (*eparchia*) into the form of government now still in place' (14.1.38, C646). Gruen nevertheless rejects the usual assumption: 'The legacy of Attalus did not translate itself into major territorial acquisitions for Rome—if any'. He acknowledges, however, extensive Roman road-building.<sup>17</sup> Rome's consolidation of its presence was clearly underway; and what must be noticed in the inscription referred to above (*OGIS* 435), whether dated to 133, 132 or 129 (or even a year or two later), is that the Senate envisaged the annual dispatch of generals to Asia.

The sheer extent of Roman sway prompted a conception of *imperium* beyond the power of individual commanders. At the funeral of Scipio Aemilianus in 129, his *laudator* pronounced Rome's good fortune that Scipio had been born there and nowhere else—on the ground that *imperium terrarum* would surely reside wherever Scipio did (Cic. *Mur.* 75). At the same time, the question of imperial management became politicised. The effects of expansion came to dominate politics, whilst politics impacted on expansion. Moreover, the maintenance of Rome's military enterprise became an issue for Rome's leadership. The politicisation of foreign affairs, when tribunician initiative in 133 wrested them from the Senate, has grasped historians' attention. What needs to be brought back into the spotlight is one of Ti. Gracchus' probable motivations.

<sup>17</sup> Gruen 1984, 605-8; Kallet-Marx 1995, 106, 112-13, 122, 353-5; Sherwin-White 1983, 88-92.



In 133, the Roman People, on Gracchus' motion, without the prelude of a Senate resolution, passed a *plebiscitum* defining Asia as a tax-paying territory. It is now customary to see Roman foreign policy, at least from 133, as driven in part by internal politics. It is just as plausible to see Roman politics as driven by Rome's military enterprise. Any interpretation of Ti. Gracchus' original objectives will remain contentious, but if Appian is accurate Gracchus pronounced Rome's military needs as demanding profound social reform:

[Gracchus declaimed that] the Romans possessed most of their territory by conquest, and that they had hopes of occupying the rest of the habitable world; but now the question of greatest hazard was whether they should gain the rest by having plenty of brave men, or whether, though their weakness and mutual jealousy, their enemies should take away what they already possessed (*BC* 1.11.45, Loeb tr.).

This need to underwrite Rome's military enterprise led directly, then, to contentious political proposals. In the republican era, military problems were not discrete; Roman self-definition meant that they became a social and a cultural issue. At the same time, Rome's military success had created the social and political parameters (not least, a growing inequality amongst the citizenry) that fuelled political division. The seismic character of political strife from this time onwards often distracts scholars from Rome's core business (warfare), which frequently drove its politics. Also at the same time there was a sense, at least from 146 BC (as we have seen in Scipio), that what had been won could be lost, 'the potent idea that imperialism carries the seeds of its own destruction', as Griffin puts it. If nothing else, Greek historical and political thought to which the Romans were now avid heirs would instil the anxiety.<sup>18</sup>

Counterbalancing that apprehension was the sense that the benefits of *imperium* were to be enjoyed. This was bolstered not only by Roman citizens' freedom from tax from 167, but by the quasi-regular triumphal parades enjoyed by city-dwellers. From 133, there arose a repetitive *popularis* theme that conquered territories ought to be exploited to advantage the wider community. A fragment survives of a speech by C. Gracchus in 124 or 123 in a debate over whether Nicomedes of Bithynia or Mithridates V of Pontus should be 'allowed' to take Phrygia. Gracchus urged the citizenry to *increase* the revenues flowing from tribute-paying areas. Along the same lines were his laws in 123 to regulate more tightly, and more to Roman

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<sup>18</sup> Griffin 2008, 85-111 (quoted, 103-4).

advantage, the tribute from Asia, now clearly seen as a 'province' belonging to the Roman People rather than the sphere in which an individual general exercised his *imperium*.<sup>19</sup>

In the Gracchan period, another area that saw increased military activity was Gaul. After the warfare of 125–120, Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, assigned, like his predecessors, Gallia Transalpina as his *provincia*, built the *via Domitia* from the Rhône to the Le Perthus pass into Spain, and advertised the consolidated Roman presence by riding an elephant through his *provincia* (Suet. *Nero* 2.1). Shortly afterwards (exact date disputed), the Roman colony of Narbo Martius (Narbonne) was founded. Notably, the legislation enabling this was regarded as *popularis*. Burgeoning trade ensured that eventually Rome would be drawn further in to defend its 'interests', but again it seems reluctant to govern the area more directly—until a crisis intervened. The movement of the northern (Celtic) tribes in the last two decades of the century eventually constituted a genuine threat, providing not merely the pretext but the necessity of defending Rome's interests and allies.<sup>20</sup>

The Romans of that time and even down to the days of our own memory believed that struggles against others were a matter of valour, but against the Gauls they struggled for survival, not glory (Sallust, *BJ* 114.2).

Again, as in 148, Rome's *maiestas* was looking like a concept under threat. A series of reverses had reignited in the Roman psyche one of those elements that according to tradition had—paradoxically—underlain Rome's early expansion: fear. The idea of defensive aggression would again lodge in the Roman mind. By the time that the Gracchan land laws had effectively been scrapped (ca. 111), the idea of an agrarian solution to the problems of maintaining Rome's military enterprise, without which the Roman leadership lost a *raison d'être*, and without which the Roman community feared even for its future, was at an end. The privatisation of a large proportion of public lands and the triumph of the *latifondisti* meant that such land produced neither peasant recruits for the army nor the rents to the Roman treasury that would fund the enterprise. It was, in retrospect, only a matter of time before a militarily savvy leader embraced a trend already in the offing: the creation of a professional army. When Marius took this up (in 107), the move was, politically, irresistible—but no less contentious. The needs of Roman *imperium* were now the stuff of politics.

<sup>19</sup> Gell. *NA* 11.10.2; Erdkamp 1998, 111, 119–20; Naco del Hoyo, 2007, 223.

<sup>20</sup> On Gaul, Cic. *Font.* 11; cf. Clemente 1974, 29–66, with the caveats of Wiseman 1976, 21–2. Overviews: King 1990, 35–41; Lintott 1994, 23–5. Cf. Badian 1958, 264.

*REI MILITARIS VIRTUS ... ORBEM TERRARUM PARERE HUIUS IMPERIO  
COEGIT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF ROMAN IMPERIUM*

*Lea Beness and Tom Hillard*

[Our] strength of character in matters military has forced the whole world to submit to this *imperium*.

Cic. *Mur.* 22

In some respects, this chapter picks up where the previous left off—but it marks a significant shift in thinking. If not by the beginning of the 1st Century BC, then very soon into it, we would argue that the idea of a Roman Empire (as modernly understood) had come to be taken for granted.<sup>1</sup> It was also regarded as under threat. It is better not to attempt to date the change too precisely. The first thing to note is the continuity. Rome held to the creed of its People's *maiestas*, and expected foreign powers to recognise formally and to respect Rome's superiority. This could embrace the expectation of a supine foreign policy by 'friends', and being ready to go to war if, alternatively, offence was given. Early in the 90s, Rome dispatched to the East no less a figure than C. Marius, ostensibly on a personal mission but in all likelihood to investigate developments in Cappadocia. In offering friendly advice to the energetic Mithridates VI Eupator, king of an expanding Pontus, Marius put it succinctly: 'Be stronger than the Romans or obey their commands in silence' (Plut. *Mar.* 31). These were the options. It was a fact, and this was business as usual—except that Rome felt a more pressing need to assert its status in the wake of its troubles in the previous decade.

Rome also demonstrated the traditional hesitation about annexing foreign territory. In 96, Ptolemy Apion bequeathed Cyrene to Rome (Sall. *Hist.* 2.43 M = 41 McG; cf. App. *BC* 1.111). Rome was happy to accept the territory's tribute (possibly irregular), but was just as happy to leave Cyrene to its own devices—for more than two decades—countenancing a high level of governmental disorder (Plut. *Mor.* 255e–257e; *Luc.* 2).

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<sup>1</sup> Others would argue that the conception be predated; e.g., Baronowski 1988, 1991. Other discussions found particularly useful by the authors, but not cited specifically below include Momigliano 1975, 27–8; Brunt 1978; Harris 1984; Champion 2004a, 1–3, 48–9; Erskine 2010, 33–49.

On Rome's borders (and Rome now had borders in effect, even if not physically marked), it was a different matter. Order was to be maintained. But those borders were ever further afield. It was a matter of urgency that Roman majesty be respected by other forces in the East. *Circa* 96, the Senate instructed both Nicomedes of Bithynia and Mithridates of Pontus to quit Cappadocia and (again) Paphlagonia. Rome annexed neither, declaring the territories free. The Cappadocians received a king—but when Tigranes of Armenia (with Mithridatic encouragement) moved to unseat the new monarch, a Roman praetor in the region was redirected to intervene. This man was L. Cornelius Sulla (an individual of destiny) and the intervention, in the mid-90s, was of major significance: 'the first time since 188 that a Roman army of any sort had intervened in the dynastic quarrels of the Anatolian kings'—a presage of the way in which this theatre would change the face of Roman *imperium* in the East, a development rendered inevitable as much by Mithridates' readiness for war as by Roman expectations. It was also significant for Rome's first diplomatic encounter with the Parthians, a reminder of Rome's seemingly ineluctable expansion of horizons (and confrontations).<sup>2</sup>

The new element was the proprietary attitude of Rome to the wider world under its sway. This brought with it the likelihood of Rome feeling directly threatened by foreign forces far distant from it.

Our people, ... by defending their friends, is now in power over the whole world (*terrarum ... omnium potitus est*: Cic. *Rep.* 3.35)

It seems disingenuous, but represents a philosophy of imperialism that did not seem absurd to Cicero. And it instructed a school of modern scholarship which characterised Rome's expansion as 'defensive imperialism'. By the 80s, the idea of Rome claiming *imperium orbis terrae* was, as Gruen says, unabashed. The *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, at this time, provides a sample (perhaps an actual speech delivered ca. 90, perhaps an artificial example). It contains the first surviving occurrence of the term *imperium populi Romani*, 'the *imperium* which all peoples, kings and nations have, partly by force, partly by consent, accepted' (4.13). The term is repeated in the same paragraph. A coin issued in 76 or 75 carried the symbols of globe, wreathed sceptre and rudder (long-established images in the Hellenistic world of

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<sup>2</sup> *Fines provinciae*: Richardson 2008, 80-1; Mithridates: McGing 1986, 76-7, 85; Rome's intervention in dynastic quarrels: Sherwin-White 1977, 72; 1983, 109-11.

wide dominion). Twin themes of the Ciceronian age will be, then, Rome as a world power and Rome simply defending its own.<sup>3</sup>

The concern with piracy provides an obvious example. Cilicia, or at least its coast, was allotted as a *provincia* in 102 to the praetor M. Antonius to combat piracy. Epigraphic texts from Delphi and Cnidus illuminate Roman thinking. Rome professed commitment to the safe-sailing of Roman citizens, Latins and allies, and the citizens of 'whichever of the nations are in the friendship of the Roman People'.<sup>4</sup> To this end, Cilicia is deemed a praetorian *provincia*, which might still simply be translated 'a general's sphere of command'; and to this end the praetor will write to the kings in Cyprus, Egypt, Cyrene, and Syria to ensure no safe haven for pirates within their territory. These kings are thus deemed the enthusiastic fellow-workers of Rome. Sulla, before his reassignment to Cappadocia, had been assigned to the coast of Cilicia to deal with the same problem. The two missions would not have struck Sulla as exclusive. Areas of Roman *imperium* (*provinciae* by technical definition) were created as Rome saw fit. (That much was traditional.)

But at issue now (in and after 102) was defending the Roman domain. If the Romans had been freed from the *metus Gallicus* in 101 (Chapter 8), the war with their Italian allies—followed closely by unprecedented internal strife and then war with Mithridates, not to mention piratical depredations along the Italian seaboard (and a raid on Ostia itself)—ensured that Rome felt genuinely defensive. The Mithridatic War, in retrospect, seems unavoidable—short of two international powers performing contrary to form. The sequence of events was hardly coincidental: reportedly the Italians had invited Mithridates' intervention (Diod. 37.2.11); and Rome's distraction certainly had an effect upon Mithridates' decision-making. But the observer also sees at play the full range of dynamics of Roman militarism, both ingrained and new.

The now customary need to impose *maiestas* was, as seen, stronger than ever. That fed the traditional élite quest for *gloria*—and the various benefits. The 'ambassador' M. Aquillius seems to have been as keen for war as Mithridates. Modern scholarship has discerned a novel aspect to the traditional freedom of action accorded *de facto* to commanders operating at so great a distance from Rome. Roman foreign policy, once synonymous

<sup>3</sup> Gruen 1984, 274-8; cf. for a still cautious view, Richardson 2008, 44, 56-7, 71, 78-9; coin: Crawford 1974, 1, 407 [393]; cf. Erskine 2010, 71-2, 166 fig. 11; symbols: Momigliano 1942, 62-4. For the concept of 'defensive imperialism' contextualized, Linderski 1984.

<sup>4</sup> Precise contexts debated; cf. Sherk 1984, no. 55, pp. 59-66; Crawford 1996, 231-70.

with 'senatorial' policy, became, as Badian puts it, the 'plaything of private and factional ambitions'. Sherwin-White also sees Aquillius as the first exponent of 'that aggressive imperialism of the individual commanders'.<sup>5</sup> Roman commands were now marked by a new harshness (distinct from the often pitiless behaviour of earlier commanders). With the Italian war came the crossing of a psychological threshold: troops that had once fought shoulder to shoulder could now fight face to face. The generals who emerged most successfully from that devastating conflict were men of a certain stamp: Pompeius Strabo and Sulla. Unprecedented military acts followed. It is no small factor in Roman foreign policy that Roman leadership was less inclined to seek a non-violent option to conflict resolution. Yet the Pontic king's seizure of Asia in 88 and the large-scale massacre of Romans and Italians in that territory meant—we may concede—that the Romans construed their own reactions as defensive. But what they were defending was, in effect, their Empire.

The inconclusive settlement of the First Mithridatic War (in 85) left unfinished business, but saw a major development. The unprecedented political violence at home—a coup and two civil wars—led to Rome's first political dictatorship. The concentration of power would have an effect on the way in which Rome exercised its sway.

Having settled the affairs of Asia, Sulla bestowed freedom on numerous communities, as either a reward for their co-operation or a recompense for what they had suffered through their loyalty to him, and inscribed them as 'friends of the Roman People', while for 'errant' communities severe terms were laid down (App. *Mithr.* 61–62).<sup>6</sup> Appian reflects, doubtless with a certain amount of retrospective wisdom, on the tightening of the system in the context of Sulla's harsh autocratic régime at home.

Into such evils were the Romans plunged by this war [the civil war]; and so likewise were all the countries beyond Italy by the recent piracies, or by the Mithridatic war, or by the exhausting taxes levied to meet the deficit in the public treasury due to the seditions. All the allied nations and kings, and not only the tributary cities but those which had delivered themselves to the Romans voluntarily under sworn agreements, and those which by virtue of their furnishing aid in war or for some other merit were autonomous and not subject to tribute, all were now required to pay and to obey, while some were deprived of the territory and harbours that had been conceded to them under treaties (*BC* 1.102).

<sup>5</sup> Badian 1958, 289; Sherwin-White 1977, 75; an analysis tempered in 1983, 112–20; cf. McGing 1986, 81. On Aquillius, see also Kallet-Marx 1995, 254–9, playing down Roman aggression.

<sup>6</sup> For source references to the settlement of Asia, see Kallet-Marx 1995, 261–90.

'The First Mithridatic War and its conclusion are an epochal moment in the history of Rome's Eastern *imperium*.' <sup>7</sup> The *shock* of that war, the recognition of the great losses that might have been, prompted a harsh reassessment in how Rome thought of its domain—and beyond. In the same section, Appian describes Sulla's decree that Ptolemy XI should be king in Alexandria. That arrangement proved not blessed by Sulla's usual *felicitas* (Ptolemy was killed by the Alexandrians), but indicated the interference that a Roman dictator might now conceive.

Such a turning point was apparent not just to later sources and modern scholarship. It was discerned by a contemporary (looking back, admittedly, over four decades). Towards the end of his life, when ideals struggled with pessimism, Cicero reflected on the nature of Roman *imperium*, and on a drift from what had been a 'protectorate', serving the interests of Rome's allies and those under Roman dominion, towards an empire that exploited its subjects.

As long as the *imperium populi Romani* maintained itself though benefactions and not aggression (*beneficiis ... non iniuriis*), wars were waged on behalf of the allies or of that *imperium* (*pro sociis aut de imperio*), their conclusions were marked by kindnesses or necessary force only (*exitus ... aut mites aut necessarii*), the Senate was a point of refuge for kings, peoples and nations, and above all else our magistrates and generals sought to win praise if they defended the provinces and the allies with equity and good faith (*si provincias, si socios aequitate et fide defendissent*). This could be labelled more truthfully a protectorate of the world rather than empire (*itaque illud patrocinium orbis terrae verius quam imperium poterat nominari*). This manner of behaviour and this discipline we had already begun to drift from, but after Sulla's victory, we have lost it altogether (*Off.* 2.26-27).

Cicero refers here to levels of exploitation, and that brings us to what North phrases 'the establishment of an imperialistic pattern of economic relationships'.<sup>8</sup> The Sullan scheme recognised 'provinces' as geographical entities awaiting governors (a concept developed from that time onwards, and strengthened with the *lex Pompeia* of 52). In the 70s, Cicero could speak of the differences in taxation between Sicily 'and the other *provinciae*' (2 *Verr.* 3.12). He goes further: 'Sicily was the first of all foreign nations, the first ornament of *imperium* to receive the title of province' (*prima omnium, id quod ornamentum imperii est, provincia est appellata*), 'the first to make our ancestors realize how pleasing it is to rule over foreign peoples' (2 *Verr.* 2.2).

<sup>7</sup> Kallet-Marx 1995, 291.

<sup>8</sup> North 1981, 8.

The language and the thinking are anachronistically retrospective, but the illustration of contemporary thinking is clear. Cicero makes it plain that Gaul is a province in the conventional modern sense: *provincia Gallia*—albeit on constant alert, because it contained communities that had been at war, in recent memory, with Rome (*Font.* 12–13). Even as late as the 70s, these Gauls had been brought under the ‘power and pronouncement of the Roman people’ (*populi Romani imperium dicionemque*: *ibid.*). It is a formula we have seen before. In this province, Narbo Martius stood as a watchtower and bulwark (*specula populi Romani ac propugnaculum*). The recalcitrant communities are depicted as within the province, an entity that cannot be characterised as the territory of allies. It is spear-won, and held by force of arms. Albeit Cicero is speaking to a jury panel with equestrian interests now well represented, his enthusiastic description of ‘provincial’ affairs is telling:

Gaul is packed with traders, full of Roman citizens. Not a coin is exchanged in Gaul without that transaction being recorded in the books of Roman citizens (*Font.* 11).

This more holistic view of an ‘empire’ (cf. *ad Herennium* 4.13 above), paved the way for Pompey’s imperial behaviour during *his* commands in the 60s. It had begun considerably earlier—unsurprisingly in response to perceived threat. Around 102, M. Antonius was given a maritime commission—perhaps roving (without fixed boundaries).<sup>9</sup> But the command given to his son, M. Antonius Creticus, in 74 was extraordinary beyond doubt. That he was given *imperium infinitum* is debated, but not its extraordinary extent. It was a foretaste of Pompey’s command in 67 over Mediterranean coastlines, with scarce regard for whether or not it encroached on a pre-existing *provincia*:

Gabinus ... drew up a law which gave Pompey not just a naval command, but an out-and-out power and authority (*dynamis*) over all men ... dominion (*arche*) over the sea this side of [Gibraltar], and over all the mainland to the distance of 400 *stadia* from the sea. These limits included almost all places in the Roman world, and the greatest nations and most powerful kings were comprised within them (Plut. *Pomp.* 25).

Velleius Paterculus (2.31.2), specifying that the law gave Pompey a power equal to that of other proconsuls up to 50 miles inland, concludes that ‘by this decree the command (*imperium*) of almost the entire world (*paene*

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<sup>9</sup> That the maritime command was without strict territorial basis is moot: de Souza 1999, 104 n. 40.



*totius terrarum orbis*) was being entrusted to one man'. And what of those who ruled outside the areas where *imperium* was conventionally allotted to Roman commanders ('the greatest nations and most powerful kings')?

The Romans ... sent letters to all kings, rulers, peoples and cities, that they should aid Pompey in all ways ... Never did any man before Pompey set forth with so great authority conferred upon him by the Romans (App. *Mithr.* 93).

Rulers, peoples and cities not subject to *imperium* would be expected to cooperate. What is significant is *maius imperium* concentrated in the hands of a single individual in the interests of the *imperium populi Romani*. And then came the Mithridatic command from 66 to 62. Pompey's settlement of the East after this war was not simply on a vaster scale than anything done before, but represents a redefinition of the nature of a province. Pompey, in his treatment of Syria, had created a *provincia* where none had previously existed, and which was not a 'province' for the exercise of a single commander's *imperium*. (It is in this light that we must regard the Senate's obdurate resistance to his *acta*.)<sup>10</sup> There was here a struggle between the Senate and the empire's new forces.

These extraordinary commands, envisioning such an expansion of Roman *imperium*, were both—significantly—the results of *popularis* legislation, plebiscites promulgated by the tribunes Gabinius and Manilius. For the debate leading to the Mithridatic command, we have a primary document. In Cicero's speech *de Imperio Cn. Pompei*, paradoxically an advocacy concerning a single general's *imperium* (in the traditional sense) and also the newly developing sense of empire, we see the twin incentives of profit and protection fused. By the early 60s, piracy had become brazen, assaulting the coastline of Italy, its riverine hamlets, and even Ostia. This was an outrage against Rome's *dignitas* and *imperium* (where the latter means, as much as 'command', territory in Roman hands):

for some considerable period before the passage of the *lex Gabinia*, the Roman People—which had always been able to maintain its reputation for invincibility in naval warfare—had been deprived of a great part, indeed the greatest part, not only of its facilities but of its *dignitas* and *imperium* ... We, who previously could vouch for the safety not only of Italy but of all our allies on far-flung coasts by the authority of our power (*auctoritate nostri imperii*), were denied not only the provinces, the Italian coastline, and our ports, but even the Appian Way itself (*de Imp. Pomp.* 54-55).

<sup>10</sup> Richardson 2008, 111.

Here the quest for international security is cast as defensive, and the Empire (an area within which Rome ought to have power) has become a discernible space requiring protection. This had apparently vindicated the drastic measures in 74 when the very concept of *imperium, qua* command, was redeveloped, M. Antonius being awarded *imperium infinitum* (*curatio infinita*, says Pseudo-Asconius)—and it vindicated, in Cicero's eyes, the similar measures in 67 which saw the whole Mediterranean delivered into the hands of Pompey. The controversial ambitions of that man brought into sharper focus the internal political ramifications of these developments. Debate was fierce, but uneven in strength. The defence of Empire prevailed as chief *desideratum* over any considerations of the Roman republic's political transformation.<sup>11</sup>

For those who advocated this exigency, Pompey's success against the pirates vindicated it. With the proposed Mithridatic command, a different mood predominated. The old motives are still professed. The honour of Rome is at stake.

Since you have ever been, beyond other peoples, seekers of *gloria* and avid for praise (*laus*), I call upon you to eradicate that stain incurred in the First Mithridatic War, now so deeply ingrained, and a disease to the name of the Roman people (*de Imp. Pomp.* 7).

Defence is a factor, but it is to be a defence of those who collect Rome's revenues:

... to defend at one and the same time the safety of your allies and the honour (*dignitas*) of your *imperium*, especially when your chief sources of revenue are involved! For while the revenues of our other provinces, gentlemen, are barely sufficient to make it worth our while to defend them, Asia is so rich and fertile as easily to surpass all other countries in the productiveness of her soil, the variety of her crops, the extent of her pastures and the volume of her exports. This province, gentlemen, if you wish to retain what makes either war possible or peace honourable, it is your duty to defend not only from disaster but from fear of disaster ... Do you imagine that you can enjoy these advantages unless you preserve those from whom you derive them and keep them free not only, as I said before, from disaster but from fear of disaster?

... For in the first place the honourable and distinguished men who farm our revenues (*publicani homines honestissimi atque ornatissimi*) have transferred their business and their resources to that province, and their interests

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<sup>11</sup> Antonius' command: Ps.-Ascon., 202, 259 Stangl; cf. Cic. 2*Verr.* 2.8; 3.213; Vell. 2.31.3-4; Brennan 2000, 406-7. Cicero's views are nowhere more clearly put than at *de Imp. Pomp.* 60. On Pompey's personality as the issue, Vell., *ibid.*

and fortunes ought, on personal grounds, to be your concern. For if we have always held that our revenues are the sinews of the commonwealth, then we shall assuredly be right in saying that the class which farms those revenues is the mainstay of the other classes. ... And believe me when I tell you what you see for yourselves—that this system of credit and finance which operates at Rome, in the Forum, is bound up in, and depends on capital invested in Asia; the loss of the one inevitably undermines the other and causes its collapse. Think, therefore, whether you should hesitate to throw yourselves with the utmost enthusiasm into a war to defend the honour of your name (*gloria nominis vestri*), the well-being of your allies, the most important of your revenues and—something in which the state is closely concerned—the fortunes of so many citizens (ibid. 14-19).

The *vectigalia* are the 'sinews of the commonwealth' (*nervos ... rei publicae*). The argument is unblushing, and even if not *verbatim* the speech which Cicero delivered before the people, it is the speech he wished published. It represents the argument that would convince the Roman assembly to vote for the extraordinary form of command being proposed. The other provinces, barely sufficient to make it worth while to defend, notably are no longer spheres within which individual commanders exercise their *imperium*; they are units within, and comprising, the Roman *imperium*. In so far as Cicero's speech urges Rome's exploitative class(es) as *essential* to the State, it belongs to the *popularis* tradition which goes back to 123 and was powerful at the time of the war with Jugurtha (Chapter 8). It has been suggested that Cicero's argument drew inspiration from a speech of Sulpicius in 88 advocating that Marius be given the command against Mithridates.<sup>12</sup> That is very speculative, but the suggestion that the *populares* often championed business interests is not.

It has been estimated that Pompey enrolled around 50,000 legionaries for perhaps twelve legions. Plutarch records that Pompey sent out edicts calling for enlistments in all directions (and, by the bye, summoned rulers and kings to him). Many Italians had long since become accustomed to the rewards of empire. One earlier factor predisposing Rome's decision-making élite to constant military action had been that, by the treaties which bound the Italian 'allies' to Rome, the former were obliged to supply Rome with troops, providing more than half (and Velleius tells us two-thirds) of the 'Roman' army. They paid no other tribute. To remain at peace was, in effect, to remit Italian taxes; and, more dangerous still, render the confederation meaningless. The enfranchisement of Italian communities (even if not effective until the censorship of 70) might be expected to alter that

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<sup>12</sup> Powell 1990, 458.

dynamic utterly, but enough opportunities had come to Italian communities for non-compulsory recruitment to remain apparently popular.<sup>13</sup>

The profit motive did not require annexation. Traditional hesitation prevailed. In 81 Ptolemy XI had been killed by the Alexandrians (above), leaving his mentor Sulla to contemplate the options. Nothing happened, demonstrating, it has been said, that Sulla 'stood in the line of the Senate tradition, opposed to the expansion of administrative responsibilities'. Alternative explanations have been advanced (internal rivalries, concerns about expenditure), and we could add the possibility that by late 80, Sulla had ceased to care. Yet perhaps only political rivalries and infighting prevented the *coup de grâce*. It is often said that in 65 Crassus, as censor, proposed annexation—though Plutarch reports only that he proposed Egypt be made tributary (*hypoteles*) which we have seen is not the same thing—but that Crassus' opponents thwarted him (Plut. *Crass.* 13.2; cf. Cic. *Leg. Agr.* 2.44). An unreliable report has it that Crassus' ally Caesar, then merely an aedile, hoped for a *plebiscitum* that would make Egypt his *provincia* (Suet. *Iul.* 11). Some intervention was, however, debated. We have a fragmentary speech of Cicero counselling against it. The country remained profitable for individual Romans; Caesar 'extorted' 6,000 talents from Ptolemy XII Auletes, if we can believe Suetonius (*Iul.* 54.3).<sup>14</sup>

In 62, Pompey returned to Rome, dispensing lavish financial gifts to his veterans. In September 61, he was finally able to treat the Roman citizenry to a spectacular two-day triumph. Many ornamented trophies were displayed; the crowning one bore an inscription proclaiming that it was a trophy of 'the inhabited world' (*oikoumene*). We met that pretension earlier (Chapter 8) but pretension is moving closer to reality in 62. Not that reality governed claim; according to Diodorus (40.4), citing an inscribed tablet, Pompey claimed to have 'extended the boundaries of [Roman] hegemony to the boundary-markers of the earth'. In an assembly at this time he claimed, according to Pliny (*NH* 7.99), to have received Asia as the ultimate 'of the provinces' and left it 'in the middle of the *patria*.' Pompey rode in a gem-studded chariot, wearing, he claimed, Alexander's cloak (App. *Mithr.* 117). This is worth pausing to contemplate. The Romans had com-

<sup>13</sup> Pompey's recruitments: Plut. *Pomp.* 31.1; estimates: Brunt 1971, 457-60; Italian enrichment: Wallace-Hadrill 2008; proportion of allied forces: Vell. 2.15.2; allied participation as tribute: Momigliano 1975, 45-6; North 1981, 7.

<sup>14</sup> On Egypt, Badian 1967, 189-90 (for the quotation); Harris 1979/1991, 156-7; Lampela 1998; Santangelo 2005, 328. Cf. Hölbl 2001, 213-14, 222. For the fragments of Cicero's *de Rege Alexandrino*: Crawford 1994, 43-56; cf. Cic. *Leg. Agr.* 2.41-42. Cf. Welch 2006/7, 183 (pursuing a different line of thought).

pared their achievements to those of Alexander before, and how they regarded his image is debated. But Pompey was openly proclaiming identification with the world-conqueror, and that this was a matter for celebration in Rome is food for thought. Pompey would also claim to have almost tripled Rome's revenues (Plut. *Pomp.* 45.3). His conquests had altered the Roman economy. His triumph celebrated not just a victory, or series of victories, but dominion. The same language is used, via the different medium of architecture, in the portico adjoining Pompey's new theatre (opened in 55). Statues of the fourteen subject nations featured.<sup>15</sup>

Compare Cicero's description of the parlous state of the *imperium* in 67 with the situation in 56 (admittedly a rhetorical flourish with a political objective):

In these times the assignment of *provinciae* should be aimed at maintaining a lasting peace. ... We have long seen that those vast seas, whose unrest endangered not only voyages but even cities and military roads, are possessed by the Roman People, through the valour of Cn. Pompeius, from the Ocean to the distant Black Sea, as though one safe and, as it were, enclosed harbour; that those nations whose great numbers could enable them to sweep over *our* provinces have, thanks to the same man, been in part brought low and in part repressed; that Asia, which beforetimes marked the extent of our *imperium*, is itself now encircled by three new provinces. I can speak of all regions and of all manner of enemies. There is no race that has not been so thoroughly put down so that it scarcely exists, so subdued that it is now quiescent, or so pacified that it rejoices in our victory and our *imperium* (*Prov. cons.* 31).

### *Epilogue*

By that time, Roman expectations had been fundamentally transformed. In 58, P. Clodius Pulcher, another *popularis* tribune, had legislated for a monthly distribution of free grain to probably around 300,000 citizen-recipients and costing the state something like 108,000,000 sesterces annually. One of the arguments in its favour will have been that the state could now afford such largesse. In the following year, Pompey was given a five-year command (a curatorship, it was conveniently labelled) over the Mediterranean to ensure the food supply (*per quinquennium omnis*

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<sup>15</sup> For references to Pompey's triumph, Broughton, *MRR* 2.181; cf. Beard 2007, 7-41; Alexander: Green 1989; Gruen 1998; Welch (forthcoming); portico: Nicolet 1991, 37-41; Welch 2006, 512; Erskine 2010, 80.

*potestas rei frumentariae toto orbe terrarum*).<sup>16</sup> The *popularis* exaltation of the *commoda populi* (benefits of the people) had continued apace. Clodius, in part to assure the Senate that the corn distribution was properly underwritten, also legislated for Cyprus to be confiscated from one of Rome's allies, Ptolemy, brother of Auletes. Cyprus was adjoined to the *provincia* of Cilicia.<sup>17</sup>

The 'Egyptian Question' dragged on (with Ptolemy Auletes a veritable cash-cow for individual senators), definitive action thwarted not so much by Rome's traditional reluctance to annex (at least so far as the evidence goes) but by internal jealousies. The competition for prizes had become fiercer, and to complicate matters certain Roman noblemen were more openly involved than ever before in commercial enterprises. In 55, Auletes was restored to his throne by a commander who had Syria for his *provincia* (and Roman troops remained in Alexandria to ensure order); the commander was duly prosecuted in Rome for diminishing the majesty of the Roman people through his unilateral initiative. He was narrowly acquitted. Auletes appointed a Roman financier as his virtual treasurer.<sup>18</sup>

Finally, we might note the increasing pressure for administrative responsibility and systemisation. Paired with this was the belief in some quarters that governors' behaviour ought to be monitored where self-restraint had been lacking. The relevant legislation had become, by 59, when Caesar passed a sharply defined law, ever more complex. In 52, Pompey legislated a five-year gap between political office and provincial governorships. This was designed to thwart corruption, but it demonstrates something else. Such a separation of military and administrative functions had effectively been part of Sulla's arrangements. Its further institutionalisation shows that *provinciae* were now regarded as geographic entities awaiting a governor. That said, 'imperial administration' remained relatively small-scale (in staffing) and light on (Roman) 'bureaucracy'. Administration was

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<sup>16</sup> Grain law: Tatum 1999, 119-25; Pompey's command: Cic. *Att.* 4.1.7; *Dom.* 4, 18-21; Livy, *Per.* 104; Plut. *Pomp.* 49.4.

<sup>17</sup> Festus, *Breviarium* 13.1: 'Cyprus, celebrated for its riches, beckoned to the poverty of the Roman people, with the result that it was taken'; cf. Amm. Marc. 14.8.14-15; Oost 1955; Badian 1965; Tatum 1999, 150, 155-56. Clodius also legislated, according to Cicero, that some hitherto sovereign Greek states, including Athens, should fall within the *provincia* of Macedonia's governor (to advantage an internal political ally)—appropriation (by plebiscite) rather than annexation: Habicht 1995/1997, 338-42. The evidence, however, has been questioned: Eilers 2006.

<sup>18</sup> Shatzman 1971; Lampela 1998; competition: Wiseman 1976; trial: Alexander 1990, 145, no. 296; Rabirius as Ptolemy's 'treasurer': Cic. *Rab. Post.* 22.

very much secondary to the chief goals of Rome's governing élite.<sup>19</sup> There-in lay dangers for subjugated and conquerors alike.

Earlier we paused on Cicero's observation that Sulla's dictatorship had marked a watershed. He observed too that Sulla's victory exposed Roman inhumanity to Roman, and that such atrocity outstripped even the injustice towards those under Rome's sway. What is interesting, apart from Cicero's discernment of a distinct shift around this time, is not so much Cicero's melancholy observation that self-interest at Rome now prevailed over concern for equity, but the degree to which questions of morality were to the fore. A Roman Empire was now taken for granted; its nature was the discussion-point. By the end of this period, if not before, it is clear that some Romans perceived their holdings (and the history of their acquisition) as objects of hostility and accusation. There was, then, amongst some Roman thinkers, a critique of Roman imperialism sensitive to the hostility aroused by Roman success—without that in any way being accompanied by serious contemplation of abandoning the clear gains; it was felt that Roman leadership ought, by whatever means, to increase the Republic in power, territory and resources. This was the way of the ancestors, and it held good still (Cic. *Off.* 2.85). Within that recognition of ill-will, however, was perhaps a consciousness that with finite manpower the vast empire could not be held without the acquiescence of its subjects whom Romans would cast as 'allies'. This was articulated clearly by Cicero (*Fam.* 15.3.2). A policy of conciliation—humanity, if you like—was a practical strategy. But there was, at the same time, a sense of loss and danger in the observation that with Rome's success, attendant inflow of wealth, and the rise of appetites whetted by opulence and power, the less than equitable treatment of subject populations trained the powerful to visit tyranny upon their fellows (*Off.* 2.28). Roman gain had been Rome's loss.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> On this topic generally, Lintott 1993, 97–107, esp. 105 (on Caesar); cf. Erskine 2010, 75; *lex Julia, lex Pompeia*: Rotondi 1966, 389–90, 411–12; ramifications: Richardson 2008, 108–9.

<sup>20</sup> Roman perceptions of hostility: Sall. *Hist.* 4.69.5; 17M; Justin 38.3.11–7.9 ('Mithridatic' polemic seems to have been a *topos*); pragmatism or humanity?: Fantham 1991; downside of success: Griffin 2008.





IMPERIALISM AND THE FALL OF THE REPUBLIC:  
*POST HOC ERGO PROPTER HOC ?*

*John Serrati*

The period from mid-2nd Century to the late 1st Century BC is perhaps the best sourced in all of the ancient world. This period, however—standard dates fall around 146–30 BC—is not studied in any great depth within the context of Roman imperialism. In the late Republic, while warfare could still involve foreign conflicts and conquest, it more often featured provincial rebellions and civil wars fought by individual commanders who themselves had become larger than the state. Thus the wars of the period were of a fundamentally different nature, and often do not fall under the rubric of imperialism leading to mass foreign conquest, as seen before the mid-2nd Century.

However, 146 does not represent an absolute or firm break with what came before; in modern works, it is the differences in the nature of warfare in the late Republic, often involving provincial or slave rebellions, that are usually stressed. Even in this period, however, Romans still undertook wars for the same reasons: military victory brought immense social prestige and possible enrichment, and plunder continued to represent an appreciable addition to the income of the average soldier. As before, the Republic in the late 2nd and 1st Centuries continued on an aggressive imperialist path; the Roman hegemony of the Mediterranean had been created by war, and generals in the late Republic continued to actively seek out the conflicts that their militaristic society necessitated. Moreover, warfare after 146 shared significant aspects with the century or so beforehand, compared to the era before the First Punic War (264–241): notably significant periods of peace and an army that no longer served annually but by campaign, giving it a professionalised, long-service core despite the fact that it remained technically a citizen militia.<sup>1</sup>

Yet, as much as there was continuity, there was even greater change. Firstly, the period saw a different scale of conquest than before: at first smaller, and then, after Marius, significantly larger than most annexations

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<sup>1</sup> Champion 2004a, 2–3; Cornell 1993, 154–60.

before 146. The latter became the preserve of great men commanding private armies made up not of the small freeholding class as before, but by rural poor who became fully professional soldiers in all but name. Moreover, late Republican warfare was usually undertaken by proconsuls or by *privati* with special, irregular, and poorly defined grants of *imperium*. Many were looking to enrich themselves and pay off massive debts, while building power bases and armies loyal only to them. Although Roman generals had always aimed at greater social standing and greater wealth, in the 1st Century the stakes were higher as victory often meant the difference between fantastic riches and power, and a life of obscurity crushed by extreme debt.

As a result of these much higher stakes, late Republican conquests often saw many more unprovoked acts of aggression. Warfare could also be far more ruthless, with a higher decree of violence targeted at entire populations, as seen in Spain and Gaul. Another change was that, particularly after Sulla, the state itself had broken down, and was thus unable to restrain these powerful men and their armies who were now undertaking the expansion of the empire. What is more, the empire itself and its expansion were thought of in a fundamentally different light than before. More Romans—particularly from the wealthy and educated class, who played a considerably smaller role in warfare than had their forerunners—while not condemning Roman warfare and imperialism, saw that conflicts were not all started out of fear or for the purposes of defence and security, but often for economic considerations, plunder, dominance, conquest, and a recognition of Roman *maiestas*.<sup>2</sup> Simply put, not only was Roman conflict now significantly different, but the rôle of warfare itself in society had changed so much by the 1st Century, as had the view of Roman hegemony, that the imperialism of the time is almost *sui generis*.

#### 1. 146(?)

It is almost a maxim of first-level Roman history classes everywhere to have imperialism peak in 146 with the sacking of Carthage and Corinth, and then take a hiatus until the Jugurthine War in 112. Although a large oversimplification of the period, there is a degree of truth in this schematic.

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<sup>2</sup> *E.g.* Cic. *Off.* 1.38, *Rep.* 3.35; Sall. *BJ* 84–86; cf. Richardson 2008, 55–70, 89–92; Woolf 2001. On the increased ferocity of warfare in the 1st Century BC, cf. Andreski 1968, 53–73; Harris 1979, 51, 164–6; Nicolet 1980, 93–5, 129–31, 219–24; Patterson 1993, 94–7.

Nevertheless, it is incorrect to view the years 146–112 as a time of peace. The bloody conflicts in Spain down to 133 illustrate clearly that Roman aggression continued, and Roman consuls still sought out wars for triumphs, social prestige, and plunder. The period saw wars against the Allobroges and other Gallic and Alpine tribes; in Dalmatia; against the Cimbri and Tigurini; and in Thrace. Consuls persisted in marauding deep into foreign territory in hopes of forcing battle, while proconsulships in provinces where there were possibilities of warfare were highly prized.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, numerous finds attest that military themes were still the subject of choice on monumental and sepulchral architecture, and victory temples continued to be built along the triumphal route in Rome: the foremost examples being the temple of Hercules Victor in the Forum Boarium, dedicated in the late 2nd Century by an unknown *triumphator*, and of Fortuna Huiusce Diei (Temple B) in the Largo Argentina, dedicated by Q. Lutatius Catulus in 101 for a victory over the Germans. Military expenditure not only persistently increased but actually peaked in the period 125–100.<sup>4</sup> These happenings should come as no surprise: simply because no large, wealthy enemy presented itself did not mean that war should cease. As the main method of garnering social standing for the ruling élite, and as an important addition to a small farmer's income, warfare and imperialism naturally continued.

Nonetheless, this change in scale was indeed significant. As noted above, Roman aggressive wars were now visibly smaller and conducted almost exclusively against tribal peoples. Within the Mediterranean, conflicts were often confined to provincial defence and internal insurrections; even the Jugurthine War falls under this rubric, as it is clear from the episodes preceding it, and from its aftermath, that the Romans viewed Jugurtha as a client king in rebellion, rather than the object of a new foreign conquest. Smaller-scale conflict against rebellious slaves and foes who

<sup>3</sup> Spain: cf. Richardson 1986, 126–55. Gallic and Alpine tribes: *CIL* 13.1668; Apollodorus: *FGrH* 244 F25; App. *Celt.* 12; Caes. *BG* 1.45.2; Cic. *Font.* 36; Flor. *Epit.* 1.37.4–6; Jerome, *Chron.* 127 BC; Livy, *Per.* 61–62; Pliny, *HN* 7.166, 33.141; Suet. *Nero* 2.1; Str. 4.1.11, 2.3; Val. Max. 3.5.2, 9.6.3–4; Vell. 2.10.2–3, 39.1. Dalmatia, App. *Ill.* 11; Livy, *Per.* 62; Eutr. 4.23.2. Cimbri and Tigurini: App. *Celt.* 13; Cic. *Corn. ap. Ascon.* 68, 80; Diod. 34/35.37; Livy, *Per.* 63, 65; Plut. *Mar.* 16.5; Str. 5.1.8; Tac. *Ger.* 37; Vell. 2.8.3, 12.1–2. Thrace, *CIL* 1.2.2.692–3; Dio 26 F 88; Front. *Strat.* 2.4.3; Livy, *Per.* 63, 65; Vell. 2.8.3. Proconsulships with possibility of warfare: Schulz 2011.

<sup>4</sup> Monumental and sepulchral architecture: Hölkeskamp 2005; 2010, 120–3, 131; Welch 2010, 497–512, 528–32. Temple of Hercules Victor, Livy 10.23.3; Pliny, *HN* 35.19; Steinby, *LTUR* 3.15. Temple of Fortuna Huiusce Diei, Plut. *Mar.* 26.2; Steinby *LTUR* 2.269–70. On Republican victory temples, cf. Orlin 2002, 116–39; Welch 2010, 502–5. Military expenditure: Catalli 2001, 126–31; Crawford 1974, 617, 633, 694; Hollander 2007, 99–101; Hopkins 1980, 106–10.

were not particularly wealthy afforded the common soldiery far fewer opportunities for plunder, and this, combined with the more dangerous nature of the fighting in Spain and the drudgery of garrison duty, led, despite reductions in the property qualification necessary for service, to a noticeable drop in the number of citizens coming forward for military service. This was Rome's so-called 'manpower crisis', whereby the Italians gradually began to absorb more and more of the responsibility for the defence of Roman territory and any new conquests beyond it.<sup>5</sup>

Perhaps of even greater impact than the smaller scale of war was its lack of frequency. From the conquest of Veii in 396 to the end of the Third Macedonian War in 168, the Romans were almost continually involved in military conflict. Afterwards, however, they experienced a period of peace that lasted for over a decade. Considering the previous two centuries, this must have come as a somewhat of a jolt to Roman society, something of which the Senate, according to Polybius (36.13.6-7), was not unaware. This set the tone for what was to come; after a resumption of warfare in east and west from 154 to 133, periods of peace gradually become longer and more frequent, and thus, by the end of the 2nd Century, we can no longer speak of a professional class of Roman soldiers like Livy's famous Sp. Ligustinus (42.34.2-15). As a result, more than one Roman general had to deal with a phenomenon not heretofore found in their legions: a lack of both training and discipline. Scipio Aemilianus in Spain in 134, Calpurnius Piso in Sicily in 133, and Caecilius Metellus in Africa in 109 all had to train their armies and instill in them a sense of discipline after defeats suffered under earlier commanders.<sup>6</sup> In short, it is clear that from the mid-2nd Century Rome ceased to have a ready supply of highly seasoned, battle-hardened men from the rural proletariat. In the past, even hastily raised armies almost always prevailed because the soldiers were not new to the battlefield. Extended stretches of peace equally spelt extended stretches of military unemployment for these formerly long-service legionaries, and Roman generals from this period onwards were often forced to begin campaigns with raw recruits.

The shift in attitude towards warfare equally applied to the ruling élite who themselves saw combat far less often than before. And Roman society itself had changed in the interval, as no longer would an aristocrat neces-

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<sup>5</sup> Jugurtha as client: Sall. *Jug.* 13-6, 21.2, 26.1-3. Lack of recruits for Spain: Pol. 35.4.1-7. Reduction in property qualification: Cic. *Rep.* 2.40. 'Manpower crisis': Cagniat 2007, 81; Rich 1983.

<sup>6</sup> Scipio: App. *Iber.* 85. Piso: Val. Max. 2.7.9. Metellus: Sall. *BJ* 44-5.

sarily be trained on the battlefield in his youth, and instead, by the late 2nd Century, was far more likely to be educated in philosophy, rhetoric, and law. Furthermore, it was during the late Republic that the equestrian class officially ceased to provide cavalry for the legions, although it is likely that they had not undertaken this role in any significant way for some time.

The speech of Marius as consul in 107 is highly indicative of this process. 'What they have learnt from books, I have acquired in the field.' Marius is clearly able to draw a dichotomy between himself, educated as a soldier—at one point even opening his toga to reveal the scars on his chest—and many, though certainly not all, of those in the Senate whose learning had been of a more academic nature.<sup>7</sup> Of course, by the 1st Century at the latest this new type of education was not simply desired but necessary. For many of these men, success in the Forum rather than on the battlefield was the goal, and as a result, the level of rhetorical training and technique required to succeed in politics increased dramatically. Rome now had a political culture to go along with its military one. No longer seen as a means towards achieving greater levels of command and more success on the battlefield, the garnering of political office had become an end in itself.

Thus, while the change in warfare in the 2nd Century was gradual and 146 should not be seen as some sort of tipping point, the change was nonetheless highly significant and altered the very nature of Roman society. Smaller and less frequent wars go a long way towards explaining why the Roman army appeared so ineffectual at first against the likes of Jugurtha, the Cimbri, and the Teutones. Moreover, changing aristocratic attitudes meant that, long before Marius, warfare was becoming the preserve of a smaller number of more powerful men, a process that, arguably, began with Scipio Africanus and continued throughout the 2nd Century. Nonetheless, while Marius should therefore not be seen as a new phenomenon, that he achieved such a degree of power is due in no small part to the diminished number of generals of great standing within the Senate who had the *gravitas* to rein him in; and with this new-found power, Marius was able to fundamentally alter the Roman state and set the stage for what was to come.

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<sup>7</sup> End of equestrian cavalry: McCall 2002, 100-13. 2nd-Century changes: Blois 2000, 11-5; 2007, 168-9; Cornell 1993, 154-60; David 2006; Harris 1979, 5, 9-53, 257; Nicolet 1980, 93-6; Rosenstein 2007, 143-4. Speech of Marius: Sall. *Jug.* 85, cf. 84-6 (quotation, 85.13; scars, 85.29-30); cf. Evans 1999.

2. *Marius*

The career of Marius marks a watershed in the history of Rome and its military, as he was the first Roman to achieve such an appreciable level of individual power; this and his equestrian background combined to upset the political equilibrium previously established by the ruling élite. His newfound power as well as some of his more far-reaching military reforms meant that he possessed the ability to undermine the established oligarchic system, as Sulla would do in just over a decade. Although it probably did not dawn on him to subvert the state in such a way as Sulla, what matters is that he had the power to do so, and this opened up a new, often violent, route to power for those who followed him. It also changed the very nature of Roman imperialism.

The aforementioned process concerning the ruling élite in Rome, whereby education was far less grounded in warfare and most senators were now more politicians than generals, concentrated military prowess in the hands of fewer and fewer members of the aristocracy. This made the rise of a figure like Marius perhaps inevitable as the Senate, with its shrinking number of military men, was gradually losing its ability to keep headstrong and ambitious generals in line. What truly changed things for Marius, however, was his enrolling of the landless poor into the Roman army in 107. This was an unknowingly monumental decision that had several important consequences. Firstly, as the poor flocked to Marius' standards, he found himself with an abundant supply of manpower; thus the mould for the formation of armies in Rome was broken and never again would Senate or general revert to a system of raising troops via the property qualification. While the fully professional legions of Augustus were still far into the future, the Roman army was nevertheless on its way to becoming a force composed of men who would spend a substantial number of consecutive years together under the standards. The culmination of the process is perhaps the army with which Julius Caesar conquered first Gaul and then the *imperium Romanum* itself. By the time of Pharsalus in 48, many of these soldiers had spent a decade fighting alongside each other and under Caesar, and were thus, arguably, the most experienced and battle-hardened fighting force the Mediterranean had seen up until that point. Such levels of elitism were possible only because Marius allowed a large segment of the Italian population to view the army as a full-time career.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Enrollment of landless: Gell. 16.10.14; Sall. *BJ* 86.2-4; cf. Blois 2007, 164; Cagniat 2007, 81-2; Gabba 1976, 1-19; Keaveney 2007, 24-8; Morstein-Marx and Rosenstein 2010, 630-2;

Moreover, this affected not only the landless poor but the wealthier classes as well. As military service waned amongst the *nobiles*, generals now recruited their officers and staff from the lesser Roman aristocracy, the equestrian order, and the Italian gentry. Like the men they commanded, these too served for substantial periods of time and thus became near-professional soldiers. Whether they served out of loyalty to a commander or, more likely, a desire to win plunder and move up the social ladder in Rome, the development gave the legions an almost full-time general staff. By Caesar's time, this had expanded to include many if not all centurions. These long-service veterans now regained the place once occupied by men such as Sp. Ligustinus in the first half of the second century, and it is clear from numerous references in Caesar's writings that he deeply trusted these men and treated them as near-equals to his general staff, seeking their participation in councils of war and looking to them for opinions on strategies and tactics.<sup>9</sup> For Caesar's staff, officers, centurions, and men, war was their business and their livelihood, and, although this was not yet the army of the imperial period, it would be difficult to argue that these men were not professionals in terms of both career and skill.

This process had serious effects on the nature of Roman imperialism. The ideological link from the mid-Republic between the state, the people, and the army was now permanently severed, and the legions were now seen as something removed from everyday Roman society. The men serving within the army, whether officers, centurions, or legionaries, now wholly depended upon their general for rewards during and after their terms of service. Officers expected to be rewarded with help in securing political offices while front line soldiers sought land upon their retirement. Equally, all hoped to gain substantial amounts of plunder in order to achieve their political ambitions or to ease their post-military careers. In this respect they were not disappointed; the veterans of Marius received land after their service, and with men like Pompey and Marc Antony, to name but two, we can see a pattern of Romans from the middle and lower cadre of the élite who used service in the army to catapult their political careers. Thus the men who served became willing instruments in the hands of commanders like Sulla, Pompey, Caesar; men who could give them what they wanted.

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Nicolet 1980, 129-37; Rosenstein 2004, 167-9. Caesar's army: Blois 2007, 173-6; Cagniard 2007, 84-5; Keppie 1984, 80-102.

<sup>9</sup> General staff: Blois 2000; 2007, 168-9, Patterson 1993. Centurions: Blois 2007, 168-9; Keppie 1984, 84-8, 98, 106. Veteran armies compared with raw recruits in the late Republic: App. *BC* 3.69; Cic. *Fam.* 10.24.3-4; *Tusc.* 2.38.

A new bond between soldier and commander was hence formed, and the fact that such a large proportion of the army was now Italian rather than Roman only served to further this bond as few legionaries would have had any particular loyalty to the city of Rome, let alone to the Republic.<sup>10</sup>

After Marius, armies now belonged to and served only their general, the man to whom they saw their future prosperity and success tied. The aforementioned split between the state, the people, and the army is accompanied by a shift in vocabulary as soldiers are now, for the first time, referred to not as Romans or even as legionaries, but as men belonging to their commander. This again culminates with Caesar whose men came to be known as *Caesariani*. These quasi-private armies were the instruments of Roman imperialism from the early 1st Century onwards, as foreign wars were now exclusively the preoccupations of a small number of powerful men, rather than of the state. The shift is first noticeable with Marius himself: in the early 90s, he travelled to Cappadocia and Galatia in hopes of goading Mithridates VI of Pontus into war. The Senate, however, sensing his power as well as the loyalty of his veterans, stepped back from imperialism and voted against war. It is clear that this rare and uncharacteristic move was done because many of the ruling élite feared Marius. As someone from an equestrian background, he had already upset the oligarchic equilibrium, and moreover they doubted their ability to set limits upon his command.<sup>11</sup> This was the last time that they were able to exercise such power. When many of their number attempted to do so against Sulla in 88, he turned his troops, loyal first and foremost to him, upon the state and then used his power against the *patres* themselves as he sought to reorder the Republic according to his own views.

### 3. *Post-Sulla*

Regardless of Sulla's intentions, his proscriptions caused the state to break down; it is ironic that, in his attempt to restore the Republic and the primacy of the Senate, Sulla actually significantly weakened the former and

<sup>10</sup> Marius settles veterans: *CIL* 8.26181, 15450, 15454-5, 26270, 26275, 26281; *de Vir. Ill.* 73.1, 5; *Cic. Balb.* 48; cf. Keaveney 2007, 57-69. Pompey: *Plut. Pomp.* 6-15. Antony: *Plut. Ant.* 5; Huzar 1978, 12-52. In general, Blois 2007, 173-6; Cagniard 2007, 80-5; Flower 2010, 157-60; Keaveney 2007, 37-55; Nicolet 1980, 93-5, 129-31; Rosenstein and Morstein-Marx 2010, 630-2; Patterson 1993, 95, 107.

<sup>11</sup> *Caesariani*: *Caes. BAfr* 13.1; cf. Blois 2007, 167-8; Keaveney 2007, 42-4. Marius in the east: *Cic. Brut.* 1.5.3; *Plut. Mar.* 31; cf. Harris 1979, 158, 273; Kallet-Marx 1996, 245-7; Sherwin-White 1984, 108-9; Sordi 1973.



destroyed the latter. After his dictatorship of 81–80, most of the older men of the Senate, those with military achievements whose word carried massive weight, lay dead. The younger generation who replaced them proved unable to keep in line the likes of M. Aemilius Lepidus, who revolted in 78, and were hopelessly outmatched when it came to Pompey and Caesar, each of whom wielded immense political power backed up by armies loyal only to themselves. The fact that Sulla doubled the size of the Senate to six hundred only further diluted its power.<sup>12</sup>

Men such as Sulla, Pompey, and Caesar were able to rise to power because, in part, of the conflicts in which they fought. Roman imperialism after the age of Marius enters a new phase in which wars of conquest became significantly larger in scope, duration, and violence. This is an era where we must speak of campaigns rather than wars, as a single military adventure by a general could involve several wars against several opponents, at times allied and at times disparate. Foreshadowing the imperialism in the time of the emperors, conflicts were now more complex, usually further away, and far less frequent than in the 3rd Century and earlier. In short, campaigns could often become lengthy, colossal events, involving unprecedented numbers of men and unprecedented logistical acumen. These were made possible by the new military realities outlined above. Generals now stayed in the field for significantly longer, usually until a campaign was deemed complete. They operated with the same men—staff, officers, centurions, and legionaries—year after year, forming a strong bond and interlocking their successes and fortunes. The campaigns of Sulla, Lucullus, and Pompey in the east as well as those of Caesar in Gaul all required a degree of command and control, long-term and broad strategies, and absolute mastery over logistics that could only be executed by a general with supreme power, in place for a significant duration, and with a highly experienced army. The complexity of these military adventures cannot be overstated: this was imperialism on a grand scale, one which was unimaginable less than a century before.

Another reason that such campaigns could be undertaken was because generals in the late Republic were far less restrained by senatorial orders or interference than their predecessors. Operating largely independently was the only way such campaigns could have been planned, coordinated, and executed. This independence was taken to extremes by two

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<sup>12</sup> Proscriptions and reforms: Broughton, *MRR* 2.69; cf. Flower 2010, 117–71. Revolt of Lepidus: App. *BC* 1.107; Cic. *Scaur. ap. Ascon.* 19; Livy, *Per.* 90; Pliny, *HN* 7.122, 186; Plut. *Pomp.* 16.1–6; Sall. *Hist.* 1.65–72 McGushin; Val. Max. 2.8.7.

individuals and their armies. What Lucullus did from 75 to 67 in the east was hardly different from what Caesar would do shortly afterwards in Gaul. Both, in many ways, 'went rogue' and operated beyond the authority of the Senate. The difference between the two was that, in Rome, Lucullus had opponents with a vested interest in curbing his power, whereas, by the time these emerged against Caesar, it was already too late to stop him. But the point remains: after Sulla, generals did wilfully ignore the Senate and undertake private conquests. This, of course, combined with a poorer soldiery served to make plunder even more important than it had been in the past (which is quite a statement, as plunder had always been highly important) and thus made war even more rapacious.

Several decades ago, sociologist Stanislaw Andreski put forward the notion that greater participation by the citizenry in warfare is directly proportional to its ferocity. Simply, the more citizens from all classes who take part in military ventures, the more violent these ventures become. The twentieth century certainly illustrated this point, and the late Roman Republic would seem to conform. War in the earlier Republic was no doubt brutal, with cities sacked and entire populations sold into slavery. This ferocity, however, now reached new extremes. Examining Sulla's campaign against Mithridates or Caesar's in Gaul, it is clear that, in the 1st Century, warfare went beyond mid-Republican pillaging and was now visited regularly upon entire peoples, specifically targeting far more of the civilian population.<sup>13</sup>

This, in some ways, was a necessary outgrowth of the enrolment of the landless classes by Marius. Unlike specifically the soldiers of the mid-Republic who saw plunder as a top-up to their income, those of the late Republic viewed plunder as an investment in their future, almost as a pension fund, and therefore it went from being the legionary's goal to the legionary's necessity. Whereas previous commanders had allowed their men to loot captured cities, 1st Century generals permitted the pillaging of entire areas, as with Sulla in Boeotia and Caesar in the territory of the Eburones. The motivation of Sulla's troops is particularly clear: when Marius seized the command against Mithridates in 88, Sulla, in convincing his men to march on Rome, played heavily on the idea that they as well as himself were not to go east on campaign and would thus lose out on plunder. Although there is nothing to say that this was true and Marius may very well have enlisted them in his army, Sulla's speech clearly had its desired effect.

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<sup>13</sup> Andreski 1968, 51-73, 117-8; cf. Harris 1979, 51 n. 4, 164-6; Nicolet 1980, 93-5, 129-31, 219-24; Patterson 1993, 94-7.

And the eastern campaign did indeed prove highly lucrative for them; in 83, at the commencement of the civil war with the Marian forces, Sulla's own troops had taken so much loot that they were in a position to offer their general a loan to finance his upcoming campaign.

Commanders in general, perhaps even as far back as Marius if we are to believe Sallust (*Jug.* 84.4), should have been in no doubt about the motivation of their troops. Pompey distributed the immense sum of 384 million sesterces to his legionaries during his triumph of 61, while Caesar was taught a harsh lesson in 47 when almost all of his veterans rebelled due to a lack of financial rewards while stationed in Italy. Many actually took to looting local Campanian towns. Caesar desperately needed these troops and was thus forced to give in to their demands for money, land, and, for nearly half of the rebels, discharge. Calling these soldiers mercenaries would deny that Roman troops for the last three and a half centuries had fought for plunder; but Roman imperialism shifted its targets, scope, and level of violence when plunder went from a motivation to a goal in and of itself.<sup>14</sup>

Furthermore, this need for plunder was not exclusive to the soldiery. Centurions were certainly aware that, as trusted subordinates with a direct link to their general, they would receive a greater share of any plunder and, upon discharge, perhaps twice the amount of land and cash bonuses. Their incentives were therefore strong, as this newfound wealth might catapult a centurion into a significantly higher economic circle, and might even lead to a local political career in the city where he was settled. The strongest motivations as always, however, existed with the generals themselves. There is no question that Roman military leaders since the fourth century had fought for inherently selfish reasons, but the imperialism of the mid-Republic was fuelled by competition amongst an established ruling élite. By the 1st Century, the stakes for generals were much higher than social prestige, as these men—Caesar being the prime example—had often incurred massive debts in campaigning for and winning political office. Hence victory during a campaign often meant the difference between abundant wealth and power and a life of obscurity crushed by extreme debt. As a result of these much higher stakes, magistrates lobbied for provinces with a greater potential for military activity, in particular Gaul

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<sup>14</sup> Boeotia: App. *Mithr.* 51, 54; Plut. *Sulla* 26.7. Eburones: Caes. *BG* 6.29-34, 43. Sulla's speech: App. *BC* 1.57. Offer of loan: App. *BC* 1.79; Plut. *Sulla* 17.3, 27.1-5. Pompey's triumph: App. *Mithr.* 116; Plut. *Pomp.* 45.4. Mutiny of 47: App. *BC* 2.92-94; Dio 42.52-3; Livy, *Per.* 113; Plut. *Caes.* 51.2.

and Spain. Thus late Republican conquests, whether they were grand campaigns like Caesar's or small incursions by governors, often saw a greater number of naked acts of aggression.<sup>15</sup>

Finally, the new large-scale warfare proved spectacularly successful not only for the generals and men, but also for the state: the Elder Pliny relates how the treasury in 91 was already significantly wealthier than during the first half of the 2nd Century, at the height of the lucrative conquest of the Greek east (*HN* 33.55-56). Four decades later, with Rome still in the midst of civil war, the treasury was wealthier still. In all, the amount of coinage in store increased by fivefold in just over a century, from approximately six million sesterces in 157 to thirty million in 49. Although some of this undoubtedly represents the monetisation of Roman society that happened in the late 2nd Century, as well as the likelihood that some subject territories had recovered from the initial depredation brought about by conquest, so that they could now pay more tax, the figures nevertheless represent a fantastic accumulation in a very short span of time.<sup>16</sup> However less systematic and frequent Roman imperialist ventures might have been in the late Republic, there is little question that imperialism on such a grand scale was far more lucrative.

#### 4. *The Imperium Romanum*

Roman imperialism in the era after Marius had much in common with the century before, but was nonetheless significantly different in that it was, by and large, no longer carried out by the highest levels of the Roman aristocratic élite or by small farmers. Thus it should come as no surprise that, throughout the 1st Century, the view was propagated within Roman society that warfare was removed and separate from the lives of most, practised by specific groups with whom many had little or no connection. A shift in attitude towards conquest and its results also occurs at this time. Although we have very little contemporary evidence for Roman attitudes towards conquest before Cicero, it is safe to say that the pervasiveness of militarism within Roman society, along with the regularity of conflict, meant that aggressive war was favoured. By the 1st Century, however, while

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<sup>15</sup> Centurions: Brunt 1971, 294-300, 312-26; Keppie, 1983, 91-2, 104-12, 124; Gabba 1976, 26-7; Patterson 1993, 103-4. Caesar's debts: Suet. *Caes.* 13.1, 46, 54.1. Lobbying for provinces: Schulz 2011.

<sup>16</sup> Monetisation of Roman society: Catalli 2001, 128-35; Crawford 1974, 640-72; Hollander 2007, 17-30; Hopkins 1980, 103-12.

we only have Cicero's voice in this regard, it is very significant that he more than once admits that not all of Rome's past conquests were undertaken out of necessity, and some were indeed aggressive (*Off.* 1.26, 36, 38; *Phil.* 8.12). Of course, he felt comfortable admitting this as it was in the distant past, and, while it is always difficult to use Cicero as a barometer for the entire educated class at Rome, that he writes these ideas in published works may very well indicate that certain Romans were recognising that their rule over the Mediterranean had not been won by completely altruistic means.

Similarly, the language and concept of empire began to change in the late Republic. The original connotation of the word *provincia* was a task or responsibility, usually but not always military. As a result, it could often be a geographical area in which a magistrate was permitted to exercise his *imperium*. Over time, many of these military zones of control became permanent areas of occupation, and by the 1st Century it is clear that *provincia* does, at times, correspond to the English 'province': an area with fixed borders and a Roman administration that existed beyond the *imperium* of a proconsul.

Furthermore, the idea of *imperium* itself was changing during this period. (See also Chapters 8–9.) The Romans of the mid-Republic had little if any concept of having an empire or even an extended state; to them, the Mediterranean was simply a place that featured a series of unconnected territories that were under the *imperium* of various magistrates. By the 1st Century, however, we can see a shift, again via Cicero. Here, not only can the Roman people themselves now have *imperium* over conquered territories, but the word *imperium* itself appears often to be referring to the Roman state as a whole, conquered territories included. There are other instances where *imperium* may even be taking on a territorial definition.<sup>17</sup> While this is not yet the concept of empire as it would evolve in the imperial period, Cicero at the very least is viewing Rome's dominion in a very different light: no longer as a series of unconnected, randomly conquered areas, but as an *Imperium Romanum*.

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<sup>17</sup> *Provincia*: Caes. *BC* 1.11; Sall. *Hist.* 2.41 McGushin; for Ciceronian references (see especially Cic. *Pis.* 50, on Sulla's law limiting a governor's power to leave his defined province) cf. Richardson 2008, 79–86. *Imperium*: Richardson 2008, 71–9.

### 5. Conclusion

The changes to Roman imperialism in the late Republic form an integral part of the Roman revolution and helped to transform the state from a Republic into a monarchy. In many ways, the large-scale imperialism of the style of Sulla, Pompey, and Caesar caused, if not hastened, the demise of the *res publica*. These commanders needed supreme power over logistics in the field as well as a loyal and experienced staff and soldiery in order to execute their colossal campaigns, that often integrated and interconnected several different wars and peoples over wide expanses. As more was at stake for soldier and general alike, these campaigns covered not only larger territories but targeted a greater number people in a drive to obtain plunder. The necessity of plunder, furthermore, served to make the imperialism of the late Republic more systematically violent than what had been seen before. The results of these campaigns, however, expanded a general's supreme power to include the political as well as the military, the Forum as well as the battlefield.

In the end, no matter what might be said about long-term trends or reasons, one can never get away from the military aspects of the Republic's fall, for there is no question that the end of this system of government was accompanied by an unprecedented degree of bloodshed. This is intrinsically bound up with external conquest, expansion, and imperialism. All of the major players, whose military actions both caused and exacerbated the *stasis* that eventually brought down the state, emerged because they engaged in aggressive imperialist warfare. This, to a degree, is not dissimilar to than what their forefathers had done, but their level of individual power and their near-professional armies made them significantly different from their mid-Republican predecessors. In some ways the motivations, although heightened, were the same, but the means were different. This would be brought to culmination under Augustus who fully cleaved the army and conquest from politics and society. These were now the domain, the *provincia*, of a professional class of fighting men at every level and of their commander the emperor. In the following era, conquest continued, but the direct involvement of the average Roman citizen in war was a thing of the past.

## IMPERIALISM AND ITS FAILURES, 60 BC–AD 14

*Brian Campbell*

### 1. *The End of the Republic*

The Romans were notorious for making war. Polybius said of them that they 'rely on force in all their undertakings, and consider that having set themselves a task they are bound to carry it through, and that nothing is impossible once they have decided on it'. The narrative history of Rome superficially bears this out, seemingly involving a long story of conquest and aggrandisement unrelieved by reflexion or compassion. The reality is more complex, and among other things there is evidence of the gradual emergence of a sophisticated diplomatic method. It is clear that several, often competing factors influenced Rome's decisions to go to war or to annex territory.<sup>1</sup>

Most important is perhaps the Roman ideology of warfare, in particular the significance of military prowess. Traditionally, the Roman upper classes had a tremendous respect for the glory (*gloria*) that came from success in battle, since this brought praise (*laus*) and established renown based on valour (*virtus*). Therefore one important route to social and political advancement lay in acquiring military commands, winning battles and obtaining wealth and booty; the supreme military honour of the triumph was the zenith of senatorial accomplishment.<sup>2</sup> Roman politics were highly competitive, and in the struggle for advancement those taking major decisions might well be loath to see an end to wars. In other words, the prevailing social ethos might influence the Senate, under pressure from prominent individuals or groups, to allow disputes to grow into war, or even to provoke war. Of course the Roman People had the final say in voting for war, but without leadership it would find it very hard to resist senatorial advice and pressure.

The prospect of new lands and booty was doubtless attractive to all; enrichment from military campaigns benefitted commanders, especially

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<sup>1</sup> Pol. 1.37.7. For a general survey, see Campbell 2001.

<sup>2</sup> *Laus* and *virtus*: Harris 1979, 20. See Versnel 1970; Beard 2007, for the rôle of the triumph in Roman life.

the less scrupulous, but also individual soldiers, who got a proportion of the spoils; successful wars could bring generous benefits to the *plebs*. Consequently the People's assembly, where some of the voters would have to do the fighting, might go along with senatorial opinion. Although the expansion of Roman territorial control was a legitimate war aim among the upper classes, in the context of intense political rivalry it will also have been true that some senators, having achieved military excellence, might jealously attempt to restrict the opportunities of others to command armies by refusing to vote for expansive military campaigns. Furthermore, senators had to consider that the emergence of the quasi-professional army had encouraged a style of dashing personal leadership, and that special commands though profitable to the state might also be politically dangerous.

Few Romans would have questioned the concept of ruling others; in a sense it was their duty, and subject peoples would benefit from Roman control and benevolence, and the peace and order that Rome brought, unless they were irredeemably savage, in which case they deserved retribution. It was accepted at all levels that the Roman state should profit from its acquisitions. Given that questions of war and peace and the decision to make a treaty rather than war down an adversary had complex motivation, particularly involving the self-interest of individual commanders and the deteriorating political situation in Rome, it is very difficult to believe that the Romans were concerned with precise definitions (whether imperialist or not) that would fit their activities with foreign peoples. Although they were capable of sophisticated policy and at times considerable restraint, as in their dealings with the Greek states, they clearly set no limits to what could be achieved by force of arms, even if their realization of this was inconsistent.<sup>3</sup>

The narrative of Rome's military aggrandisement in the last century of the Republic shows an absence of clear policy or consensus. In the principal spheres of operation, events seem to have been dictated more by the personal ambitions of leading senators than by any coherent or rationally formulated policy, and vital decisions tended to be taken by commanders on the ground.<sup>4</sup> Lucullus and Sulla manipulated military commands as suited their interests, and this helped to get Rome involved in Anatolia and Syria. The military operations proved lucrative for commanders and

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<sup>3</sup> For the nature of the debate on the development of Roman imperialism, see Harris 1979, 1984; North 1981; Rosenstein 1990. Dealings with the Greek states: Crawford 1992, 66-8.

<sup>4</sup> Richardson 1986, 172-80.



soldiers, and there was no pressure to reach an agreement; war against Mithridates of Pontus and then against his ally Tigranes of Armenia seemed more rewarding than the tough campaigns in Spain. Pompey took these eastern commitments a step further by developing Roman contacts in Judaea and Parthia, and annexing Seleucid Syria. He set no limits to Roman power, famously rejecting the Parthian suggestion that the Euphrates serve as a frontier, but likewise had no overall foreign policy objectives. His settlement of the east was effectively an attempt to sort out the consequences of the spasmodic warfare of ambitious senatorial commanders. Therefore in the end deals were done in Parthia and Armenia to allow Pompey to return to Rome with honour to pursue his political objectives. Nevertheless, he substantially increased Roman territory and revenues, and Cicero could say that Pompey's triumphs 'bore witness to the fact that the whole world was subject to our empire'.<sup>5</sup>

Caesar shifted this eastern focus dramatically by his conquest of Gaul; he showed that it was possible and profitable to make a name for yourself as a general in the west. Diplomacy was limited, although he did refrain from pursuing his ambitions in Britain and beyond the Rhine. Therefore, both west and east now offered scope for expansion of Roman power and influence, the annexation of territory, and inevitably aggrandisement of personal reputation. It was surely no accident that after 59 BC attention centred on certain areas while persistently troublesome regions like Spain and Illyricum tended to be neglected. Pompey, granted both Spanish provinces in 55, governed them through his officers while he remained close to political life in Rome. There was no coherent policy here of imperial expansion, as three pre-eminently powerful individuals (Pompey, Crassus and Caesar) manoeuvred for position. Military reputations were crucial and aspiring commanders still looked to the paramount example of Alexander the Great. Pompey of course had taken the *cognomen* 'The Great', and Caesar had lamented his lack of achievement compared to Alexander who had conquered the entire known world by his thirties.<sup>6</sup>

Anyhow, for the moment Caesar's campaigns in Gaul had put the others in the shade. This is the background to Crassus' expedition to Parthia in 54–53, leading to the disastrous defeat at Carrhae in 53. There was no significant strategic or economic imperative to challenge the Parthian empire and no ancient writer offers any justification. But to Crassus it seemed

<sup>5</sup> Pompey's measures: Dio 37.5.5–6.3; Plutarch, *Pompey* 33.8; *Apophthegmata Regum* 8; Cic. *Balb.* 16; cf. *Cat.* 3.26; Sherwin-White 1984, 218–26; Kallet-Marx 1995, 291–334.

<sup>6</sup> Plutarch, *Caesar* 11.

suitable for a military adventure with good hopes for a quick success; it could be associated with the conquests of Alexander, and while Pompey had been active in the east he had not invaded Parthia. The sequel was not a failure of imperialism or an over-estimation of the military resources or capabilities of the Roman state. Rather, a senator who was determined to outdo his rivals and prove his *virtus* made a careless assessment of his own competence and the need for adequate preparation, and then failed in the application of suitable tactics.

The defeat at Carrhae was serious and embarrassing, but not decisive, though it temporarily upset the balance of influence in the territories around the newly-established province of Syria. But up to this point Rome did not have a territorial presence in Parthia or significant military presence in Armenia, and therefore nothing was lost; the Romans' ability to wage future war was not seriously affected, and other commanders were not discouraged. Indeed in 48, Caesar after defeating the Pompeians and dealing with Egypt, marched through Syria into Cappadocia and at Zela crushed Pharnaces, ruler of the Crimean Bosphorus. It is notable that Caesar was unrelenting in his determination to preserve the territorial integrity of the Roman empire intact. The confusion of the civil war offered an opportunity for a brief invasion of Syria and part of Asia in 41/40 by the renegade Q. Labienus and Pacorus, the Parthian king's son. But Rome soon returned to the offensive, and the campaigns of Antony's competent officer, P. Ventidius, restored some prestige and ensured that control of established Roman territory was maintained.<sup>7</sup>

Then Antony himself launched an invasion of Parthia in 36. Like Crassus his motives were to build up his political and personal prestige, as he vied with Octavian for supremacy after the defeat of the murderers of Caesar. Octavian was left to make his name in the west, which (Antony might hope) was likely to be difficult for an inexperienced commander. As it happened, Antony's war against Parthia was unsuccessful: he was fortunate to be able to conduct a retreat without suffering the fate of Crassus. Antony was after a spectacular victory, booty and military honour. It is unlikely that he had a clearly focused policy of expanding the territorial empire, or had made a calculation of possible benefits against expenditure or future commitments. The fiasco carried a warning and in some ways perhaps set the scene for the development of future policy, particularly in the time of Augustus. The Roman army had experienced difficulties in the east against

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<sup>7</sup> Caesar's determination: Sherwin-White 1984, 299-301. Parthian invasion defeated: Dio 48.26; 49.20; Frontinus, *Stratagemas* 2.2.5; 2.5.36-37.

the Parthian cavalry and archers; tactics needed to be carefully thought out and success was not assured.<sup>8</sup>

## 2. *Augustus*

Octavian defeated Antony at Actium in 31 BC, and by 27 was firmly in control of the Roman world, with the name Augustus voted by the suitably grateful Senate. Augustus was definitely in the ideological tradition of the republic with its respect for martial prowess, the idea of *virtus* achieved through military *gloria*, and an expectation that things would be settled by force. Augustus indeed wore a signet ring with an image of Alexander the Great, and was drawn into the rôle as *imperator*.<sup>9</sup> As the victor in a costly civil war he needed to establish a respectable military status by fighting foreign foes, especially since his previous record as a commander was not distinguished. Above all, he had to think of his own security, dignity and political survival.

In terms of the Roman world view, to which Augustus doubtless subscribed, foreign peoples were often despised. Indeed Augustus referred to 'peoples who did not obey our *imperium*', implying that this would not long continue as he expanded the territory of neighbouring provinces. Livy routinely accepted Rome's power and invited his readers to consider what kind of men and what skills in peace and war had established and increased the empire (*imperium*). No writer placed any formal limit on Rome's ability to add more peoples to the empire, and an easy assumption of superiority was inherent in these views; for example, Virgil gave poetic expression to Rome's self-confident domination by having Jupiter declare: 'To this people I have given power without limit'. The Romans' rôle was to govern nations and make peace customary, sparing the vanquished (i.e., those who recognized Rome's obvious right to rule) and warring down the arrogant (i.e., anyone who resisted).<sup>10</sup> Augustus was the human instrument of these sentiments. He also had to accept the legacy of previous imperialism, in that for example, the Romans thought that Armenia was within their orbit after Pompey's exploits there. But he did not have an entirely

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<sup>8</sup> Sherwin-White 1984, 321; Antony did not aim for annexations. Sherwin White, 320, makes the point that Antony's losses may have discouraged Augustus from further ventures in Parthia.

<sup>9</sup> Suet. *Aug.* 50.

<sup>10</sup> Aug. *RG* 26.1; Livy, *Preface* 9; Virg. *Aen.* 1.279; 6.851-3.

free hand because previous neglect meant that some areas needed urgent intervention.

Augustus' brief autobiographical memoir (*Res Gestae*), while invaluable for offering the official view, certainly is not to be taken as an entirely credible record. Information was manipulated to give the message that Augustus wanted, and a prominent theme is that of perpetual conquest, as summed up by the writer of the preamble: 'The achievements of the Divine Augustus, by which he brought the world under the empire of the Roman people.' However, even here Augustus does hint at a different approach, noting that he preferred not to turn Greater Armenia into a province. Poets and commentators did not necessarily understand everything that was happening, especially matters discussed in imperial councils: some enjoyed imperial patronage and were eager to please though they were not merely mouthpieces; they reflected the upper class view of the society in which they lived. The general thrust of Augustan writing is of the invincible advance of Roman arms, with expectations of great victories still to be won in Germany, Parthia and Britain. There may have been a swell of public opinion expecting military action, though Augustus could channel that in the direction that he thought most conducive to his own success. On the other hand, he perhaps found that after the exhausting civil wars he needed to stir up aggressive sentiments.<sup>11</sup>

In the complex literary and social culture of the early empire, sophisticated analysis of imperial policy is limited. Tacitus has some useful comments on Roman policy in Germany just after Augustus' death. Apparently quoting a letter of Tiberius to Germanicus, he gives due weight to the advantages of offensive diplomacy over warfare in securing Roman interests on the Rhine. That of course would not rule out a commitment to extend Roman control beyond the Rhine, and elsewhere Tacitus mused on the length of time taken to conquer Germany.<sup>12</sup> This is an interesting long-term viewpoint and it is worth recalling the comment of Lucilius in the second century BC, that the Romans often had lost battles but never a war, and that war was everything, which may hint at the possibility of distinguishing the immediate from long-term policy.<sup>13</sup> However, it is not until Cassius Dio, commenting on Septimius Severus' annexation of Mesopotamia at the end of the 2nd Century AD, that we get a more substantial analysis of foreign policy and imperialist expansion. This is useful and relevant

<sup>11</sup> See the not entirely convincing argument of Cornell 1993, 161. Armenia: *RG* 27.2.

<sup>12</sup> *Ann.* 2.26; *Germania* 37.3—'tam diu Germania vincitur'.

<sup>13</sup> Lucilius 26.708-9 ed. E.H. Warmington, Loeb revised edition, 1967.

because of the crucial question of relations with Parthia, and Dio may have carried some of his ideas into his analysis of Augustus' policy. Severus claimed that the expansion into Mesopotamia was justified on the grounds that this would protect Roman interests and long-established provinces. Against this Dio argued that far from enhancing security the new territory would embroil the Romans in still more wars through contact with more peoples with whom they had no affinity and in whose conflicts they became involved. What is more, the whole operation was extremely expensive, not that that is likely to have bothered Severus. In the end emperors got what they wanted.<sup>14</sup>

For Augustus major questions loomed concerning the deployment of his armies: Spain, which was still not fully subdued; Illyricum up to the Danube, which was vital for the west-east route of communications; the Alpine regions, commanding the approaches to Italy itself; Germany, which Caesar had invaded and which was arguably linked to the future of Gaul; Parthia and Armenia, where it was still unclear whether and how the empire should deal with these areas. Augustus in the words of Strabo was 'lord of war and peace', but his freedom of action must be set against the limitations imposed by resources and immediate requirements. A large army will have been an enhancement of his prestige, a demonstration of his might, and a guarantor of his security. But it was also very expensive, and Augustus after pensioning off many veterans settled on a force of twenty-eight legions, gradually supplemented by increasing the number of auxiliary troops. The legions were stationed in several crucial areas and for major campaigns large concentrations of troops had to be specially assembled.

Therefore Augustus and his advisers had much to ponder. Their response apparently was to embark on a series of conquests by which the whole of Spain was secured, Roman administration was imposed on the Alpine areas, control was extended to the south bank of the Danube, and the provinces of Raetia, Noricum, Pannonia and Moesia created. Syria was consolidated, Egypt was added to the empire and Roman armies set off from the Rhine to the Elbe.<sup>15</sup> Amid such vigorous military activity we must ask if it makes sense to talk about 'failures of imperialism', although in this category we might arguably place Augustan policy in Parthia and Armenia, Arabia, and ultimately in Germany.

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<sup>14</sup> Dio 75.3. See Cornell 1993, 147–9, for the idea that military policy was not determined to any significant extent by financial constraints.

<sup>15</sup> Review of Augustan policy by Gruen 1990 and 1996.

Augustus, a shrewd observer of his self-interest and conscious of the need for military prestige, will have noted that there had been spectacular success in Gaul, which Julius Caesar had conquered in less than ten years while also invading Britain and Germany, whereas in Parthia there had been significant setbacks. Parthia had no history of Roman control, though there was a flurry of speculation that the young leader would go where Alexander had gone. Armenia, on the other hand, was believed—however vaguely—to be under Rome's influence. Augustus could not simply ignore it though in strategic terms it was probably not considered particularly significant (Roman involvement was inconsistent and careless). In Parthia Augustus had the opportunity for diplomacy, since it had a relatively stable government structure and clear avenues of communication with the Romans. Phraates was a strong ruler with whom Augustus could do business, and we may argue that from the start he set out to get what he wanted by means other than open warfare. This does not mean that he was stepping back or that it was some kind of failure. In 30 BC Tiridates was an intermittently effective pretender to the Parthian throne, and Augustus was personally present in the east with large forces, but he held back, negotiating with both sides.

One of his crucial objectives was to get back the military standards captured from Crassus and Antony, which would be very popular with public opinion. And he was prepared to go to the brink of war if Phraates proved recalcitrant. Troops were assembled and Augustus himself visited the east.<sup>16</sup> A diplomatic agreement in 20 BC brought the return of the standards and in exchange Augustus refrained from attempts to destabilize Phraates. Peaceful if rather uneasy relations were confirmed with the visit of Augustus' grandson and heir Gaius Caesar to meet the new Parthian king Phraataces in AD 1. Augustus had conducted aggressive diplomacy, which led to a treaty; Parthia accepted the Roman practice of indirectly controlling Armenia by arranging the appointment of a king and did not interfere in any Roman province. The Romans accepted the Euphrates as a boundary. This was unusual, but if pushed Augustus could have said that it was temporary.

Augustus' policy in the east was cleverly presented to the Roman people as a great victory. Coins depicted the surrender of the standards by a humble Parthian, and they were eventually placed in the temple of Mars the Avenger, dedicated in 2 BC. Augustus did not come to meet the Parthian king in person because he did not want it to seem that they were equals.

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<sup>16</sup> For this period, see Sherwin-White 1984, 322-41; Campbell 1993; Cornell 1993, 145-6 argues that terrain would not have discouraged the Romans.

But military honour had been satisfied, and he could claim that Armenia was under Roman control even if he chose not to annex it. The Parthians appeared as suppliants, an appearance that was reinforced when Augustus towards the end of his reign was invited to appoint a Parthian king (Vologases), because of Parthian internal squabbles. Tiberius preserved the status quo and despite the manoeuvring and posturing in the time of Nero this détente persisted until Trajan, who took the initiative in making war. His disastrous expedition achieved nothing and confirmed Augustus' judgement.<sup>17</sup>

This was not therefore a 'failure of imperialism', as there had been no consistent policy of conquering Parthia or Armenia. Nor was it a case of imperialism postponed, in that Augustus was perhaps sidetracked by events elsewhere.<sup>18</sup> Parthia was low on his list of priorities, not primarily because he had other more pressing concerns, but because he had doubts about whether significant success was possible within a reasonable time-span, and also because diplomacy was feasible. Diplomacy in practice worked so well that there was no need to revisit the question.

Augustus' policy in Arabia is rather mysterious. In 25 BC Aelius Gallus, Prefect of Egypt, launched an attack on southern Arabia (Arabia Felix); Strabo plausibly thought that the motive was plunder. Arabia was hardly strategically important; apart from the opportunity for quick profit, the expedition as described in the *Res Gestae* appeared impressive, with a suggestion of far-away conquests and romantic names.<sup>19</sup> Arabia was an important link in trade from Egypt to India, and was rich in spices and diamonds. The campaign produced no obvious long-term benefits and could be classed as a military setback. But the objectives were probably limited, and this was not a retreat from some imperialist vision, rather an exploitative gathering of plunder and a kind of declaration of interest that could be followed up as suited.

The outcome of Augustan policy in Germany is certainly different from events in Parthia and Arabia. Augustus was in Gaul from 16 to 13 preparing the way, and large-scale operations beyond the Rhine were planned, involving the establishment of permanent legionary bases. In 12 BC Drusus

<sup>17</sup> Augustus believed that a war should not be started unless the hope of gain was greater than the fear of loss: Suet. *Aug.* 25.

<sup>18</sup> As suggested by Brunt 1990, 105–6; also 1990, 288–323, and 433–80 for a detailed appraisal of the imperialist ambitions of Augustus.

<sup>19</sup> *RG* 26.5; Strabo 16.4.22 C780; Dio 53.29.3. See Marek 1993, though I cannot accept his view that the expedition was linked to events in Parthia and that its failure moved Augustus towards a diplomatic solution there.

crossed the river, advancing by three routes, one by way of a canal on the lower Rhine to the North Sea and then along the coast, exploiting the courses of the rivers Ems, Weser and Elbe. Other routes led directly eastwards along the valley of the Lippe and Main. Supply bases were built, and important permanent legionary bases along the river Lippe: Haltern was established on the north bank of the river about 54 km. from *Castra Vetera*, while Oberaden was situated 90 km. east of *Vetera*. By the time that Drusus died in 9 BC after a riding accident, Roman troops had already reached the Elbe. Tiberius took over as commander and he apparently intended to impose an administrative structure of the usual type between the Rhine and Elbe. Indeed L. Domitius Ahenobarbus crossed the Elbe and conducted negotiations with the tribes beyond that river.<sup>20</sup>

In AD 6 the planned invasion of Bohemia and subsequent serious revolt in Pannonia removed attention from Germany, where P. Quinctilius Varus was now in command. Dio implies some criticism of his lack of military experience, but he had been governor of Syria, and it is possible that he had been sent to preserve the status quo and prepare the framework of permanent Roman administration. Perhaps the degree of pacification in Germany had been over-estimated. Varus was lured into a trap by Arminius and defeated with the loss of three legions, three cavalry units and six auxiliary cohorts (about 20,000 men). The immediate consequences were some degree of panic in Rome; freedmen were recruited into the army and guards placed on the city; the numerals of the lost legions were never used again, blame was cleverly shifted to Varus, and Tiberius was sent out to restore the situation.<sup>21</sup> He invaded Germany but Haltern was not reoccupied and new tribes moved into Germany from the east, making reconquest a challenge. Augustus did not rise to it. The legionary bases were withdrawn to the right bank of Rhine and remained there.

It would be unwise to call this a failure of imperialism. The Romans had perhaps been careless and were distracted at a crucial moment by events in the Balkans. Augustus was now an old man and there were other preoccupations, particularly the succession. He did not need the glory of conquest in the same way as in his early days. His final advice to Tiberius was to keep the empire within limits, not necessarily defensive boundaries, but territories that were sustainable according to his judgement. Tiberius did not allow Germanicus to extend his punitive expeditions in Germany into another war of conquest, possibly because he thought that it was ultimately

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<sup>20</sup> Dio 55.10a; Wells 1972, 149-61; 163-211 (Haltern); 211-20 (Oberaden).

<sup>21</sup> Velleius 2.117-20; Dio 56.18-24.



too difficult to achieve, or because of doubts about Germanicus as a commander for such an enterprise.<sup>22</sup> The result was that the conquest of Germany was deferred, not cancelled. We may compare the Roman presence in Spain, where initial conquest with its provincial structure in 197 BC was not finally completed until Augustus' Cantabrian Wars in 26–19 BC. However, Claudius chose to attack Britain (which surely seemed just as daunting as Germany), and Trajan chose to go in another direction, this time into Dacia, another huge undertaking. Either emperor might have decided that the way to military glory lay in renewing the advance into Germany.

### 3. *Conclusions*

The Romans had no foreign office or foreign minister through whom long-term policies could have been developed, or a regular framework of diplomatic contact. Emperors tended to deal with individual situations on an *ad hoc* basis, using whatever advice they could. Neither emperors nor their advisers had clearly defined imperialist policies, though they set out to preserve established Roman territories. Significant conquests and annexations, as in Britain, Dacia and Mesopotamia, had more to do with the rhythms of imperial politics and personalities than with any elaborate policies. Successful warfare increased imperial prestige and standing with the troops, whereas a serious setback could well undermine confidence in the regime. It is therefore no surprise that Claudius, unprepossessing in appearance and initially lacking prestige, sought to build a reputation partly by invading Britain and establishing a new province with all the fanfare of a triumph. We need to resist the tendency to assume that all imperial decisions emerged from rational analysis. In Rome's foreign relations it is often extraordinarily difficult to discover clear motivation or see consistent objectives.<sup>23</sup>

In general, there were no inevitable limitations on Roman imperialism except those that were self-imposed, through the condition of the army and the lack of available resources. Even here it can be argued that the Romans decided what they wanted to do and then made resources available one way or another. Geographical ignorance was also a factor, in that,

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<sup>22</sup> Augustus' advice: Tac. *Ann.* 1.11. Tiberius' view of Germanicus: *Ann.* 2.26; imperial etiquette meant that Germanicus would have to have supreme command of a major campaign.

<sup>23</sup> Dio on Claudius: 60.21.1–22.2. There is a substantial debate about Roman policy in frontier areas; for an overview and bibliography, see Wilkes 2005.

for example, initially they did not appreciate the extent of territory beyond the Rhine. The Romans genuinely believed there was no limit to their power and their ability to conquer peoples. As noted, even in the late first century Tacitus was still dreaming of the conquest of Germany (n. 12). Therefore there were no failures of imperialism, just occasional setbacks that could be rectified. And where the conquering did come to an end an explanation could be found to preserve the façade of military *gloria*; consequently, it was said that certain lands were not worth conquering.<sup>24</sup> Imperialist rhetoric and ambition never died, and clever presentation concealed the setbacks and suggested the overwhelming power of Rome. Overall, wars of aggression were often determined not by state requirements, economic pressure, or even strategic necessity, but by an emperor's assessment of where he thought he could win.

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<sup>24</sup> Cornell 1993, 146-7; Whittaker 1994, 60-97 on the emergence of frontier zones.

## REVERBERATIONS OF EMPIRE: CICERO, CAESAR AND THE POST-SULLAN EMPIRE\*

*Tom Stevenson*

It has become conventional to describe Roman imperialism in the post-Sullan Republic in terms of accelerated exploitation by powerful individuals and decline in the Senate's control of war and provincial management.<sup>1</sup> Evidence for greed, graft, and the pursuit of glory (*gloria*) seems prominent in comparison to evidence for defensive concerns and the concept of the just war (*bellum iustum*). Cicero and Caesar often seem little inhibited by moral concerns. This is not to say that ideas of defence and justice held no significance for them, but it is important to examine the contexts in which such ideas appear.

### 1. *Modern Scholarship*

Tenney Frank emphasised the cruel exactions of tax-gatherers (*publicani*) and the influence of equestrian companies—i.e., companies owned by *equites Romani*—on foreign relations during the late Republic. In Frank's view, it took the establishment of the *pax Romana* by Augustus to bring the depredations of these rampant capitalists to an end. John Buchan accepted Frank's picture, describing the unscrupulous behaviour of the tax-gatherers as 'false imperialism', 'based on the interests of the capitalists, which regarded the provinces as mere milch-cows.' In a series of studies, Ernst Badian drew a line at 70 BC and painted the following age as one of senatorial weakness, corrupt governors, rapacious publicans, warlords like Pompey and Caesar, and armies owing their allegiance to their generals rather than to the state. However, Badian systematically dismantled Frank's theory of economic imperialism based on equestrian pressure. Badian recognised clearly the impact of such developments as the addition of Asia and the enfranchisement of Italy, but argued that accelerated exploitation

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\* I want to thank Andrew Lintott for the help and advice he gave during the writing of this paper. Remaining errors are of course my sole responsibility.

<sup>1</sup> This implies understanding 'imperialism' as 'exploitation by the ruling power': Badian 1968, 69.

of conquered peoples by members of the Roman élite was the product not of capitalist influences but of internal political corruption in the period. William V. Harris does not treat the period in detail, but this is partly because his arguments about the earlier period did not need to be repeated. Aristocratic pursuit of glory was obvious after 70, as was desire for material gain. As before, the period of Cicero and Caesar was a period of aggressive individualism, in which war and imperialism were used for the empowerment of members of the Roman élite.<sup>2</sup>

The idea of a sharp change in Roman imperialism should be questioned. Variation rather than uniformity of experience was probably the order of the day. Peter Brunt uncovered a considerable number of cases of provincial maladministration in the early imperial period. Thus factors other than political régimes are relevant in explaining exploitative behaviour. Robert Morstein Kallet-Marx argues for a long, slow evolution from hegemony to empire in the East: the Roman presence was by no means intrusive or heavy-handed before the first war with Mithridates; annexation of Asia beyond the Roman province began only with the activities of Sulla, and the process of creating provinces and an empire was carried on by Pompey. Regional studies tend to reinforce the impression of slow evolution continuing even later. Andrew Lintott has laid out in great detail both the opportunities for enrichment and the regulations which governed the activities of publicans. His conclusion is that 'Roman rule, even if at many points unjust and inefficient, was not only tolerated but appreciated by many of its subjects.' Motivation was probably complex and variable too. Furthermore, there are many topics beyond motivation, such as the structures and rhythms underlying Roman imperialism.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Frank 1914; Buchan 1932, 7, quoted by Harrison 2008, 10; Badian 1958; Badian 1968, 16-28, 47, 61-92, 69; and 1972, 81-118. Cf. Richardson 1991, 4; Harris 1985, esp. 252 ('the driving force now tended, more than in previous periods, to come from individuals rather than from Rome as a whole'); Beard and Crawford 1999, 73. The narrative of Sherwin-White 1984 seems inclined to the traditional model of an earlier phase of 'defensive' imperialism subsequently overtaken by an age marked by the ambitions of the great generals.

<sup>3</sup> Brunt 1961, 189-227; 1990, 53-95. Morstein Kallet-Marx 1995; cf. the excellent review by G. Reger, in *BMC* 1997.2.6. Regional studies: e.g. Richardson 1986; Freeman 1986; 1994; 1996; Lintott 1993, 14-15, cf. 70-96 (taxation and *corvées*). Motivation: Rich 1993, 65 ('Roman warfare and imperialism were complex phenomena, for which no monocausal explanation will be adequate'). On the inter-related military and social structures of Roman imperialism, see Hopkins 1978, 1-74; North 1981, esp. 6-7, 9; Rich 1993, 44-55. More attention might be given to Romans buying land in the provinces, e.g. *Cic. Fam.* 1.9.24 (Quintus Cicero buys land in Cilicia, though he hates the place); *Fam.* 12.21, 12.26, 12.27 (African landowners and businessmen); *Nep. Att.* 12.4 (the poet Julius Calidus).

Under these circumstances some scholars have focused anew on contemporary attitudes to imperialism. Brunt has shown that Cicero and Caesar tend to emphasise the glory and benefits of empire. In fact, perhaps surprisingly, the similarities between their attitudes tend to stand out over the differences. Catherine Steel has argued that Cicero had a deep understanding of imperial problems such as equestrian rapacity, structural difficulties and social tensions; yet he chose, in spite of his principles, to avoid antagonising the *equites* and blamed particular individuals. It seems more likely that Cicero was thinking conventionally for a Roman in blaming problems on individuals rather than groups or social movements, whose influence was often overlooked entirely or poorly understood, and that his principles were not as developed in modern terms as is implied.<sup>4</sup> Unfortunately the tendency to dismiss rather than analyse relevant evidence remains strong, on the assumption that much of it is untruthful or insincere, viz. fashioned to support various Roman interests or to demonize Roman enemies. If, however, the dismissive reflex is removed, contemporary expressions can indicate a great deal about what was appropriate for particular settings.

## 2. *Cicero on War and Imperialism*

Two of Cicero's philosophical works, *On the Republic* (*de Re Publica*) and *On Duties* (*de Officiis*), contain what are probably his most famous statements on Roman war and imperialism. The former work, begun in 54 BC and completed in 51, discusses the ideal state and the ideal statesman, and emphasises high moral standards in connection with war. Laelius defends the empire on grounds that it was acquired by wars which were morally justified and properly declared, in defence of Rome's safety or that of her allies. The empire was subsequently maintained by just treatment of the allies, whether judged legally on a treaty or morally on good faith (*fides*: *Rep.* 3.34-6). This was Laelius' reply to the argument of Carneades presented by Furius Philus, that it was self-interest rather than justice which was the supreme principle, particularly in the case of expansionist nations: an oblique swipe at Roman claims to just behaviour. It is later argued that

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<sup>4</sup> Brunt 1990, 288-323—note Brunt's cautionary words on interpreting the writings of Cicero and Caesar (288-91); Champion 2004a, 163-85; Steel 2001, cf. the review by C.S. Mackay, *BMCR* 2002.10.08.

Rome's right to rule is established by the moral character of her leaders and the justice of her constitution (*Rep.* 5.1).

Written in the wake of Caesar's assassination, *de Officiis* was finished in November 44. Cicero was consoling himself over the decline of senatorial government, enhancing his reputation for philosophy, educating the younger generation, and venting his spleen against Caesar. While interacting with Panaetius' account of justice, Cicero repeats Laelius' definition of the just war but goes on to distinguish between civilised enemies and cruel enemies. Wars for glory were fought with the former; wars for survival with the latter. In practice the distinction must have been difficult, and Cicero himself displays uncertainty. He argues that defeated enemies should not be destroyed utterly, unless they are cruel; those who appeal to a general's *fides* should be accepted as clients (*Off.* 1.35 ff). The annihilation of Carthage and Numantia was entirely just, though Cicero has some regrets about Corinth (1.35). He admits that Rome fought some wars for glory and profit, though there were just causes for them too (1.38). Force should nonetheless be the last resort, when persuasion and discussion have failed (1.80).

The fundamental claim that Rome always acted in defence of her allies was highly controversial. Cicero defined defensive behaviour broadly and advantageously to Rome: 'we may ward off any disadvantage that may be brought to us' (*Off.* 2.18). As Brunt writes, 'Roman reactions to the possibility of a threat resembled those of a nervous tiger, disturbed when feeding.'<sup>5</sup> An empire based on fear rather than justice, however, cannot last (2.26). Rome's empire was a protectorate (2.27: *patrocinium orbis terrarum*).

According to Cicero, those high principles were eventually abandoned. Sulla, Cinna, Pompey and Caesar all aspired to tyrannical power (*regnum*); when the Romans became objects of fear rather than affection, and when lawlessness was tolerated in the provinces, civil war followed; Caesar's ambition brought about the end of constitutional government. Corruption in the provinces reached its heights following Sulla's proscriptions; Cicero's examples are concerned with loss of property rather than human life (2.27 ff). As with Ti. Gracchus' tribunate in *de Re Publica*, therefore, Cicero selects a political event at Rome—Sulla's proscriptions—as the turning-point. Cicero says little about the relationship between the provinces and the central government, though he emphasises the necessity of preserving good faith towards the allies, instead of looking upon the provinces as

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<sup>5</sup> Brunt 1993, 308.

sources of revenue (*Rep.* 3.41, 4.7; *Leg.* 3.9, 3.17 ff.; *Off.* 2.27). His criticism of Caesar is entirely concerned with politics at Rome, not the dictator's conquest of Gaul. In order to gain power (*principatus*), Caesar overthrew all laws, sacred and profane (*Off.* 1.26). Like Sulla, he was too liberal with the possessions of others (*Off.* 1.43). His injustice extended to the scaling-down of debts without motive or excuse (*ibid.*); no wonder that he later enslaved Rome and triumphed over Massilia (2.28). The capital rather than the empire is the key to understanding Cicero's attitude to the empire.

The idea of decline from an age of meticulous concern for justice in Roman imperialism may be found elsewhere, but justice is really a secondary matter in these other contexts. In general, Cicero was proud of the empire of his day, and associated it with victory and glory (e.g. *Rosc. Amer.* 50; *Arch.* 21 ff, 30; *De Orat.* 1.156; *Phil.* 5.47). He frequently showed little regard for provincials and promoted the military adventures of both Pompey and Caesar in famous speeches. Cicero's attitude to justice also depended on whether he was supporting or opposing the matter or individual at issue.<sup>6</sup>

The behaviour of C. Verres, who was prosecuted for extortion in 70, still has the power to shock, and Cicero certainly responded to Sicilian appeals. His motivation, however, was far from being altruistic or humanitarian. It was important for him to build a client base and to enhance his reputation as an orator and politician at Rome. The *Verrines* emphasise the advantages of empire and the consequent importance of keeping the allies content through sound administration and impartial courts of law (cf. *Div. in Caec.* 7-8, 26, 66-9; 2*Verr.* 3.94, 3.207). In contrast to Verres, Mummius and Marcellus adhered to traditional standards in taking booty (2*Verr.* 4.4, 4.120-2). Aemilianus even restored artworks pillaged from Sicily to their rightful owners after the destruction of Carthage (4.73-4). Verres sold Sicilian tithes at unprecedentedly high amounts, but this brought ruin to the farmers and jeopardised future tax returns (3.48). He even mistreated Roman citizens (5.139-44, 160-4, 166-70).<sup>7</sup>

Cicero was able to condemn the likes of Verres and Piso while defending Flaccus, Fonteius and Scaurus, who were probably guilty too, if less flagrantly so. When Q. Cicero governed Asia from 61 to 58, Cicero sent his

<sup>6</sup> For Cicero's lack of interest in the relationship between the provinces and the central government, see Smethurst 1953, 222. On *de Officiis*: Steel 2001, 192-202. For Cicero's attitude to provincials, see (e.g.) *Flacc.* 9, 11, 17, 19, 31, 57, 60, 65-6; *Post red. sen.* 13-15; *Font.* 15-16, 27, 30 ff, 33, 41; *Scaur.* 20, 41, 44; *Lig.* 11; *Phil.* 5.13-15; *Fam.* 7.24.2; Brunt 1993, 316-17.

<sup>7</sup> On Cicero's mixed motives, see Taylor 1949, 102-3, 112-16; Smethurst 1953, 218. On the *Verrines*, see Steel, 21-47; Vasaly 2002, 87-104; Lintott 2008, 81-100.

brother two long letters of advice (*QFr.* 1.1–2). The second letter implies that things did not work out quite as the two men wanted, and that his brother disregarded his advice on important points. The first letter, however, sets up the governorship in optimistic mood by emphasising qualities which make Quintus an ideal governor: his self-control (1.7); incorruptibility (1.8–9); honesty (15); strict but mild manner (21–22). Cicero advises Quintus to control his lictors (13); watch the provincials on his staff closely (15); place provincial councils in the hands of aristocrats, and be approachable rather than harsh or cruel (25). The letter, significantly, has considerable advice about the *publicani* too. Quintus must not alienate them (32 ff), and the provincials must realise that the empire can only guarantee peace by raising taxes, which are no more onerous than under previous governments (34). In the end, the provincials must knuckle under and it seems that their interests were always subordinate (cf. *Att.* 2.16.4; cf. *Flacc.* 98–100).

Cicero promoted the expansionist adventures of Pompey and Caesar in two well-known speeches, on the Manilian Law (*pro Lege Manilia* or *de Imperio Gnaei Pompei*) of 66 and on the Consular Provinces (*de Provinciis Consularibus*) of 56. The first of these supported a bill to transfer the military command against Mithridates from Lucullus to Pompey. Cicero emphasised the dishonour Rome had suffered at the hands of the pirates and Mithridates, as well as the danger they both represented to important revenues. The heart of the speech, however, is devoted to praise of Pompey, as the ideal general (*imperator*), distinguished by qualities which appear to derive both from Roman tradition and Greek philosophy (*Leg. Man.* 29–42). Pompey will restore the ancestral prestige of the Roman people, who outstrip all others in the pursuit of *gloria* (6, cf. 7–11, 53 ff). He will protect the interests of the treasury and of Roman businessmen in the East (14–19). His upright behaviour has won subjects' hearts (36–42). He will not mistreat the allies because he is immune to the greed and lust shown so often by Roman generals and their troops among subject peoples (64–8). Cicero is here praising himself implicitly, as well as Pompey explicitly, for being a champion of the provincials, even though his speech is carefully crafted to avoid giving offence to groups such as the *publicani*.

In *de Provinciis Consularibus*, delivered in the Senate as the result of triumviral pressure in 56, Cicero argued disingenuously that Caesar's achievements in Gaul had converted him from an opponent to an admirer (*Prov. cons.* 25; cf. *Fam.* 1.9.12–18), and asserted that victory and extension of the empire are the objectives of every provincial governor (29; cf. *Phil.*



13.14). Caesar was performing the highest service to the state by conquering the entire country of Gaul: this was the only way of providing permanently for Italy's security (19-36). Former generals repelled Gallic attacks and avoided aggression; Caesar went on the offensive against those who were already in arms against the Roman people (32). The argument is notable for adumbrating the principle that no war fought by Rome could be anything other than defensive, if it was waged against foreign peoples who were, or might one day be, strong enough to attack her. It seems that Caesar's political opponents, who wanted to relieve him of his Gallic provinces, were arguing not that the war was unjust but that it was over.

Cicero's preoccupation with glory is significant, given that his concentration on oratory and the law made him a very different public figure to the great generals of his own and previous generations. When, however, he was forced to serve as governor of Cilicia from summer 51 to summer 50, and during his term conducted a punitive campaign against bandits who had taken refuge on Mount Amanus, he subsequently magnified his achievements in hope of a triumph, and was awarded a lesser honour (*supplicatio*). He retained the title of *imperator* down to May 49 at least (*Fam.* 2.16, 15.4-6). This was probably a responsible thing to do at a time of significant Parthian threat, but even Cicero, it seems, coveted military glory along traditional lines. He appears to have been a mild governor, but his heart was not really in it, because he did not want to leave Rome at a critical time in the fortunes of the state (*Att.* 5.15.1, 5.21.3, 6.2.6).<sup>8</sup>

### 3. *Caesar on War and Imperialism: The Bellum Gallicum*

Caesar's *Bellum Gallicum* has been called 'the most remarkable document of Roman imperialism'<sup>9</sup>, given that it records, uniquely and at length, a Roman general's version of prolonged aggression by his forces. Of course it dominates any study of Caesar as an imperialist. It was once common to think that Caesar was protecting himself against charges that he had violated a Sullan *lex Cornelia*, which prohibited governors departing their provinces without senatorial permission. Now it seems that this law had little effect, especially against barbarian nations, and that the theme of

<sup>8</sup> On *Pro Lege Manilia*, see Steel, 113-56, 173-81; Vasaly, 106-8; Lintott, 427-30. On *de Provinciis Consularibus*, Steel, 47-52, 156-60, 181-9; Lintott, 205-11. For Cicero as a governor, see Lacey and Wilson 1978, 282-9; Rawson 1978, 145-57; Lintott, 253-67.

<sup>9</sup> Brunt 1990, 309. Cf. Sherwin-White 1957, 36: 'the only contemporary narrative of a major Roman imperialist war, and that by its principal agent.'

self-justification has been over-estimated in Caesar's account. Caesar did not have to insist on the legality of his campaigns (cf. §2), though he is concerned to give the impression that he did not provoke the war for personal glory or greed. As a result, scholars have concentrated on the presentation of the achievements and the expectations of the audience, which included the Roman people, whose interests are constantly linked with those of Caesar. The narrative is certainly favourable to Caesar, though the degree of self-promotion is difficult to assess. The achievements had to equal (at least) those of Pompey, but there were many in Rome and Italy who had served with Caesar and could moderate excess claims. The Roman people were not single-minded about legal propriety; they wanted to learn about the brilliant achievements of Caesar against dangerous peoples in strange and unfamiliar places. The important consideration was victory: Caesar had to win.<sup>10</sup>

This is not to say that the idea of the just war was of negligible interest, for it is handled respectfully and probably governs the omission of some motives. Caesar says nothing about wanting to match or surpass Pompey, or about a desire to enrich himself and his supporters. Yet these are safe assumptions and the plan at first was evidently to satisfy his aims in Illyricum, as the original disposition of his legions shows. Due to a mass migration of the Helvetii, Caesar changed his plans and focused his attention upon Gaul. He justifies his actions most expansively in Book I, where he

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<sup>10</sup> On serial publication of the *BG*, and the Roman people as audience (through recitation beyond elite circles), see Wiseman 1998, 1-9, and succeeding chapters in Welch and Powell 1998 (especially those by the editors). The most comprehensive statement of *Tendenz* in Caesar's writings is Rambaud 1966. For the view that there was little serious opposition at Rome to Caesar's activity in Gaul, see Collins 1972, 923-6, though a certain scepticism is retained by Raditsa 1973, 425-7. On the excitement of learning about the unfamiliar regions, peoples and customs described by Caesar, see Cic. *Prov. cons.* 22, 33; *Q. fr.* 3.6(8).2; Pelling 1981, 741-2. On the *BG* as self-panegyric with 'white' and 'black' propaganda (slanting the truth vs. lying), see Stevens 1952; supported by Levick 1998, esp. 71 ('propaganda ... designed not to convert, but to tell people what they want to hear'), 73, 75 (deceit). Balsdon 1957, 27, writes rather unhelpfully that '[t]he truth no doubt lies somewhere between the view of those who reject nearly every word that Caesar wrote and those who believe that every statement of Caesar is true'; Harris 1989, 211, describes the *BG* as a turning point for being *personal* propaganda. On the limited utility nowadays of the ('Rambaudesque') approach which seeks to uncover 'deception' or 'deceit' on Caesar's part, see Riggsby, *BMCR* 1999.04.16. Riggsby 2006 argues that Caesar presents himself as a subtly new kind of Roman general who deserves credit not only for his own virtues, but for those of his soldiers as well. Other literary studies are perhaps less compelling: Murphy 1977 (*BG* as a literary work governed by successive themes which are designed to enhance vividness or express one of the four cardinal virtues); Conley 1983 (against the view that the principal aim is to glorify Caesar's prowess as commander-in-chief).

foregrounds the interests of Rome and Roman allies, and there are no wild assertions about world conquest or divine mission. Considerable space is devoted to the respective threats posed by the Helvetii and Ariovistus' Suebi. Caesar seems to have relied heavily on notions of defensive warfare which could accommodate the removal of *any* menace to Roman power, even a potential one.<sup>11</sup>

The Helvetii were inspired to migrate by a devious leader named Orgetorix, whose supposed plan was to make himself the ruler of all Gaul (*BG* 1.2 ff). Orgetorix died before the migration commenced, and the Helvetian leaders asked for Caesar's permission to travel through part of the Roman province of Narbonensis. Caesar refused permission, for they were a fierce people, who had destroyed a Roman army commanded by his relative Lucius Cassius in 107 and represented a palpable danger to Rome's interests in the region (*BG* 1.7.4, 10.2, 12–14, 30). Caesar preferred to win a battle rather than an ally and proceeded to stall them. Eventually, they decided to march through territory of the Aedui, Rome's foremost allies among the Gauls. An appeal from the Aedui provided Caesar with a just cause (*iusta causa*: *BG* 1.11, 1.16.6), though it seems clear that the Helvetii went to lengths to skirt the Roman province. When ultimately attacked, they fought desperately but were overcome.<sup>12</sup>

None of this was planned by Caesar, but he was clearly ready to exploit opportunities. Soon another 'crisis' arose, with Caesar turning his attention towards Ariovistus (*BG* 1.30–2), who had earlier brought German forces across the Rhine in response to Aeduan appeals for help against their enemies, then had stayed. The complication for Caesar was that as consul in the previous year he had rebuffed Gallic appeals for help against Ariovistus, recommending instead his enrolment as a friend of the Roman people (*BG* 1.1–4, 35, 36.7, 40.2; 6.12; cf. *Cic. Att.* 1.19.2, 20.5). Now Caesar preferred to evoke the Cimbric menace and to underline Rome's fundamental obligation to help allies in trouble. His phrasing presses a number of buttons: it would be disgraceful for an *empire* as great as that of the *Roman people* to permit the Aedui, *friends and brothers* of the *Roman people*, to be reduced to *servitude* (*BG* 1.33). No mention is made of benefits which might accrue

<sup>11</sup> In the early months of 58 three of Caesar's four legions were at Aquileia, a suitable port of embarkation for an Illyrian war (*BG* 1.3.7, 5.4, 10.3; cf. 5.1.5). For Caesar's constant identification of his interests with those of Rome, see Rambaud 1966, 272; cf. Martin 1965, 65–6; on literary and political elements, Collins 1972, 927–8; for the 'Gallic menace' as a propagandist theme in the *BG*, Gardner 1983; on Roman paranoia about Gauls, Williams 2001.

<sup>12</sup> *BG* 1.26.1–3. For the *virtus* of the Helvetii and the Germans in *BG* 1, see Martin 1965.

to Caesar. Ariovistus becomes a figure of tyrannical arrogance. When Caesar demands that he withdraw from Gaul, the German's response is that both he and Caesar had acquired their territories by right of conquest (*iure belli*: BG 1.34.4, 1.44). This could be seen as an assertion that he meant no harm to Caesar, but the Roman interpreted it as arrogance, failure to comply with a reasonable demand, and a cause for war. His soldiers were fearful of the Germans, but Caesar was resolute and an inspiration to them (BG 1.39–41). Ariovistus was a potential menace to Rome (BG 1.34–6, 40, 42–5), an ally who had failed to live up to his duties as an *amicus* (BG 1.42.2 ff, 43–4). Rome's right to rule the Gauls, established by her victory over the Arverni in 121, effectively superseded any subsequent claims that Ariovistus might make (BG 1.45).<sup>13</sup>

The events of 58, Caesar's first season in Gaul, tend to dominate analyses of his aims and attitudes.<sup>14</sup> Yet the decision to winter among the Sequani signalled his ongoing interest in Gaul (BG 1.54). His subsequent decision in 57 to launch a bold attack on the powerful Belgae went even further in this direction, for the destruction of Belgic power would do much to give him sovereignty over the remaining tribes. The thinking is now much more comprehensive and more obviously reliant on Gallic allies in his rear. The Belgae, by the way, deserved aggression because they had grown suspicious that Caesar was planning their conquest and hence 'conspired' against his presence in Gaul (BG 2.1–6). Dislike or fear becomes threat to the Roman mind. Victory produced the famous claim that all Gaul was now pacified (BG 2.35.1: *pacata*), which seems a statement that everywhere was quietened as a result of his campaigns rather than a claim about absolute conquest.

In 56 the Veneti, by wavering over a demand for hostages, were treated as being in revolt and were crushed. Caesar gave up his Illyrian designs to invade Aquitania, whose tribes had not provoked him but had attacked Roman forces two decades earlier (BG 3.20) and so could be treated as a danger. The cursory justification would resonate with Roman sensibilities and allowed a fresh claim of total pacification (3.28.1).

The campaigns of 55 and 53 across the Rhine to punish German tribes for more or less recent raids into Gaul aimed at demonstrating, on both

<sup>13</sup> For Caesar's presentation of the tyrannical arrogance and cruelty of Ariovistus, see Martin, 64–5. The 'mutiny' at Vesontio need not be read as tendentious, anxious justification, as does Hagendahl 1944.

<sup>14</sup> Stevens 1952, 7, goes a bit too far in asserting that justification after 58 is not attempted, though the difference between the first and later books in this regard is certainly striking.

sides of the river, Rome's determination to protect her 'allies'. Caesar massacred the Usipetes and Tencteri on the plea that they were likely to support disaffected Gauls (4.5–6); his suspicious claim of 430,000 Germans opposing him probably aimed at impressing his Roman audience (4.15), while the human value of the lives lost was hardly of consequence to him or them. That he had acted during a truce—for which Cato demanded that he be handed over to the Germans (Suet. *Iul.* 24.3; Plut. *Cato Min.* 51, *Caes.* 22 [from Tanusius Geminus]; App. *Celt.* 18)—is admitted by Caesar himself without hesitation: for breaking the truce the Germans deserved retaliation. The hefty *supplicationes* voted for him at Rome indicate impressive support.

In 55 and 54, Caesar launched invasions of Britain. His justification was that the Britons had assisted the Gauls in almost every war (*BG* 4.20.1, 4.21.5–8, 4.27.1, 4.30.2, 5.20–2). Yet there had been no previous mention of British presence or assistance. The first invasion is presented in terms of reconnaissance and intelligence. The second invasion, therefore, required no justification. Caesar could have written about the need to protect new allies. He does mention that a load of captives were shipped back from the island (*BG* 5.32.2; cf. Cic. *Att.* 4.16.7; *QFr.* 3.7.4) but it was probably more exciting for his readers to contemplate the adventure of going to this dark, misty, little-known land at the edge of the world.

Caesar's return to Gaul was hastened by the first stirrings of widespread revolt, which developed by stages over the next few years and required his complete attention down to 51. Throughout his account of these events, he stands out unwaveringly as a general who was ever-alert and resourceful, prepared for every eventuality, the very embodiment of the Roman *impe-rium*.<sup>15</sup> The revolts show that the Gauls would not have described Caesar's expansionism as he did.<sup>16</sup> The authority he claimed as 'ally', 'friend', or the protector of their freedom (cf. *BG* 1.45) entailed complete obedience, the furnishing of troops for his campaigns, and interference in their internal affairs (2.14, 5.3.25, 5.5–7, 5.54, 7.32 ff). Even Gauls who sought his friendship or chose to come to terms rather than fight were treated this way (3.11, 4.6, 6.5; cf. 1.37, 2.24, 5.2–4 [Treveri]; 4.8, 16; 6.9 [Ubii]). His expectation that no Gauls who had surrendered should ever take up arms again must equally have been hard to fathom (3.10.2, 4.30.2, 4.38.1, 5.26.1, 6.8.8). It implied that

<sup>15</sup> Collins, 941; cf. Martin, 66 (on Caesar's *diligentia*, *liberalitas*, *aequitas*, *innocentia*).

<sup>16</sup> Sherwin-White 1957, 41–3, is too positive in his assessment of the leniency of Caesar's treatment of the conquered tribes prior to the revolts of 54–51.

a revolt would always constitute a Gallic wrong, regardless of Roman attitudes or behaviour which might have induced it.

Caesar knew fully that he was the arbiter of freedom for the Gauls, but even when he acknowledges that his opponents were fighting for *libertas*, he does not concede that they had a right to determine it for themselves (*BG* 3.8.4, 10.3; 4.34.5; 5.7.8, 27.6, 29.4, 38.2; 7.1.5–8, 4.4, 14.10, 64.3, 76.2, 77.13–16, 89.1; 8.1.3). Conquest had given this right to Rome, along with the right to impose tribute (5.22.4; 7.76.1). When Caesar refrained from imposing new taxes in 51–50 (8.49), he was probably thinking in terms of expediency and realism: it was the best move to assist suppression of the revolts and it acknowledged Gaul's weakened economic base consequent on the horrendous loss of life. At other times his severity was great (e.g. 6.34, 43 [annihilation of the Eburones], 8.44 [right hands cut off at Uxellodunum]). Furthermore, he clearly enriched himself.<sup>17</sup> He was alleged to have enslaved a million in Gaul (Plut. *Caes.* 15; App. *Celt.* 2; cf. *BG* 7.89.5). These were the harsh realities which accompanied Rome's fine-sounding rhetoric.

#### 4. Conclusion

The audiences addressed by Cicero and Caesar were evidently convinced that Roman piety had earned the goodwill of the gods, and that in turn divine favour underpinned the acquisition and protection of the Roman empire. Moral attitudes and behaviour were important for maintaining that favour, as Augustus (for one) makes plain (e.g. *RG* 3 [mercy to defeated citizens and foreigners], 8 [*lustra*], 19–21 [temple restorations], 34 [the *clipeus virtutis*]). Yet audiences often seem to have been little concerned with the concept of the just war or with treatment of provincials that might be deemed just in modern terms. Of course, modern humanitarian or egalitarian attitudes are not relevant to the world of late republican Rome. On the other hand, the Romans did not rely upon the concept of 'might makes right', regardless of the importance they placed upon victory as ultimate proof of the justice and piety of their cause. It was constantly necessary to maintain the impression that Roman imperialism had a moral basis.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>17</sup> For a list of Caesarian atrocities in the *BG*, see Collins, 933–5. For riches from Gaul, see Cic. *Att.* 4.17.9; Suet. *Iul.* 26.2; Collins, 938–9.

<sup>18</sup> On piety and Roman imperialism, see Brunt 1990, 293–7. On the inappropriateness of modern attitudes, see Collins, 936–7; cf. C.F. Konrad, review of Richardson 1988, in *CJ* 84 (1988–89), 61–3 (at 63): 'discussion is for theorists, imperialism for realists.'

Furthermore, it should be emphasised that Cicero and Caesar do in places dwell at length on matters related to the just war. Cicero's *De Officiis* stands out clearly in this connection, as does the first book of Caesar's *Bellum Gallicum*. The modern tendency to argue that Caesar saw no need for justification after the first book seems overstated, though certainly there is much less attention given to justification in the later books. Obviously, then, the moral basis for Roman imperialism was important in certain contexts, especially in respect of ideas about moral and political decline.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> On this theme, see Lintott 1972, 638 ('the tradition which ascribed the political failure of the Republic to moral corruption derived from wealth and foreign conquest, developed from the propaganda of the Gracchan period'); Levick 1982, 53-61; Edwards 1993. For the institutions of a city-state being inadequate to govern an overseas empire so huge, see Meier 1980; Brunt 1988. Cicero (*Off.* 1.62-69, esp. 68) was conscious of the link between excessive pursuit of military glory and the downfall of the Republic.





PART TWO

THE IMPERIALISM OF THE CAESARS



## AUGUSTAN IMPERIALISM

*Richard Alston*

### 1. *Introduction: The Nature of Empire*

Imperialism, notably modelled for future generations in the glory and grandeur of Rome has been at least as important an influence as democracy for the political thought of later ages. Yet imperialism's problems of definition and understanding are considerably greater, partly from the multiple circumstances to which the term 'empire' has been applied, and partly because the political thought of the Greek *polis* lacked a workable definition.<sup>1</sup> The most basic definition of 'empire', as a state which exercises hegemony or dominance over other previously independent states, is so broad that it is almost without analytical value. I propose instead to use 'empire' to denote a state-type political structure which exercises hegemony or domination over smaller states and incorporates those states within its organisation. Operating above the level of conventional states, an empire may have a political structure similar to that of a state, but must be something new.<sup>2</sup>

Imperialism would thus be the ideology that sustains and maintains the empire-state, and its emergence must be contemporaneous with the birth of an empire. The Roman Empire has conventionally been seen as coming into being with either Caesar or Augustus and to thus be identical with the re-emergence of Roman monarchy. This has led to fruitful debate over whether it is possible for a 'free' (meaning republican) nation to control an empire, which suggests the incompatibility of the traditional structures of nation-state governance with Empire.<sup>3</sup> I suggest that Augustus (or possibly Caesar) established a new form of state, an imperial state which grew out of the city-state of Rome but was distinctively different; and it substantially postdated Rome's acquisition of new

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<sup>1</sup> See Maier 2006, especially 1-77.

<sup>2</sup> This definition emphasises the difference between traditional state organisations and empires and is broadly in keeping with modern analyses. For varied views see Hardt and Negri 2001; Turner 1978; Brewer 1990; Ferguson 2003, 2004; cf. n. 22 below.

<sup>3</sup> Start of Roman Empire: e.g. Rice Holmes 1928-31; Everitt 2007. Incompatibility of empire with a nation-state: e.g. Froude 1894; Johnson 2007.

territories and her hegemony over previously independent states. Its newly invented ideology drove perhaps the most rapid and closely planned period of expansion in Roman history. This was the emergence of a new type of polity and with it a new form of politics.<sup>4</sup>

## 2. *Imperial Politics*

The modern view that the Augustan period was a break between two different systems of government and politics is not shared by ancient writers. Augustus himself writes (*RG* 34):

In my sixth and seventh consulships, after I had extinguished civil wars and by the consent of all I was in control of all things, I transferred the republic from my power to the judgement of the Senate and Roman people.

This echoes a gold coin of 28 BC, stating that Octavian *LEGES ET IVRA P. R. RESTITVIT* ('restores the laws and rights of the Roman people') and also the *Fasti Praenestini* under January 13th, that as traditionally restored reads:

[the Senate decreed that] an oak crown be placed [over the door of the Emperor Caesar] Augustus because he restored [the republic] of the Roman people ( [*quod rem publicam*] *p. R. rest[itu]it* ).

But 'rem publicam' is not a necessary reading of this last and 'provincia' (cf. Ovid, *Fasti* 1.589-90) would better fit Dio's narrative of the events of January, 27 BC (see below). If so we have Augustan texts on the events of 28-27 which summarise their significance as a restoration of laws and rights after the triumviral period, a restoration of control over the provinces to the Roman people, and a return of the republic to the judgement of the Senate and people: arguably the main elements of the Roman Republican constitution.

Suetonius also records a supposed statement from Augustus himself on his constitutional position (*Aug.* 28.2):

Let it be for me to establish the Republic [*rem publicam*] firm and secure in its place, and receive the fruit of that action, which I seek so that I may be called the founder of the best constitution, and carry the hope when I die that the foundations which I have laid for the Republic will remain unshaken.

Rather puzzlingly, Suetonius introduces this quotation by claiming that 'he (Augustus) twice considered returning the Republic', showing that *res*

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<sup>4</sup> On Augustus as a monarch (a different issue), see Eck 1998; Kienast 1999; Jones 1970; Linderski 1990.

*publica* meant 'Republic' as a category of constitutional organisation; but the Augustan edict would appear to use *res publica* in a sense equivalent to 'state'. Augustus thus restored much of the legal and constitutional framework that is associated with the Republic, but not the state of government pre-49 BC which we and contemporary Romans associated with the 'Republic'. Instead, he established a new *status*, which we know as the Principate or the Empire.

Contemporaries struggled to define this new polity. Augustus had no title; sources name him Caesar, or Caesar Augustus. Velleius Paterculus under Tiberius writes (2.89) of Augustus' *principatus*, 'period of leadership', a vague formulation that both reflected Augustan dominance (and no source seems to doubt this) and uncertainty as to how to express it. Although Dio, writing two centuries later, sees 28–27 BC as inaugurating a monarchy, he rather implausibly suggests that it was somehow cloaked. As Fergus Millar and others have pointed out, if this was a 'cloaked' monarchy, then Augustus went about that 'cloaking' in a very strange way, erecting or allowing monuments proclaiming his importance across the city. Tacitus, rather closer to events, more subtly sees a gradual emergence of monarchy as Augustus absorbed the functions of the state, and memory of how the Republic really functioned was gradually lost.<sup>5</sup> And yet this very lack of clarity reinforces the confusion in Dio and strongly suggests that the contemporary record did not recognise what is so obvious to later commentators.

In 28 BC Octavian took the consulship with Agrippa and the pair set about regularising the constitution, ending the 'emergency' of the triumviral period, and re-establishing normal government. Great stress was laid on divesting Octavian's rule of all monarchic elements. On January 13th, 27, in what appears to have been the last stage of this regularisation, Octavian returned the provinces he controlled to the Senate and people of Rome. The Senate responded with the title of Augustus and various other honours. One could interpret these events conventionally and locate them within an Aristotelian framework of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, as the restoration of a 'mixed' system. Yet the non-lacunose sources are explicit in linking the title to the return of provinces; although this restoration may have been symbolic of a wider constitutional reform, it is in itself difficult to relate to a restoration of the Republic.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Dio 53.1–21; Tacitus, *Ann.* 1.3–4. See Millar 1984 and 1973; also Zanker 1988.

<sup>6</sup> There is a mountain of literature on this event, but see Linderski 1990; Lacey 1974, 1996; Rich and Williams 1999.

It would seem that the provincial responsibilities that Augustus received in 27 BC were central to a controversial 'deal' in which his control was preserved. This was perhaps the most striking innovation in the Augustan constitution. It survived the readjustments of Augustan powers in 23 and 19 BC, and there is reason to believe that its radical nature was recognised at the time. There was seemingly a view that the state was 'new'. The new title, 'Augustus', is redolent of a foundation, and has implications of augmentation, which would most naturally point to a programme of imperial expansion.<sup>7</sup> Augustan control over the Empire was seemingly the most controversial element in this 'new' state, but expansion was a major justification of Augustus' position.

Although inevitably imprecise poetic and architectural associations of the régime with a programme of world conquest (discussed below) provide evidence of a political atmosphere that spans the first decades of Augustan rule, undated anti-expansionist statements in Suetonius, vaguely dated attestations in Dio (who is often chronologically imprecise), and Tacitus' description of the accession of Tiberius, which obviously seem to contradict Augustan actions, have puzzled historians since antiquity. His documentary advice to Tiberius, urging a defensive frontier policy and emphasising the threats to Rome, is roughly contemporary with the *Res Gestae* and its narrative of Augustan 'world' conquest (*RG* 25–33). Whether its Preface, in the versions from Asia Minor, was inserted in the east or was in the original at Rome is uncertain, but it attests the centrality of imperial conquest to Augustus' reputation:

A copy is set out below of the achievements of the Divine Augustus, by which he brought the world under the empire of the Roman people, and of the expenses which he bore for the state and people of Rome; the original is engraved on two bronze pillars set up at Rome.

The discrepancy causes Tacitus to remark ironically that Augustus must have been motivated by a jealousy for his reputation (*Ann.* 1.11).

Cassius Dio (56.33) presents more detail, summarising the testamentary statement as urging a risk-averse strategy, the danger that the empire may be taken from Rome, and the difficulties in holding what Rome already had. Supposedly Augustus claimed that this had been his consistent policy, and that acquisitions had been forced on him. If accurate, this suggests that Augustus was attempting to address the discrepancy between stated policy and actions in his final report to the Senate. Similarly in 20 BC

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<sup>7</sup> See, among others, Zanker 1988, 79–100.

Augustus reportedly commended a policy of imperial restraint in very much the same terms (Dio 54.9). Although the anomaly of actions and stated policy might arguably reflect a change from earlier Augustan strategies due to the Pannonian and German revolts, Augustus in AD 14 represents his strategy as consistent and this is supported by his reported statement in 20 BC. A transference of the later statement into a narrative of 20 BC would seem unlikely. The most consistent theme in the presentation of strategy would seem to be the instability of the Empire.<sup>8</sup>

The centrality of the provinces to Octavian's position after 29 is obvious. From 27 to 19 he spent little more than two years at Rome, an interlude marked by serious political strife. In 22 he took *imperium proconsulare maius* which allowed him to intervene in all provinces when necessary, and though consul from 28 to 23 he acted very much as a governor, his unique rôle being identified with empire.

The rough and tumble of Augustan politics had the same focus, starting with the still inadequately explained case of Cornelius Gallus, the first prefect of Egypt. A trilingual inscription commemorates his suppression of a revolt in Upper Egypt and his successful campaign beyond Egypt's southern borders. Our two ancient sources accuse him of little more than a penchant for self-publicity and gossip, but it apparently cost him Augustus' friendship and led to prosecutions which drove him to suicide.<sup>9</sup> As an *eques* he was probably a controversial figure, for conventionally such important appointments were allotted to senators. He thus symbolised Octavian's dominance and senators' loss of military authority. Once Augustus' protection was withdrawn his enemies moved in, though the precise accusation is unclear. Yet Gallus retained friends in the Augustan circle, like Augustus' intimate Proculeius. The full complexity of the politics is beyond reconstruction, but most likely the accusations against Gallus came from those hostile to the régime rather than from vengeful friends of Augustus.

The Marcus Primus trial of 23 or 22 seems to have exposed similar divisions. Accused of making war as governor of Macedonia, Primus claimed authorisation by Augustus or his nephew Marcellus. Augustus appeared at the trial to deny it, and Primus was condemned though almost

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<sup>8</sup> Alleged policy change: Dio 55.29–34; 56.18–25; Velleius 2.110–16; 117–22. See Gruen 1990; Brunt 1990, 96–109; Cornell 1993. On Dio's historical method see especially Gowing 1992, and also Millar 1964.

<sup>9</sup> EJ 21 (29 BC). Dio 53.23–24; Suet. *Aug.* 66.2. Dio has the account under 26 BC though this dating might not be precise.

certainly closely connected to the Augustan circle and defended by a member of it, Varro Murena. This led to a conspiracy, probably in 22, which went to the heart of the imperial court. Augustus had intervened because otherwise it would mean that he, not Primus, had acted *ultra vires*, and clearly this was important enough for him to risk important friendships (Primus, Murena, Maecenas). I suggest that control over the provinces was the central political issue.

Other events too suggest considerable political strife. Messala Corvinus, in 26 appointed *praefectus urbi* for Augustus' absence, found this so unpopular that he quickly resigned. Augustus, on returning from Spain in 24, received honours that elevated him above the law and granted privileges to Marcellus and Augustus' stepson Tiberius, yet he was hardly universally popular (Dio 53.20). Recovering from a life-threatening illness in 23, he offered to read his will to the Senate; the testament presumably would have made Marcellus heir to his private estate, but criticism clearly centred on whether Augustus was founding a monarchic dynasty (53.30–32). He resigned the consulship and in 22 left for Sicily and the east, but Rome continued to be riven by riots even though Agrippa was sent back there in 21 (where he married Augustus' daughter). One of the consulships was left open for Augustus (Dio 54.6), as again in 20 and 19 when electoral violence apparently dogged politics. The emergence of a popular politician, Egnatius Rufus, brought further violence (Velleius 2.91–92). These events in Augustus' absence leave us in no doubt that there was conflict between the senatorial aristocracy and an Augustan popular group.<sup>10</sup>

Augustus returned in triumph in 19, with a victory of sorts achieved over Parthia that was plausibly a testament to the success of his military leadership. There is little evidence for further political strife and Augustus governed with a renewed confidence. In 18 he radically revised the Senate (Dio 54.14–15), and resumed a 'moral reform' programme delayed for over a decade.<sup>11</sup> In 17 he celebrated the secular games, which inaugurated a new 'golden age' and was a vast celebration of Augustan ideology. The Senate's inability to control the *plebs* or even its own membership, and Augustus' successful interventions in the city's food supply, displayed his

<sup>10</sup> The Primus case: Dio 54.3; Velleius 2.91, 93; Suet. *Aug.* 63, *Tib.* 8. This is a much discussed and disputed event: see Arkenberg 1993 (both); Levick 1975; Raaflaub and Samons 1990; Stockton 1965; Swan 1967. Messala: Seneca, *Apocol.* 10; Tac. *Ann.* 6.10–11. Riots in 22: Dio 54.1; *RG* 5; Suet. *Aug.* 52. In 21: Dio 54.6.

<sup>11</sup> See Propertius 2.7, probably published ca. 25 BC (Badian 1985).



political muscle and the Senate's weakness. It is very tempting to attribute his success to his control of grain-producing provinces. After 19 too, Augustan militarism continued to be the aggressive centre of the régime's activities. By 16 there were wars of vast conquest being undertaken in Germany and Pannonia that would occupy the best part of Augustus' last three decades and the time, energies, and sometimes lives of his closest family members.

The explicit statements of imperial strategy noted above had a political context. Augustus associated his régime with the difficult and dangerous tasks of governing and expanding the empire. His conquests justified his position, and his caution and care merely showed the quality of his stewardship. We can understand the Principate as the delegation to Augustus of the problem of governing the Empire, a delegation which was undoubtedly controversial and provoked resistance, but which in itself did not result from the foundation of a monarchy. Instead, as I shall argue, the provincial commands provided Augustus with the means to stage a 'reverse take-over' of the Roman state, in which the powers delegated to him allowed or perhaps required his dominance of the delegating authority. It would, of course, be naïve to regard this as an 'unintended consequence': both Pompey and Caesar had used extended provincial commands to accumulate political power. In the 'take-over' the state developed a new political structure which does not easily fall within the analytical framework of the Aristotelian city.

### 3. *Imperial Culture*

An imperial state requires an imperial ideology, and this ideology is abundantly attested in the art, archaeology and literature of the Augustan period. This ideology received neither programmatic nor philosophical expression—there are no Latin equivalents to 19th-Century English theorising about empire. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the ideology fulfilled a central political requirement. The Augustan régime could not escape its originality and instead harnessed the Empire to justify itself.

Its most notable representations in Rome were architectural. The very heart of the city, the Forum Romanum, was completely reshaped in the triumviral and early Augustan period. For example a new Rostrum was constructed which appears to have referenced the victory of Actium. The temple of Divus Julius dominating one end of the Forum, although not in itself a victory monument, was an equivalent through its associations

with Caesar and with Octavian's victory in the civil wars. Two victory arches were constructed on either side of the temple, though debate rages as to quite what they represented. Victory monuments appeared elsewhere. Both the Mausoleum of Augustus, which was to be adorned by the *Res Gestae* on his death, and the Ara Pacis, authorised in 13 BC, could be considered such, and so too the *porticus* of Octavia: constructed soon after Actium, it contained statuary of Alexander as well as what seems to have been a map of empire (see below). Since Augustan iconography from the early 20s associated the young emperor with Alexander (see the Meroë head), this statue is likely to have emphasised Augustan associations with conquest. Aqueducts and theatres demonstrated the benefits that Empire brought to the plebeians, and their concentration on the Campus Martius turned the area into something of a monumental park centred on victory.

Even Augustus' house on the Palatine could be seen as a monument of victory, with its decorations of civic crown and laurel trees in recognition of military achievement, together apparently with Egyptian motifs which probably recalled the Egyptian war. Its location next to the hut of Romulus, its incorporation of the temple of Vesta, and its inclusion in the complex of the temple of Palatine Apollo provided further associations between conquest and the religious origins of Rome. Apollo was credited with giving victory at Actium and was Octavian's patron god, and *Aeneid* 8.720-8 depicts the temple as Augustus' stage from which he viewed the conquered peoples marching past his door and where he displayed the gifts of other nations. The culmination of the secular games a decade later at the gates of the temple of Apollo (Horace, *Carmen Saeculare*; *CIL* 6.32323) takes on a new significance as representing not just Augustan renewal of Rome's religion and the centrality of Augustus in that programme, but also Augustan empire. The Palatine can be understood as a complex rewriting of Roman religious tradition which placed Augustus and military victory at the symbolic heart of the city.<sup>12</sup>

The Forum of Augustus can be understood similarly. There is an impressive continuity of symbolism between the reworking of the Forum and Palatine and the Forum of Augustus over more than thirty years.

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<sup>12</sup> For a survey of Augustan Rome, see Patterson 1992, and for an imaginative reconstruction, Favro 1996; see also Galinsky 1996. The Forum: see Zanker 1988, 79-85. Victory arches: Kleiner 1988; Rich 1998; Wallace-Hadrill 1990. Augustus' house: Carettoni 1983. For a contemporary description see Propertius 2.31; Ovid, *Fasti* 4.951-4 describes the complex as the home of 'three eternal gods' (Apollo, Vesta, and Augustus).

Although not dedicated for almost four decades after the victories over Caesar's assassins—for which the central temple of Mars Ultor was vowed—and probably transformed in symbolic function by that temple's rôle as the depository for the eagles recovered from the Parthians, Augustus' Forum is the largest and most significant monument to Augustan ideology. The longest literary description we have (Ovid, *Fasti* 5.551-98), whatever its ironic subtext, places considerable emphasis on its scale and majesty, and specifically on its representations of conquest: texts and statues that displayed the achievements of Roman generals and the weaponry of the conquered peoples, fragments of which survive in the archaeological and epigraphic record. But all is subordinated to Augustus and to the Parthian standards, which are also given a prominent place in numismatic representations of the temple. Augustus stands as the *telos* of conquest and empire, and a true descendant of Mars.<sup>13</sup>

As Nicolet has pointed out, the map of Agrippa, which was displayed in the Porticus of Octavia, was a direct representation of Empire that should be seen in conjunction with the chronological representation of Empire in the Forum of Augustus and its representation in the *Res Gestae*. To take one further example, the Ara Pacis, a relatively small if elaborate monument, brings together many of the themes of Augustan representation: the fertility of Italy, Rome as an ordered political community, and the Augustan family representing not only an emerging dynasty but also the values of family life that Augustan legislation was seeking to restore. The image of Mars or of an armoured Aeneas establishes a further familial context, but also reminds the audience that this luscious peace is achieved through war. Once more we see the centrality of empire to the Augustan message; and rather than attesting Augustan monarchic domination, the monument seems to suggest that the Augustan family worked alongside Rome's traditional authorities in furthering the empire.<sup>14</sup>

Military imagery appears in many other forms, suggesting that it became pervasive, as for instance on the silver Boscoreale cups and the Gemma Augustea: the emperor is shown among the gods gazing on a triumphal procession and suppliant barbarians. The Prima Porta statue, perhaps his most famous depiction, shows Augustus in armour, bare-foot (perhaps the statue should be dated after his apotheosis in AD 14),

<sup>13</sup> On the Forum of Augustus see Luce 1990; Zanker 1968, and 1988, 194-5. For the statuary: Geiger 2008.

<sup>14</sup> Nicolet 1991, 15-27, 95-122; Castriota 1995; Billows 1993; Bowersock 1990; Elsner 1991; Galinsky 1966; Pollini 1986; Rose 1987; Weinstock 1960.

wearing a cuirass referring both to his receipt of the standards from the Parthians and his subjugation of the world. Augustan coinage associated the emperor with Pax, Victoria, the recovery of the standards, triumphs, the temple of Mars Ultor, and proclaimed the captures of Armenia, Asia, Egypt. Victory and globe imagery were far from confined to the architectural sphere.<sup>15</sup>

Military themes also pervaded Augustan poetry, notably in the programmatic prophecy of Jupiter in *Aeneid* 1.261-96 (cf 6.788-883; 8.675-728), which predicts the achievements of Augustus and promises the Romans *imperium sine fine*, an empire that is eternal and universal. On a darker note the text ends with an image of *impius Furor* bound within the temple of Janus, suggesting that war might, one day, break forth again. Yet, at least at face value, Augustus and the conquest of the east are represented as a *telos*, a reading that makes world conquest the fated end of history.

The elegists also played with military imagery. The *militia amoris* (service of love) substitutes for the conventional military duties of the Roman male, and the pursuit of the girl is suffused with the imagery of military campaigning. Propertius, especially, continually returned to the theme. His poems offer seeming support to the Augustan imperial endeavour yet dissociate the poet from actively participating in it (3.4 and 3.5, and the Cleopatra poems 3.11 and 4.6). The more oppositional 2.7 celebrates the failure of a law that would have hampered Propertius' love-affair while promoting the birth of future soldiers. What matters here is the infusion of the text with imperial imagery and the association of imperial ambition with cultural and moral reform. This association echoes throughout Horace's so called Roman Odes (*Odes* 3.1-6). Masculine *virtus* equates with war and public duty, Augustus is a saviour divinity, and the Empire has limitless power, provided morality is maintained (unlike at Troy and in Crassus' eastern failure) as Augustan reforms set out to do. Livy's Preface presents Rome in spectacular political and moral decline that implicitly threatens the survival of the state.

This context explains innovations such as the *lusus Troiae*, quasi-military competitions held to train Rome's aristocratic youth (Suet. *Aug.* 43.2). Facing opposition to the marriage-laws in AD 9, Augustus

<sup>15</sup> Boscoreale cups: Kuttner 1993. Pax: *RIC* 251, 252, 476. Victoria: e.g. *RIC* 1a (*BMC* 293), 2a (*BMC* 295), 93, 94v. Standards: e.g. *RIC* 82a (*BMC* 414), 86b, 87a, 87b, 132, 510. Triumphs: *RIC* 99 (*BMC* 397), 108. Mars Ultor: *RIC* 506; 507. Armenia: *RIC* 306, 515. Asia: *RIC* 276. Egypt: *RIC* 545. On how 'propagandistic' imagery appeared in the public sphere, see Wallace-Hadrill 1986.

reportedly argued (Dio 56.1–10) that having children was divinely approved, made the city prosperous, gave heirs to the wealthy, and provided the manpower necessary for Roman rule. The laws were thus presented as enforcing a disciplinary régime once enforced by traditional values, an encroachment on individual liberty justified in imperial terms. In Augustan culture, the Empire was everywhere represented as the *telos* of the Roman state, its *raison d'être*. Both the historic inevitability of empire and its fragility were emphasised, the latter a surprising doubt which may have drawn strength from the traumas of civil war and especially from the perceived threat of Cleopatran dominance.<sup>16</sup>

#### 4. *Imperial Pragmatics*

The pervasive representation of empire reflected an imperial mission that justified the 'exceptional nature' of the imperial regime, but those representations would have been less persuasive if was not supported by the 'pragmatics' of imperial domination. Augustan control over the empire brought material benefits which included money, a far-reaching patronage network, and the creation of a vast reservoir of political-military power in the colonies of veterans established in Italy and the provinces. Augustus created a number of new offices for senators and equestrians, including military and gubernatorial posts, and the epigraphic record starts to attest individuals who defined themselves on their tombstones through their offices. The Augustan aristocracy remained a landed élite, but increasingly presented itself as an office-holding one. This can be seen as an element in a broader attempt to discipline the aristocracy and to inculcate a culture of service. Augustus' various and controversial revisions of the Senate and equestrian order appear not so much as partisan politics but as aiming to produce ordered and more homogeneous orders. Many of the prestigious posts, more obviously the military and provincial ones, were within the gift of the emperor and utilised the resources of empire.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> On Cleopatra in Augustan poetry, see Wyke 2007. For a critique of interpretations of Augustan poetry that deploy primarily political criteria see Kennedy 1992; on the relationship between elegy as a genre and the political environment, Miller 2004. On Ovid, see Labate 1984 and Sharrock 1994. On the importance of the Triumviral period, see Gurval 1995 and Osgood 2006.

<sup>17</sup> Suet. *Aug.* 35–37, 38.2; *RG* 8; Dio 52.42, 53.15, 54.14–15, 26, 35; 55.13. The Augustan aristocracy: Nicolet 1984; Eck 1984; Nicolet 1976.

A second major resource was money. Although Roman state finances are clouded in obscurity and the most basic issues rely heavily on speculative reconstruction, Augustus clearly derived large revenues from the Empire. The defeat of Egypt led to a significant transfer of wealth to Rome. Much former state land came under Roman control and was presumably legally owned by the Roman people, but some appears to have been associated with the emperor. Augustus gained generous estates, too, as bequests from people wishing to attest to their political friendship. He also seems to have owned mines and quarries.<sup>18</sup>

These extensive resources were managed by *procuratores Caesaris*, many of them apparently of servile origin and part of the imperial household. This was a perfectly normal way of managing the resources and interests of a major aristocratic household and Augustus appears to have extended it to the imperial resources. But those resources were so vast and so closely connected to the Roman 'state' that there appears to have been some blurring of distinctions between state and household (note Strabo 3.4.20, 17.1.12). In Augustus' detailed posthumous report to the Senate on the state of the Empire 'he added, besides, the names of the freedmen and slaves from whom the details could be demanded' (Suet. *Aug.* 101).

Whereas so much of Classical literature was either careless of or averse to statistics, the *Res Gestae* appears addicted to them. Augustus claims to have spent 600,000,000 sesterces on Italian lands and 260,000,000 on provincial lands to settle troops after Actium (*RG* 16–17), then over the next thirty years 400,000,000 on settling other troops. The annual pay budget for the legionary troops was probably less than 170,000,000 sesterces. Additionally, Augustus' four major disbursements to the treasury, and the setting up of the military treasury in AD 6, amounted in all to 1,580,000,000. The *Res Gestae's* Appendix claims that Augustus spent 2,400,000,000 sesterces on the *plebs* or discharged soldiers. Given that the census level for a senator was set at 1,000,000 and at least some senators had difficulty meeting it, Augustus probably spent from his 'private' resources comfortably more than the total wealth of his fellow senators.

Augustus claims that more than 500,000 soldiers served under him, 300,000 of whom he discharged with land or monetary bonuses. Allowing

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<sup>18</sup> Duncan-Jones 1990; Scheidel 2001; Goldsmith 1984; Hopkins 1995–96; Rathbone 1996; Rathbone in Lo Cascio and Rathbone 2000, 44–54; Bowman and Rathbone 1992. Imperial estates: Parassoglou 1978. Mines and quarries: Lo Cascio in Lo Cascio and Rathbone 2000, 77–85.

for families, these figures suggest that more than a million citizens benefited directly from Augustan military patronage over more than forty years. This would be a significant number if the much-debated citizen population of Augustan Italy, male and female, was as high as 12,500,000; on low estimates of 4,500,000, Augustus settled such a high proportion of the citizen population that credulity is strained. These soldiers were settled in colonies in many provinces and in Italy (*RG* 28). From the first major settlement programme, which sparked the Perusine war in 41 BC, Octavian seems to have been very careful to preserve the interests of his soldiers and his links with them (e.g. *RG* 15.3).<sup>19</sup>

We know very little about the socio-economic background of the men who served in the legions of the late Republic, but the very necessity of reducing the census requirement during the 2nd Century BC (and the decline in the census figures for the period) suggests powerfully that it was perceived that there was a potential pool of impoverished recruits. It does seem that military service provided much-needed income for the poorer in Roman society and employment for surplus labour in the Italian economy, even if the development of more commercial estates and of Rome itself provided other work opportunities. Giving land to those who had been on extended service would seem to indicate that most troops had either limited or no land to return to.<sup>20</sup>

Military service gave the soldiers a political identity. This identity was part of a process of 'structural differentiation' by which the soldiers emerged as a separate 'class' in the late Republic. With Augustus we see a reform of the terms and conditions of service, an extension of service to a regular period of sixteen or twenty years, and clarification of the legal position of soldiers (Suet. *Aug.* 49; Dio 52.27; 54.25; 55.23–26). Furthermore, the Augustan period also saw the recording of soldiers' careers on tombstones, and the appearance of 'veteran' status. Yet the evidence from legal sources suggests that, with certain innovations, Augustus was largely codifying and clarifying a legal differentiation of the soldiery that had been emerging for the last fifty years. Colonies offered a means of integrating these groups into the Italian-Roman political system but also preserved the identity of the soldiers and their political loyalties to

<sup>19</sup> See Alston 1994 for debates about army pay; Saddington 1982 on auxiliary units. For a high population estimate see Lo Cascio 2001, and 1994 (both); on demographics and the Roman army, Alston 2002. Augustan military colonies: Keppie 1983. Soldiers' involvement in politics: Appian, *BC* 3.40–48, 83; 5.59–65, 123–126; Osgood 2006. Their rewards: Brunt 1988.

<sup>20</sup> On these questions see Rich 1983; Gabba 1977; Alston 2002; Keaveney 2007, 9–35, and Rosenstein 2004. On the census, see Brunt 1971, esp. 13–14, and works cited in n. 19.

their general, probably the one connection between them and the political establishment. There was every reason, therefore, for the political élite of Rome to view colonisations as a means of institutionalizing the authority of the general and yet they were in no position to resist a general and his soldiers. The Caesarian and Augustan colonisations not only resulted from civil wars which the senatorial group lost, but depended on individuals who positioned themselves above and against the Senate. They were a form of revolutionary activity in that they redistributed land and power in Italy for the benefit of a new class (the soldiers), and also supported and depended on a new political system. After Actium, Augustus demonstrated that he could restrain the revolutionary potential of the soldiery (Dio 54.25; 56.28). In reverting from '*commilitones*' (comrades) to '*milites*' (soldiers) as a term of address to troops, Augustus did not, as Suetonius supposes (*Aug.* 25), signify a restoration of 'quiet times' (*quies*) but of hierarchy: it was his position that guaranteed peace, a peace dominated by the Emperor: *pax et princeps*.<sup>21</sup>

### 5. *Conclusions: Birth of an Empire*

The historiographical discrepancy between the modern view that the Roman Empire came into being with Augustus (or Caesar) and Republican Rome's acquisition of an extensive territorial domain can be resolved if we view Empire as not just a territorial entity, but as a specific type of state. The change in political culture, and the development of a pervasive imperial ideology in which the function and purpose of the state is to maintain the Empire, can be dated to the Augustan period. Our problems in understanding Augustan politics may have been shared to a significant extent by contemporaries, for the new state system did not sit easily within classical traditions of political analysis. The Augustan restitution of the Republic was real, but that restitution involved the delegation of power over the provinces to Augustus. His predecessors in political hegemony, Caesar and Pompey, had shown that provincial commands allowed

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<sup>21</sup> 'Structural differentiation' of particular groups: see Hopkins 1978, 74-96, arguing that it is a result of the increasing complexity of societies. In contrast, I see the structural differentiation of the soldiery as a response to particular political circumstances. On legal privileges see Campbell 1984; Phang 2001. On the epigraphic record, see Keppie 1983, and 1977 (2000); and Phang 2008 on the culture of the army. Legal differentiation of soldiers: Giuffrè 2007. On Augustan colonisation and Augustan imagery, see Crawford 1995; Torelli 1999.



such a concentration of power that the general could threaten to overwhelm the state. Hobson feared that this loss of domestic independence in the face of imperial resources would take place in British imperialism, and Arendt saw it as an inevitable feature of imperialism. Even though the nation itself often attempts to insulate itself from the *dominatio* of Empire both politically and culturally, she wrote,

the only grandeur of imperialism lies in the nation's loss of domestic independence in the face of imperial resources. The tragedy of this half-hearted opposition was not that many national representatives could be bought by the new imperialist businessmen; worse than corruption was the fact that the incorruptible were convinced that imperialism was the only way to conduct world politics.<sup>22</sup>

Thus modern imperialism set the stage for the reverse take-over of the national state. The ideology and power of Empire, perhaps even what was seen as its necessity or inevitability, came to dominate the politics of a nation. In spite of the many differences, Augustan Rome was in a homologous situation and the Augustan period saw the disposition of the enormous power of Empire, political, military and economic, to overwhelm but not destroy the Republic and bring into being a new state.

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<sup>22</sup> Hobson 1902; Arendt 1966, 133.



## BARBARIAN FRIENDS AND FOES: HEGEMONY BEYOND RHINE AND DANUBE, AD 14–98

*Susan Mattern*

### 1. Overview

In the epitaph published on the bronze doors of his mausoleum and on his temples throughout the empire, Augustus still claimed dominion over Germany as far as the Elbe river:

I pacified the Gallic and Spanish provinces, and Germany; all that the Ocean surrounds from Cadiz to the mouth of the Elbe (*RG* 26).

In the year of his death, AD 14, his grand-nephew by adoption Germanicus waged war across the Rhine with eight of the empire's 25 legions. In three campaigns between 14 and 16 he sacked barbarian villages and slaughtered their inhabitants, recaptured two of the legionary eagle-standards lost with Quintilius Varus, discovered the scene of the defeat at Teutoburg, and buried the bones of Varus' men. He also suffered a catastrophic reverse on land and wrecked a fleet, and Tiberius recalled him in AD 16. Germanicus celebrated a triumph and his victory was also commemorated on monumental arches in Rome and on the Rhine after his death in 19.

By AD 98, Tacitus writes of the Germans as a free people or group of peoples that has successfully resisted Roman domination for hundreds of years (*Germ.* 37). In retrospect, he and other sources attributed to Augustus a decision to abandon Roman ambitions beyond the Rhine, and some modern scholars have similarly described a policy of entrenchment and consolidation in Europe in the course of the 1st Century AD.<sup>1</sup> However, the evidence is complicated. In Tacitus' time, Rome already claimed control over an area in what is now southwestern Germany, in the crux between the upper Rhine (south of the Mainz river) and the upper Danube, a region the historian calls the *Agri Decumates*; this area was later occupied and

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<sup>1</sup> On Augustus' policy of confining the empire behind its boundaries at his death, with references, see Mattern 1999, 90 n. 40 and 111 with n. 136; the passage in Tacitus is *Ann.* 1.11. Modern scholars: for full discussion see Whittaker 2004, 6–8 and his chap. 2.

heavily fortified.<sup>2</sup> In 90, Domitian established two provinces named 'Germany'; we do not know what Domitian meant by giving them that name. Most archaeologists see a relatively fluid and permeable frontier in most of Europe, and it appears that by tradition Roman provinces did not have officially delineated external boundaries (though the boundaries between provinces were known and marked).<sup>3</sup>

Emperors after Augustus continued to wage war across the Rhine, including (in the period discussed here) Gaius and Domitian. These campaigns are poorly attested; of Gaius' campaign we know only that he amassed a huge force (Dio 59.22.1) and proceeded some distance across the Rhine before turning back and staging his notorious invasion of the British Channel (Dio 59.21; Suet. *Gaius* 43–46). Corbulo campaigned against the Chauci under Claudius (Tac. *Ann.* 11.18; Dio 60.31). Domitian waged a war on the Chatti (AD 83), for which he raised a new legion (this was rare in the imperial period), constructed 120 miles of roads into Germany, and used a large force of five Rhine legions plus detachments from nine others. Although ancient sources agree that he achieved little, he proclaimed 'Germania Capta'.<sup>4</sup>

On the Danube frontier, Augustus had claimed conquest of the kingdom of the Daci, even beyond the Danube (*RG* 30), although post-Augustan sources describe the Danube as the boundary of the Roman empire. Tiberius had campaigned across the river in the territory of the Marcomanni—apparently in an effort to conquer the remainder of what the Romans called Germany—but he withdrew when Illyricum revolted in AD 6. Domitian campaigned across the Danube against the Sarmatians, Dacians, Marcomanni, and Quadi. This war is very poorly attested and it is unclear under what circumstances it began. Ancient sources attribute to the Dacians the disastrous defeat of the consular Oppius Sabinus and also of Domitian's legate Cornelius Fuscus—apparently entrusted with the campaign of retaliation—and the destruction of a legion; the Dacians cut off Sabinus' head. Domitian transferred one legion from Germany to Pannonia, abandoning his campaign on the Rhine; one from Dalmatia; and one from Britain, notoriously curtailing Agricola's conquest of Scotland. He made what ancient sources describe as a disgraceful peace with the Dacian king,

<sup>2</sup> Tac. *Germ.* 29; Hind 1984; Sommer 2002.

<sup>3</sup> For extensive discussion see Whittaker 1994 and 2004.

<sup>4</sup> On Domitian's war against the Germans see Strobel 1987.

Decebalus, after a defeat by the Marcomanni and the revolt of the emperor's legate Antonius Saturninus with the army of Upper Germany in 89.<sup>5</sup>

Even after Germanicus' recall, the Rhine remained heavily militarised throughout the period discussed here, with eight legions concentrated on that frontier until Domitian reduced the garrison to seven legions. On the death of Augustus the Danube garrison of the vast, vague territory of Illyricum was five legions, with two in Macedonia; by the end of Domitian's reign there were five legions in Pannonia, two in upper Moesia and two in Lower Moesia (Farnum 2005, 43-5, 60-1).

In the 1st Century both frontiers underwent substantial development, with roads and veteran colonies, as was typical for territories occupied by the Romans. The provinces became more urbanised as military installations and colonies attracted settlements around them; though Tacitus still writes of Gaul as organised tribally in his history of the Civil War of AD 69, and some areas retained an Iron Age economy through the 2nd Century, notably eastern Pannonia.<sup>6</sup>

## 2. *Imperialist Rhetoric and the Northern Frontiers*

Julius Caesar was the first to articulate a developed concept of Germany. The Rhine was his boundary of reference between the relatively more civilised Gauls and the more primitive and warlike Germans, though he recognised complexities and shades of gray in this scheme. For Strabo, Germany is bounded on the west by the Rhine and extends indefinitely to the east along the northern Ocean. The Dacians and Getae (ancient ethnographers either conflated the two or considered the Getae eastern relatives of the Dacians) lived along the northern banks of the Danube from its middle to its mouth in the Black Sea (Strabo 7.1.2, 2.4, 3.1, 3.12). On the 'map of Agrippa', published in both literary and graphic form by M. Vipsanius Agrippa in Augustus' reign, Germany was bounded by the Rhine, the Danube, the Vistula to the east, and the Ocean on the North; east of Germany was Dacia, which stretched from the Danube in the south all the way north to the Ocean. (Agrippa's lost document recording the dimensions

<sup>5</sup> On Domitian's Danube war, Strobel 1989; on the legionary force, cf. Farnum 2005, 8. The main source is Dio 67.6-7. On Sabinus and Fuscus: Suet. *Dom.* 6.1; Dio 67.6.5; Eutr. 7.23.4; Jord. *Get.* 76-77.

<sup>6</sup> For an overview of frontier development, see Burns 2003, 182-91 and his chap. 5. On the subtle question of 'Romanisation' in the European provinces see e.g. Woolf 1998; Oltean 2007. Tacitus on Gauls: *Hist.* 1.51; 3.57, 64, 66-68; 4.56, 67-70, etc.

and boundaries that he prescribed for each region is extensively quoted by Pliny the Elder in his *Natural History*.) The Romans' persistent image of a flat eastern Europe, in which the perceived boundary of the world—the Ocean—was relatively close, helped to fuel ambitions in some emperors to conquer what remained of Europe and extend the empire's boundaries to its theoretical limits in that direction.<sup>7</sup>

Ethnographic descriptions of Germans survive from the period under discussion in the work of Strabo, Pliny the Elder, Seneca the Younger, Pomponius Mela and (at the end of this period or a little beyond) Tacitus. In recent decades scholars have drawn attention to the difficulty of distinguishing fact from literary tradition and a complex cultural construction of the barbarian 'other' that included both positive ('noble savage') and negative aspects. Some ancient traditions certainly reflect observed reality, but it is hard to identify which ones; and a thick interpretative filter is obvious in all sources. Ancient ethnographers emphasise Germany's cold and damp climate (astronomical theory rendered its northern regions near-uninhabitable), wild and treacherous landscape (for example the impassible Hercynian Forest), and the height, pale coloring, ferocity, and primitivism of its inhabitants. Germans lack fundamental Greco-Roman institutions such as agriculture, monogamous marriage, money, or law, and basic technology such as tools and textiles; inured by the exigencies of their climate to cold and hunger, they are vulnerable to heat and thirst; their diet is mainly milk and meat, their habits nomadic; in character, they are irascible and lack discipline. Germans are the northern barbarians best-attested in ancient sources, but descriptions of tribes of the British isles and the Danube region are similar.<sup>8</sup>

Rivers were often personified in the art of the Hellenistic and Roman periods and played a role in the iconography of Roman imperialism, for example in triumphal parades. Tacitus tells us that Germanicus' triumph featured 'representations of mountains, rivers, and battles'; the representations of rivers were probably not maps or pictures but personifications.<sup>9</sup> The poet Statius describes an equestrian statue of the emperor Domitian whose horse trampled a personification of the Rhine river (*Silv.* 1.1.50-1). In

<sup>7</sup> On the ethnography and geography of Dacia see Oltean 2007, 41-53. On the geography of northern Europe, with references, Mattern 1999, 51-2; on the Map of Agrippa, *ibid.* 49-50. On conquest to the Ocean, *ibid.* 60-1, 169-70.

<sup>8</sup> Mattern 1999, 74-8, and Isaac 2006, chap. 12, on the ethnography of Germany. On ethnography and imperialism generally, see Isaac 2006, for a full and sophisticated discussion.

<sup>9</sup> On the triumph: Künzl 1988, Beard 2007; cf. Brodersen 1995, 118-26.

an early scene from the famous column of Trajan, which celebrated his conquest of Dacia, the Danube river is portrayed as a shaggy giant.<sup>10</sup>

Bridges over rivers also had symbolic significance and are a fundamental theme in stories of Roman imperialism. Both Nero Drusus and Germanicus are supposed to have bridged the Rhine.<sup>11</sup> A dramatic moment in Tacitus' story of Germanicus occurs when soldiers stationed at the Rhine hear the rumor of a reverse and almost destroy his bridge. The heroism of his wife Agrippina saves the day, as she stands on the bridge to welcome the returning soldiers (*Ann.* 1.69).

Whether or not they actually functioned as boundaries, rivers *symbolised* boundaries. In the Roman discourse of imperialism they are the barriers across which envoys meet and negotiate and across which Arminius debates with his pro-Roman brother Flavus (*Ann.* 2.9, in this case the Weser). They symbolised the divide between conquered and unconquered territory, and also between primitive and civilised lands. Taking this theme to the extreme, Tacitus describes the Gallic branch of the Rhine where it divides at the island of Batavia as shallower and gentler than its swift and violent German branch (2.6). Bridges symbolise the crossing of boundaries. They signify Roman progress into new territory and especially the Roman conquest of nature and of the wild or primitive landscape—thus of the barbarian, the guise in which the river is normally represented in iconography.

Tacitus and other historians associate the Germans with wild, broken or unstable landscapes such as swamps, mountains, ravines, or trackless virgin forests. Several sources mention the impenetrable Hercynian Forest—dense, gloomy, with enormous trees (Strabo 7.1.5, Plin. *HN* 16.2.2) and weird animals (Caes. *BG* 6.25–28). Caesar wrote that it had never been crossed (*BG* 6.25). In Tacitus, barbarians stage ambushes from the woods and trap legionary armies in the marshes and swamps, while the legionaries seek the level, solid ground most favorable to their disciplined fighting style;<sup>12</sup> and Varus, of course, meets his end in the Teutoburg Forest. In his account of this same event, Cassius Dio describes the barbarians' sudden ambush in the impenetrable gloom; they reveal their true primitivism in the darkness of the forest (56.19–20). Tacitus also offers a baroque and visually evocative description of the sticky, swampy territory where Germanicus' general Caecina becomes trapped (*Ann.* 1.63–64). In one passage,

<sup>10</sup> On the idea of river frontiers generally, see Braund 1996.

<sup>11</sup> Nero Drusus: Flor. 2.30.32. Germanicus: Tac. *Ann.* 1.49.

<sup>12</sup> E.g. *Ann.* 1.63, 68; 2.14, 23, 24.

Caecina dreams that a mud-begrimed Varus rises from the marsh and beckons him (1.65). In another, Tacitus conjures the fear that the legions must have experienced when they heard the woods and low-lying valleys echoing with barbaric chants (*ibid.*). The Roman army cuts down trees, builds roads and causeways through forests and swamps, and constructs forts and canals (1.50, 61, 63; 2.8). Describing the scene of Varus' disaster, Tacitus implicitly contrasts the broad, flat space that was once the Roman camp with the obscure forest beyond, in which the Germans had made barbaric human sacrifices (1.61).

Tacitus' account of Germanicus' campaigns is the story of the recapture and reconstruction of the landmarks left there by his heroic father, from whom the general inherited his ethnographic or geographic victory-title. The story of the land is united with the powerful twin themes of patriarchal family tradition and imperial conquest. Germanicus states that he will follow in the *vestigia* of his father Nero Drusus—that is, in his physical traces on the ground (*Ann.* 1.56). Germanicus proclaimed the Elbe river—the farthest point reached and monumentalised by his father—as his goal and claimed to have attained it (2.14, 22). Both Nero Drusus and Germanicus bridged the Rhine. Both sailed the northern Ocean,<sup>13</sup> and Germanicus pauses to pray to his father before repeating this particular feat (2.8). Germanicus recaptures and rebuilds forts constructed by his father, and sails to the Ocean on a canal also built by Nero Drusus and named after him (1.56; 2.7, 8).

Tacitus links the power and ferocity of the Ocean, the world's theoretical boundary, to the barbarism of both the landscape and the peoples of Germany. The shipwreck of Germanicus' fleet surpassed other disasters to the same extent that the Ocean is more violent than the sea and the climate of Germany is harsher than that of other places (*Ann.* 2.24). He alludes to the theory of climatology that divided the earth's spherical surface into temperate, tropical and frigid zones and debated the habitability of areas at the northern and southern extremes; Tacitus is locating Germany at the northern extreme in a zone of borderline habitability.<sup>14</sup> In this same passage he attributes the strength of the storm to the south wind, blowing out of the barbaric German landscape: its swamps, deep rivers, and thick

<sup>13</sup> *RG* 26; Pliny, *HN* 2.167; Tac. *Germ.* 34, *Ann.* 2.23–24; Romm 1992, 141–8.

<sup>14</sup> On the complex relationship that the Greeks and Romans perceived between environment and national character, see recently Isaac 2006, 56–109. A sophisticated discussion of the history of geography in the Roman period through Augustus may be found in Nicolet 1991, 60–74.



clouds all contribute to the storm's ferocity. He writes that soldiers who were shipwrecked and rescued in the disaster returned telling wild tales of monsters inhabiting the distant shores on which they landed. These themes of ocean, climate, weather and extreme primitivism evoke the edges of the world in the minds of his readers. They signify the furthest and most heroic reaches of imperialism. They suggest the ecumenical ambitions of Augustus' imperial agenda, which is very obvious in the *Res Gestae* and other accounts of his reign.

As the story of Germanicus' shipwreck suggests, there is not only a geography of Roman imperial victory but also a closely related geography of defeat. I have argued elsewhere that the great military defeat and vengeance for a defeat played a key role in the rhetoric of Roman imperialism (Mattern 1999, 183-94). In Germany the Romans remembered two especially infamous disasters, the defeat of Lollius in 16 BC mentioned by Velleius Paterculus (2.97) and Cassius Dio (54.20.4-5) and also briefly by Tacitus (*Ann.* 1.10); and the more famous defeat of Varus in AD 9. In Dacia, two disasters are attested (but much more scantily) under Domitian, where the generals involved were Oppius Sabinus and Cornelius Fuscus (n. 5).

When describing great military defeats or disasters, Romans usually recorded the name of the vanquished commander, and the number of legions and standards lost; they emphasised the damage to the reputation of Rome, embodied in its aristocratic general and legionary army. Disasters also had a location, even though this aspect can be obscured by the difficulty in ancient sources of assigning specific place-names to military events. This topography of disaster emerges in Caesar's negotiations with the Helvetians, in Book 1 of his *Commentaries* on the Gallic War. He refers several times to the defeat of a consul named Cassius fifty years previously, without saying where this occurred (*BG* 1.7, 12-14, 30). But at one point the Helvetians threaten him by warning that the very spot on which they stood might become the site of another infamous Roman disaster, evoking the idea of a fatal location (1.13).

In Germany, no source records the location of Lollius' disaster; but the site of Varus' disaster plays a central role in Tacitus' history. It is Tacitus who gives it a name: the Teutoburg Forest. He describes how Germanicus was attacked by a *cupido* or passion to visit the site, which he calls 'grim places hideous to sight and memory' (1.61). I have also mentioned Tacitus' description of the site of Caecina's potential disaster—like Caesar, Caecina escaped the events that might have turned this location into a landmark like that of Varus' defeat.

Romans sometimes monumentalised the sites of disasters if they were able to do this. Germanicus built an altar to Drusus at the site of Varus' defeat and also a burial mound for the bones of his soldiers (1.62)—according to Tacitus, both were destroyed when the Germans reconquered the site, and the mound was not rebuilt. The largest and most prominent monument to disaster may be the *tropaeum* or victory-monument at Adamclisi in southeastern Rumania, just inside the Roman province of Lower Moesia, constructed under emperor Trajan. It may commemorate the site of a disaster, though this is not the most usual interpretation. The monument takes the shape of a mausoleum and stands near a large altar inscribed with the names of Roman casualties. It is dedicated to Mars the Avenger. Perhaps it commemorates those who died with either Sabinus or Fuscus and marks the place where they fell, like Germanicus' tumulus on the site of Varus' defeat.<sup>15</sup>

Roman ideology in the 1st Century AD obviously continued to glorify expansion, even as it came to recognise limits and boundaries to the empire. Rivers were boundaries; but crossing them was glorious, as was the conquest and subjection of wild, primitive barbarians and (through the army's feats of engineering) their equally wild land. Also, the Romans attached great importance to the concept of revenge for past disasters and humiliations. This idea could drive major campaigns into enemy territory and was probably a significant force behind Trajan's conquest of Dacia.

### 3. *Hegemony and Diplomacy*

At all times, Rome maintained a complex and dynamic network of alliances with powerful and petty kings, tribal chiefs, and strong men across both rivers, as it did everywhere around the empire. Rome's military forays across the rivers came and went, but this diplomatic push-and-pull of empire was always in operation. The rhetoric of imperialism, described above, operated alongside a network of social interactions and 'ritualised friendships'—negotiated relationships between barbarian tribes, kings, and families and Roman governors, officers and emperors. Some individuals mixed these categories (e.g., a barbarian chief might be an officer in the Roman army, as Arminius was).

The labels that Greco-Roman sources applied to tribes and peoples might or might not reflect natives' understanding of their own social

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<sup>15</sup> On the monument see Florescu 1965.

organisation. I will use the Romans' terms without comment, with the caveat that we do not know whether they reflected 'real' cultural or political distinctions. The Romans' categories do of course reflect their own understanding of foreign relations, and are helpful in this sense.

Auxiliary units with ethnic names are well-attested in this period of imperial history; these came from all over the empire (Speidel 1975). It is usually impossible to determine the ethnicity of the soldiers in these units; and it is generally believed that while their ethnic names reflected the tribes from which they were originally recruited, their ethnic makeup did not remain stable over time as their personnel were replenished with recruits from the regions in which they were stationed (e.g. Southern 2007, 120-3). However, soldiers in Batavian and Tungrian cohorts stationed in Britain in the late first and early second centuries AD still have Germanic and Celtic names (Bowman and Thomas 1994, 30-2) and Tacitus everywhere writes as though the auxiliaries' ethnic names reflected their tribal identity. Gallic and German ethnic units play a prominent role in his *Histories* on both sides of the conflict and in all the European campaigns that he describes in the *Annals*.

Most famous of all these ethnic auxiliaries were the Batavians; Tacitus describes them as migrants from across the Rhine settled on the island between the Rhine and the Waal.<sup>16</sup> Besides the contingent that served as imperial bodyguard (dissolved after 68, when they supported Nero) a Batavian cavalry unit under a native commander fought in Germanicus' German campaigns (Tac. *Ann.* 2.8, 11) and eight infantry units were stationed in Britain. According to Tacitus, the Batavians did not pay taxes or tribute; their contribution was military service (*Germ.* 29.1). He writes that Julius Civilis and Claudius Paulus, the leader of the Batavian revolt in 69 and his brother, were Batavian nobility of royal lineage (*Hist.* 4.12-13). One reason Julius Civilis gave for his revolt, as Tacitus writes, was that Vitellius conscripted Batavian troops directly, in violation of longstanding tradition (*Hist.* 4.14). If all this is accurate, the Batavians were almost a militarised, independent tribe within the Roman empire or on its edge.

Tribes beyond the Rhine and Danube also fought alongside the Romans. Tacitus writes that the Mattiaci have the same status (*in eodem obsequio*) as the Batavians, but live beyond the Rhine (*Germ.* 29). The Chauci fought with Germanicus in AD 15 (*Ann.* 1.60). During the Civil War that followed Nero's death, the chiefs of the Iazyges were enlisted on Vespasian's side,

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<sup>16</sup> On the Batavian cohorts see recently Birley 2002, chap. 2; Roymans 2004.

though he refused their offer of cavalry (*Hist.* 3.5). Two loyal kings of the Suebi also joined him, Sido and Italicus (below). Domitian expected military aid from the Marcomanni and Quadi against the Dacians and attacked them because they did not provide it (Dio 67.7.1).

Rome also had close and complex diplomatic relationships with peoples across the Rhine and Danube, for example the Cherusci, notorious because their chief Arminius had led the revolt against Varus. Arminius at the time was commander of a unit of his people, and spoke Latin (*Tac. Ann.* 2.10; Strabo 7.1.4). His brother Flavus served in the Roman army that campaigned against him under Germanicus (*Ann.* 2.9). His father-in-law Segestes had received Roman citizenship from Augustus and supported the Romans during the revolt (*Ann.* 1.55, 57, 58; Strabo 7.1.4). It was Segestes who provided a pretext for Germanicus to campaign against the Cherusci, by inviting their intervention against the rising power of Arminius. In the course of the campaign Germanicus removed Segestes and a number of his relatives (including his daughter, the wife of Arminius) to Roman protection (*Ann.* 1.57–58); Segestes' brother Segimerus, and his nephew, also surrendered to the Romans (1.71). Decades later, in 47, the Cherusci—their ruling class wiped out in civil strife, as Tacitus writes—sought a king from Rome. Flavus' son Italicus, still in residence, was sent; after initial resistance he prevailed and reigned for a long time (11.16–17). A successor Charionerus of the same tribe, also loyal to the Romans, was driven out by the Chatti in Domitian's reign and ultimately took refuge in Rome, but not before a short-lived return to power (Dio 68.5.1).

In Tacitus' *Germania* the Suebi are a group of tribes including the Marcomanni and the Quadi (*Germ.* 38–42); the latter pair are the tribes that figure most prominently in Roman history. In AD 6 Tiberius had made peace with Maroboduus, king of the Marcomanni—who had, according to Strabo, spent his youth at Rome before returning to rule his people (7.1.3)—in order to withdraw his army to fight the Illyrian Revolt. In 19 Maroboduus, still in power, asked for Roman aid against the Cherusci who, incited by Arminius, sided with Maroboduus' enemies in his own tribe, seeking his overthrow (*Ann.* 2.45). Tiberius refused to support him because—as Tacitus writes—Maroboduus had not provided aid against the Cherusci (2.46); Tiberius' son Drusus supported a rival chief of the Gotones, named Catualda, in his bid to overthrow him. Eventually both Maroboduus and, in his turn, Catualda were driven out and granted asylum in Roman territory. Their followers—paradoxically, pro-Roman factions on each side of the conflict between two German tribes—were resettled on the far bank of the

Danube and granted a king from among the Quadi, named Vannius (*Ann.* 2.63). Later, in 50, Vannius was driven from his kingdom by an alliance between the Hermunduri and a faction of his own family (*Ann.* 12.29). He and his followers were granted refuge and land in Pannonia (12.30). One of the usurpers, his nephew Sido, appears alongside another chief named Italicus of the Suebi—which tribe Tacitus here describes as long faithful to the Romans (*Hist.* 3.5)—siding with Vespasian in the civil war; Italicus' name suggests that he was raised at Rome, like the chief of the Cherusci also called Italicus.

The Frisii lived across the Rhine in what is now the coastal Netherlands. Since the campaigns of the elder Drusus in the reign of Augustus, the Frisii had paid tribute to Rome in the form of ox-hides (*Ann.* 4.72). Tacitus mentions 'centurions (*primipilares*) placed over them' and soldiers 'who were present to collect the tribute' (*ibid.*); archaeology suggests Roman influence but no military presence, the nearest Roman military installation being the naval base at Velsen on the Rhine (Galestin 2002). In AD 28 they revolted; after they defeated the governor of Lower Germany, Tiberius (to Tacitus' scorn) did not pursue the matter (4.72–74). Nineteen years later, on campaign against the neighboring Chauci, Corbulo accepted hostages from the Frisii, resettled them and 'imposed magistrates, a senate and laws' (11.19); according to Tacitus he also built a fort, but Claudius ordered him to withdraw his soldiers back across the Rhine. In 58 the Frisii migrated to the far bank of the Rhine onto lands 'vacant and reserved for the use of the [Roman] army'; the Roman governor forced them to petition Nero for the land. The emperor refused their request but granted Roman citizenship to the two Frisian chiefs (13.54). The Frisii later supported the Batavians in the revolt of Civilis (*Hist.* 4.15).

Finally, the kingdom of Thrace on the lower Danube was not made a Roman province until AD 46. Augustus had partitioned the kingdom of Rhoemetalcēs between the two sons of the latter, Rhescuporis and Cotys. But in 19 Rhescuporis attacked Cotys' lands, imprisoned and executed his brother, and conscripted a large army, ostensibly for an invasion of the Bastarnae and Scythians (*Ann.* 2.65). Tiberius appointed Pomponius Flaccus, a longstanding friend of Rhescuporis, as governor of Moesia; Flaccus negotiated Rhescuporis' surrender, and he was tried at Rome and exiled. The kingdom was divided between his son Rhoemetalcēs and the immature sons of Cotys; for the latter Tiberius appointed as guardian a senator of praetorian status (*Ann.* 2.66–67). A coalition of anti-Roman tribes rebelled in 21, but they were defeated with the aid of the governor of Moesia

(3.39). Another revolt was crushed in 26 by Poppaeus Sabinus. In this case the Thracians were rebelling against Roman conscription: the tribes in question apparently were required to send recruits to the Roman auxiliary army, but also served the Thracian kings under their own commanders (*Ann.* 4.46). Sabinus defeated them with the help of one legion under the command of the governor of Moesia and the army of the loyal King Rhoemetalces (4.47–51).

In these examples the Romans were players in a complex tribal political landscape—factions within tribes allied with the Romans or used their enemies' Roman ties against them; one faction would invite Roman intervention against another; neighboring tribes, or factions within them, would support the pro- or anti-Roman sectors of other tribes. 'Free' German tribes allied with Roman emperors in civil war or in their foreign wars against other tribes; some supported the ethnic revolt of Gaul under Civilis; while many Gallic ethnic units fought with the Roman legions against them. The Batavians were a semi-independent tribe on the Rhine frontier paying no tribute; for a time the Romans collected tribute from the Frisii across the frontier; and well south of the Danube, Thrace remained an allied kingdom with its own army until 46. The Romans transported some peoples across the great rivers, granting them territory and making them tributary at their request;<sup>17</sup> they also adjudicated resettlements beyond the frontiers. Noble scions of barbarian tribes lived at Rome as hostages, refugees, or simply guests, from which they might return to their people as pro-Roman rulers at the request of the tribe or a faction within it.<sup>18</sup> The Romans traded benefits with their allies and supported some factions against others, and their allies did the same—using their Roman connections to further their own interests. This dynamic, constantly negotiated push and pull of power on the fringes of the empire is how imperialism worked day to day—beyond the simplistic rhetoric of conquest, glory, revenge and punishment lay a dense network of shifting alliances.

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<sup>17</sup> Other examples of the relocation of tribes from outside to inside the empire, besides those mentioned above: under Augustus, Aelius Catus relocated 50,000 'Getae' from across the Danube to Thrace (Strabo 7.3.10), and Agrippa relocated the Ubii in the area around what later became Cologne (*Tac. Ann.* 12.27, *Germ.* 28); under Nero, Ti. Plautius Silvanus relocated more than 100,000 'Transdanuviani' to the Roman side of the river and made them tributary (*ILS* 986; Conole and Milns 1983).

<sup>18</sup> For full discussion see Allen 2006.

## PEARLS, GOLD, SLAVES? THE SLOW ANNEXATION OF BRITAIN

*Steven Rutledge*

My present fortune is as sordid for me as it is magnificent for you. I had horses, men, weapons, wealth. What wonder, if I lost these unwillingly? For if you wish to rule all, does it follow that all welcome slavery?

Caratacus, Tac. *Ann.* 12.37

To steal, to butcher, to pillage they call by the false name "empire", and where they make a desert they call it peace.

Calgacus, Tac. *Agr.* 30

By the time Caratacus delivered his frank speech before Claudius and the Roman senate, the Romans had been involved in the conquest of Britain, on and off, for a century; another forty years intervened between Caratacus' defiant speech before Rome's senate and Calgacus' defeat at Mons Graupius. Over time the conquest of Britain, and Roman involvement in that province, has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention. Indeed, so prolific is the scholarship on Roman Britain (itself attributable to a nexus of socio-political factors in Britain itself, as well as the very visible mark the Romans left on the island) that it is fair to say that it constitutes a virtual industry. Standard surveys of Roman Britain include Salway's (1981), Todd's (1981 and 2004), Frere's (1987), Potter and Johns' (1992) and, most recently, Bedoyère's (2006). The present discussion will attempt to synthesize and distill some of the major questions and controversies surrounding the conquest of the province through a chronological narrative of Roman involvement in Britain, from Julius Caesar's initial foray onto the island through the tenure of Agricola, at which point major attempts at the conquest of the island were, for the most part, abandoned, with a policy of consolidation and containment on its northern boundary taking precedence.

### 1. *From Julius Caesar to Caligula*

Caesar's description of Britain's disposition and geography is the earliest we have from a Roman author (*BGall.* 5.12-13), and is one that influenced

subsequent descriptions such as those found in Diodorus Siculus (5.21.3-6) and Strabo (1.4.1-3; cf. 4.5.2, 5).<sup>1</sup> Both his description and his failed attempt at the island's conquest take up Book 5 of his *de Bello Gallico*. His first attempt to bring the island within the Roman sphere came in 55 BC, although the mission may have been intended simply for reconnaissance with a view to subsequent conquest (Webster 1980, 36-7). To what degree the invasion of the following year, 54 BC, could have been a success we shall never know. While Caesar initially made inroads against the Britons, who were led by Cassivellaunus, serious trouble in Gaul forced Caesar back to the continent.

In hindsight, we might view Caesar's decision to invade Britain as rash, given his apparent miscalculation concerning the stability of his newly conquered province. However there were several motives, doubtless compelling ones in Caesar's mind, that will have driven him to divert his attention for the moment away from Gaul towards Britain, and while there is no need to choose one excluding the others, some motives certainly carried greater weight. His expedition was doubtless intended to win him prestige for political gain. No one would challenge his clout after the conquest of Gaul, the Rhineland, and his invasion of the hitherto largely unknown island. Indeed, that he was making a foray into unknown territory was an angle played up by Caesar himself, although the outcome of the expedition has led some scholars to view it less favorably as a clear case of overreach.<sup>2</sup> While that might have been the case, a significant reason for Caesar's failure was not lack of preparation but his misjudgment of the situation in Gaul. As Webster has noted (1980, 84), the attempted conquest of Britain was undertaken by Caesar with the intent of ultimate victory, as the large forces he had already employed in 54 (five legions and 2,000 horse) indicate. Moreover Caesar's 'failure' is somewhat moot since, in terms of enhancing his reputation, his invasion had virtually the same effect as a successful conquest, generating considerable excitement in Rome.<sup>3</sup> Detractors, however, imputed motives of greed to Caesar's invasion (specifically the hope of cornering Britain's pearl market: Suet. *Iul.* 47; 50).

Such criticism was not without merit. Trade and the exploitation of natural resources (noted in his initial description of the island) were certainly on Caesar's mind (Mitchell 1983, 80-99). He remarked that the island

<sup>1</sup> For Britain in the Roman literary imagination see Stewart 1995, 1-10.

<sup>2</sup> See Todd 2004, 42-3 for the exploratory angle and overreach; cf. Braund 1996, 12-23, 52-3.

<sup>3</sup> See Braund 1996, 42-4; cf. 48-54 for Caesar's portrayal of his venture into Britain.



was productive of tin, iron, and timber, but had to import bronze (*BGall.* 5.12; cf. Tac. *Agr.* 12), although if he was attracted by rumors of fabulous wealth he was soon disabused of such notions. Caesar's knowledge, correct or incorrect, concerning Britain's resources will have come from commercial contacts between Gaul and the island, and he will have gained his intelligence through the trade network between Gaul and Britain. He will doubtless have been aided by Italian businessmen in Gaul who had earlier contact with tribes such as the Veneti on the Atlantic coast, who carried on extensive trade with Britain (Caes. *BGall.* 3.8–9; cf. Strabo 4.4.1). It is important to note that despite Caesar's apparent lack of success in reducing Britain to a Roman province, his conquest of Gaul will still have had a major impact on Britain and helped pave the way towards the island's Romanization. Trade that had previously taken place between the Britons and the inhabitants of Gaul was forever disrupted, and trade would now take place between Gaul *qua* Roman province and Britain, no doubt with many Italian businessmen, at least in the early years, representing the trading class on the mainland (Cunliffe 2004, 1–10).

The attention of Caesar's successor, Augustus, was less focused on Britain, although he did establish a series of alliances with various kings who sent embassies to him in the course of his reign (Strabo 4.5.1–3). Strabo asserts that Augustus was disinterested in Britain's conquest because there was nothing to fear from the island (2.5.8), and that its scant resources made conquest not worth the effort, adding further that more was to be gained from customs dues from its exports than from tribute. Economic and military considerations likely played a significant rôle in Augustus' indifference concerning the island's conquest. Coin evidence, however, attests subsidies to the rulers of Britain under Augustus, and it is worth noting that the numismatic record constitutes an important source for the history of the island at this period.<sup>4</sup> In terms of the political situation in the Augustan period, to the north of the Thames lay the kingdom of the Catuvellauni, with their capital Camulodunum (Colchester) ruled by the legendary Cunobelinus, whose power lasted into the reign of Caligula. To the south was the Belgic kingdom of the Atrebates, ruled by Tincommius (ca. 25 BC–AD 7) after the death of his father Commius (who had fled Caesar), but who himself was forced to flee to Rome in AD 7 (Aug. *RG* 32). Eppillus (AD 7–15), who had overthrown Tincommius, ruled briefly before the advent of Verica (AD 15–ca. 42) whose reign lasted until Claudius'

<sup>4</sup> See Todd 2004, 43–4; Barrett 1989, 285 n. 8; cf. Webster 1980, 47–9 who also notes the importance of pottery and fortifications for assessing this period.

succession. Little attention was paid to the island under Tiberius, who was famously (some might say notoriously) *proferendi imperii incuriosus* ('uninterested in expanding the empire': Tac. *Ann.* 4.32).

Caligula was more avid for conquest as emperor than Tiberius (who had established his military credentials prior to his accession), and his designs on Rome's northern frontiers are attributable to his need to win military laurels for himself. In addition, his father, grandfather and uncle had all won honors either by fighting or expanding Rome's northern frontiers. Caligula needed to win the same sort of prestige if he was to have legitimacy as Rome's *imperator*. Despite the absurdist depiction of Caligula's campaigns in the north by our sources, scholars, such as Todd and Barrett, take Caligula's intention to invade Britain quite seriously. Barrett has argued that Caligula was planning in earnest to campaign against Germania in 39 and that a part of his overall plan included Britain as well, noting in particular the serious nature of the preparations (Barrett 1989, 102-3; cf. Braund 1996, 91-6). Both Suetonius and Dio note the vast resources gathered for the enterprise, which Claudius ultimately was able to use in the invasion of AD 43 (Barrett 1989, 125-6). Problems remain, however, as Barrett notes, making our understanding of the proposed timing of the invasion uncertain. While preparations may have been in their inception under Caligula, no invasion was imminent when in 40 he marched his men to the Channel and humiliated them by ordering them to collect sea-shells.<sup>5</sup> Ongoing operations on the more vital German frontier would, in fact, have made the conquest of Britain a near impossible burden, a scenario emphasised later in Domitian's reign when Britain would prove a drag on military operations in the north. Nonetheless, that Caligula was in the planning stages of an invasion by 40, while not a certitude, is plausible enough as indicated not only by his reconfiguring of the legions, but also possibly by other logistical preparations such as the construction of an enormous lighthouse at Gesoriacum (modern Boulogne: Suet. *Calig.* 46).<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Contra scholars such as Balsdon 1934, 92 who viewed the order as punishment for refusal to participate in the island's invasion; cf. Barrett 1989, 135; Phillips 1970, 369-74. Also see Braund's discussion (1996, 12-23); the possibility remains that Caligula's campaign was genuine. Caligula granted the soldiery 100 denarii each, an action, as Barrett points out, that would not have been in keeping with the attempt of men to mutiny, making a so-called refusal to cross an even less likely possibility.

<sup>6</sup> See Barrett 1989, 136. Contra see e.g., Bicknell 1968, 496-505, who has suggested that these operations were intended against others such as the Canninefates, or Davies 1966, 124-8, who suggests that these were simply manoeuvres along the Channel.

At some point during Caligula's reign events were set in motion that were inextricably linked to subsequent Roman involvement on the island. The relatively pro-Roman Cunobelinus had been succeeded (we do not know precisely when) by his two sons, Togodumnus and Caratacus, who started to encroach on the Atrebatian kingdom to the south (Webster 1980, 74-5), forcing its king, Verica, to later seek refuge with Claudius, something that may have supplied the emperor with a pretext for the invasion of the island. The Atrebates were pro-Roman, while Cunobelinus' sons, Caratacus and Togodumnus, were anti-Roman and by Claudius' reign purportedly threatened the Atrebates. Caligula reportedly gave refuge to Adminius (who is called Amminius in the numismatic record), another son of Cunobelinus who was possibly fleeing from his anti-Roman siblings (Suet. *Calig.* 44). As Barrett (1989, 137) notes, Adminius' defection will have helped Caligula to save face in light of disappointed expectations for his northern campaigns and to portray the event as a victory. Caligula presented the event, according to Suetonius, as though the whole island had surrendered—*quasi universa tradita insula*. While the political and logistical groundwork for Britain's conquest was established under Caligula that was a task ultimately left to his successor Claudius.

## 2. *The Claudian Annexation and Its Aftermath*

There was a variety of factors that will have motivated Claudius' expedition against Britain in 43. Among these was the need for prestige, given the difficult nature of his succession and the rebellion he had faced in Pannonia in 42 (Levick 1990, 139; Webster 1980, 84). While the revolt might have given him pause about leaving his capital, it potentially made his need to secure military credentials all the more pressing.<sup>7</sup> In Britain itself the death of Cunobelinus resulted in the fraying of an alliance that had been longstanding with Rome; as Todd notes, part of the reason for Claudius' invasion will have been the loss of Roman prestige and alliance on the island, something Claudius' campaign appears to have successfully restored in the end.<sup>8</sup> In addition to military glory, Webster notes the economic motives: trade with Roman merchants was already vigorous, and Spanish silver

<sup>7</sup> He was absent for only six months and had spent sixteen days in Britain (Dio 60.23). See Levick 1990, 142 (cf. 31), for the risk Claudius ran leaving Rome; as Levick notes, he took with him some of the more powerful (and problematic) consulars; cf. Todd 2004, 45. Vitellius, his trusted courtier, was left in charge of the city.

<sup>8</sup> Todd 2004, 44; cf. Webster 1980, 84; Levick 1990, 144.

mines were becoming more expensive to operate as they were increasingly depleted, had to be dug deeper, and hence had more expenditure devoted to them (Roman mints relied heavily on Spain for its silver). The pre-existing trade with Roman merchants may have been facing some difficulties too, as Levick notes: since Adminius and Verica were still under Roman protection, Britons may have been taking their resentment out on Roman commerce.<sup>9</sup>

Of significant interest to scholars has been the question of the intended extent of the conquest. As Levick (1990, 140-1) notes, this likely had not yet been worked out in 43, since the full extent of the island remained unknown. Todd (2004, 48) notes that upon Claudius' departure from the island he merely instructed Plautius 'to conquer "the rest"', leaving the extent of the intended conquest vague. Levick (1990, 140) argues that the initial objective 'was probably the subjection of the fertile lowlands south of Severn and Trent', possibly to be followed by a comprehensive conquest. One of Claudius' first acts was to place a compliant client king in charge of the Atrebates, Ti. Claudius Cogidubnus. Claudius also drew on four experienced legions, which, with auxiliaries (and Batavian and Frisian cavalry), numbered perhaps 40,000 men. His commanders included A. Plautius, leader of the enterprise, with Cn. Hosidius Geta, T. Flavius Sabinus, and Sabinus' brother Vespasian, the future emperor, as legionary commanders (Black 2000, 1-10). Preparations were extensive, and even then Claudius' men were reportedly reluctant participants, and had to be goaded to humiliation by being addressed by Claudius' freedman, Narcissus, whom they shouted down with derision before embarking (Dio 60.19).

The actual landing point of the invasion remains a matter of dispute. Richborough is the current most likely candidate, with other landings in east Kent, although one view that has not been widely accepted argues that the landing will have taken place in west Sussex.<sup>10</sup> While the literary sources indicate that Plautius' initial campaign was not without its problems (see, e.g., Dio 60.20-21), the defensive nature of his campaign may in fact have merely been intended to enhance Claudius' own prestige. As Levick (1990, 142) has noted, Plautius had likely been instructed to wait for Claudius' carefully orchestrated arrival. Soon after Claudius defeated the enemy

<sup>9</sup> Levick 1990, 140; cf. 226 n. 8 where she suggests that 'perhaps Roman merchants were being attacked or held hostage in an effort to secure the surrender of Adminius and Verica.'

<sup>10</sup> See Todd 2004, 46-7, for a good discussion of this question, contra Hind 1989, 1-21, who has proposed Sussex; see Webster 1980, 95-100, for a discussion of the archaeological evidence.

and captured Cunobelinus' capital, Camulodunum; before leaving, he ordered Plautius to continue with the subjugation of the island and returned to Rome. At some point he had received into alliance Queen Cartimandua of the Brigantes, giving him an ally in the broad swathe of territory from Yorkshire northwards to the area that was eventually defended by Hadrian's wall. Cartimandua received subsidies in the hope that she would protect the Romans on their northern side as they proceeded with their conquest of the south and west. This, and similar alliances such as that between Claudius and Cogidubnus, will have been an important instrument of policy in helping to bring over the island into the Roman sphere, although the place of Cogidubnus within the Roman alliance is problematic.<sup>11</sup>

Plautius returned to Rome for an *ovatio* in 47, having conquered much of the south-east, after putting in place a line of fortifications that stretched from Gloucester to Lincoln and due north to the coast at Winteringham, on the Humber. He was succeeded in command by Ostorius Scapula, whose tenure as related by Tacitus is given in schematic terms at best.<sup>12</sup> He waged a successful campaign against the rebellious Iceni who occupied the regions of modern Norfolk, Suffolk, and Cambridgeshire (Tac. *Ann.* 12.31), proceeded against the Ceangi and devastated their territory in the west, crushed a minor rebellion by the Brigantes (12.32), then finally turned against the implacable Silures (probably after 49), a tribe that occupied south-eastern Wales. The Romans came into conflict with other tribes in the neighboring regions, including the Ordovices, who likely occupied most of mid-Wales, and with some minor tribes, including the Deceangli and the Demetae, in the west (Manning 2004, 60-2; cf. 63-7 for the process of fortification throughout the region). He suppressed the recalcitrant Silures with the establishment of a legionary camp in their territory (*Ann.* 12.32) and a colony of veterans at Camulodunum. The Silures were led by none other than Caratacus (12.33), who had taken refuge among them and

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<sup>11</sup> See Todd 2004, 47-8, for discussion; for Cogidubnus (whose name is alternatively given as Cogidumnus and Togidubnus in various manuscripts) see Tac. *Agr.* 14; and Ogilvie and Richmond 1967, 189-90, citing *RIB* 91 (the inscription of Cogidubnus at Chichester); for his place in the literary record see Braund 1996, 108-12, challenging Barrett's (1979) argument that he assisted in the rebellion against Boudica.

<sup>12</sup> For Tacitus' schematic and vague presentation of Ostorius' campaigns see Manning 2004, 60; Todd 2004, 49-50. For Ostorius' career see Birley 1981, 41; cf. 2005, 25-31. See Webster 1980, 114-23, for Plautius' deployment of defence works.

whose prestige loomed large among the Britons according to Tacitus.<sup>13</sup> Caratacus moved the seat of conflict to central and northern Wales, in the territory of the Ordovices, desiring to hazard one last throw of the dice against the Romans (12.33). Ostorius defeated him, and Cartimandua (to whom he had fled) handed him over into Roman custody (*Ann.* 12.36). For all its success, Tacitus indicates that the campaign was a difficult one that continued against the Silures into 52, and eventually claimed the life of Ostorius, who died of worried exhaustion in that year (12.38–39). Ostorius' tenure also saw the start of Britain's exploitation for its mineral resources. By 49 Roman troops were sufficiently entrenched in southern Britain to oversee the mining of silver and lead, while by the late 50s (though possibly earlier) north-east Wales was being exploited likewise.<sup>14</sup>

In 53 Aulus Didius took charge of the province and, Tacitus' lukewarm treatment notwithstanding, proved a competent overseer.<sup>15</sup> He started his tenure by immediately confronting Venutius, a Brigantian once married to Cartimandua. Civil conflict erupted, however, between Venutius and his former wife (*Ann.* 12.40). Tacitus says an invasion by Venutius against Cartimandua's territory provided Didius with the pretext he needed to confront Venutius successfully. He was able to maintain order in the regions in which Ostorius had conquered or campaigned and was allowed to stay at his post until 57, well into the reign of Nero.

The permanency of Roman occupation may not have been set in stone when Nero succeeded Claudius. Suetonius asserts that Nero contemplated evacuating the province (*Nero* 18.1), although the charge needs to be understood in the context of a literary tradition hostile to Nero and, possibly, in light of a serious rebellion that occurred in the province. Quintus Veranius, who succeeded Didius, died within a year of his appointment in 57 and Suetonius Paulinus replaced him as governor (*Ann.* 14.29). Suetonius appears to have continued campaigns against the Ordovices, but the major event of his tenure was a dangerous revolt between 60 and 61. Its cause, according to Tacitus, was the pillaging of the former kingdom of the Iceni by centurions (*Ann.* 14.31), though the deleterious effects of loans by Roman money lenders appears to have been a significant factor as well (*Dio* 62.2; *Ann.* 13.42). In addition, the widowed queen (and the leader of the ensuing revolt), Boudica, was beaten and her daughters raped, while the

<sup>13</sup> For a detailed treatment of Caratacus see Webster 1982; for Caratacus in the literary tradition see Braund 1996, 112–16; for Cartimandua, 124–32.

<sup>14</sup> Todd 2004, 51 (cf. 55), citing *RIB* 2.2404.1; 2404.2.

<sup>15</sup> See *Agr.* 14, *Ann.* 12.40, 14.29; for his career see Birley 1981, 44; 2005, 31–7.

foremost men of the Iceni were deprived of their estates.<sup>16</sup> Indeed, the Iceni's plight was sufficiently alarming, according to Tacitus, to elicit the support of the Trinovantes (of modern Suffolk and Essex), and others. Particularly infuriating was the placement of a veteran colony in their midst at Camulodunum, and attendant mistreatment of the locals (*Ann.* 14.31). In addition, the sharp wave of resentment engulfing the province was exacerbated by the looming presence of the temple of Divus Claudius (*ibid.*). Moreover Suetonius had attacked one of Britain's most sacred sites on the island of Mona (modern Anglesey: *Ann.* 14.29–30). While Suetonius was occupied on Mona the rest of the province burst into insurrection. Roman suppression of the revolt, as was always the case in such instances, was brutal and harsh, and ended with the defeat and suicide of Boudica.

Our literary sources for the province after the revolt remain relatively sparse until the 70s; we do know that the Silures and the Ordovices had to be reconquered. It appears that there was a partial withdrawal from Wales but its extent remains uncertain. In 66 *Legio XIV* was withdrawn in preparation for Nero's campaign against Parthia resulting in a redeployment of *Legio XX* to Wroxeter and *II Augusta* to Gloucester (Manning 2004, 69–70). On top of the Parthian campaign, the revolt in Judaea will doubtless have been a further reason for trimming sail on any plans of further conquest in Britain under Nero.

### 3. *The Flavians, Agricola, and the End of Roman Conquest*

The Flavians, who succeeded Nero, have been given excess credit in our sources for the conquest of the island. This is due in part to Vespasian's associations with Trajan, Nerva's designated successor by the time the *Agricola* was written, and also to a tradition that sought to flatter both the Flavians and Trajan (Braund 1996, 147–51). Soon after Vespasian's accession Q. Petilius Cerealis, a Flavian adherent and possibly a relation by marriage, took command from AD 71 to 74 (*Tac. Agr.* 8; cf. *Ann.* 14.32; *Hist.* 3.59). Petilius started a campaign against the Brigantes, while his successor, Julius Frontinus, undertook the reconquest of Wales in earnest, beginning in 74. Tacitus tells us he subdued the Silures and there is an implication in his

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<sup>16</sup> Tacitus reports that her husband, the late king of the Iceni, Prasutagus, had willed his kingdom to Rome with a view to preventing such abuse. See Braund 1996, 132–46; for a good current biography of Boudica see Aldhouse-Green 2005, esp. 172–209 for the rebellion.

text that he brought the Ordovices back to heel as well (*Agr.* 17).<sup>17</sup> Vespasian's motives in continuing operations in Britain will have included a desire to consolidate Roman sovereignty in the province, which was tenuous particularly in the western section, and to complete the province's conquest as a whole. An added motive will have been to lay claim to the prestige that such a conquest would bring, and is in keeping with further operations in areas along Rome's northern frontiers.

Frontinus' successor in AD 78 was Cn. Julius Agricola, Britain's most famous governor as a result of Tacitus' eponymous biography, and the subject of a very detailed survey by Hanson (1987). He had had experience in Britain under Suetonius Paulinus as a junior officer, was commander of *Legio XX* under Petilius Cerealis, and he governed Britain until his recall in the winter of AD 84–85. His first order of business was to complete the conquest of the Ordovices, who had attacked one of his cavalry units stationed in the Ordovices' territory, the extent of which is subject to some dispute (Manning 2004, 71). Tacitus tells us he exterminated virtually the entire tribe (*Agr.* 18). If Tacitus can be believed, Agricola's strict oversight of his own people in the governance of the province will have been an attempt to right the wrongs of previous administrations, such as those under Nero. Agricola was also proactive in his introduction of Roman culture among the provincials, according to Tacitus, and in securing the province in general (*Agr.* 20–21). This was achieved in part by reinforcing the pre-existing urban infrastructure and establishing new settlements within the province, usually (where none previously existed) around Roman fortresses (Hanson 1987, 78–80). Although Tacitus attributes this policy to his father-in-law, the process was no doubt one that had been already instituted by previous governors. His predecessors Cerialis and Frontinus had also been active in the area of northern Britain amongst the Brigantes, as Hanson notes citing the archaeological record (in particular the somewhat extensive series of fortifications: 1987, 63–5).

Tacitus' account has received a great deal of analysis from virtually every perspective. Scholars have scrutinized it in particular to reconcile or understand his treatment of Britain in conjunction with the archaeological record. Agricola's campaign and consolidation of his conquests up until 83 between the Tyne and Forth has been discussed in great detail by Hanson

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<sup>17</sup> As Manning 2004, 70–1, notes, one of our difficulties in recovering details from the Roman conquest of Wales is that our best evidence includes temporary 'marching' camps, which, though ample, cannot be readily assigned to a specific campaign; cf. Frere 1987, 175; Arnold and Davies 2000, 7, fig. 1.1A.



(1987, 84-114). The governor constructed a series of fortifications to secure Roman gains, although to what extent such fortifications proved a drain on Roman manpower remains a matter of dispute.<sup>18</sup> By 81 it appears that Agricola had stopped at the Clyde-Forth, and it has been argued that this was a deliberate policy on the part of Titus (Hanson 1987, 107), and one approved by Tacitus (*Agr.* 23). With the advent of Domitian there was a change in policy. The new emperor was interested in imperial expansion for the sake of earning prestige and with a view to establishing the military credentials he decidedly lacked. With this in view he launched campaigns on the Rhine frontier, the Danube, and Britain. Agricola, as a part of that expansion, confronted a diverse set of tribes in Caledonia in 83 culminating in the battle of Mons Graupius in 84, and he was recalled sometime late in that same year.<sup>19</sup> Agricola and or his successor had started the fortification of the north at places such as Fendoch and Inchtuthil, though there was a gradual withdrawal from the area; the problems of the nature and extent of the withdrawal are themselves a matter of controversy.<sup>20</sup> It appears though that the Romans were forced to abandon Agricola's conquest, in part due to the need to meet other exigencies in more important regions of the empire, such as the Rhine, Danube, and Euphrates frontiers, and due to an inability to withstand enemy pressure from the north, forcing a pullback of the frontier into northern England under Trajan and the reconquest of lowland Scotland by Antoninus Pius (Hanson 1987, 164-6). Already in 83 Domitian had found troop withdrawals necessary to deal with wars against the Germans (*ILS* 1025, 9200) and between 85 and 86 there was a serious situation with the Dacians on the Danube frontier which saw the deaths of two generals, Oppius Sabinus and Cornelius Fuscus, and the situation was not rectified until 88 when Tettius Julianus won a victory at Tapae (Jones 1992, 141-3).

Conflict in Britain, as shown vividly by the construction of the Hadrianic and Antonine walls, did not end with Agricola's departure. Indeed, nearly two hundred and seventy years after Caesar's first foray into the unknown reaches of the north, Septimius Severus still had visions of bringing all Britain into the Roman fold (Birley 1999, 170-87). His plans for conquest north of the frontier may itself have been inspired by a reading of

<sup>18</sup> Hanson 1987, 97. The dating of such fortifications is also problematic in the periods of conquest and consolidation; see Hanson, 99.

<sup>19</sup> The date of Agricola's recall is a matter of some controversy; see Hanson 1987, 130-6; for the date of the battle, 137-9.

<sup>20</sup> See Hanson 1987, 143-73; cf. Breeze 1996, 91-4 on the occupation of Scotland after Agricola.

the *Agricola* (Birley 1999, 173-4). In addition, the expansion of Rome's boundary, naturally abutting against peoples who were reportedly making hostile incursions into Roman territory by Severus' day, proffered another excuse for mounting a new campaign. Yet, as was the case with Caesar and Agricola, events were destined to frustrate Severus, who died in Eboracum (York) in 211. The north remained unconquered and constituted a physical reminder of Caratacus' bold interrogative before the senate cited above: 'For if you wish to rule all, does it follow that all welcome slavery?'

## EASTERN HEGEMONIES AND SETBACKS, AD 14–96

*Benjamin Isaac*

### 1. *Attitudes and Ideology*

Strabo's work is marked by a profound admiration for the Roman empire in the age of Augustus and Tiberius: he says it encompassed all that was worthwhile having, and left aside infertile regions and those inhabited by nomads (6.4.2, C288; 17.3.24, C839). According to the Roman conception of empire no distinction was made between vassal kingdoms on the periphery or directly administered regions and those included in them. They were all equally part of the empire. Rome saw dependent neighbours as subject to Roman hegemony to the same extent as any fully incorporated province. Among the vassal kingdoms that of the Parthians was, in fact, included, in Strabo's opinion. Germany was in the process of being conquered (this was written before the defeat of Varus in AD 9) and regions in the north and east were all the time being added to the empire.

In the 2nd Century AD Appian had a similar attitude (*Praef.* 7.25–28): he held that the Romans had conquered all that was worth and profitable to conquer. Here again, Appian stresses the need for selective expansionism: 'possessing the best parts of the earth and the sea, they generally prefer to preserve their empire by good judgment rather than extend it indefinitely over poor and profitless barbarian peoples.'

Pausanias notes with approval that the Romans refrain from superfluous conquests and praises the peace kept by Antoninus Pius (Paus. 1.9.5; 8.43). Here too the emphasis is on cautious imperialism versus unprofitable adventurism. Aristides mentions wars as a thing of the past (*Roman Oration* 70–71). These last three all lived in the time of Antoninus Pius. Later Septimius Severus claimed that, through his conquest of Northern Mesopotamia, he had added a large territory to the empire and had made it a bulwark of Syria, but Dio himself insists it was all a waste of money and a cause of constant war. Rome had now annexed peoples who were neighbours of Parthia and was therefore constantly fighting other peoples' wars. Apart from being an interesting observation in itself, it shows that there existed internal criticism of the ideology which demanded periodical

expansion of the empire (Dio 75.3, ed. Boissevain). Herodian and the *Historia Augusta* claim that desire for glory had been the only motive for Severus' Parthian campaign (Hdn. 3.9.1; *HA Sev.* 15.1).

Pausanias and Aristides, like Strabo and Dio, represent Greek culture, but this in itself was not a factor of decisive importance. Like Strabo, Herodian, writing toward the middle of the 3rd Century, admires expansionist policy: according to wise advice given to Commodus, it would be wonderful for the new emperor 'to return in triumph, leading home barbarian kings and governors as prisoners in chains. This was what made your Roman predecessors great and famous' (Hdn. 1.6.6). One is reminded of Corbulo's exclamation: how fortunate were the Roman commanders of the past, at the moment when he himself was prevented by the emperor from military activism in the North (Tac. *Ann.* 11.20.1: 'beatos quondam duces Romanos'). Procopius, in the 6th Century, still found that a noble king is rightly praised for striving to enlarge his realm (*Wars* 2.2.14; *de Aedificiis* 1.1.6). During five centuries of historical literature, therefore, expansionist policy is both praised and criticised, according to the differing viewpoints of the authors.

On the relationship between Rome and Parthia/Persia a few statements found in the ancient literature are of interest here.

Strabo described the Parthians as powerful but virtually part of the empire (6.4.2, C288). Tacitus states that Artabanus III, in AD 35, demanded restoration of the old border between Persia and Macedonia (*Ann.* 6.31). It may be noted that the reign of Artabanus III was a period of great political instability.<sup>1</sup> In a period postdating the coverage of the present chapter, Dio reports hearing that Ardashir, in the 3rd Century, laid claim 'not only to Mesopotamia but also to Syria, threatening that he would regain all that the Persians once possessed as far as the Hellenic Sea, because it was his inheritance from his forefathers' (Dio 80.3). Herodian, rather more verbose, says something similar: Ardashir believed 'that the entire mainland facing Europe ... (the whole of what is called Asia) belonged to him by ancestral right, and [he] was intending to recover it for the Persian empire. He alleged that from the rule of Cyrus ... up to Darius, the last of the Persian kings, whose kingdom Alexander of Macedon had destroyed, the whole country as far as Ionia and Caria had been under the government of Persian satraps. So it was his right to restore and reunite the whole empire as it had once been' (Herodian 6.2.2, tr. C.R. Whittaker, Loeb). In a similar vein in the

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<sup>1</sup> See Richard N. Frye in Millar 1981, 250.

4th Century, Sapor II wrote to Constantius that he might claim all the lands of his forefathers as far as the Strymon, but he would be satisfied with the handover of Armenia and Mesopotamia (Ammianus 17.5.4–5; see also 17.14.1).

There are several points to be made. First, not all such reports are true, particularly if they derive from a hostile source. Second, in diplomacy and war one must distinguish between words and deeds. Tacitus suggests that Artabanus was, in fact, interested in Armenia. Third, Tacitus considered Artabanus' claim mere boastfulness; and Dio adds that there would have been no cause for worry if only the Roman army had been in any shape to fight. There are reports of a mutiny among the troops in Mesopotamia which resulted in the assassination of the governor.<sup>2</sup> The *Historia Augusta* tells about disciplinary problems which arose among troops stationed in Antioch and Daphne. In 218 there had been unrest among the troops in Syria because they were kept in tents in winter, in spite of apparently peaceful conditions (Dio 79 [78].28.2).

It is possible, although there is no evidence of this, that Romans genuinely believed the Parthian and then Persian empire to constitute a danger. Regarding the Parthian attack in 51 BC Debevoise observed that both the Roman commanders and the historians failed to understand the tactics employed by the enemy. The Parthian campaign was a cavalry raid, carried out by a limited number of fast-moving horsemen, whose aim was not conquest and occupation, but booty and the destruction of Roman property.<sup>3</sup> This may well have been true of other Parthian campaigns as well, where documentation is lacking.

Generally speaking, in diplomacy and war the relationship between the perception of danger and preventive attack is often confusing. History is full of empires whose motive—or justification—for continued expansion was the need to protect the frontier. However, there is little evidence that this was so in the case of the Romans. The only apparent exception I can think of is Josephus' story about the annexation of Commagene by Vespasian: *if* the client king had been disloyal (he was not) and *if* the Parthians had wanted to attack (they did not), it would have been dangerous for the Romans not to occupy Samosata (they did). Josephus nowhere else suggests that the Parthians constituted a danger in these years. Before the Jewish War he represents Agrippa II as saying that Parthia would do

<sup>2</sup> Dio 80.3.1; 4.1–2; Herodian 6.4.7, with Whittaker's note (Loeb edn., vol. 2, p.107); Eutropius 8.23; *HA Sev. Alex.* 55, 52–53; 53.1–3; Zosimus 1.18.

<sup>3</sup> Debevoise 1968, 96.

nothing to violate the treaty with the Romans (*BJ* 2.379, 389), and afterward Vologaeses I gave Titus a gold crown when they met at Zeugma to celebrate the suppression of the Jewish revolt (*BJ* 7.105). Otherwise we know only of the claims made by Ardashir discussed above. Finally, for a period subsequent to the one dealt with here, it is to be noted that all available sources deny that there was any practical need for Severus' Parthian campaign, as already observed, while that of Caracalla is said to have been undertaken because, in fact, the emperor 'wanted to acquire the Parthian kingdom for himself' (Dio 78.1.1; Hdn. 4.10.1).

It is often claimed that there was an important difference between the Parthian and Sassanian attitude.<sup>4</sup> For the present it may be observed that the few sources quoted do not support this view, as Artabanus, in AD 35, made the same claims as Ardashir in the 3rd Century.

The attitudes of the Roman upper class towards the army form a highly interesting subject. It is probably true that the upper class always feared the army, hence the insistence of many authors that it be kept in order by discipline. Yet it is clear that this was a particularly familiar topic among the proponents of an activist frontier policy—one of their motives being that it kept the army away from mischief at home. Fronto echoes Tacitus on the eastern army under Corbulo. The idleness of the troops, says Tacitus, was a greater problem than the perfidy of the enemy. The Syrian legions had become lazy as a result of the long years of peace (*Ann.* 13.35). The younger Pliny praises Trajan for restoring military discipline after Domitian had allowed it to deteriorate (Pliny, *Pan.* 18.1; cf. *Ep.* 8.14.7; 10.29.1). Against this Dio, who approved of Hadrian's eastern policy and found the expeditions of his own time wasteful and superfluous, emphasises that Hadrian revived military training and discipline and thus preserved the peace without going to war.<sup>5</sup> Herodian severely criticizes Severus, accusing him of undermining military discipline (Hdn. 3.8.4 f.; cf. 2.6.14). While Herodian favoured an activist policy such as was indeed pursued by Severus, the historian disliked this particular emperor, so it is perhaps more correct to say that the maintenance of military discipline was one of the frequent subjects of debate in a discussion of any emperor's merits (e.g. Dio 79 [78].3.5). Julian, in his panegyric in honour of Constantius, claims that the

<sup>4</sup> See for instance Frye 1984, 239, 293. As regards Roman-Parthian relations Frye concludes that the conflict mostly concerned a matter of honour, particularly concerning Armenia, but he takes seriously the western sources on Sassanian expansionism.

<sup>5</sup> Dio 69.9.1-6 (229 f. Boissevain), and see the comments by Millar 1964, 66f. Dio, who had mixed feelings about Trajan, acknowledges that he kept the soldiers well in hand after his victory and did not allow them 'to become conceited and arrogant, as happens usually' (68.7.5).

troops in the east were disaffected or even mutinous when Constantius took over command (Julian, *Or.* 1.18d; 20d). In the preceding period of peace the troops had become lax. Constantius had to drill them in person before they could fight the Persians (*Or.* 1.21c). Following the disaster at Adrianople in 378 complaints of slack discipline were uttered repeatedly (for instance Zosimus 4.23).

Another point is to be made regarding Corbulo and his 'lax and demoralised' army. Corbulo fought a difficult mountain war in the Armenian highlands with troops accustomed to service in Syria. Such a war is hard for any army and it may be relevant to cite a history of more recent warfare in the same region: 'A notable lesson of the successive Russo-Turkish wars over the same terrain and under similar climatic conditions is the progressive capacity of man to endure and overcome hardships imposed by the natural conditions.'<sup>6</sup> A peace-time army needs a period of learning and transition to become fully functional in wartime, particularly if war is fought under difficult physical circumstances. In other words, Corbulo's troops went through a natural and unavoidable process of acclimatisation described by Tacitus in a biased manner.

## 2. *Rome's Parthian Wars*

In modern literature it is very common to speak of Rome's need to defend herself against Parthia, 'whose power was the only "systemic threat" to Rome...'<sup>7</sup> Yet it may be noted that Mommsen assessed the relationship differently. 'The reason, or, if one wishes, the excuse for the continuation of conflict, is that the coexistence of equal major powers was regarded as incompatible with the essence of Roman politics, or perhaps with ancient politics in general. The Roman empire accepted as imperial boundary only the sea or undefended territory. Rome did not accept the position of power of the weaker, but yet militarily defended Parthian state and therefore took from Parthia what it could not afford to lose. Consequently the relationship between Rome and Iran was, during the entire period of the Empire, an eternal struggle over the left bank of the Euphrates, interrupted only by periods of cease fires.'<sup>8</sup> In fact, except in the 160s, Parthia never took

<sup>6</sup> Allen and Muratoff 1953, 7.

<sup>7</sup> The description by Luttwak 1976, 19. See recently Sommer 2005, 66–78.

<sup>8</sup> Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte* 5, ch. 9, especially p. 358 (my translation).

the initiative in attacking Roman territory, nor is there any evidence that it ever laid claim in earnest to the Syrian region.

A brief survey of well-known facts: before the first war between the two empires there were three treaties concluded with, on the part of the Romans, Sulla, Lucullus, and Pompey (in 66 BC). Each time the initiative came from Parthia. Rome responded by bullying and insulting without actually entering into conflict with Parthia.<sup>9</sup> As soon as Syria and Pontus were brought into the empire in the 1st Century BC, Rome ceased to recognize the Euphrates as the boundary delimiting the spheres of influence of the two states.<sup>10</sup> In 51 Parthian incursions into Syria were repelled. These, however, followed preparations for an invasion made by Gabinius in 65 and Crassus' actual invasion and defeat at Carrhae in 54. According to Plutarch the expedition was undertaken out of sheer megalomania. Crassus dreamt of 'Bactria, India and the Outer Sea.'<sup>11</sup> This was followed by Caesar's preparation in 44 for a grand Parthian campaign.<sup>12</sup>

During the Civil Wars there was a clear tendency on the part of the losers to call in the aid of the Parthians against their Roman enemies. In 45 BC Q. Caecilius Bassus (a Pompeian), shut up at Apamea by Caesarian forces, appealed to the Parthians for aid. The Parthian Pacorus forced the abandonment of the siege (Cicero, *ad Att.* 14.9; Dio 47.27; App. *BC* 4.59). In 40 Labienus persuaded the Parthian king to invade Roman territory. This resulted in the only large-scale Parthian invasion of Roman territory (41–38) and was followed by Antony's disastrous campaign in 36 into Media Atropatene (Azerbaijan) and beyond: an attempt intended to turn Antony into the new Alexander that ended in débâcle.<sup>13</sup> This was followed by an Armenian campaign in 34. In the same years the Hasmonaean Antigonos offered money to the Parthian king in exchange for support against his rival Hyrcanus.<sup>14</sup> The Parthians were popular with the subject peoples, for the Roman governors had mistreated them, while Pacorus was just and mild, as observed by Cassius Dio (48.24.8; 49.20.4). Later, in 35/34, Sextus

<sup>9</sup> See the detailed analysis by Keaveney 1981, 1982.

<sup>10</sup> See Brunt 1978, especially 170–1. Keaveney, *op. cit.*, traces an increased tendency towards confrontation on the part of the Roman leaders in the east.

<sup>11</sup> Plut. *Crass.* 16. According to A.D.H. Bivar, *Cambridge History of Iran* (2000), 3.1.49–50, the expedition is to be seen in the light of the dynastic struggle in Parthia. Crassus came to the support of Mithradates who was besieged in Seleucia.

<sup>12</sup> Appian, *BC* 2.16.110: scheduled to last three years; 16 legions—90,000 infantry; 10,000 cavalry. Mommsen is quite clear about Rome's ambitions beyond the Euphrates: *Römische Geschichte* 3.148–9.

<sup>13</sup> *CAH*<sup>2</sup> 10.30–4, 39–40. For the geography see Bivar (note 11), 3.1.63–4.

<sup>14</sup> See Debevoise 1938, 105–18.



Pompeius offered the Parthians his services (Appian, *BC* 5.133; Dio 49.18; Livy, *Epit.* 131).

Augustus was cautious, practicing diplomacy, reaching a settlement in Armenia that recognised Roman influence in the kingdom and the return of standards and captives lost by Antony to Parthia. At home he proclaimed victory and conquest: 'I compelled the Parthians to return to me the spoils and standards of three Roman armies, and as suppliants to seek the friendship of the Roman people.'<sup>15</sup>

One subject that has been much debated and insufficiently clarified is the status of Palmyra in—or associated with—the province of Syria.<sup>16</sup> It is clear that Germanicus in AD 18 did something, but it is not clear what.

Throughout much of the Julio-Claudian era Rome continued to rely on diplomacy vis-à-vis Parthia without resorting to open warfare. We know that Tiberius gave specific orders to L. Vitellius on his negotiations with the Parthians (Jos. *AJ* 18.96, 101–104). Concerning Armenia, one of the most important issues in the rivalry between the two powers, for most of the time it was in the hands of Roman clients, a cause of recurring tension and instability. Armenia, under Roman control, was a threat to Parthian Mesopotamia, while, in the hands of the Parthians, it gave the latter access to the Black Sea, eastern Asia Minor and the Caucasus region. Over time, neither power was prepared to give up. The Romans claimed the right to dispose of Armenia as they pleased, a cause of friction with its inhabitants, and of provocation to Parthia: long-term trouble for all concerned.

In AD 51 Rome's nominee to the throne of Armenia was deposed and killed. The governor of Syria, Ummidius Quadratus, tried to intervene, but without success. (Tac. *Ann.* 12.48). The Parthians occupied Armenia and Vologaeses installed Tiridates, his brother, as ruler. The news reached Rome soon after the accession of Nero. Preparations for a war started immediately, with Corbulo acting as commander as well as governor of Galatia and Cappadocia (*ILS* 232).

Rome's eastern campaigns from 52 until 63 turned a diplomatic conflict regarding Armenia into a military one.<sup>17</sup> Rome's invasion of Armenia in 57–58 transformed that state into a client with a garrison of Roman troops. So far the war was a Roman success. In 58 Corbulo, when campaigning in

<sup>15</sup> Aug. *RG* 29: 'Parthos trium exercitum Romanorum spolia et signa reddere mihi supplicesque amicitiam populi Romani petere coegi.' Cf. Ovid, *Fasti* 5.179–94.

<sup>16</sup> Isaac 1992, 141–7.

<sup>17</sup> The main source for the war is Tac. *Ann.* 13.6–9, 34–41; 14.23–26 (for the first phase, AD 54–62); 15.1–7; 24–31 (for the second phase, 62–63). Cf. *ILS* 986.

Armenia, had his supplies brought from Trapezus on the Black Sea over mountains occupied by Roman troops (Tac. *Ann.* 13.39). Subsequently, in 61–63, the pro-Roman Tigranes V of Armenia, supported by Corbulo, invaded Adiabene, a Parthian dependent state, east of the Tigris and thus far into the Parthian sphere of influence by any standard. This inevitably led to a Parthian response. In 62 the Parthian king Vologaeses initiated a counter-attack. Corbulo threatened Vologaeses with an invasion of Mesopotamia and made actual preparations. Corbulo then moved his troops to Syria, the river crossings of the Euphrates were fortified and bridgeheads thrown across the river (*Ann.* 15.3; 5). Caesennius Paetus, who had been appointed legate of Cappadocia, invaded Armenia, from which Corbulo had withdrawn. Paetus returned to Armenia with instructions to annex it. He failed to recapture its capital Tigranocerta because he had not assured his corn supply. His campaign was a disaster and Corbulo had to march with part of his army from Zeugma to bring assistance, but Paetus surrendered on terms before Corbulo's arrival. Meanwhile Syria was threatened by Vologaeses (*Ann.* 15.17). Corbulo and Vologaeses reached an agreement whereby Corbulo evacuated the east bank of the Euphrates and the Parthians refrained from occupying Armenia militarily. Thus the war ended without the Romans achieving their central aim: the securing of Armenia for Rome. An agreement was reached in 63/66 according to which Vologaeses' youngest half-brother Tiridates became king but received his investiture from Rome. It entailed a factual loss of Roman control and recognition of Parthian dominance, but it was a *modus vivendi* that lasted until the end of the Flavian dynasty.

A major war was initiated by Trajan in 112–114. Trajan annexed Armenia and in 115–116 his Parthian campaign was followed by another annexation: Seleucia and Ctesiphon were taken and three new provinces organised. However, it all finally ended again in failure and withdrawal.<sup>18</sup>

While it must be admitted that there is an overwhelming lack of ancient sources which explicitly discuss why the wars between Rome and Parthia

<sup>18</sup> See Lepper 1948; Angeli Bertinelli 1976, 3–22; for the capture of Ctesiphon see Honigmann, RE, Suppl. 4, s.v. 'Ktesiphon' col. 111–12. A considerable number of Roman coins, the latest of 115/16, have been found at Seleucia, cf. R.H. McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia on the Tigris* (1935), 194, 232. For Seleucia and Ctesiphon see: A. Oppenheimer, in collaboration with B. Isaac and M. Lecker, *Babylonia Judaica in the Talmudic Period* (1983), 179 ff. For Trajan's organisation of the province see A. Maricq, *Syria* 36 (1959), 254 ff. = *Classica et Orientalia* (1965), 103–111. For evidence regarding the military occupation of Armenia in those years see J. Crow in *The Defence of the Roman and Byzantine East, Proceedings of a Colloquium at the University of Sheffield in April 1986*, ed. P. Freeman and D. Kennedy (1986), 80–1.

took place, it cannot be denied that the survey of known facts given above shows a consistent pattern of Roman expansionism in Mesopotamia. In the meantime there were also periods of Roman inaction. It cannot be shown that the safety of the Roman province of Syria was consistently threatened by Persian ambition. Raids into Syria always were part of the Parthian strategy, but it is not at all clear that the Parthians—or the Persian Sassanians for that matter—had any desire permanently to occupy the Syrian region. When the Roman army operated in Armenia a successful Persian raid into Syrian territory was the most effective move to bring Roman troops back west (e.g., in 62). It is no coincidence that in 359 it was a Roman deserter, Antoninus, who persuaded the Persian king not to waste time in Mesopotamia, but to press on to the Euphrates crossings (Ammianus 18.10.1; cf. 19.1.3, 6, and 18.8.1). This is not to suggest that the impact of the Parthian invasion of 40 BC and its repercussions in Asia Minor were negligible.<sup>19</sup> It is possible, but not certain, that the memories of the event had a long-term effect on Roman attitudes toward Parthia. The same may be said of Shapur I's invasion three centuries later.

The striking element in this survey is the fact that no part of Syria or Cappadocia was ever occupied by Parthia/Persia for any length of time. What that kingdom never accepted was the permanent Roman ambition to control Armenia or expand east of the Euphrates. As part of their efforts to drive out the Romans from these areas or to block further advance the Parthians would threaten Syria when they could—as Vologaeses did in the 60s. Luttwak expressed similar views on the Roman relationship with Parthia. However, he agrees with many others in considering Sassanian policy radically different from that of the Parthian Arsacids: 'Sassanid expansionism transcended the scope of Arsacid ambitions, which had been limited to Armenia.' And he goes on to say: 'A bare chronology suffices to illustrate the continuity of the Sassanid threat.'<sup>20</sup> All that the chronology illustrates is that the Parthians and later the Persians did not accept the Roman presence east of the Euphrates. Before the 7th Century the Persians reached Antioch twice, the Romans southern Mesopotamia again and again Roman and Byzantine rule in the east lasted seven centuries. The border remained more or less static for an extended period, during the two-and-a-half centuries following the Byzantine loss of Nisibis in 363 (Ammianus 25.8.13–

<sup>19</sup> See Magie 1950, 1.430–31 with note 10 at 2.1280–1. In 39 BC Aphrodisias was granted its freedom apparently as a reward for resistance to the Parthians, see J. Reynolds, *Aphrodisias and Rome* (JRS Monographs, 1, 1982), document 8.

<sup>20</sup> Luttwak 1976, 150–2.

9.2). In this period there were no major changes because neither power succeeded in effecting them in the many wars that were actually fought.

### 3. *Other Roman Activities in the East*

Let us return to Roman activity in the east. In Nero's reign the failure in Armenia did not put an end to this activist policy. This appears from the plans made for massive intervention in the north-east and for an Ethiopian campaign.

In 61 a unit of praetorians was sent to Ethiopia for the purpose of exploration (Seneca, *Naturales Quaestiones* 6.8.3; Pliny, *NH* 6.181; 12.19; Dio 63.8.1). Seneca claims it was a purely informative undertaking: the purpose was the discovery of the source of the Nile. Pliny, however, describes it as a preparation for military action which, clearly, is the truth. While the Romans are on record as combining military campaigns with geographic curiosity, there is no support for a claim that such curiosity was the sole or main reason for army activity beyond the imperial frontier. It is less obvious why Ethiopia was regarded as an attractive region for imperial expansion. There may have been faulty rumours about the advantages of a Roman presence south of Egypt. In any case, however, these activities could not be pursued further, because of the outbreak of the Jewish revolt in Judaea in 66.

In the north-east there was contact between Rome and peoples in the Caucasus region as early as Pompey's eastern campaign. Various peoples south of the Caucasus became nominal clients then. In 37/36 BC the Iberians and Albanians were defeated (Dio 49.24). Strabo, writing in the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius, considered these good subjects as long as they were properly supervised, though when neglected these peoples tended to make trouble (Strabo 6.4.2, C288). He describes Colchis, Iberia and Albania in the Caucasus region as rich and fertile lands (11.2.19, C499). That in itself would be a good reason for Roman interest. In AD 66–67 there were abortive plans for a Caucasian expedition.<sup>21</sup> According to Tacitus, the aims were the Albani and the 'Caspian pass' (*Hist.* 1.6.31–6). This may have been the Darial Pass, but the geography is not quite clear. However this may be, the troops concentrated for the purpose were actually used for the suppression of the revolt of Vindex in Gaul in 68.

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<sup>21</sup> Isaac 1992, 43–4, with nn. 159, 391, 404–5. The sources: Pliny, *NH* 6.15.40; Tac. *Hist.* 1.6.9; Suet. *Nero* 19; Dio 63 [62].8.1–2.

In the 70s these activist interests were pursued on a more modest scale. Pliny the Elder mentions forts on the Black Sea coast (*NH* 6.12.14). An inscription of AD 75 records Roman assistance in the restoration of a fort at Harmozica, 14 km. from Tbilisi (*SEG* 20.112). A centurion is mentioned under Domitian in an inscription found on the Caspian coast, not far from modern Baku (*AE* 1951, no. 263). These two inscriptions prove that Roman troops were at least occasionally present in a region which otherwise remained on the fringes of the empire. Nero apparently prepared to interfere here on a massive scale, but the Flavians extended Roman influence in the region without serious investment. A long-term interest is clearly attested on the south-eastern coast of the Black Sea, where Roman troops saw to the security of the coast and ports and kept an eye on Roman clients immediately to the east.<sup>22</sup>

The aims of these activities in the Flavian period have been a subject of debate.<sup>23</sup> It has been argued that they represent a reaction to events in the 60s, measures taken to increase control eastward, toward Armenia. More often it is argued that these Flavian activities were defensive in nature. This then would lead to further defensive warfare initiated by Trajan which aimed at the subjugation of all of Armenia and Mesopotamia. However, these are modern arguments, not found in any ancient text. What we can state with certainty is that Vespasian witnessed the failure of Nero's eastern policy. It is therefore reasonable to assume both that Vespasian wanted to prepare for a successful conquest of Armenia in future, and that Trajan thought he could proceed from there.

#### 4. *Provincialisation*

As is very well known, the expansion of the Roman empire usually was a gradual process whereby peoples, allied rulers, and states beyond the annexed frontier provinces formed a network that was incorporated into the empire through a series of steps, violent or not. At the time this survey starts, with the reign of Tiberius, there was no commitment to provincialisation as a matter of explicitly formulated policy. For instance, Augustus detached the area of Cilicia Tracheia from the province of Galatia and gave it to the dependent king Archelaus of Cappadocia (Strabo 14.5.6, C671; Dio 54.9.2). Augustus made arrangements and adapted them as he found

<sup>22</sup> Isaac, 45–7.

<sup>23</sup> Isaac, 50–1.

useful, which included the gradual removal of a plethora of local leaders (tetrarchs) and the transfer of their lands to other leaders or their inclusion in the Roman provinces, such as the land of Zenodorus and the Apamean tetrarchy. In the Syrian region, Emesa and Ituraea continued to exist as small kingdoms. Judaea was indeed annexed in AD 6, but this was done following the failure of Herod's son Archelaus to establish himself as an accepted ruler there. Nabataea was a dependent kingdom. There was interference in the region during an obscure *expeditio Arabica* of Gaius Caesar in AD 1, but it is not clear what were the intention and results of it (Pliny, *NH* 2.168; 6.141; 12.55–56; *FGrH* 2A 275, F1–3). Nabataea remained a dependent kingdom until the reign of Trajan in spite of occasional active interference: for instance, in 38 Vitellius, governor of Syria, conducted a campaign against Nabataea in order to punish the Nabataean king, Aretas IV, for the military action he had undertaken against Herod Antipas. When Tiberius died Vitellius was no longer empowered to conduct the war and he therefore withdrew with his troops (Jos. *AJ* 18.115; 120–126).

When Archelaus of Cappadocia died in AD 17, Tiberius incorporated this large and prosperous region as a separate province, leaving only part of Cilicia Tracheia under the rule of Archelaus II, the son (Tac. *Ann.* 2.42; 56). The reason for the annexation was vague. King Archelaus of Cappadocia had been accused of 'rebellious conduct' (*Ann.* 2.42; Dio 57.17.3–7). Tacitus seems to imply that gain was a motive, for, with the revenues from Commagene the one per cent tax could be lightened and was in fact fixed at a half per cent. At the same time Commagene and the kingdom of the Amanus were incorporated into the province of Syria.

Caligula reversed some of these measures. In 38 he returned Commagene to Antiochus IV, including Cilicia Trachea (Dio 59.8.2; 60.8.1) and entrusted Polemo II with Pontus (Jos. *AJ* 19.338), both local princes. Claudius organised a new province in Asia Minor: Lycia-Pamphylia. Judaea was given to Agrippa I, Herod's grandson, by Claudius in 41 and became a province again after his death in 44. As before, it was a province governed by a Roman equestrian officer, who was subject to the higher authority of the Syrian legate. This changed with the outbreak of the Jewish revolt in 66. Vespasian was sent to the province as a consular legate with three legions. Following the suppression of the revolt the province was governed by a senatorial, praetorian legate with one legion. Henceforth the governor was no longer subject to the authority of the Syrian legate. All in all provincialisation was the long-term trend.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> For all this: Sartre 2005, ch. 1; Sommer 2005, ch. III.

Under Nero, eastern Asia Minor was reorganised. In 54 Cappadocia and Galatia became one major province under Corbulo as governor, one of the two commanders of the campaigns of those years described above.<sup>25</sup> Pontus was annexed again in 64 when it was incorporated into the province of Galatia. It had a common frontier with Lesser Armenia and placed under Roman rule all of the Black Sea coast up to the slopes of the Caucasus.

Commagene retained its semi-dependent status until its incorporation in 72. It is quite possible that the desire to station a legion at Samosata was one of the reasons for the annexation. Caesennius Paetus (Corbulo's unsuccessful colleague in the 60s), as governor of Syria ca. 72, reported to Vespasian that Antiochus of Commagene was conspiring with Parthia (Jos. *BJ* 7.220–225). He accordingly asked for, and received instructions to invade the kingdom and annex it. There was no resistance. According to Josephus the report of Paetus was untrue, but Vespasian had to act in the light of the information he received. 'For Samosata, the largest city of Commagene, lies on the Euphrates so that it would offer the Parthians, if they had such plans, an easy crossing and safe base.' Josephus does not go to any trouble to present it as anything but a flimsy pretext.<sup>26</sup> In any event, the result is not in doubt: Samosata and Satala became legionary bases in a major frontier province, consisting of Galatia, Cappadocia and various associated regions such as Pontus, Pisidia, Paphlagonia, Armenia Minor, Lycaonia and Isauria. In southern Anatolia a large province, Cilicia Trachea, was organised. Probably not long afterwards Emesa was re-annexed, and, more than a century after that, the future emperor Septimius Severus married Iulia Domna from Emesa. As a result three Emesan empresses and their children would rule in Rome.

The reorganisation of the eastern frontier, including the annexation of Commagene, may well have represented an attempt to apply lessons learnt from the failure of the attempts to conquer Armenia by Paetus and Corbulo under Nero. From a military point of view the most obvious result, however, was a movement of part of the Roman army closer to the frontier. This inevitably enhanced the weight of Roman diplomacy toward Armenia and Parthia, even if, in fact, the major offensive took place more than forty years later, in Trajan's reign. Vespasian's reorganisation undoubtedly influenced the course of the wars in the 2nd Century. The importance of lateral communication and the disastrous effect of shortcomings in this

<sup>25</sup> E.M. Smallwood, *Documents Illustrating the Principates of Gaius, Claudius and Nero* (Cambridge 1967), 244.

<sup>26</sup> R. Syme, *CAH* 11.139; Isaac 1992, 39–40.

respect are clear from Tacitus' account of the campaign waged by Paetus and Corbulo. The response was a reorganisation that entailed a movement to stations which were good bases for an attack and, at the same time, allowed safe and quick lateral movement. It was not a preparation for defence, but an attempt to apply the lessons learned from a previous, failed war of expansion.



## TRAJAN: IMPERIALISM VICTORIOUS AND FRUSTRATED

Peter Edwell

### 1. *Ideas about Trajan's Imperialism*

The Roman Empire arguably reached its greatest extent during the reign of Trajan. This could be said in terms of both formal provincial organisation and the more informal means by which the empire wielded power and influence beyond its frontiers. During the reign of this emperor, provinces were established and organised beyond the Danube, the Euphrates and at one stage even beyond the Tigris. The last piece of the Mediterranean coast and hinterland in Arabia, not previously provincialised, now fell into place and the power of the empire was felt as far north and east as the Black Sea coastline of southern Russia. The expansion of the empire came both as a consolidation of expansionary activity of previous emperors and especially through the hard-fought campaigns led by the emperor himself. Despite the loss of most of the provincial gains made in the east by the time of Trajan's death in 117, the example set by Trajan was followed for centuries and the idea of provincial territory organised all the way to the Tigris and even beyond represented the furthest practical accomplishment of the theoretical ideal of *imperium sine fine*.

The motives for Trajan's military activity and expansionism were discussed in antiquity and they have been the subject of considerable debate in modern scholarship. Was Dio (68.17.1) correct in evaluating Trajan's motives for empire as driven by little more than glory or was the emperor concerned more with the noble pursuit of *securitas* for the *imperium* as his panegyricist Pliny suggested (Pliny, *Pan.* 12.1)? How do we reconcile the sometimes conflicting images of war and peace remaining in the literature, architecture and iconography of Trajan's reign? Did Trajan over-extend the empire and sow the seeds of the difficulties it would face over a century after his death? Given the actions of Hadrian and his successors, was Trajan's expansionism something of an aberration which could not be sustained? Further to these problems and discussions has been the issue of the frustratingly fragmentary nature of the textual sources for Trajan's reign generally and more specifically for his wars and expansionary activities.

Dio survives only in epitome for this section of his history and Arrian's *Parthica* is but a few fragments. Pliny the Younger's *Panegyricus* is highly coloured by its very nature and Trajan's own account of the Dacian Wars is lost. Inscriptions on coins and milestones shed some light on events as do the detailed reliefs of Trajan's column still standing in Rome. The archaeological and epigraphic evidence for the process of provincialisation during Trajan's reign, especially in Dacia, has been more promising and provides important contributions to analysing the type of imperialism Trajan sponsored and pursued.

Trajan's imperial motives not only served the rhetorical purposes of Pliny, Dio Chrysostom, Fronto, and Dio Cassius but are of great interest to modern ideas about imperialism. Motives for imperialism have been at the centre of modern discussions and analysis of imperialism since the term was first coined in the middle of the nineteenth century, when British, European and American imperialism was making itself felt in all parts of the globe. Was it always Trajan's intention to embark on wars of expansion? Was he an 'accidental' imperialist? Was he driven more by economic motives and to what extent was he driven by the expectations of the Roman aristocracy as the first non-Italian emperor? These are just some of the questions posed in modern analyses of the motives for Trajan's imperialism and they will form part of this analysis of his expansionary activity as well.

## 2. *The Situation under the Flavians*

Trajan was a military man whose career began and flourished under the Flavians, especially the last and most despised of them, Domitian. Born in AD 53 in the town of Italica, a veteran colony established in Baetica, Spain, following the Second Punic War, Trajan was the son of one of the ablest and most trusted generals of the Flavian era, M. Ulpius Traianus, who served as *legatus* of *Legio X Fretensis* in the war against the Jews before Vespasian came to power. He is thought to have held the consulship in 70, before serving as *legatus pro praetore Syriae* ca. 73–76 and holding the pro-consulship of Asia in 79–80 (Bennett 1997, 11). During his governorship of Syria, Trajan's father won the *ornamenta triumphalia*, probably for some sort of victory over the Parthians, and while in his early twenties, Trajan served as military tribune under his father. His father's success and reputation as one of Vespasian's most able generals had clear implications for Trajan's own rising military career which saw him transferred to Germany ca. 77 as a military tribune followed by his appointment as *quaestor* in 81

(Bennett 1997, viii-ix). Having served as praetor in 86, Trajan was appointed to the command of *Legio VII Gemina* in his native Spain in 89. Trajan's success against the rebel, Saturninus, in 89 saw his appointment to the consulship in 91 and for much of the next decade he fought Rome's enemies on the Rhine and Danube, serving as *legatus Augusti* in Germania Inferior and then Pannonia before scoring an important victory over the Suebi. Soon after, in October 97, Trajan was formally adopted by Nerva and returned to his province to begin reorganising the German frontier soon after. Only three months later, on the death of Nerva, Trajan received news of his elevation to the principate. He would spend most of the next eighteen months inspecting and re-organising the troublesome Danubian frontier before finally entering Rome.

Nerva had chosen the right man to succeed him, and the aristocratic line Nerva traced back to the glory days of the Republic helped bestow legitimacy on Rome's first non-Italian emperor. Trajan's successful military career, his father's close connection to Vespasian and his own ability to flourish through the troubled principate of Domitian, also stood him in good stead on his elevation early in 98. Together with this, Trajan was a man in his mid-40s with enough military and political experience behind him and enough years ahead to establish a solid reign as emperor. The fact that it took eighteen months for him to make his way to Rome after his elevation was an early signal of the priority he would place on first-hand involvement in dealing with Rome's enemies. As a soldier, he brought military experience in the provinces of both the west and the east, which gave him an understanding of the challenges confronted across the empire.

At the same time, Trajan was praised, admittedly in panegyric, for the deference he paid to the senate on arrival in Rome and for the image of modesty and restraint he developed and cultivated (Griffin 2000, 103; Pliny, *Pan.* 2.4—'we are talking of a fellow-citizen, not a tyrant, one who is our father not our master [*dominus*]). Importantly, the imperial image cultivated by Trajan was linked to that of Augustus and it could be argued that his imperial imagery was increasingly linked to outdoing Augustus. His adoption by Nerva, whose lineage traced back to the golden age of Augustus and who served as *sodalis Augustalis*, one of the priests of the cult of Caesar and Augustus (Bennett 1997, 35), assisted greatly; and the deification of both his natural and adoptive fathers meant he was *divi filius* twice (Griffin 2000, 99). It was perhaps no mistake that Trajan took two more imperial salutations than Augustus. His building program in Rome, often linked to important military victories, was a further contribution to the

cultivation of an imperial image which equalled and even surpassed the greatness of the founder of the principate. Trajan's forum outdid all of the imperial *fora* in size and grandeur and Aulus Gellius (13.25.1) claimed that it was built in the shape of a legionary camp, underscoring the centrality of military victory to the ideology of his reign.

### 3. *The Dacian Wars and Provincial Acquisition*

Despite conquest and provincial acquisition representing key components of Trajan's reign, very little detail survives about his campaigns of conquest in the ancient sources. The two Dacian campaigns rely mostly on Xiphilinus' 11th-Century epitome of Dio and a few other brief references in textual sources such as Pliny the Younger's *Panegyricus*, and the letters of Fronto. The Column of Trajan, which provides extraordinary visual detail of the two Dacian campaigns, complements the ancient texts on very few details and may have required Trajan's now lost account of the Dacian wars to make sense (Coarelli 2000, 13-14). Thankfully, archaeological and epigraphic sources are more abundant for evidence of the process of provincialisation following the activity to acquire territory in the first place.

The First Dacian War was in some senses inevitable, tracing its immediate origins to the Flavian era but also representing the culmination of ongoing difficulties Rome had with Dacia which traced back to the days of the Late Republic. The emergence of Decebalus as the Dacian King ca. 85 and his subsequent establishment of alliances with tribes such as the Bastarnae and Roxolani elevated the Dacian threat to Rome's Danubian provinces to a new level (Bennett 1997, 86). Trajan was keenly aware of this, having governed Pannonia before his elevation to the principate and spending the first eighteen months of his reign strengthening defences in Pannonia and the two Moesias. In March, 101, after he 'took into account their (the Dacians') past deeds and was grieved at the amount of money they were receiving annually, and ... that their power and their pride were increasing', he embarked on a full-scale military campaign against Decebalus (Dio 68.6.1). The details of the campaign are limited and can be summarised in a few lines. Departing Rome amid great fanfare, Trajan arrived at Viminacium and then crossed the Danube. He marched towards the Dacian camp at Tapae, where he received an ultimatum from the Dacians which he ignored before advancing against them (Griffin 2000, 109-10; Dio 68.8.1). Serious losses were experienced on both sides but Trajan continued on towards the Dacian capital of Sarmizegethusa, at which time

Decebalus sued for peace. He was required to give up arms and siege equipment, demolish forts, and hand back deserters (Dio 68.9.5-6). Decebalus accepted Trajan's terms and was required to send envoys to the Roman Senate for ratification of the treaty (68.9.7). Trajan established a camp at the Iron Gate pass on the Danube, and an impressive stone bridge was built further east at Drobeta under the supervision of Apollodorus of Damascus, the celebrated architect who would later design his forum in Rome (Dio 68.9.7). Trajan acquired the title *Dacicus* and celebrated a triumph in December, 102, marking the end of the war (*RIC* 2.276, nos. 447-8).

The forces available to Trajan on the first campaign against Dacia were considerable, with nine of the empire's thirty legions already based on the Danube and with approximately 90 auxiliary units. Other troops, composed of *nationes* and *symmachiarii* (troops levied from allied and previously conquered foreign territories), have been estimated to total 50,000 men (Bennett 1997, 88-9). Trajan's main aim in the First Dacian War appears to have been to make a show of force rather than to occupy the kingdom, although he took the opportunity to annex territory north of the Danube, and he added territory in the west to the province of Moesia Superior. Coin legends celebrating Dacia *victa* rather than *capta* are suggestive of the motive (Bennett 1997, 95).

It did not take long, however, for Decebalus to renege on the arrangement he struck with Trajan and the Senate. Following reports that Decebalus was rearming, repairing forts, gathering allies among neighbouring tribes and even annexing territory from the neighbouring Iazyges, the Senate declared him an enemy in 104 (Dio 68.10.3; Pliny *Ep.* 10.74). It was not until Decebalus directly attacked Roman forces at Banat in June, 105, that Trajan set out to deal once and for all with the troublesome Dacian king. That the emperor left so late in the campaigning season is thought to indicate that the attack came as a surprise. Though making his way with urgency to the bridge at Drobeta, his all-out assault on Decebalus and his capital of Sarmizegethusa did not get underway until spring 106. In the interim Decebalus attempted to have Trajan assassinated and kidnapped one of his leading generals, Longinus, but this only increased Trajan's resolve (Dio 68.11.3-12.5). Importantly, the emperor raised two new legions, *II Traiana Fortis* and *XXX Ulpia Victrix* while also forming permanent units, *numeri*, out of the *nationes* and *symachiarii*. This activity is a good indication of Trajan's plan for permanent occupation of Dacia after the war was concluded.

The details of the Second Dacian War are even scantier than those of the first due again to the fragmentary surviving sources. On crossing the stone bridge at Drobeta, Trajan's army was not met by the Dacian army in set battle but was confronted by guerrilla warfare along with the necessity to conduct sieges of Dacian forts. Sarmizegethusa was captured virtually without a fight in July, 106, when Trajan took his sixth imperial salutation. Decebalus appears to have escaped the capital before its capture but committed suicide soon after; and at about the same time, the enormous royal treasury of the Dacians was captured (Dio 68.14.3-4). Trajan did not return to Rome for another year, celebrating a lavish triumph once he did and ordering spectacles and games which continued up to November, 109 (Bennett, 102: Dio 68.15.1-2). This time coins were minted referring to Dacia having been captured (*capta*).

Of great importance to the analysis of Trajan's imperialism is what took place on the Danube after the annexation of the Dacian kingdom. Dacia itself was placed under a consular governor and was garrisoned by two legions. Along with this, Pannonia was organised into two provinces, with three legions in Pannonia Superior and one in Pannonia Inferior, while Thrace was also organised into a province. Wilkes (2000, 589) concludes that 'Trajan's reign marked the full incorporation into the empire of the eastern Balkans and the lower Danube, following the annexation of Dacia.' An important element of this incorporation was the process of provincialisation which accompanied it. In Dacia Trajan established the new colony of *Ulpia Traiana Sarmizegethusa* in 108 along with a garrison of two legions and approximately thirty auxiliary units numbering around 27,000 troops in total (Bennett 1997, 166). A road network was constructed and a complicated system of defences, watchtowers and embankments was built to control migrations from further north. Eutropius (8.6.2) claimed that the emperor transferred a large number of Roman citizens to Dacia and the capture of approximately 50,000 Dacian prisoners in the two wars led to the wholesale transformation of Dacia, for which there is still evidence in Romania to this day (Bennett 1997, 170-1). Trajan's victories over the Dacians might have been famous, but the actions he took following the destruction of Decebalus are instructive on the emperor's idea of empire in the first half of his reign. The image of an all-conquering, victorious emperor, represents only one side of an approach to empire which was more than just the expression of military power. The long-term exploitation of conquered territory which would provide resources of manpower, agriculture and minerals while also providing better protection from tribal threats

across the Danube were obvious contributions to providing *securitas* for the *imperium*.

#### 4. *The Acquisition of Arabia*

The annexation of the Nabataean kingdom in 106 came in the middle of the second Dacian War. It is perhaps for this reason that coverage of the events leading up to the annexation are somewhat mysterious. The annexation of the kingdom saw it incorporated into a new province of Arabia, to which was added some territory and cities in the south of the province of Syria. Only one line surviving from Dio (68.14.5) says that 'Palma, the governor of Syria, subdued the part of Arabia around Petra and made it subject to the Romans.' As Bowersock (1983, 80) points out, the verb ἐχειρώσατο ('subdued') implies a defeat on the part of the Nabataeans; and the movement of troops (*Cohors I Hispanorum* and *Cohors I Thebaeorum*) from Egypt to Judaea in 105 might also be indicative of military designs on the kingdom (Kennedy 2004, 39). Ammianus Marcellinus (14.8.13) was less clear on military conflict leading up to the annexation but claims that there was later resistance to it: 'It (Nabataea) was given the name of a province (Arabia), assigned a governor, and compelled to obey our laws by the emperor Trajan, who by frequent victories crushed the arrogance of its inhabitants when he was waging glorious war with Media and the Parthians.'

Adding further to lack of precision on the details of the annexation of Nabataea and the formation of the province is that it took five years for Trajan to advertise the fact, and when he did his coins bore the legend *Arabia Adquisita* rather than *Arabia Capta*, in stark contrast to the aftermath of the Dacian wars (*RIC* 2.278, 287). There is also no indication that Trajan took the title *Arabicus*. While some minor level of military conflict is likely before the annexation, therefore, it was not anything like the level of conflict with the Dacians and it is possible that the last Nabataean king, Rabbel II, ceded the kingdom to Rome on his death.

Bowersock (1983, 82) notes that the establishment of the province of Arabia represented the final piece of the Mediterranean coastline and hinterland coming under Roman provincial organisation. For modern analysts of Roman imperialism, this surely represents a major symbolic step; but there is no suggestion in the ancient sources that it was celebrated as such, and whether Trajan conceived of it in this way is unknown to us.

Similar to the situation in Dacia, archaeology and epigraphy provide a clearer picture of the process of provincialisation in Arabia following the

annexation of the Nabataean kingdom. The centre of Roman authority in the province was Bostra and the province's legionary garrison, *Legio III Cyrenaica*, was ultimately based there, provably under Hadrian but probably also under Trajan. The initial garrison of the province may have been composed of parts of an initial invading force of *Legio III Cyrenaica* from Egypt and *Legio VI Ferrata* under Cornelius Palma from Syria (Kennedy 2004, 46-7). Epigraphic evidence suggests that six auxiliary units were formed out of troops drawn from the Nabataean royal army (*Cohortes I-VI Ulpiae Petraeorum*) soon after the annexation of the kingdom, also as part of the provincial garrison (Graf 1994). Speidel 1977 estimates the garrison at approximately 10,000 men in the second and third centuries.

Urban centres were also an important feature of the new province. In keeping with tradition, the province's most famous city, Petra, was honoured as metropolis by Trajan (Bowersock 1983, 84-5). The new province also incorporated the Decapolis cities of Adraha, Dium, Gerasa, and Philadelphia which had previously been part of the province of Syria. There is increasing archaeological evidence for the growth of existing Nabataean villages and the establishment of new ones throughout the newly established province (Kennedy 2004, 39-40). An especially important feature of Trajan's new province of Arabia was the construction of the *Via Nova Traiana* which ran all the way from Bostra in the north of the province to Aila in the south on the Red Sea. The recovery of milestones from the road indicate that construction was taking place from 111-114. The *Via Nova Traiana* was an important contributor to the linking of Arabia with neighbouring provinces, especially Egypt and Syria, and it also linked the major urban centres of Arabia more effectively. It is important to bear in mind that the annexation of the Nabataean kingdom and the formation of the province of Arabia built on the urban, military and transport infrastructure which already existed under the Nabataeans. Indeed, the existing infrastructure would have been attractive to the Romans as a basis on which to build the province. The acquisition of Arabia is another important indicator of the type of imperialism Trajan pursued. Just as it was in Dacia, the provincialisation of Arabia had long-term designs and long-term effects.

### 5. *The Parthian Wars*

Trajan's Parthian campaigns (114-117) were and remain one of the most famous military exploits ever undertaken by Rome. The campaigns and their outcome have been important to interpretations of Trajan's



imperialism in modern scholarship just as they were to assessments of his reign in antiquity. There are important similarities with the wars against the Dacians, the most unfortunate being the lack of contemporary ancient evidence for crucial details of the campaigns. Again, Dio survives only in the epitome of Xiphilinus, and a source which would have been most instructive, Arrian's *Parthica*, survives in the barest of fragments. It is possible, however, to reconstruct the main events from the fragments of these texts, references in other later texts and some surviving epigraphic and archaeological material.

Trajan's coins indicate the possibility of upcoming military action as early as 111, and developing problems in Armenia over the royal succession at this time point to some type of campaign against the Parthians (Bennett 1997, 190). The appointment of Trajan's nephew Hadrian as governor of Syria in April, 112, is another possible indicator of upcoming conflict with Parthia, just as it was when Crassus took up the appointment in 54 BC. The catalyst for conflict was the situation in Armenia. In 113 the new Parthian king, Osroes, abrogated the agreement struck between Rome and Parthia originally under Augustus and confirmed under Nero, whereby the Parthians nominated the Armenian king and Rome formally installed the Parthian choice on the throne (Dio 68.17.1). Trajan set out from Rome for Armenia in the autumn (Arrian, *Parthica* 33) making his way to Antioch via Athens. At Athens, Trajan received an embassy from Osroes bearing gifts, requesting peace and suggesting a compromise over the appointment of the Armenian king (Dio 68.17.2). These requests were effectively ignored and Trajan pressed on, entering Antioch with Hadrian in early January, 114 (Malalas 2.272). Hadrian had already gathered a substantial army in the Syrian metropolis and in April the emperor set out for Armenia.

The course to Armenia took Trajan through all of the legionary bases established on the upper Euphrates since the reign of Vespasian. These included Zeugma (*IV Scythica*), Samosata (*VI Ferrata*), Melitene (*XII Fulminata*) and finally Satala (*XVI Flavia Firma*) (Bennett 1997, 192). Embassies from Parthamasiris, the compromise candidate for Armenia put forward by Osroes, were ignored and before reaching Satala Trajan captured the first major city he encountered in southern Armenia, Arsamosata, without a fight (Dio 68.19.2). Leaving Satala in May, 114, with a legionary and auxiliary army numbering approximately 80,000, Trajan made for Elegeia, approximately 300 km west of the Armenian capital Artaxata, where he was to meet Parthamasiris. On arriving at the city, Parthamasiris laid his diadem at Trajan's feet expecting to receive it back, therefore fulfilling the

longstanding arrangement between Rome and Parthia over the nomination and installation of the Armenian king. To Parthamasiris' dismay, Trajan was hailed *imperator* by his troops and declared Armenia a Roman province, appointing L. Catilius Severus as its first governor (Dio 68.19.3). Despite some resistance, Trajan's generals spent most of the following year subduing Armenia and laying the groundwork for its provincialisation, just had been done in Dacia.

Trajan's success in Armenia saw embassies from various kings along the east coast of the Black Sea and in the Caucasus confirming themselves as clients of Rome (Eutropius 8.3). A campaign against the Parthians, following the success in Armenia, seems to have always been planned and in 115 Trajan captured the key upper Mesopotamian cities of Nisibis and Batnae (Dio 68.18.2) for which he received the title *Parthicus*. At the same time, Lusius Quietus defeated the king of Adiabene, Mebarsapes, and soon after occupied the strategically important city of Singara (Dio 68.22.2). Despite previous problems with Abgar of Edessa, Trajan confirmed him as king of Osroene before retiring to Antioch for the winter of 115/116.

After barely surviving a serious earthquake in Antioch during the winter, Trajan set out in the spring of 116 for the Tigris with the aim of subduing Adiabene (Dio 68.26.1-2). After a difficult crossing of the Tigris in Corduene using a pontoon bridge, Adiabene was subdued and, according to Eutropius (8.3.2) and Festus (14.20), the province of Assyria was formed. While one division of the army captured the key Adiabene cities of Nineveh, Arbela, and Gaugamela, another division made its way south and captured Babylon (Dio 68.26.4). Trajan himself seems to have doubled back to the Euphrates in order to lead a force downriver as part of attacking the Parthian capital Seleucia-Ctesiphon. It was probably at this time that Roman troops briefly occupied Dura-Europos and the triumphal arch dedicated to Trajan was constructed outside the city (Baur *et al.*, 1933, 56-65). On arriving at the point where the Euphrates and Tigris flow closest to each other, Trajan ordered his ships hauled across the land in between before crossing the Tigris to Ctesiphon and capturing the city with virtually no resistance (Dio 68.28.2-3). Dio tells us that Trajan was voted the title *Parthicus* by the Senate as a result of his successes to this point.

Trajan now sailed down the Tigris to the Persian Gulf and won over Athambelus who was king of Mesene and also controlled Spasinou Charax at the river's mouth (68.28.4). Both Mesene and, especially Spasinou Charax, were closely connected to Palmyra through trade at this time. On arriving at the Gulf, Trajan saw a ship leaving for India and famously

lamented, 'I should certainly have crossed over to the Indi, too, if I were still young': a clear reference to Alexander whom, Dio claims, Trajan in letters to the Senate actually intimated he had outdone (68.29.1-2). But on returning to Babylon, Trajan learned that much of the captured Parthian territory was in open rebellion under the leadership of Sanatruces, who was probably from Hatra.

Despite some success in putting down these rebellions, especially the recapture of Nisibis and Ctesiphon together with the capture of Edessa, it appears to have been increasingly obvious to Trajan that holding the gains in Adiabene and Mesopotamia in the longer term presented a myriad of difficulties for the Romans. The emperor appointed and crowned a Parthian client-king, Parthamaspatēs, in the wake of the rebellions before departing for Roman territory (68.30.2-3). On the way back to Antioch, Trajan besieged the desert city of Hatra in what proved to be an unsuccessful attempt to punish the city's disloyalty. Arriving in Antioch soon after, and suffering increasingly from ill health, Trajan departed for Rome but died at the port of Selinus in Cilicia on 8 August, 117 (68.33.3). As is well known, Hadrian immediately gave up all of Trajan's gains beyond the Euphrates, reverting to the Augustan policy of keeping the empire within its natural boundaries (Bennett 1997, 203).

## 6. Conclusion

The expansion of the Roman empire under Trajan is seen by some as a reassessment of the approach taken by Augustus (*RG* 26.2-4; 30), and largely followed by his successors, who saw the empire's limits defined by natural features such as rivers and oceans (Griffin 2000, 126). Under the leadership of Trajan in person, Roman armies had marched deep into Dacian and Parthian territory, and the administrative machine followed quickly in organising provinces well beyond the Danube, Euphrates, and even the Tigris. The final, missing piece of the Mediterranean coast and hinterland also came under formal Roman provincial rule in Arabia, and when Trajan stood on the shores of the Persian Gulf contemplating India, one could argue that he would gladly repudiate the oceans as a limit to his imperial agenda given resources and time.

The stark contrast with his great-nephew and successor Hadrian, who quickly abandoned all of the eastern gains and even contemplated giving up Dacia (Eutropius 8.6.2), further underscored the idea promoted by some and noted by Lepper more than sixty years ago (1948, 106) that 'Trajan's frontier policy was a rude and costly interruption of a process of careful

and economical stabilization which had been begun by the Flavians and to which Hadrian wisely returned.' As the first non-Italian emperor, had the weight of public expectation and private insecurity motivated Trajan to military activity and the establishment of an empire which would outdo that of Augustus and even rival another non-Italian whom the Romans loved, Alexander the Great?

In assessing Trajan's aggressive military activity and imperial expansion, it is all too easy to focus on the personal and political motives of the man himself, the rhetorical expressions of Pliny, Fronto, and Dio, and the stark contrast of Trajan's actions with those of his Flavian predecessors and Antonine successors. Trajan was a more seasoned general when elevated to the principate than Augustus or any of his successors. At the age of 44, he was just one year older than the minimum age of a consul in the days of the Republic, and his father had been a trusted general of the much-admired Vespasian. Both had navigated military and political careers through the troubled principate of Domitian. When Nerva adopted Trajan as his heir, he chose very well, and bestowed on Trajan the ancestral legitimacy that some could claim he otherwise lacked. In many senses, the stage was ideally set for the principate which would unfold.

No emperor since Augustus had the military experience, authority, and ability to prosecute the wars and imperial expansion undertaken by Trajan, and he was an ideal age on coming to power. The military campaigns undertaken during his reign were ostensibly to deal with issues which the empire had faced long before he came to power. Julius Caesar was seriously contemplating a campaign against the Dacians at the time of his death (Oltean 2007, 43); Domitian would have done so except for regular problems of rebellion in Rome; and the formal provincialisation of client-kingsdoms in the east was a significant feature of Vespasian's reign. The Parthians chose an especially inopportune time to repudiate the long-established agreement over the Armenian kingship, as Trajan was at the height of his powers as a popular emperor with unrivalled imperial military prowess. Any previous emperor with similar political and military capital is likely to have reacted in a similar way. Augustus' advice in the *Res Gestae* was prudent and practical, Hadrian's surrender of territory east of the Euphrates was a response to the practicalities of serious revolts in the newly won territories and the immediacy of his own uncertain position as Trajan's successor. The rhetorical notion of *imperium sine fine*, first expressed in Augustus' reign, had never left the Roman mind, and Trajan was remembered for centuries as the man who had taken the empire closest to this ideal.

PART THREE

THE PROVINCES AND ROME



# EXPLOITATION AND ASSIMILATION: THE WESTERN ROMAN EMPIRE FROM AUGUSTUS TO TRAJAN

*Richard Hingley\**

## 1. *Introduction*

This chapter explores the assimilation of indigenous peoples across the western Roman empire from the end of the first millennium BC and in the first century AD. It provides an assessment of the variable ways in which Rome incorporated provincial peoples and the reactions of these people to imperial control. The Roman administration usually co-opted local élites into the power structure of empire, while communities that were not co-operative were forced into submission or defeated. A number of influential texts, published during the past twenty years, are drawn upon, in order to review interpretations of Roman identity and social change. These recent works explore how people of variable status were integrated into the Roman empire in ways that exploited their abilities and local resources. The empire expanded across a vast area and was consolidated as a result of the co-opting of local people. The successful assimilation of such peoples transformed their cultures but did not create a fully unified and coherent 'Roman' identity; people retained aspects of their indigenous identities in the transformed local cultures that constituted individual elements of a mosaic of regional societies across the empire. The expansion of Roman imperial control was based on a process of imperial incorporation that exploited people while enabling them to live in new ways. This involved the spread of a malleable imperial culture—a culture of inclusion and exclusion (Dench 2005, 35)—that identified and helped to create imperial order through a structuring system of difference.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> These ideas are addressed in greater detail in Hingley 2005 and Hingley 2009. An important issue that is not addressed here is the cultural context in which these new ideas about Roman identity and social change are developing and what this tells us about the rôle of classical scholarship in our contemporary age of empire (see Hingley 2009).

## 2. *Cultures of Inclusion: Romanisation and 'Becoming Roman'*

For the past hundred years, the most influential concept of social change has been 'Romanisation', an idea that has been used to address societies across the empire (for recent accounts, see MacMullen 2000 and Millett 1990a; for a critical review, see Hingley 2005, 30-46). Originally, Romanisation was taken to represent a fairly unitary process through which barbarian societies across the western empire came to adopt Roman civilisation (Hingley 2005; Mattingly 2002). Approaches to Romanisation have gradually changed, being increasingly focused, from the 1980s, upon the methods by which local groups within Italy and the provinces came to adopt variable forms of Roman culture. During the 1990s, new interpretations developed to account for the active rôle of local élites in the adoption and adaptation of the imperial culture offered to them by the expanding imperial system (e.g. Millett 1990a; Terrenato 2001; Woolf 1998). These reconstruct the empire as focused upon numerous local élites, within the imperial core of the Mediterranean, who negotiated their own identities in order to create a system that worked to the benefit of at least a significant proportion of the population. These accounts no longer viewed 'Roman' culture as a clearly bounded and monolithic entity, but as a malleable group of practices that were derived from a variety of sources spread across the Mediterranean (Woolf 2001).

During the final centuries of the first millennium BC, élite groups across Italy developed a growing unity through a process that Nicola Terrenato has called 'élite negotiation' (Terrenato 2001). A new culture arose as a result of the benefits of peace and relative prosperity brought to these groups through closer contacts with the growing power of Rome. As part of this process, communities within the expanding empire became allied with Rome and incorporated precisely because they bargained for, struggled for, or were offered the privilege of retaining the core of their traditional organisation within an imperial framework intended to guarantee order and stability (*ibid.*, 5). Greg Woolf's account of 'becoming Roman' in Gaul during the late first century BC and first century AD provides a detailed and influential exploration of the assimilation of the upper strata (Woolf 1998) while comparable approaches have been adopted in the Netherlands, Britain, and elsewhere (Hingley 2005). The local élites across the provinces were co-opted to run and administer their own peoples so that much of the control of the empire was devolved to the descendants of the upper strata of the indigenous societies that had been incorporated into the



empire. These people were allowed some independence in adopting aspects of a common Roman culture that spread with the empire. It was in the interests of the upper strata in Rome and their counterparts in indigenous societies across the empire to co-operate in the creation of imperial control, since this increased the power and prestige of all concerned while ensuring stability and order (Terrenato 2001).

Concepts of Roman and native are seen to break down entirely in an expanding empire that recreated itself through local engagement (Woolf 1997). This approach explains imperial expansion and stability by addressing the way that local élites were used to knit together the structure of empire. Becoming Roman also reinterprets earlier ideas of Romanisation by allowing a greater regional variability in the ways that Roman culture was picked up by provincial élites. Thus, the form of Roman culture adopted in Gaul could be very different from that in Britannia or Iberia, while variable cultures also developed within individual provinces (*ibid.*). In addition, the attempts of people from outside Rome and Italy to 'become Roman' fed back into a gradually evolving conception of what it was to be Roman across much of the empire (Woolf 1997; 2001).

Latin culture—ways of living, dressing, and public behaviour—acted as a powerful agent of inclusion, incorporating influential people within societies at the imperial margin into the power structure of the expanding empire (Dench 2005). Can these contrasting views of fragmentation and centralization be reconciled? These assimilative forces of social inclusion formed a vital aspect of the manner in which imperial expansion and consolidation occurred from the Augustan period to the late first century AD, since empire could not expand without them. Certain highly visible aspects of culture—such as the diction of Latin, the wearing of the toga, or correct etiquette at a banquet—helped to create an 'international' coherence in the hybrid local 'Roman' cultures that developed, a series of rules that excluded those who lacked advance knowledge and experience (*ibid.*, 35). The common élite package of Latin language and literacy—together with distinctive ways of eating, bathing, dressing, living and behaving in public—spread widely across the Roman west, as attested by the archaeological information for public buildings, cities and Roman villas. That Roman urban centres, country houses, military forts and some styles of pottery appear to possess a certain unity of form across much of the Roman empire—from Britain, to Germany, Gaul, Iberia and North Africa—is taken to support a process of change to a Roman way of life for many across the western empire (MacMullen 2000). At the same time, as Woolf argued

(1997; 2001), these innovations were adopted in different ways in the regions and provinces of the Roman western empire.

### 3. *Spreading the Culture of Empire to a Broader Community?*

Studies of Romanisation and becoming Roman adopt the perspectives expressed through the surviving classical texts by focusing upon the lives and interests of the upper strata of Roman and imperial societies, those who ruled their communities through urban centres and who lived in elaborate urban and rural residences (Hingley 2005, 49-50). The surviving literature of the classical world has helped to create a research-tradition that focuses upon the archaeological evidence left behind by the rich and privileged (Potter 1999, 152; Hingley 2005). By seeking to adopt Roman ways of life, the élite of various provincial societies are imagined to have been drawn into a common Graeco-Roman identity—a culture that communicated across the vast geographic extent of the empire (Woolf 1998) but that also had a specific relevance to the wealthy and well connected. How have such accounts examined the less wealthy and influential?

Drawing upon earlier works, MacMullen (2000, 128, 137) argues that Romanisation operated through a process of ‘osmosis’ that incorporated the less wealthy and privileged, while Woolf (1998, 201-2) has made broadly comparable observations for the spread of *terra sigillata* and the process of becoming Roman in Gaul. This suggests that many within the Roman empire aspired to some of the same rules and standards, and accumulated as complete a Roman cultural package as was possible according to their resources and contacts, since it was considered natural to aspire to these things (MacMullen 2000, 134).<sup>2</sup> Consequently, Roman ideas are felt to have trickled-down to the less privileged and wealthy (Millett 1990b, 38). The spread of innovations, such as *terra sigillata* and wheel-made pottery, to the people who lived in relatively un-Roman settlements across the western provinces is often taken to support the adoption of Roman ways by the lower social strata. Where people could not afford to build a villa or dine from silver dishes, they acquired pottery, new types of personal ornamentation, or changed their building styles in imitation of their social superiors (Hingley 2005, 34).

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<sup>2</sup> Woolf’s observations on the spread of *terra sigillata* do allow for regional variability in the ways these wares were adopted across Gaul.

Such an approach imagines a simple assimilation of all (or most) people across the Roman West, based on the idea of Roman identity as a culture of inclusion. People were assimilated in positive ways based on the practical and symbolic advantages of the ways of life offered by the expanding empire. From this perspective, Roman culture was intrinsically attractive and it is assumed that everyone will have wanted to share in it (MacMullen 2000, 134). The creation of a common Roman culture across large areas of the Mediterranean and northern Europe is thought to have led to a certain degree of cultural ('Roman') unity, tying local élites into a coherent whole and uniting, to a degree, the wealthy with the less well provisioned.

#### 4. *Roman Culture as a Colonising Mythology*

The idea of a common élite western culture that derives from classical Rome has dominated writings since the Renaissance. Such an approach emphasises the texts and material records left behind the relatively wealthy and powerful of imperial and provincial society and projects a relatively simplistic idea of cultural assimilation, with everyone aspiring to a common goal. Recently it has been argued that, by focusing attention upon the rich and powerful, such approaches over-simplify the complexity of highly variable societies that were created as a result of imperial expansion (Alcock 2001; Mattingly 2002; Hingley 2005). Did Rome transform the lives of all within the boundaries of the empire? Can we assume that interpretations derived from the material records left behind by the rich and powerful, and from their textual records, represent the lives of all the peoples incorporated into the empire?

A counter-claim emphasises that the identities that developed across the western empire were not at all unified and consistent. Mary Downs (2000, 209) has contested that the idea of Roman unity—the argument for a united and standardised urban civilisation—is a colonial myth. Invented in classical times and adopted and transformed by antiquarians and archaeologists since the Renaissance, it has conditioned the materials that have been collected by archaeologists and how these have been interpreted and communicated (Hingley 2005). Thus, by focusing on the excavation and publication of evidence for certain types of sites and landscapes—including monumental towns, villas, roads, imperial administration and the army—archaeologists have created a self-fulfilling process, in which the material collected naturally supports the initial research focus on which excavation strategies have been based. At the same time, such approaches

write out the histories and cultures of peoples who did not adhere to a pre-determined Roman identity.

Broadening research agendas for classical archaeology since the 1960s had, by the late 1990s, provided new data on which to build different perspectives about Roman identity and social change. The development of archaeological field surveys in Italy and the Mediterranean resulted in the collection of information about rural landscapes that were occupied by networks of communities, many of which do not fit the predictions of Romanisation (van Dommelen 1993). In Britain, France, Spain and the Netherlands, excavations have explored varieties of settlements that appear less directly Roman in character, as some attention has been directed away from the Roman cities and villas (Hingley 2005, 36). Carol van Driel-Murray has argued that the application of recent approaches to the Batavians of the Lower Rhine valley has created 'undefined, undifferentiated and apparently entirely male' élites (van Driel-Murray 2002). A focus in the classical literature on wealthy and influential men has found a reflection in research traditions that emphasise the material record left behind by the upper strata, approaches that fail to represent the aspirations of the vast majority of the population of the empire, including the less-wealthy and the marginalised (Culham 1997; Hingley 2005). The new information collected through landscape survey and excavation clearly indicates that ways of life in the Roman empire were far more variable than the colonial myth that is incorporated into accounts of Romanisation and becoming Roman. New types of site and landscape have come to be recognised that challenge earlier understandings and support the development of new approaches (Dench 2005, 232; Hingley 2005, 36).

### 5. *Counter-cultures*

In response to critiques of élitism, studies during the early 21st Century have started to fragment Roman identity by deriving new interpretations that draw deeply upon material remains (Hingley 2005, 91). This is achieved, for example, through the creation of the ideas of 'sub-cultures' and regional cultures, now argued by some to have formed constituent parts of a heterogeneous but relatively unified empire (James 2001; Hingley 2005, 91-2). These new approaches seek to establish the degree to which a broadly defined imperial culture that spread with Rome appealed to groups of different status and wealth across the empire. As a reaction to former ideas of the centrality of power, scholarship has been transformed by modelling

new approaches that explore the complexity of cultural identities, including those that are wealth-based, occupational, regional and gender-specific. This has created the idea of a flexible form of Roman citizenship, and broader forms of Roman identity for those who had not achieved it, including soldiers and traders.

Groups such as soldiers, their wives and families, traders, workers and farmers can be seen to have redefined themselves in the new contexts created by the expansion of empire (James 2001; Hingley 2005; van Driel-Murray 2002). For example, soldiers were recruited from native peoples into the auxiliary units of the Roman army, where they were taught a version of Roman culture (James 2001). If they survived to retirement after 25 years of service, they became Roman citizens. These soldiers usually served abroad and, together with traders who lived outside their native communities, may have helped to spread an international Roman culture that identified them within a challenging and alien cultural milieu (*ibid.*, 203). The incorporation of auxiliary soldiers into the empire will also have influenced the lives of their wives and children (van Driel-Murray 2002), although military identity appears to represent a sub-culture that was very different in character to the culture of the upper strata of imperial and provincial societies (James 2001).

The archaeological records for some of communities across the Roman West appear to be rather un-Roman in character, raising problems with the idea that their cultures were actually 'Roman' in any meaningful way (Hingley 2009). Useful studies, considered in more detail elsewhere (Hingley 2005, 91-116), include the Batavi of the Lower Rhine valley and the population of north-western Iberia, but similar arguments can be derived from other peoples throughout the Roman empire (*ibid.*). In many places, the local peoples were assimilated into the empire in ways that exploited their past histories, the resources that they could utilise, and the relations that were built up with Rome at the time of their conquest and incorporation. In north-western Iberia and the Lower Rhine valley, for example, the male populations were recruited into the Roman army as auxiliary soldiers on a fairly large-scale basis, while the mining of minerals was also significant in the former area. There was no development of a regular network of urban centres or villas during the first century AD in either of these regions, helping to explode the colonial myth of a highly integrated and Romanised western empire (*ibid.*, 91-2).

The territory of both areas has been described as a 'non-villa landscape' (Derks and Roymans 2002, 88; Millett 2001). The standard settlements

appear to represent a development from the indigenous pre-Roman forms. In the territory of the Batavi, people continued to live in settlements of timber long-houses, while in north-western Iberia enclosed hilltop settlements (*castros*) remain common. The urban centres in these two territories usually appear to be implanted as a result of Roman military activity and there may have been relatively little input from the local people in the development of these towns. A Roman transformation, involving cities in which local government was conducted and the spread of rural élite residences (*villas*) across the countryside, does not appear to have occurred in these particular landscapes. A different look at the archaeology of the western empire suggests that the two areas may not be unrepresentative of others across the western empire. The standard élite model of an assimilative Roman culture, in which monumental towns and *villas* spread throughout the landscape, may not actually be a very common occurrence (Hingley 2005, 116).

This is not to say that the settlements and houses occupied by the Batavi and people in north-western Iberia remained the same after the conquest of these territories. New forms of living emerged during the first century that adopted innovations which spread as a result of the international contacts brought about through the incorporation of people into the empire. It is important, however, that, although these ways of life formed a response to imperial incorporation, they were also based on the indigenous histories of the communities concerned. Batavians and Iberians were highly effective soldiers and were natural recruits as Roman auxiliaries. The question of whether these peoples were 'becoming Roman', or not, focuses on whether their culture can be seen as sufficiently Roman to warrant such a term (Hingley, 2009). With regard to this question, it is particularly relevant that, among the Batavi, Latin language and literacy may have spread widely throughout their territory as a result of the recruitment and training of the auxiliary soldiers. Ton Derks and Nico Roymans (2002) have argued that the Batavi people adopted Latin as a way of communicating with their kin who traveled on military service to other lands.

Latin has often been seen as a symbol of élite status in classical society: does the suggestion of fairly wide-spread Latin literacy amongst the Batavi indicated their assimilation into a fully Roman identity, despite the relatively un-Roman character of their material culture?

### 6. *Culture of Inclusion and Exclusion*

By the Augustan period, Roman culture acted as a powerful agent of imperial incorporation but, as Emma Dench has recently argued (2005, 35), it also represented a 'highly ideologically laden and increasingly international culture of social exclusion'. Anyone who has studied Latin at school will realise that the teaching of this language is not entirely motivated by a wish to include the uninitiated. Until recently, knowledge of Latin grammar and the canonical Latin texts has constituted a means to acquire status and power in western society (Corbeill 2001). In these terms, Latin was one element in a powerful Roman culture of inclusion that was spread to people across western Europe, including the Batavi.

At the same time, however, the grammatical rules and standards espoused for Latin also serve to exclude the uninitiated or uninvited. Latin language and ways of living like a Roman were not available to all within society, since a full Roman identity as a citizen of the empire focused on an élite lifestyle to which only few could aspire. A certain degree of social mobility was possible for some people in provincial society: slaves could become free, and auxiliary soldiers could become Roman citizens after twenty-five years of service, but Roman culture remained exclusive and élite-focused. It constituted a series of standards and ways of life that could include and, at the same time, exclude those that were incorporated in the empire. This is because a single person could be partially assimilated while also being effectively marginalised — the two processes were complementary rather than oppositional.

The assimilation of provincial peoples across the empire cannot be characterised in simple terms as a process of either inclusion or exclusion. The nature of Roman culture acted to include and exclude simultaneously all who were incorporated and the issue is rather the degree to which inclusion (assimilation) and exclusion (marginalisation) characterised each individual local situation (Hingley 2009). The character of Latin grammar provides a metaphor for ways in which Roman culture operated. Individuals could be included in a broader fellowship of Latin-speakers and writers by learning Latin but, at the same time, the character of the language achieved by an individual will have served to exclude him/her from the international fellowship of Latin speakers. Only through extensive and detailed learning and experience and by the achievement of a considerable proficiency and depth of scholarship and knowledge could an individual become relatively fully assimilated. Such an advanced knowledge of Latin will have been restricted to the circles of the Roman upper strata.

In the context of the Batavi, the imperial administration recruited and used these auxiliary soldiers for its own purposes, encouraging the development of a pre-existing military identity that kept Batavian soldiers in a position of dependency that was symbolised in an effective manner by the un-Roman character of their cultures, their relative lack of involvement in urban life, and the general absence of villas and other aspects of imperial culture in their territory (van Driel-Murray 2002, 215). Thus Batavian culture helped marginalise these people from 'Roman' imperial culture. Inadequate Latin helped project a cultural marginalisation that was highly apparent to the imperial administrators who visited Batavian territory and to members of the Batavi themselves when they travelled to other areas of the empire.

Archaeological research conducted over the past forty-five years strongly suggests that the vast majority of people across the Roman empire did not have the material resources and contacts to aim for the achievement of full Roman identity, although the evidence has often been sidelined as the result of a determined search for the progressive value of Roman innovation (Hingley 2005, 116). An auxiliary soldier from Germany or Spain who had achieved Roman citizenship would not appear particularly Roman to a senator in the city of Rome, while an agricultural peasant would have been beneath notice. (The rather heartless trick played on a couple of peasants' sheep by the young Marcus Aurelius comes to mind: Fronto, *Epist.* 2.12 Haines = 2.34 van den Hout; Dexter Hoyos, personal communication). The gradations of Roman-ness even in the heartland must have been close to infinite. This does not mean, however, that aspiring to adopt Roman ways was irrelevant to the majority populations of the empire. Indeed, the expansion of the empire resulted in the spreading of a variety of traditions and materials—of which new language is merely one example—that could be used to create new ways of being. Other aspects of Roman identity, including urban living, dress, religion and cuisine, may have operated in a broadly comparable manner by helping to fashion new identities while maintaining and transforming the structure of social differentiation that was fundamental to the expansion of empire and the imperial stability that was created.

## 7. Conclusion

This paper has provided a brief survey of a number of studies in order to explore transformations in the academic context of knowledge over the



past twenty years, addressing Romanisation, 'becoming Roman' and approaches to what I have termed counter cultures. Shifting attitudes to the current world, together with the collection of new classes of archaeological data have challenged earlier ideas, enabling classicists and classical archaeologists to imagine the Roman past in new ways. This allows the empire to be perceived as a more heterogeneous society, in which groups and individuals acted in different ways while retaining the core of their inherited identities; at the same time, this heterogeneous cultural initiative contributed to the centralising forces inherent in the project of imperial order and governance.

Ideas of Roman and native, élite and non-élite, incorporation and resistance, are seen to break down, at least to a degree, within this empire that recreated itself through local engagement (Woolf 1997). The Roman empire became a highly variable series of local groups, held roughly together by directional forces of integration that formed an organised whole which lasted for several centuries (*ibid.*; Dench 2005, 220-1). Heterogeneity became a binding force of imperial stability—a tool in an ambitious mission to create perpetual imperial order. At the same time, cultural difference was also used to establish opposites in order to marginalise, but also to crush and even exterminate, people. Heterogeneity and imperial force had a complex inter-relationship in terms of marginalisation and assimilation, but the focus upon the centrality of imperial power helps to explain the variable local response to changing power relations, as people were enabled to change their ways and to co-operate with the imperial initiative.

This allows for a greater variety of cultural experiences across the empire. In building such approaches, Roman imperial studies reflect changing perspectives in the humanities. New approaches have aimed to broaden (de-centre) understanding and to challenge earlier interpretations of the centrality of imperial civilisation and its progressive logic by exploring the complexity of identities, through focusing upon the locality and its relationship to wider imperial forces (Hingley 2009). Archaeological research over the past four decades has demonstrated the highly variable character of provincial landscapes, emphasising the importance of taking a less deterministic approach to identity, history and assimilation. The variability in this evidence suggests that approaches to Romanisation by osmosis and ideas of trickle-down Romanisation are too simplistic. Once resistance to empire was suppressed, people may have had little option but to co-operate and exploit the new provincial situation to best effect; but peasants, industrialists and traders could not really aspire to the lifestyles of the upper strata.

This paper has argued that new identities were created through an assimilative imperial culture. Presumably many people had at least some option to aspire to certain forms of imperial behaviour (Latin, literacy, styles of eating, etc), but wealth and social contacts will have influenced and constrained the ways that people could respond. People were incorporated, in part, according to their natural abilities and available materials, but under rules of imperial engagement that were certainly not of their own making.

## CO-OPTING THE CONQUEROR: THE EAST FROM AUGUSTUS TO TRAJAN

*Maurice Sartre*

From Rome's first dealings with the Greeks at the end of the 3rd Century BC, she adopted two contradictory attitudes toward them: disdain and admiration. Cicero's works attest this ambiguous relation between Rome and the Greeks: in his courtroom speeches he never has words harsh enough for denouncing the foibles of the Greeks (trickery, cowardice, flattery), but he himself followed the teachings of Antiochus of Ascalon at Athens and of Posidonius at Rhodes, and recommends to his brother Quintus, governor of the province of Asia, never to forget that he is governing the descendants of the founders of civilisation.

A long time before the age of Augustus, the Roman empire became *de facto* a bilingual empire: cultivated Roman notables all knew Greek, for they had long considered the Greeks as the custodians of culture; and whatever the disdain they show for *Graeculi*, towards whom they display unbearable arrogance, they became, from the mid-2nd Century and still more with Pompey, Caesar and Mark Antony, the propagators of Hellenism in the eastern Mediterranean. Not only did they respect everywhere the lifestyles *à la grecque*, but they adopted parts of them for themselves and propagated them broadly over the entire *pars orientalis* of the empire. In this sense the famous pronouncement of the poet Horace (*Ep.* 2.1.156), 'conquered Greece captured her rough conqueror and brought the arts into rustic Latium', proves to be exact but inadequate: her conqueror was for over three centuries the best propagandist for her culture, particularly in the new provinces of the Near East.

The century that extends from Augustus to Trajan marks, in this field, a decisive stage on the political, as much as on the economic, social or cultural, level. While the totality of client states were moving progressively under Rome's direct administration, Rome was spreading the model of the Greek city (*polis*), making it the basic unit of its administration; was admitting many inhabitants of the Mediterranean provinces into Roman citizenship; and was introducing various members of their élites into the Senate. The return of peace and security, and respect for local traditions,

encouraged the inhabitants of the eastern provinces to adhere to the authority of Rome. This did not prevent either complaints from provincials faced with governors' extortions or several violent revolts (Thrace, Judaea).

The battle of Actium (2 September, 31 BC) marks the opening in Mediterranean history of a double process achieved in the following months: the completion of the unification of all the shores of the Mediterranean under the direct or indirect authority of Rome (with the creation of the province of Egypt in spring 30), and the return of peace. The Greek-speaking provinces had paid a heavy tribute to the civil war in fact and in metaphor, and emerged exhausted by the exactions of the *imperatores*, the pillaging by pirates and bandits, and the ravages of Roman troops and those of the kings of Pontus, Armenia and the Parthians. The defeat of Antony and Cleopatra allowed peace to be glimpsed. And in fact, apart from localised revolts, peace reigned for the most part during the 1st Century of our era.

Augustus broadly continued the policy of Antony on an essential point: recourse to client princes to administer the regions hardest to control. He left in peace native princes in Thrace, Judaea, Nabataea, Syria (at Emesus, Chalcis in Lebanon, etc.), and in Commagene, as well as in the interior of Asia Minor (Pontus, Cappadocia, Galatia, Paphlagonia and Cilicia, not to mention numerous states of lesser extent). But he also inaugurated a policy of annexing these states when opportunity arose: this happened with Galatia from 25 BC, Paphlagonia in 6 BC, certain districts of Galatian Pontus in 3 BC (Amaseia, Sebastopolis, Sebasteia), and part of Judaea in AD 6. This integration policy was continued slowly but steadily until the reign of Trajan, who put an end to the last client-state in the region, the kingdom of the Nabataeans which became the *provincia Arabia* in 106. Thus, to mention only the chief states, Cappadocia was annexed in AD 17, Pontus in 33, the Lycian *koinon* in 43, the Thracian kingdoms in 46, Commagene, Armenia Minor and Emesa around 70–72, the kingdom of Agrippa II in southern Syria in the late 80s. That did not prevent some backward turns, for example Caligula's restoration of Commagene and Pontus after earlier annexation, and the re-establishment of the kingdom of Herod the Great for the benefit of Agrippa I by Claudius in 41.

Annexing client states occurred as a result when Rome estimated that administration by Roman officials was made possible by the existence of native élites Hellenised enough to provide ruling groups in provincial cities. For Roman provincial administration, except in Egypt, was based on a relatively autonomous network of native cities and communities.

Annexation was often accompanied, therefore, by the creation of *poleis* where they did not as yet exist, by reinforcing them, or by refounding them. The new names of cities attest this, like Tiberiopolis borne by Pappa in Pisidia and Arcades in Crete, or the epithet *Claudia* adopted by Apamea on the Orontes and Balaneia, also in Syria, or Iconium in Isauria.

Creations, however, were few in the 1st Century and it was not until the reigns of Trajan and Hadrian that cities truly multiplied. Augustus all the same had set the example by creating Nicopolis in Epirus, opposite Actium: a Greek-style *polis* to commemorate his victory, not a *colonia* on the Roman model. A list (incompletely preserved) of communities forming the province of Asia in Vespasian's time nonetheless shows that there still remained very many non-civic communities even in this long-urbanised province. In Syria and Judaea, native cities were promoted to the rank of *polis*, like Palmyra some time after its annexation to the empire in AD 19; but the client princes were the most active in this field, with the creation of several Caesareas (Maritima by Herod the Great in 20 BC, Caesarea-Panias in Galilee, Caesarea-Arca in Lebanon, Caesarea in Cappadocia) and various cities with dynastic names (Livias, Iulias, Neronias, Tiberias, Germanicia etc.). Only Egypt escaped this foundation movement entirely, but this really maintained Lagid tradition because the Greeks themselves had created no city apart from Alexandria and Ptolemais.

The emperors adopted towards cities an attitude both respectful and firm. Firm, in that emperors took strict steps to restore order in them after the troubles of the Civil War. Various edicts bear witness to their efforts. Civic finances were restored, as at Ephesus where it was forbidden to borrow over a longer period than the term of the borrowing magistrate, as well as to remunerate priests or employ free paid persons for tasks that slaves could carry out; or again at Cyme in Aeolis, where the emperor Augustus ordered the restoration of public buildings that had been sold or leased to individuals, and the remission of privileges that were excessive or obtained without justification. The election of magistrates were regularised, with entry into office set for all at September 23rd in Asia. In Bithynia, at the start of the 2nd Century, Pliny the Younger reinstated the rules laid down by Pompey at the time that the province was established, and in Egypt the first measures of compulsion against rich recalcitrants appeared (from the reign of Tiberius). It was perhaps when these measures were promulgated that troubles broke out in the cities, for they jeopardised situations set up during the troubled period of the Civil Wars. We know of troubles at Tyre, Sidon and notably Sardis, which were severely repressed by the Roman

authorities; they attest the existence of opposing factions and the continuance of an active civic life.

By contrast Rome confirmed the political system of the cities by accentuating their oligarchic character. Councils were henceforth for life and reserved for magistrates and ex-magistrates. In many cities the *boule* was flanked by a *gerousia*, a 'council of Elders' assumed to be more conservative. Even though the popular assemblies met regularly, it was still a case of rule by notables, since all selection by lot was banned and only the well-off attained magistracies. Besides, from the end of the Hellenistic era women, children, and indeed rich foreigners could be entrusted with magistracies, in general eponymous functions without real power (*stephanophoria*, *prytany*) or quasi-magistracies like that of gymnasiarch which, juridically, was a liturgy or 'task' (*munus*) of a fiscal nature. This evolution underlines that henceforth the financing of civic functions rested partly on those who exercised them, or at least that they were expected to spend their resources on doing more than the function required. In other words *euergetism* became a method of government. The rich must therefore devote part of their fortune to the functioning of civic institutions. *Euergetism*, which had taken on a considerable financial dimension from the mid-2nd Century BC, became a means of indirect social redistribution: the instrument through which the richest men obtained public marks of recognition (honorific decrees, statues, titles of 'father (or 'son') of the city' and 'benefactor', tomb in a privileged spot, etc.), at the same time as their generosity gave distinction to the city in the form of monumental embellishments, culture, or religious life.

The policy of restoring order in the cities was accompanied by many signs of respect and aid. On the one hand Rome sought to repair the injustices which she had herself committed, such as restoring to Samos some of the statues carried off by Romans. At the time of earthquakes, emperors did not hesitate to come to the help of cities either by giving money or by remitting tribute. All the emperors displayed their benevolence, notably Augustus in the earthquake of 26 BC (Tralles), Tiberius in that of AD 17 in the province of Asia. He not only granted considerable material aid (10 million sesterces to Sardis) but also remitted tribute for five years. Nero, who robbed the greatest sanctuaries of Greece during his voyage of 67–68, went still further by proclaiming the freedom of the Greeks of Achaia, which amounted to abolishing the province and taking the cities out of the empire itself, a measure that Vespasian annulled on coming to power.

More enduringly, Rome tried to put an end to abuses in levying taxes. Already from Caesar onwards, tribute was raised directly by the communities and paid to the quaestor in charge of the finances of Asia, and this was no doubt equally the case in the other provinces. But the tax-farmers (*publicani*) responsible for the abuses remained active in indirect taxes. Nevertheless efforts were carried out to make the methods of collection and the rights of *publicani* more transparent in the eyes of provincials; this is the point of Nero's decision to publish the lengthy customs regulation-list concerning the *portoria* of the province of Asia in AD 58. Likewise it is possible that the tax of the 'inheritance twentieth' (*vicesima hereditatis*) weighing on Roman citizens ceased to be farmed out, so as to be levied directly through specific procurators from the reign of Trajan.

The restoration of the Greek cities was accompanied by a rivalry set up among them for the greater benefit of the empire. During the 1st Century a system of *cursus honorum* was developed which allowed emperors to be assured of the cities' loyalty; relying on their taste for competition (*agon*), they knew how to stimulate rivalries skilfully between cities by granting them more or less important privileges. From the years of civil war, cities had received privileges like freedom (which set them outside the provincial list and let them escape the governor's jurisdiction) and fiscal immunity. The attitude of cities during the civil wars, their resistance or non-resistance to the forces of Mithridates and, later, to Labienus' Persians, acted as a touchstone in establishing the hierarchy of friends of Rome long after the events. According to circumstances these coveted privileges could be suppressed or restored. Rhodes had a painful experience: deprived of freedom after the murder of Roman citizens in AD 43, it regained this status only in 53. New city-titles appeared, such as 'first of the province' (Ephesus) or 'first in beauty' (Smyrna), and each city busied itself with earning respect for its titles from its neighbours and rivals. For the cities were proud of the titles they acquired, and willingly displayed them on the city walls, indeed had them engraved to make their survival certain (the wall of archives at Aphrodisias).

In this competition between cities, Rome was skilled in utilising the imperial cult. From 29 BC Octavian had accepted the proposal by the Greeks of Asia and Bithynia to create a cult of Rome and of himself, temples for which were established as he wished at Nicaea and Pergamum, not in the provincial capitals Nicomedia and Ephesus where only his adoptive father Caesar was celebrated. The chief cities—in Asia, the capitals of

*conventus*—lost no time in competing for each to harbour a provincial sanctuary of the imperial cult, something that few obtained. They took the prestigious title of *neocoros* from Vespasian's reign on. A similar cult was set up in Syria, no doubt in the age of Augustus, with a high priest established in Antioch and provincial sanctuaries at Tyre and Tarsus. In the same way it was founded in Macedonia, Galatia (notably at Ancyra) and Cyprus. It was created more tardily in Achaia, but never in Egypt at the provincial level (but a municipal cult did exist at Alexandria).

The hesitation of the first Julio-Claudians over this form of divinisation, expressed notably by Tiberius in a letter to the people of Gythium and in a letter of Claudius to the Alexandrians, did not prevent them from accepting the extension of their cult in the provinces. As for Caligula and Nero, they contrastingly became its keen propagators, to the point where Caligula sought to have his statue introduced into the temple of Jerusalem.

Celebrations of imperial cult allowed all the notables of the same province, or their representatives, to assemble thanks to a structure inherited from the end of the Hellenistic era and spread through most of the new provinces: the *koinon*. This provincial assembly was placed under the presidency of an eminent magnate who bore a title clearly indicating his function: Bithyniarch, Syriarch, Phoenicarch, Galatarch, Macedoniarch, Asiarch (even if the sense of this last title remains debated). The *koinon* assembled chiefly to celebrate the provincial imperial cult (with gladiatorial combats, hunts, and combats between wild animals of which we have a fine list at Ancyra in Galatia, under Augustus and Tiberius) and to organise their shared contests, but it could also voice provincials' demands or grievances. It was the *koinon* that formulated the demands of cities for privileges, and that denounced unscrupulous governors: in this way several proconsuls of Asia and Bithynia were brought to justice and convicted during the 1st Century.

The attitude of successive emperors towards the Greeks did not prevent Rome from introducing in parallel some novelties of its own. In general it created only a few Roman colonies in Greek-speaking regions; this was seen as an advantage because founding a colony implied the loss by the previous inhabitants of their landed goods or their removal to more unfavourable lands for the benefit of the colonists. The Greeks had had experience of this during the 1st Century BC at Patrae, Corinth, Sinope, and Heraclea Pontica in particular. The few colonies founded between Augustus and Vespasian were not in the Aegean world properly speaking. Thus



Augustus initiated several colonies in Pisidia, Galatia, Lycaonia, and Isauria, in unstable regions where brigandage was endemic (in 25 BC King Amyntas of Galatia was killed fighting brigands) and poorly Hellenised. Few towns entrusted in this way to Roman colonists were previously of any importance (Pisidian Antioch, Iconium); the others were villages without importance (Comana, Parlaïs, Lystra, Cremna, Germa, Olbasa). The few other colonies (Berytus under Augustus, Ptolemaïs in Phoenicia under Claudius) remained very isolated. Augustus also contributed to strengthen some older colonies (Parion, Apamea-Myrleia) and no doubt founded Alexandria in the Troad. But in this specific case it was a matter of giving privileged status to a city which could flatter itself for having given birth to the Trojan ancestors of Rome.

But from this period, too, the status of colony began to change its nature and become one of the advantages that a city could obtain. Indeed at the same time as colonies continued to be founded with settlements of Roman soldiers (Aelia Capitolina in 130), the title was granted to *poleis*, whose citizens became *de iure* Roman citizens. The first example was Caesarea in Palestine in Vespasian's time. But this remained marginal and the colonies, whatever their nature, never became foci for the spread of Latin language and culture. Rather, from the beginning of the 2nd Century, Greek seems to rank equally with Latin in the colonies, not only in private documents (like epitaphs) but also in official texts.

If we must seek signs of 'Romanisation', in the cultural sense of the term, in other words the adoption of Roman usages properly speaking, they are best sought among political institutions, the monumental environment, and leisure activities. Where institutions are concerned, the civic *boulai* (councils) became lifetime tenures on the model of the Senate at Rome and the *curiae* of Roman colonies. In the same way the practice of the *summa honoraria* developed, at least in the Aegean provinces; by contrast the idea of the *cursus honorum* seems to have remained foreign to Greeks. In the cities the monumental environment was modified. The Roman East scarcely adopted Roman construction techniques, if only because little was constructed in brick. But certain architectural models (like the temple on a podium) are found in the East, notably in the regions that had been little Hellenised and therefore had no Greek traditions in this regard (Lebanon). Above all we observe the development of certain types of monuments hitherto unknown or scarcely developed: the monumental arch (most of them later than the 1st Century), the *macellum* or enclosed market (Ephesus), the amphitheatre (Antioch in Syria, Caesarea in Palestine) and the

hippodrome. Baths underwent considerable development, along with *gymnasia* and *palaestrae*. These monuments reveal the introduction of social usages of Roman origin: daily attendance at baths, games in the circus and amphitheatre, and especially at celebrations of the imperial cult.

It is known that the Greeks showed a veritable infatuation with gladiatorial combats, despite the misgivings of intellectuals stated by Apollonius of Tyana. Nonetheless the impact of some Roman practices did not profoundly alter the attachment of Greeks, including Hellenised peoples, to the values and cultural manifestations of the city. In the same period the practice of Greek competitive gatherings developed over the whole Near East apart from Egypt. Thus to the gatherings attested at Tyre and Sidon from the 2nd Century BC on were added, in the 1st Century AD, Greek competitive meets at Damascus, Antioch and Caesarea in Palestine. So even in the regions under the influence of Hellenisation for over three centuries, it was only in the imperial age that one of the most distinctive features of Hellenism was established, the contest or *agon* with its content of athletic nudity, spirit of rivalry, and symbolic rewards. No city could better attest its membership of the community of Greeks than by creating an *agon* in honour of its tutelary deity or of the emperor.

The return of peace entailed the return of prosperity. During the 1st Century there occurred the rebuilding of cities and, at its start, their embellishment. This era saw the arrival of the fashion of colonnaded streets, the first example of which dates to the reign of Tiberius, at Syrian Antioch. Swiftly this monumentalisation of urban space was transformed into a 'petrification' of wealth, for the magnates, as benefactors or as magistrates, encouraged the embellishment of cities so as to leave a lasting imprint of their activity. At the same time men witnessed a relative cultural unification of the entire eastern Mediterranean under Roman dominance, and this unification occurred through the medium of Greek and of the values that it conveyed.

Use of Greek, well established throughout the Near East from the Hellenistic era, was strengthened and even became exclusive in some regions. Although many native languages persisted, few maintained an important written use: Egyptian and Aramaic formed exceptions. Everywhere else the native languages retreated before Greek: the last Phoenician inscription, in reality bilingual in Greek and Phoenician, dates from 25–24 BC and mentions the consecration of a gymnasium at Aradus, symbolic of the penetra-

tion of Greek culture into Phoenicia. Epigraphy bears clear witness to the growing use of Greek. Thus even if Aramaic continued in use in the Nabataean kingdom and at Palmyra (where it was even the official language, on a par with Greek, in the new city), it disappeared in practice from private and public monuments elsewhere in Syria while continuing to be spoken there by the bulk of the population. Even the epitaphs of moderately well-off people were from now on inscribed in Greek, as if the use of this language was becoming a sign of social distinction.

The general diffusion of Greek in the East was the more encouraged as Rome never considered it a native language among others, but as the other official language of the empire. Thus imperial edicts were translated into Greek for promulgation in the East, and in turn the communities of every origin could honour the emperor, or any Roman magistrate, in Greek whereas this was never done in any other native language except Egyptian (in the temples) and Aramaic at Palmyra. Despite this acknowledged recognition of Greek, it was necessary to wait until the reign of Hadrian for a chancellery in Greek to be created at Rome, directed by a knight (*eques*) with the title *ab epistulis Graecis*.

In general, the notables of the city did not hesitate to attach themselves to the new power. Of course there was some resistance, but it appeared more in words than in deeds. Men like Strabo or Plutarch did sometimes show themselves critical of the Roman administration, but these intellectual reservations, which attest to a certain arrogance towards Rome, reflect regret for the past: Plutarch never ceases to remind his fellow-citizens that the age of Marathon and Salamis no longer exists, and that henceforth it is proper never to forget 'the senatorial boots' that dominate the Greeks. This does not mean, all the same, that it is necessary to beg for their approval for every decision. Plutarch severely criticises fellow-citizens who get all their decrees approved by the Roman administration when governors are concerned only about what could damage imperial authority. The weakening of the cities, very relative anyway, was thus not the outcome of a policy willed by Rome but the result of the notables' systematic recourse to Roman arbitration. This is well seen in the domain of justice: all those who could do so, and especially Greeks who had become Roman citizens, sought out the verdict of the Roman governor, or indeed of the emperor, to evade civic justice which was viewed as too near and therefore as inequitable. So the Cnidians, in a banal business of murder in 15 BC, appealed to Augustus for justice.

These city magnates began to obtain Roman citizenship from the age of Augustus, but exceptionally so. The number of Greeks in the Aegean provinces becoming citizens grew strongly under Claudius, then under the Flavians, to the point where in the mid-2nd Century nearly all the magistrates or ex-magistrates were beneficiaries. This did not exempt them from taking on their electoral and financial tasks in their cities, apart from special privilege. But that contributed all the same to put them solidly on the side of Roman power, even if they were too few to become involved in an imperial career. Knights (*equites*) originating from Asia appeared under Claudius, the first senators under Nero, often in fact descended from families of Roman colonists allied to rich Greek families. It was not until Flavian times that true provincials advanced to the higher ranks. But strong disparities existed between provinces. Roman citizenship remained scarce in the little cities of the interior of Asia Minor and in Syria, and was almost nonexistent in Egypt outside Alexandria. Similarly the first senators originating from Syria appeared only under the Flavians or at the start of the Antonines, and there was no native-born Egyptian. (Philo of Alexandria's nephew, Ti. Julius Alexander, was a knight and his descendants were senators at the start of the 2nd Century, but they were renegade Jews from Alexandria, not Egyptians.)

Just as the emperors had known how to organise competition between cities, so too they granted to individuals privileges which contributed to guaranteeing their loyalty. Outside citizenship, the emperors conferred juridical privileges, and above all fiscal exemptions that did not injure the Roman fisc as much as civic finances. It involved granting to certain bodies (athletes and artists victorious at the sacred contests from the time of Mark Antony on, doctors, civic rhetors and teachers under Vespasian), or to named individuals, exemption from liturgies in their cities, which resulted in imposing financial duties on the other notables of the city.

Understandably, given such benefits in a world where the richest privileges appeared guaranteed no matter how little they allowed their fellow-citizens to profit from their wealth and influence through euergetism, cities came to hope for 'the eternal hegemony of the Romans', as some inscriptions state. We must assess the rôle, in this support for imperial power, of the properly Roman populations. They are chiefly known in Asia Minor and Greece, where they were present in the Republican era. The massacres of 88 BC did not cause them to disappear entirely, and others arrived to pursue business. Already at the start of the imperial era we can fairly clearly recognise the families of Italian origin, and the Romans

grouped themselves by choice in associations, which allows identification. But in proportion to the passage of time, these Italian families blended with local families, including in the colonies. We must also add the imperial freedmen of Greek origin who, on returning to their city, were living models of the social advancement that Rome promoted: C. Iulius Zoilus at Aphrodisias appeared as an exceptional *euergetes* in Augustus' time. There was thus created a unique of rich persons, blending Greeks and native Romans, all firmly attached to the regime which favoured them. Perhaps it should be seen as a sign, but after the oaths of loyalty to the emperor taken by the provincials of Gangra in Paphlagonia in 3 BC, in Cyprus under Tiberius, and at Assus in the Troad under Caligula, this custom disappears from the documentary record as though it had become unnecessary. The *imperium* of Rome was questioned by no one.

We must not, all the same, paint an idyllic picture of Roman domination. Texts repeatedly mention dishonest governors and, in the inscriptions honouring good governors, what receives prime praise is their 'integrity'. During the 1st Century AD several proconsuls of Asia and Bithynia were prosecuted at Rome on the initiative of the provincial *koinon*, and several were convicted. On the evidence, Rome did not desire a repetition of the abuses of civil war times.

In office the governors or various procurators responsible for imperial domains called their subordinates to order so as to prevent the provincials from being crushed under abusive exactions, a proof that some complained about these. Thus the governor of Galatia in AD 14–15 issued an edict that strictly regulated the methods of transport (wagons and beasts of burden) to be provided by the inhabitants of Sagalassus in Pisidia. During his visit to Egypt in 19, Germanicus promulgated an edict to ban abusive requisitions: some Roman officials or soldiers had used his coming as a pretext for making these. Domitian wrote to his procurator in Syria, Claudius Athenodorus, to protect the peasantry from exactions. An edict of Ti. Iulius Alexander, the prefect of Egypt, issued in September 68, set out the list of abuses which he wished to end: illegal new taxes, seizures of goods, liturgies imposed without cause, judicial decisions not obeyed, appointments to various posts not followed up, tribute levied not according to the true rise of the Nile but on an estimate. Measures were decreed, but the multiplication of edicts of this kind proves that the decisions of successive prefects were little, or badly, enforced.

One of the tasks imposed on Rome was the struggle against brigandage, and this seems to have succeeded fairly well. The great campaign of Pompey against the pirates and the brigands (67–66 BC) had not eliminated them. Some client princes (Amyntas of Galatia, Herod of Judaea) and Roman governors (P. Sulpicius Quirinius) were forced to combat brigands at the start of Augustus' reign and later. Nevertheless brigandage seems to have declined and, after the mid-1st Century, the only mention is of residual disturbances.

The Roman authorities likewise helped to combat another scourge from which cities suffered, the crises of supply. Several are attested: in Judaea under Herod, at Aspendus (Pamphylia) under Tiberius, in Egypt under Claudius, at Pisidian Antioch and generally across Asia Minor under Domitian. The struggle against speculators, who were obliged to release their stockpiles, as well as imports of corn from Egypt, usually allowed a stop to be put to grain crises.

Serious troubles, however, broke out in two provinces of the Roman East, Thrace and Judaea, and to a lesser degree at Alexandria. In Thrace two factors combined to create instability. For one thing, raids by the peoples north of the Danube brought insecurity until the close of the 1st Century BC; even the victorious campaigns of Cn. Cornelius Lentulus around AD 1–4 did not achieve complete stability on the frontier, as raids by the Dacians and Sarmatians are still noted in the years following. Above all, in Thrace proper, after the pacification obtained in 11 BC Augustus left the region under the authority of a client prince, Rhoemetaces I. On his death in AD 13 his kingdom was divided between his sons Rhescuporis III and Cotys VIII, who almost at once went to war. Intervention by Rome allowed peace to be restored, with difficulty (19), but new revolts broke out in 21 and then 26. In the end Rome annexed the Thracian kingdoms in 46, and administered them through relying on the local magnates appointed as heads of districts (*strategiae*) that took the place of cities.

At Alexandria serious troubles broke out in 37 after the death of Tiberius. The prefect of Egypt, A. Avillius Flaccus, a friend of Tiberius, agreed to a policy of repression against Alexandria's Jews as demanded by the Greek magnates of the city; he hoped for their support in his favour with Caligula. There followed what must indeed be termed 'pogroms' *avant l'heure*: looting, rapes, massacres, and the defilement of synagogues. The situation persisted throughout the year 38 and ended only with the accession of Claudius in 41, who ordered the Alexandrians to cease tormenting

the Jews and the Jews not to claim the same rights as the citizens of Alexandria.

In Judaea the situation was more serious and the troubles persisted longer. After the end of the Hasmonaean dynasty, Rome in 40 BC had named a half-Jew, the Idumaeen Herod, as king of Judaea. This solution had the advantage that Rome avoided directly administering a population ready to revolt under the pretext of defilement or impiety. On Herod's death (4 BC) his kingdom was divided between his three surviving sons. The part entrusted to the eldest, Archelaus (Judaea and Samaria), was annexed to the province of Syria in AD 6 and entrusted to a prefect residing at Caesarea. Rome could then assess the size of the difficulties that had to be surmounted. Since the check to the attempted modernisation of Judaism which had been undertaken by the high priest Jason in 175 BC, pious Jews had imposed on the majority of Jews increasingly strict respect for the Torah, the Jewish Law. With the Roman presence the occurrences of defilement multiplied, leading to protests and repressions. Moreover Judaism in Palestine then lived in expectation of the end of times and, for some, in hopes of a Messiah sent by God, as announced by numerous prophets and agitators; some of these advocated violent action against the occupier. Jewish ruling circles sought to contain this agitation, of which they were often the first victims: as collaborators with the Romans they fell under the blows of *sicarii*, extremists who terrorised those who collaborated with Rome. The magnates' efforts proved useless in practice when the Roman administrators, procurators from AD 44 on, multiplied provocations against the Jews. In 66 when a general revolt broke out, the magnates took the lead in putting the country in a state of defence.

The revolt, which concluded with the capture of Jerusalem and the destruction of the Temple, mobilised important Roman forces, but the reconquest of the greatest part of the country was swift (67–68). Operations endured only around Jerusalem (where for over a year the Romans watched the unfolding of a civil war among the Jews, before taking the Temple in 70) and around the fortress of Masada, taken in April 74. The balance-sheet was disastrous for the Jews. Deprived of their sole cult centre, becoming a minority in Judaea, they had to adjust everywhere to the presence of non-Jews (the 'Gentiles') and live in Judaea as they lived in the diaspora. This was indirectly to accelerate their Hellenisation.

The first century of the Empire marks, in the East, a radical change in the Romans' behaviour. After having led to the most brutal fiscal and

economic exploitation in the last century of the Republic, Roman imperialism adopted forms more respectful towards local traditions and transformed itself into a formidable bearer of Hellenism. In these circumstances the local élites, closely associated in the administration of cities and provinces and rewarded with marks of honour that distinguished them from the population, rallied unhesitatingly to a domination which had contributed to restore peace, security and prosperity.



## SPEECHES OF ENEMIES AND CRITICISM OF EMPIRE IN EARLY IMPERIAL HISTORIOGRAPHY

*Eric Adler*

οὐ μὲν δὴ οὐδὲ ΔΙνδῶν τινὰ ἔξω τῆς οἰκείης σταλῆναι ἐπὶ πολέμῳ διὰ  
δικαιοσύνην.

[The Indians say that] no Indians ever prepared for war outside of their  
homeland on account of their supreme regard for justice.

Arrian, *Indica* 9.12

Although we possess numerous narrative histories from the early Roman imperial period, none offers a lengthy, abstract digression on the nature of imperialism. This should not be a surprise, since the term ‘imperialism’, though clearly based on a Latin word, is a modern appellation that, in its commonest current meanings, has no equivalent in either ancient Greek or Latin.<sup>1</sup> Imperialism is not only a theoretical concept of comparatively recent provenance, but is also intrinsically tied to the vicissitudes of economic life in the modern capitalist era. As no single definition of imperialism has ever met wide-ranging acceptance among scholars,<sup>2</sup> it seems foolhardy to expect ancient authors to present unproblematic ruminations on the character of Roman expansion. Accordingly, it is impossible to find Roman historians’ extended elaboration on the nature of imperialism; it remains difficult, moreover, to determine the precise applicability of this modern term to the ancient world.

Lacking lengthy discussions focused on imperialism in their works, we must often turn to ancient historians’ briefer comments on expansion, such as Arrian’s mention of the purported Indian aversion to foreign wars, which serves as the epigraph to this chapter. These observations are often—if not always—tied up in discussions of specific historical contexts, and this renders it more difficult to draw general conclusions about the particular authors’ perceptions of imperialism. Given the heavy emphasis in ancient historiography on constructing historical narratives for political,

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<sup>1</sup> See Hammond 1948, 105; Garnsey and Whittaker, ‘Introduction’ (1978), 1.

<sup>2</sup> Amsden 1987, 728: ‘...there is no agreement on the referent of imperialism’ and ‘there is none on the word [imperialism] itself.’ (See also Chapter 2 above.)

diplomatic, and military events, Roman historians seldom elaborated on more theoretical topics such as the general character of expansion and colonialism.

Many, however, did include passages in their works that offer us an (imperfect) opportunity to come to some conclusions about their views of ancient imperialism. The most thorough disquisitions on the nature of Roman expansion found in the works of ancient historians tend to appear in speeches, more specifically speeches put in the mouths of Rome's enemies, which often serve as exhortations to troops before major battles. From these orations—and those of opposing Roman generals that often accompany them—we may be able to get some sense of the sorts of questions regarding Roman expansion that ancient historians found intriguing and the kinds of criticisms of Roman rule on which they focus.

It must be admitted, however, that there are many problems with assuming that these rhetorical creations reflect the sentiments of the historians in whose works they appear. To be sure, the majority of contemporary scholars believe that such speeches of foreigners are essentially the creations of their authors and do not accurately portray the sentiments of anti-Roman historical figures.<sup>3</sup> Even so, there were many potential reasons for their appearance in ancient histories. According to Marcellinus (*Vita Thuc.* 38), Herodotus was the first historian to add orations to his work. Though not all ancient historians offered these speeches, most did, and tradition must have loomed large in their inclusion. We can, furthermore, contemplate other reasons for their incorporation in Greco-Roman historiography. Such speeches add an element of dramatic tension and present the reader with a break from longwinded historical narratives. They can also highlight key episodes in a work and home in on the character of their speakers.

Even so, there are reasons to believe that these 'enemy' orations shed some light on ancient historians' views of Roman expansion. The incorporation of particular arguments in the speeches of several historians may suggest a penchant for certain ways of reflecting on the perceived justice and injustice of imperialism. Further, a given author's repetition in

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<sup>3</sup> E.g., T.C. Burgess, 'Epideictic literature', *University of Chicago Studies in Classical Philology* 3 (1902), 209-14; M.H. Hansen, 'The battle exhortation in ancient historiography: fact or fiction?', *Historia* 42 (1993), 161-80; Marincola 1997, 17. See also K. Eisenhardt, *Über die Reden in den Historien und Annalen des Tacitus* (Diss. Ludwigshafen, 1911), 17-18; E. Keitel, 'Homeric antecedents to the *cohortatio* in the ancient historians', *CW* 80 (1987), 153-72. A few scholars still believe in the historicity of such orations: e.g., Fornara 1983, 142-68.

harangues of concerns found elsewhere in his narrative proper could imply that such matters piqued his interest. Overall, since there is a paucity of full-scale ancient commentary on the important topic of elite Roman views of imperialism, we are well served to use the little evidence we possess.

This chapter offers a cursory examination of a few enemy orations found in the work of early imperial historians of Rome. It will be of necessity brief and highly selective. Of course, even our perfunctory discussion of these anti-Roman speeches is affected by the state of preservation of ancient texts. Numerous narrative histories from the early imperial period are either lost or fragmentary. It might have proved particularly instructive to possess the universal history of Timagenes of Alexandria (*FGrH* 88), whose frank anti-Romanism supposedly irked Augustus (Seneca, *Ep.* 91.13; *de Ira* 3.23). It is similarly unfortunate that we have only meager fragments of C. Asinius Pollio's *Historiae* (*HRR* 2.67–70), given their author's purported independence of spirit.<sup>4</sup> The same is true of the likely 2nd-Century AD local history of Memnon of Heraclea (*FGrH* 434), which even presented a digression on Rome's rise to power (18.1–5). And we can point to other authors who might have added greatly to our knowledge of this topic: Nicolaus of Damascus (*FGrH* 90), Cremutius Cordus (*HRR* 2.87–90), Servilius Nonianus (*HRR* 2.98), *et al.*

Other historians whose works survive at least in large part demonstrate a disinclination to include set speeches, which renders their work less useful to our study. The quick pace of Velleius Paterculus' history, combined with its large gap in coverage for the Republican period (cf. 1.8.6–9.1), leaves comparatively scant information on its author's views of Roman expansion, despite some interesting comments (e.g., 1.12.2, 5; 2.1.1–2, 38–39, 126.3). The same holds true for the abbreviated history of Florus, which, despite its less positive assessment of late Republican wars (2.19 in the older numeration), reads much like a hagiography of Rome's martial accomplishments.

This still leaves us, thankfully, with a number of early imperial historians whose works present anti-Roman orations and touch upon Roman imperialism more fully.

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<sup>4</sup> A.B. Bosworth, 'Asinius Pollio and Augustus,' *Historia* 21 (1972) 441–73, has challenged the notion that Pollio was a firm proponent of senatorial *libertas* and resolutely anti-Augustus. See also J. André, *La vie et l'oeuvre d'Asinius Pollion* (Paris, 1949), 61–2.

1. *Livy*

To many modern scholars, Livy, as heir to the Roman annalistic tradition, was among the ancient historians most susceptible to peppering their works with patriotic sentiments.<sup>5</sup> This is the case even though Livy hints that his discussion of late Republican history would prove more critical of Rome's activities than do the surviving portions of his work (*Praef.* 5). One might suspect, therefore, that an anti-Roman oration in Livy's history such as that of Hannibal before the Battle of the Ticinus (21.43) would strike the reader as weak and tendentious, especially in comparison with its corollary in Polybius' history (3.63–64)—all the more so, in fact, since the *Ab Urbe Condita* demonstrates a clear and consistent bias against Carthage (e.g., 21.4.9; 22.6.12) and Hannibal (e.g., 21.4.2–9, 14.3; 25.1.1; 26.38.3).

Yet this does not appear to be the case. In the course of this pre-battle harangue, Livy offers a number of arguments that dramatically question Rome's foreign policy. The following excerpt from the speech can serve as an example:

This most cruel and arrogant nation considers all things its own and for its own pleasure. With whom we should have war, with whom we should have peace—that nation thinks it fair that only they decide. That nation circumscribes and confines us by the boundaries of mountains and rivers from which we may not depart; yet it does not observe those boundaries that they established. 'Do not cross the Ebro! The Saguntines are not a concern to you!' Is Saguntum on the Roman side of the Ebro? 'Never move a step!' Is it insufficient that you have taken away my most ancient provinces of Sicily and Sardinia? You even take away Spain? And then, if I depart from these places, are you going to cross into Africa? Are you going to cross indeed—I say they have crossed; they have sent two consuls of this year, one to Africa, the other to Spain. Nothing at all has been left for us, except that which we defend with arms (21.44.5–7).<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> E.g., W. Hoffmann, *Livius und der Zweite Punische Krieg* (Berlin, 1942) 101; Luce 1977, 276–7, 284–7; P.G. Walsh, 'Livy and the aims of *Historia*: an analysis of the third decade,' *ANRW* 2.30.22 (1982), 1060–2. For fuller discussion, see Adler 2011, 208–9.

<sup>6</sup> 'Crudelissima ac superbissima gens sua omnia suique arbitrii facit. Cum quibus bellum, <cum> quibus pacem habeamus, se modum inponere aequum censet. Circumscribit includitque nos terminis montium fluminumque, quos non excedamus, neque eos quos statuit terminos observat. 'Ne transieris Hiberum! ne quid rei tibi sit cum Saguntinis!' Ad Hiberum est Saguntum? 'Nusquam te uestigio moveris!' Parum est, quod veterrimas provincias meas Siciliam ac Sardiniam <ademisti?> Adimis etiam Hispanias, et, inde <si de>cessero, in Africam transcendes. <Transcendes> autem? Transcendisse dico; duos consules huius anni, unum in Africam, alterum in Hispaniam miserunt. Nihil usquam nobis relictum est, nisi quod armis vindicamus.' The text used is T.A. Dorey, ed., *Ab Urbe Condita Libri XXI–XXII* (Teubner, Leipzig, 1971). All translations in this chapter are my own.

The beginning of this passage, with its distinctly moral criticism of Roman machinations, presents a vivid, albeit unspecific and overblown, condemnation of Roman misconduct and double standards. This gives way to a series of hypothetical commands from the Romans (44.6)—Do not involve yourself with Saguntum, etc.—which Livy's Hannibal answers, lending an even more heightened feel to the ethically-charged sentiments found in this portion of the oration. Hannibal continues with a few rhetorical questions that highlight Rome's sordid actions: having taken away Carthage's ancient provinces of Sicily and Sardinia, and having entered Spain, the Romans already head to Africa itself.

The clear focus in this passage is Roman rapacity. To be sure, its argument is simplified and distorted. (We must recognize, however, that the surviving ancient histories of the Second Punic War all stem from an essentially pro-Roman tradition and have colored our impressions of the conflict.) From other portions of his narrative, furthermore, we learn that Livy placed the blame for the origin of the Second Punic War firmly on the Carthaginian side, and on Hannibal himself (e.g., 21.5.2, 9.4). Still, the ruminations in Hannibal's speech before the Battle of Ticinus could have had more resonance with Livy's ancient readership in light of the events occurring after the Second Punic War: the annihilation of Carthage in the Third Punic War, Lucullus' and Pompey's expansionism in the East, etc.

We need not assume, of course, that Livy sympathizes with Hannibal, who paradoxically casts himself as both the aggressor (21.44.3) and defender (21.44.6) against Rome in the selfsame speech. Yet Livy, seemingly interested in crafting orations with multiple τόποι, uses Hannibal's oration before the Battle of the Ticinus to highlight moral and ethical concerns regarding Roman imperialism and colonialism that are alien to Polybius' monochromatic version (3.63–64), which focuses almost exclusively on an exhortation to courage. To some extent, at least, this was the result of Livy's intention to craft impressive speeches in his work, a penchant for which he received great praise in antiquity (e.g., Quintilian 10.1.32, 101; Tac. *Ann.* 4.34; Suet. *Dom.* 10.3). Even so, this demonstrates that he allowed his concern for rhetorical showmanship to trump his political proclivities. Although this need not suggest that Livy was greatly sympathetic to the plight of the Carthaginians, it does intimate that even this most patriotic of historians was capable of reflecting on the injustices of Roman rule.

2. *Pompeius Trogus*

A Gaul of Vocontian origin whose family had possessed Roman citizenship for a few generations (Justin 43.5.11), Pompeius Trogus was a natural scientist in the age of Augustus and the author of a 44-book world history called the *Historiae Philippicae*. Unfortunately, we do not possess the original version of Trogus' historical work, but an abridgement produced by a shadowy figure named Justin, who likely lived sometime between the 2nd and 4th centuries AD.<sup>7</sup> In large part, it seems, on the basis of its author's Gallic origins numerous scholars have concluded that the *Historiae Philippicae* is deeply critical of Rome and its expansion.<sup>8</sup> Such scholars can point to passages purportedly condemning Roman imperialism (e.g., 31.4.4; 36.3.9, 4.8; 39.5.3) as well as to numerous speeches Trogus put in the mouths of Rome's enemies. In fact, toward the end of the 19th century, Alfred von Gutschmid found Justin's abridgement sufficiently hostile to Rome that he believed Trogus merely produced a Latin adaptation of a Greek history composed by the anti-Roman Timagenes of Alexandria.<sup>9</sup>

Even so, if we are to judge on the basis of speeches critical of Rome that appear in Justin's version of the *Historiae Philippicae*, Trogus does not seem to have been a particularly powerful critic of Roman imperialism. A portion of the *oratio obliqua* speech of the Aetolians in response to a Roman delegation demanding the withdrawal of garrisons from Acarnania circa 240–230 BC (28.2.1–13) can serve as an example of Trogus' preoccupations:<sup>10</sup>

[The Aetolians said that] the Romans had not been able to protect their own city against the Gauls and, when it was captured, could not defend it by the sword but had to buy it back; they said that when that people [the Gauls] attacked Greece with a considerably larger force, the Greeks destroyed them not only without the aid of foreign troops but not even with all their own, and had provided the abode for their tombs that they [the Gauls] had proposed for their cities and empire; on the other hand, Italy had been

<sup>7</sup> For various assessments of the dates of Justin's life, see O. Seel, *Die Praefatio des Pompeius Trogus* (Erlangen, 1955), 37; J.M. Alonso-Núñez, *G&R* 34 (1987), 56; T. Barnes, *CQ* 48 (1988), 589–93; R. Syme, *Historia* 37 (1988), 365.

<sup>8</sup> E.g., A. von Gutschmid, *RhM* 37 (1882), 548–55; M. Büdinger, *Die Universalhistorie im Alterthume* (Vienna, 1895), 191–4; J.W. Swain, *CP* 35 (1940), 17–18; L. Santi-Amantini, *Giustino: Storie Filippiche: Epitome da Pompeo Trogo* (Milan, 1981) 30–1; Alonso-Núñez (n. 7), 68.

<sup>9</sup> On his so-called Timagenian thesis, see von Gutschmid (n. 8), 548–55. For criticism of this position—which is no longer believed—see C. Wachsmuth, *RhM* 46 (1891), 465–79; A. Klotz, 'Pompeius Trogus,' *RE* 21.2 (1952), 2305; Hammond 1983, 163–5.

<sup>10</sup> For discussion of this (potentially invented) delegation and its likely date, see Oost 1954, 92–7.

almost entirely seized by the Gauls, since the Romans were alarmed on account of the recent burning of their city. Therefore, they said that they should eject the Gauls from Italy before they menace the Aetolians and ought to defend their own lands before striving for others'. Moreover, they wondered, what sort of men were the Romans? As everyone knows, shepherds who possess land stolen from its rightful owners through robbery, who, as a result of their base stock, could not find wives and were compelled to seize them through the use of public force, who, to conclude, founded their city on parricide and sprinkled the foundations of its walls with fraternal blood (28.2.4-10).<sup>11</sup>

This passage begins with a reference to the Gallic sack of Rome ca. 390 BC—a historical event that the Vocontian Trogus mentioned with some frequency (cf. 6.6.5; 20.5.4; 24.4.2; 31.5.9; 38.4.7; 43.5.8). It commences, that is to say, with a bit of cheerleading for Trogus' ancestors, rather than an indictment of Roman conduct. In fact, the oration's continued focus on Gaul leads one to believe that a discussion of erstwhile Gallic military endeavors was of greater import to Trogus than withering criticism of Roman foreign policy.

The appeal to Gallic martial prowess, moreover, relates to another tendency detectable in Justin's speech of the Aetolians. At the conclusion of the passage, the Aetolians discuss congenital Roman shortcomings by referring to the legends surrounding the early history of the Roman Kingship. This demonstrates Trogus' regard for presenting the reader with bookish arguments based on remote events—a penchant also noticeable in his longer Mithridatic oration (38.4.5-9, 6.7-8). It seems farfetched to assume that an Aetolian reference to the rape of the Sabine women would inspire much introspection on the part of Roman readers. Rather than hunt for more potent examples of Roman malefactions, Trogus appears to have been content to offer weaker allusions to remote Roman legends. Romulus' fratricide, after all, does not tell us much about the character of Roman

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<sup>11</sup> 'Adversus Gallos urbem eos suam tueri non potuisse captamque non ferro defendisse, sed auro redimisse; quam gentem se aliquanto maiore manu Graeciam ingressam non solum nullis externis viribus, sed ne domesticis quidem totis adiutos universam delesse, sedemque sepulcris eorum praeuisse, quam illi urbibus imperioque suo proposuerant; contra Italiam trepidis ex recenti urbis suae incendio Romanis universam ferme a Gallis occupatam. Prius igitur Gallos Italia pellendos quam minentur Aetolis, priusque sua defendenda quam aliena appetenda. Quos autem homines Romanos esse? Nempe pastores, qui latrocinio iustis dominis ademptum solum teneant, qui uxores cum propter originis dehonestamenta non invenirent, vi publica rapuerint, qui denique urbem ipsam parricidio condiderint murorumque fundamenta fraterno sanguine adperserint.' The text used is O. Seel's Teubner edn., *M. Iuniani Iustini epitoma Historiarum Philippicarum Pompei Trogi*, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart, 1972).

foreign policy, and amounts to little more than name-calling. Certainly one can find stronger indictments of Roman imperialism in the annals of ancient historiography.

Perhaps more telling than the existence of such orations in Trogus' *Historiae Philippicae* is the prominence Justin afforded them in his abridgement. In a work containing few extended orations, Justin's epitome emphasizes the anti-Roman speeches of the Aetolians, Demetrius of Pharos (29.2.2-6), Hannibal (31.5.2-9), and Mithridates (38.4-7).<sup>12</sup> According to Justin, the latter oration was the lone speech worthy of word-for-word inclusion in the abridgement (38.3.11); as a result, it is by far the longest speech in the work. Unfortunately, we do not know Justin's birthplace, save that it is unlikely he hailed from the city of Rome (cf. *Praef.* 4). Nor, as mentioned above, can we be sure of his *floruit* with any precision. With scarce knowledge of his background and intellectual predilections, we are left in the dark about Justin's rationale for seemingly offering conspicuous placement to anti-Roman orations from Trogus' world history. All the same, it appears to speak to a level of comfort with the sorts of criticisms of Rome that Trogus featured in his original work.

### 3. Tacitus

Scholars have often viewed the numerous speeches Tacitus put in the mouths of Rome's enemies—for instance, those of Calgacus (*Agr.* 30-32), Civilis (*Hist.* 4.14.2-4, 17.2-6), Arminius (*Ann.* 1.59), Boiocalus (*Ann.* 13.55), and Boudica (*Ann.* 14.35)—as a collective example of Tacitus' merits as a historian. According to Ronald Syme, for example, such orations serve as part of the reason that 'no other writer reveals so sharply the double face of Roman rule [as does Tacitus].'<sup>13</sup> This view seems divorced from an assessment of Tacitus as 'anti-Roman' in his outlook; rather, modern historians tend to believe that Tacitus' inclination to provide Roman enemies with powerful, compelling orations demonstrates his critical cast of mind—a cast of mind requisite for a good historian.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. the shorter *oratio obliqua* pre-battle harangue of Philip V (30.4.6-7), which is counterpoised with Flamininus' longer response (30.4.8-14).

<sup>13</sup> Syme 1958, 529. Cf. Walker 1968, 30, who stresses that Tacitus 'can appreciate the rival nationalisms of Arminius, Calgacus, Boudicca, and can admire the qualities of the northern barbarians; he can write with passion—not sentimentality—of the provincials' sufferings when Rome's task of Empire is abused.'



Some recent scholarship, however, has at least partially disagreed with this assessment as it pertains to Tacitus' portrayal of Rome's foreign opponents. According to such work, Tacitus, far from questioning the nature of Roman conquest and colonialism, validates Roman expansion and undercuts foreign complaints regarding Roman rule. Although superficially appearing sympathetic to the plight of barbarians, Tacitus in fact subtly casts foreigners as inferior and deserving of their subordinate status. Steven Rutledge's examination of the *Agricola*, for instance, argues that Tacitus characterizes Calgacus, the Caledonian chieftain to whom he granted perhaps the most powerful anti-Roman oration in the annals of ancient historiography, as an 'inept barbarian' and an anachronistic Roman republican. Katherine Clarke, in an article on the *Agricola* more equivocal than Rutledge's, perceives that Tacitus turns Britain into a Roman space and has Calgacus discuss his territory 'in terms which curiously echo the wishes of the Romans.'<sup>14</sup>

Though on its own the oration is incapable of reconciling these disparate positions, perhaps the examination of a speech by the Batavian nobleman and Roman citizen C. Iulius Civilis in the *Historiae* can demonstrate the sorts of complaints against Roman rule to which its author is attracted. Having gathered his tribesmen in a sacred grove in order to persuade them to revolt from Roman control in AD 69,<sup>15</sup> Tacitus' Civilis says:

For we are not considered allies, as was previously the case, but as property: when does a governor come with authority, indeed, with an oppressive and arrogant retinue? We are handed over to prefects and centurions. When they have filled up one group with spoils and blood, their men are moved and new purses and various opportunities for plundering are devised. A levy presses upon us under which children are separated from their parents and brothers from brothers, just like death. The Roman state has never been more distressed, and there is nothing in their winter quarters except loot and old men: merely lift up your eyes and do not fear the hollow reputation of their legions. But at our disposal is the élite of foot soldiers and cavalry, our relatives the Germans, and the Gallic provinces, which desire what we desire. This war is not even unwelcome to the Romans; if its outcome is not clear, we shall argue that we undertook it on Vespasian's behalf, and no one expects a rationale for a victory (4.14.2-4).<sup>16</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Rutledge 2000, 90; Clarke 2001, 103.

<sup>15</sup> On the Batavian revolt, see Brunt 1960, 494-517 = Brunt 1990, 33-52.

<sup>16</sup> '... neque enim societatem, ut olim, sed tamquam mancipia haberi. Quando legatum, gravi quidem comitatu et superbo, cum imperio venire? Tradi se praefectis centurionibusque; quos ubi spoliis et sanguine expleverint, mutari, exquirique novos sinus et varia praedandi vocabula. Instare dilectum quo liberi a parentibus, fratres a fratribus velut

Before the start of this speech, Tacitus mentions that the Romans irked the Batavians in part through the sexual defilement of their children (4.14.1). Although Civilis does not refer to this detail in the speech itself, it offers a link to other Tacitean orations put in the mouths of anti-Roman leaders. Elsewhere in Tacitus' *œuvre*, both Calgacus (*Agr.* 31.1) and Boudica (*Ann.* 14.35.1) excoriate the Romans for engaging in sexual abuse in the provinces. Tacitus had a penchant, then, for viewing the excesses of Roman provincial administration in part through the lens of sexual misconduct. To Tacitus, both stemmed, it seems, from types of unrestrained lust.

According to Tacitus' Civilis, the Romans' rapacity is so rampant and unbridled that they treat the Batavians as property (*mancipia*)—as mere opportunities for slaughter and booty. And this maltreatment, Civilis claims, occurs over and over again, since the rotation of troops allows for various portions of the Roman army to get their fill of killing and plunder. Thus Civilis rouses his fellow Batavians not only by complaining about a levy, but also by emphasizing the Romans' provincial misconduct. On its own, conscription was a likely source of discontent (cf. *Hist.* 4.26.1); Roman maladministration would only serve to make it worse. Civilis' remarks, then, dramatically remind the reader of the sort of mischief that could plague Rome's subordinates.

It must be admitted, however, that the oration seems less effective when it turns to pragmatic and expedient matters. Civilis calls into question the effectiveness of Roman forces; this proved wrongheaded, given the ultimate failure of his revolt. Further, Tacitus' Civilis speech closes with an equivocation: if the rebellion becomes unsuccessful, the Batavians can claim that they undertook it on Vespasian's behalf. This serves to highlight Civilis' own duplicity; in reality, Tacitus informs us, Civilis decided to rebel from Roman rule due to Fonteius Capito's murder of his brother as well as Civilis' personal maltreatment at the hands of the Romans (4.13.1, 32.2), and masked his revolt by pretending to be allied to Vespasian. Civilis exploited his fellow Batavians' grievances, and Tacitus reminds the reader of this in the speech's peroration.

Even so, this need not detract from the justice of Civilis' accusations. Though it is not a consistent excoriation of Roman provincial conduct, the

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supremum dividantur. Numquam magis adflitam rem Romanam nec aliud in hibernis quam praedam et senes: attollerent tantum oculos et inania legionum nomina ne pavescerent. At sibi robur peditum equitumque, consanguineos Germanos, Gallias idem cupientes. Ne Romanis quidem ingratum id bellum; cuius ambiguum fortunam Vespasiano imputaturos: victoriae rationem non reddi.' The text is that of K. Wellesley, Teubner edn., *Cornelii Taciti Libri qui supersunt*, vol. 2.1 (Leipzig, 1989).

speech offers Tacitus an opportunity to ruminate on the possibilities of Roman imperial malfeasance and the plight of Rome's subjects. Tacitus may have had limited sympathy for Civilis' revolt, yet still manages to use the speech to question Roman colonial malefactions that loom large in his other orations of Rome's enemies (cf. *Agr.* 15.2, 31.1-2; *Ann.* 2.15, 14.35).

#### 4. Appian

In the past few decades, scholars have challenged the perception—formerly an *opinio communis*—that Appian was little more than a compiler and copyist.<sup>17</sup> Some of this refashioning pertains to Appian's speechifying, which has often been deemed a comparative bright spot in his writing.<sup>18</sup> Overall, scholars tend to conclude that, though he may not have added orations in his history for which he did not possess earlier versions in his sources, Appian likely elaborated on and reworked many of his speeches to conform to his own preoccupations. To some extent, then, the orations in Appian's historical work reflect the imagination of their author.

Accordingly, we can turn to a speech that Appian puts in the mouth of one of Rome's foreign enemies in order to highlight the degree to which this historian purportedly sympathetic to the empire was capable of criticizing Roman imperialism. Among the fragments of Appian, we possess two speeches of Gavius Pontius, the Samnite general responsible for Rome's disastrous defeat at the Caudine Forks in 321 BC (*Samn.* 4.14-17). In one of these orations, delivered to Roman envoys in the aftermath of the Caudine Forks debacle, Appian's Pontius begins by saying:

We always lived in friendship with the Romans—a friendship that you dismissed when you became allies with our enemies, the Sidicini. When there was peace among us again, you waged war with our neighbors, the Neapolitans. And we weren't ignorant of the fact that these steps were part of a greedy scheme to control all Italy. In the earlier battles, having gained advantage due to the inexperience of our generals, you showed us no moderation; and since plundering our country and gaining control of others'

<sup>17</sup> E.g., Gowing 1990 and 1992; Bucher 2000. For the erstwhile dominant view of Appian as a historian, see above all Gabba 1956.

<sup>18</sup> See, e.g., A.E. Egger, *Examen critique des historiens anciens de la vie et du règne d'Auguste* (Paris, 1884), 259-61; G. Kramer, *Theologumena Appiani* (Diss. Breslau, 1889), 59-73; T.J. Luce, *Appian's Exposition of the Roman Republican Constitution* (Diss. Princeton, 1958), 22; I. Hahn, 'Geschichtsphilosophische Motive in den Reden der Emphyilia,' in *Studien zur Geschichte und Philosophie des Altertums*, ed. J. Harmatta (Amsterdam, 1968), 197-203; Gowing (n. 17), 18.

lands and cities and sending colonists to them was insufficient for you, you, when twice we sent ambassadors to you and offered many compromises, ordered other arrogant concessions from us—to give up our entire empire and to submit to you, as if we weren't allies but conquered men.<sup>19</sup>

According to S.P. Oakley, Dionysius of Halicarnassus was likely the source for Appian's discussion of the Second Samnite War and, as a result, for this Pontius speech, which differs greatly from its brief corollary in Livy (cf. Livy 9.4.3-6).<sup>20</sup> Unfortunately, the fragmentary state of his Samnite history precludes us from discovering how Appian construed the Roman-Samnite relations mentioned in the oration.

Still, Appian's Pontius offers a potentially powerful argument, one rooted in the specifics of Roman foreign policy vis-à-vis Samnium yet bolstering a weighty indictment: despite pretences, Rome aims at the ultimate subjugation of Italy. This is a sentiment, furthermore, with which Appian intimates he was inclined to agree (cf. *Samn.* 4.1)—though we need not suppose that he considered this a withering critique. Much like Sallust's rousing letter of Mithridates (*Hist.* 4.69M) and unlike Pompeius Trogus' aforementioned speech of the Aetolians, Appian's Pontius oration eschews petty name-calling and bookish antiquarianism in favor of relevant complaints regarding the injustices and duplicity of Roman expansion. It presents a sustained attack on Roman pretences to defensive warfare based on deference to fetial law. This does not imply that Appian—or Dionysius of Halicarnassus, for that matter—felt great sympathy for Pontius or the plight of the Samnites. Yet, in the course of a debate regarding the proper treatment of Roman captives, Appian fashions Pontius as respectful to his father Herennius (4.3-4), whereas Livy's Pontius foolishly deems him senile (9.3.8); this may suggest greater regard for Pontius on Appian's part. Again, we need not conclude that Appian sided strongly with Samnite grievances. Even so, his Pontius speech suggests that he was capable of envisioning the arguments of Rome's enemies and presenting them in at least a potentially sympathetic light.

<sup>19</sup> On Pontius see Salmon 1967, 225-6, 274-5; Oakley 1997–2005, 3.40-1. For a précis of the Caudine Forks disaster and its aftermath, see E.T. Salmon, 'The *Pax Caudina*', *JRS* 19 (1929), 12-18.

<sup>20</sup> Oakley, 3.7-8.

### 5. *Conclusions*

In recent years, classical scholars investigating the nature of Roman imperialism have grown critical of earlier assessments of the topic. This shift seems partly related to the intellectual influence of the late Edward Said, whose works *Orientalism* (1978) and *Culture and Imperialism* (1993) have carried much weight in numerous disciplines. According to Said, Westerners have for millennia characterized Easterners in such a manner as to justify their conquest and exploitation. Focusing such an argument on the classical world, scholars can argue that Greco-Roman authors—such as those surveyed in this chapter—ineluctably discussed foreigners with an eye toward apologizing for Roman imperialism and colonialism. Thus ancient historians, like other writers from classical antiquity, treated non-Romans as the ‘Other,’ dehumanized objects of conquest in need of Roman domination.

Such a view of Roman authors’ perceptions of imperialism has its merits—especially insofar as it serves as a reaction to earlier scholarly examinations, which may have proved consciously or subconsciously sympathetic to Roman elite impressions of Rome’s expansion. Yet, as one can tell from even our cursory discussion of enemy orations in early imperial historiography, contemporary assessments of Roman historians’ perceptions of expansion could miss the hints of societal self-doubt and self-criticism detectable in their work. This is not to say, of course, that these historians were stalwart anti-imperialists. Still, it does intimate that their works aimed at more than self-serving denigration of non-Romans. As the above examples demonstrate, Roman historians often used enemy speeches to engage in criticism of specific examples of Roman foreign policy. These critiques at least half-heartedly aimed at questioning Roman pretences to engaging in defensive warfare. Despite the supposed withering of concern for fetial law during the course of the Republic, some early imperial historians expatiated on the potentially aggressive and duplicitous nature of Roman expansion. And their readership must have felt comfortable turning to works that featured such arguments.

Again, this does not suggest that Roman historians added enemy orations into their works due to deep-seated anxieties about Roman conquest and colonialism. Nor need it imply that contemporary perspectives on Roman imperialism are wrongheaded. Certainly one can detect a tendency on the part of Roman authors to cast non-Romans as inferior—even in the context of passages critical of Roman actions. Yet we ought not dismiss

examples—however weak or qualified—of Roman societal self-criticism. To a greater or lesser extent, ancient historians were capable not only of denigrating foreigners, but also of introducing arguments that call the Roman imperial project into question. It would be unfortunate if an understandable and necessary reaction to earlier scholarly views compelled us to gainsay the ambiguities and nuances that exist in these ancient works.

## THE PROVINCIALISATION OF ROME

*Jesper Majbom Madsen*

In a debate in the Senate, Claudius argued that the nobility of Gallia Comata should be admitted to the council and counted among Rome's political élite:

Everything, Senators, which we now hold to be of the highest antiquity, was once new. Plebeian magistrates came after the patricians; Latins after plebeians; magistrates from other Italian peoples after the Latins. This practice too [the admission of the Gallic nobility] will establish itself, and what we are this day justifying by precedents, will itself be a precedent.

Tacitus, *Ann.* 11.24 (tr. Church and Brodribb, slightly amended)

In the eyes of the 2nd-Century historian and senator Cornelius Tacitus, who himself had a provincial background, an essential aspect of Roman self-perception was a multi-ethnic community inhabited by different people bound together by a strong sense of loyalty to Rome. Since its foundation, the city of Rome had first defeated and later affiliated her Latin and Italian neighbors, assimilated the conquered élite in the Senate, and allowed the newcomers to take on magistracies and promagistracies. As Roman power expanded outside Italy this strategy was continued. A still larger number of provincials settled in the capital, and illustrious men from Spain, Gallia Narbonensis, North Africa, and Asia Minor were enrolled in the Senate.<sup>1</sup> As suggested by Tacitus' account quoted above, the inclusion of the provincial élite accelerated under Claudius with the admission of the Comatan élite. In his speech, Claudius argues on ideological and practical grounds. First, assimilation of foreigners and former enemies had a long tradition and the resultant strength made the Empire more successful than, for instance, Athens and Sparta had been. Secondly, and perhaps less glorious, it was better to have the newly admitted élite spend their money in Rome than in their home towns (Tac. *Ann.* 11.24).

The admission of the provincial élites was taken a step further under Vespasian and the other Flavians. When censor in AD 73–74 Vespasian carried through a large reformation of the Senate. Newcomers were admitted

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<sup>1</sup> Eck 2000, 218–19.

to the ranks of quaestors, aediles or praetors, individuals who were already members of the Senate were moved to higher ranks, and families were awarded patrician status. The reason behind this dramatic reorganisation was practical as well as political. Nero's falling-out with the Senate had led to numerous *maiestas* trials and the deaths of senators; and more members of the élite lost their life in the Civil Wars of AD 69.<sup>2</sup> New blood and more money were needed to ensure a functional Senate and to maintain a form of organisation where governmental responsibility remained in the hands of the élite. By including the provincial aristocracy in greater numbers and by promoting the more illustrious of their body to the Roman élite, Vespasian and his sons solved the crisis and at the same time accommodated the ambitions of a wealthy and dedicated group, who in return showed both gratitude and loyalty to the dynasty.

The course of this development and how the admission to the Senate of the provincial élite influenced the concept of Roman imperialism is the subject of the present chapter. A key question to be addressed here is how men of provincial background perceived and enforced Roman rule in their allocated provinces. Did magistrates and promagistrates of provincial background represent Roman interests or were they encouraged to promote the interests of the provincial communities in which they served? Another question is the provincial perception of Roman rule and of their peers who followed a career in Roman administration. How did members of the provincial élite, who remained at home instead of pursuing a career in the provincial administration, view those who left the provinces with such ambitions?

There were notable differences in the way élites around the Empire were admitted to the Senate. As will be discussed below, these discrepancies in the integration of the local élite was closely tied to the state of development in the newly conquered area as well as to of the need to introduce Roman laws, customs, and ways of urban living in the newly established provinces.

### 1. *Turning Roman in the Provinces*

Although aristocrats from the East were among the first non-Italians to achieve seats in the Senate, it was in the western provinces that the first efforts to include the local aristocracy were made.<sup>3</sup> A key element was

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<sup>2</sup> Eck 2000, 216-17.

<sup>3</sup> Among the first Greek senators were Q. Pompeius Macer who was appointed prator under Tiberius in AD 15. Macer was the son of Cn. Pompeius Macer, procurator under



urbanisation in a Roman fashion. In Gaul, Germania, Britannia, and the sparsely urbanised parts of the Iberian peninsula, Roman colonies and civic communities based on Roman traditions introduced a lifestyle modelled on Roman society. In North Africa and in the old Punic part of Spain, urban culture flourished before the coming of Rome. But in the train of Roman conquest, Roman law, constitutional organisation, cults, and public building activities gradually interacted with existing practices.

The colonies and *municipia* constituted the political and administrative centres in Roman provinces. They were attractive to members of the local élite, who had settled in the new towns to maintain their position in the social and political hierarchy. Subjected to Roman or Latin rights and dominated by an emerging Italian way of life, inhabitants of local origin were exposed to Roman norms and values and were to a significant degree under the influence of Roman culture.<sup>4</sup>

Roman citizenship could be obtained from participation in these cities' local administration, from military service in the *auxilia*, manumission or (less often) as the personal favor of influential members of the Roman élite.<sup>5</sup> Civic rights granted its holders several improved constitutional, commercial, and social privileges, as well as economic advantages, and they improved the individual's rights in criminal trials. But besides improved legal rights, citizenship also offered a much-coveted lift in social status—from subject to member of the world's dominant power. Even though Latin, and Roman norms and way of life, never replaced the local tongues and customs entirely, they strongly influenced life in the western provinces.

The epigraphic record and the writings of provincial intellectuals such as Martial, Columella, and Seneca (all from Spain) demonstrate how Latin became the dominant language within local communities; and Roman architecture, entertainment and other political and cultural institutions were introduced throughout provincial towns. Together with the strong influence on daily life, the organisation of political system along Roman lines, and the spread of *ius Latii* (Latin right) which ensured that the local élites gained Roman citizenship after having served as senior magistrates

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Augustus, and the grandson of Cn. Pompeius Theophanes who followed Pompey in the civil wars. For more examples of senators admitted early, see Halfmann 1979, 100 ff. For the majority of provincials with a western background see Devreker 1980, 262-3; Eck 2000, 219.

<sup>4</sup> For Gaul see Woolf 1998, 112-17 and 122-6; for Spain see Keay 1998, 47-54; for Africa see Bullo 2002, 213-22, esp. 221-2. For a more overall treatment see MacMullen 2000, and Hingley 2005, 77-87, esp. 82-6.

<sup>5</sup> See for instance *Lex Municipii Salpensani* (CIL 2.1963 = ILS 6088) 21; Shaw 2000, 364-70.

in the civic administration, the western provinces were brought closer to Rome. As a result, the local aristocracy became culturally, legally and economically compatible to the senatorial élite from the Italian cities. Modelled on the colonies, the provincial *municipia* received constitutions, where the power was divided between magistrates and a city council consisting of the city élite. Over time a still larger part of the provincial communities was awarded Latin right: either as gift to an individual cities, persons, or entire provinces, such as when Vespasian gave Latin right all over Spain. When Claudius and Vespasian legislated to admit provincial élites to the Roman Senate, it was only to be expected that the new arrivals would primarily consist of wealthy men with a strong affiliation to the Roman way of life.

Men of Greek and oriental origin were also admitted to the Senate by Vespasian and by his son but in smaller numbers, and not to the highest circles of the Empire's political élite. It has been argued that the later appearance and smaller number of Greeks in the Senate and in imperial administration could suggest that members of the Greek élite were generally satisfied with their life and career in the *polis* and therefore less tempted with what Rome had to offer. This interpretation was born out of the idea that Greeks, with their continued focus on Greek culture, were more skeptical toward Roman society and therefore resisted, more or less intentionally, the cultural flux after the coming of Rome.<sup>6</sup> The continuous increase, however, in the number of senators from the east throughout the second half of the 1st and during the 2nd Centuries AD, together with the prestigious appointments of men with Greek cultural backgrounds particularly in the 2nd Century, shows that members of the Greek élite were just as interested in the Roman world as their peers of western origin. In the second half of the 2nd Century, senators of eastern background made up about 50 percent of the non-Italian senators, a statistic which suggests that the reason for the later appearance of Greek and oriental aristocrats was systemic rather than culturally or politically motivated.<sup>7</sup>

The admission of the élite from Greek provinces, such as Pontus and Bithynia, Asia, and Achaea, took a somewhat different course from those from the west and can be divided into several stages. Besides Q. Pompeius Macer from Mytilene, men from the east such as M. Calpurnius Rufus from Attaleia, L. Sergius Paullus from Antioch and M. Plancius Varus from Perge

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<sup>6</sup> Western local aristocrats and the Italian élite: Shaw 2000, 371-2. Greek élites seen as uninterested: Salmeri 2000, 87; Swain 1996, 411-12.

<sup>7</sup> Eck 2000, 219; Madsen 2009, 79-81.

had already been elected to the Senate under the Julio-Claudian emperors. Both Paullus and Varus were descended from Italian families and, judging from their Latin names, most of the senators admitted during the first half of the 1st Century had similar backgrounds. M. Plancius Varus was elected to the Senate under Nero. He came from a family of Italian merchants and managed to advance socially through marriage to a descendant of the former royal house in Galatia. This allowed Varus to accumulate extensive land holdings near the city of Germa and thereby to become a member of the landowning aristocracy in Anatolia. With his Italian origin and royal family ties, Varus was socially, culturally and economically on a par with, or perhaps even superior to, most members of the élite in the West. In the imperial administration, Varus served as *quaestor pro praetore provinciae* in Pontus and Bithynia and *legatus pro praetore provinciae* in Achaia and Asia before Vespasian appointed him proconsul in Pontus and Bithynia. At first Varus' career may not seem extraordinary. It is, however, worth remembering that he had advanced to a relatively elevated stage in the imperial hierarchy before Vespasian's reorganisation took form and was thereby ahead of his time.<sup>8</sup>

The next stage was initiated by Vespasian's census, which opened up the Senate to the Greek élite from Asia province in particular, but also from Pontus and Bithynia and from Achaia. The new senators from the east often had an Italian background, as in the case of the army officer Catilius Longus from Apamea, whom Vespasian promoted to the rank of praetor and appointed *legatus pro praetore provinciae Asiae*.<sup>9</sup> But also men of local origin were now admitted to the Senate. Among the first Greeks to receive the honor were C. Antius A. Iulius Quadratus from Pergamum and C. Iulius Bassus, presumably also from Pergamum—both descendants from the former royal families in Asia Minor.<sup>10</sup> Under the Flavians and following emperors more appointments were made. Gradually, members of the non-royal urban élite achieved senatorial appointments. One example was the *gens Cassia* from Nicaea in Bithynia that presumably achieved its first consular appointment in the early 2nd Century, when a Cassius Agrippa was elected *consul suffectus* in 130. The family reached its prime in the

<sup>8</sup> Sergius Paullus and Plancius Varus: Halfmann 1979, 101-5; Mitchell 1974, 28-33.

<sup>9</sup> Vespasian and Greek senators: Devreker 1980, 262-3. The *gens Catilia* later reached the highest level of the Roman élite when a probable descendant of Longus, L. Catilius Severus Iulianus Claudius Reginus, achieved his second consulship in 120: Halfmann 1979, 134-5; Corsten 1987, 33; Fernoux 2004, 446-50.

<sup>10</sup> Iulius Quadratus had a illustrious career with a second consulship and governorships in some of the empire's most prestigious provinces: Halfmann 1979, 43 and 112-16.

beginning of the 3rd Century when L. Cassius Dio, the historian, achieved the honour of a second consulate, appointed in 229 with the young emperor Alexander Severus as his colleague.<sup>11</sup>

Members of the Pontic and Bithynian élite often served in the army before admission to the Senate. It was from their status as equestrian officers that men like Catilius Longus, L. Flavius Arrianus from Nicomedia, and M. Claudius Cassius Apronianus from Nicaea, the father of Cassius Dio, reached the Senate and the imperial administration. Catilius Longus was promoted to *tribunus militum* by Claudius and later made *praefectus cohortis*, an office that was part of the equestrian *cursus honorum*; but it was not until the reign of Vespasian that he was admitted to the Senate at the rank of praetor.

One explanation for the differentiated process in the east may be found in the continued use of the *polis* constitution in Asia, Achaea, and Pontus and Bithynia. As a result, non-colonial cities were not subjected to Latin law, and magistrates and ex-magistrates did not receive Roman citizenship at their admission to the city council. Secondly, Greek culture continued to dominate the *poleis* communities; Latin and other aspects of Roman culture never had the same affect on the civic communities in the east as it did in the west. Consequently, cities in the east differed both culturally and constitutionally from cities in the western provinces. The economic potential of the local élite in the eastern provinces was another reason why individuals with Greek and oriental background, in general, were admitted to the Senate later than those in Baetica and Gallia Narbonensis.

Even though regular rainfall made Pontus and Bithynia, for example, relatively fertile, their geography was dominated by mountains, which offered relatively little land suitable for farming and set a relatively low upper limit to agricultural productivity. Pontus and Bithynia were known for their timber, and inscriptions set up to or by slave overseers testify to an agricultural production of some size.<sup>12</sup> Compared with southern Spain, which, in the imperial period, provided by far the largest share of the oil *amphorae* of Monte Testaccio in Rome and thereby the largest part of Rome's oil import, Pontus and Bithynia—and their élite—remained economically

<sup>11</sup> Fernoux 2004, 466-9.

<sup>12</sup> For agricultural production see e.g. *IK* 9, 192 and 196. For trusted slaves and freedmen in Roman agriculture see Carlsen 1995, 15-16; Carlsen 2002, 118. For export of timber see Hannestad 2007, 86-7.

less successful.<sup>13</sup> Compared with their peers in the West, senators of the east belonged in general to a different league.

## 2. *Perceptions of Roman Rule*

Not surprisingly, Roman rule was seen and presented very differently by the empire's intellectuals. In the High Empire (1st and 2nd Centuries), authors writing in Greek and Latin criticised the arrogant behavior of Roman promagistrates in the provinces, as well as the unreasonable exploitation of the provincial communities, which at times brought the local population to the edge of war.<sup>14</sup> On the other hand, Rome's world domination is presented as an almost undisputed right, and intellectuals of both Greek and Roman background underline their allegiance to Roman cultures of politics and power.<sup>15</sup>

Tacitus is an excellent example of such double vision. On the one hand, Claudius is depicted in the Senate arguing that the integration of the provincial aristocracies was in line with previous traditions and the reason why the Roman empire was more successful than the Athenian and Spartan equivalents (*Ann.* 11.24). On the other hand, it is Tacitus who offers the most straightforward criticism of Roman imperialism in his biographical work on Agricola, his father-in-law, a descendant of a senatorial family of Forum Iulii in Gaul. Tacitus stages a scene where the Britanni express their perception of Roman power as both greedy and violent (*Agr.* 15). Encouraged by the Roman invasion of the island of Mona and thus the absence of Suetonius Paulinus, who governed Britannia at the time, the provincial population began to discuss the presence of Rome (*Agr.* 14). The reader is led to believe that the general opinion among the provincial population was that Roman rule would bring more suffering as more life and properties would be lost to governors and procurators (*Agr.* 15).

Another critique of Roman imperialism appears in the fictitious speech of the Britannic noble Calgacus right before the battle in still unconquered

<sup>13</sup> Claridge 1998, 367-8.

<sup>14</sup> Tac. *Agr.* 18-21, 38; Dio Chrysostom on a critique of Domitian, *Or.* 13.1; on Roman luxury and lack of education, *Or.* 13.29-31. (See also Chapter 20.)

<sup>15</sup> In the *Agricola* Tacitus never questions the harsh methods used by his father-in-law, for instance when use of terror is presented as the right treatment of the Britanni. Arrian states his commitment to Roman culture by appearing as the dedicated governor in his *Periplus Ponti Euxini* (6.2), and Cassius Dio was eager to inform the reader of his achievements in the imperial administration (e.g., 49.36.4) and to affiliate himself with both the Roman army and the Senate (e.g., 73.20.1-3).

Caledonia. Roman rule is presented as slavery, where the resources and properties of the region are confiscated together with the younger generations who are taken away to serve either in the army or as workers on infrastructural facilities. The Romans are again described as greedy and less motivated to fight than the Britanni, who would fight to maintain their freedom and to protect family and property. Tacitus has Calgacus even question whether the Roman army, comprising Gauls, Germans and people of Britannia, would hold out against an army fighting for liberty (*Agr.* 32).

A similar criticism of Roman imperialism is to be found in Appian's critique of Roman lust for power and greed. In a speech attributed to Pelopidas, an envoy from Pontus prior to the First Mithridatic War, Rome is criticised for her arrogant behavior, which forced Mithridates VI to retaliate against the attack orchestrated by the Roman commission sent to force the king back to domains in central Anatolia (Appian, *Mithr.* 15.50–16.57).<sup>16</sup>

On the other hand, Rome's right to world domination is never challenged but appears to be delicately poised, not to be abused either by individual magistrates or administrative personnel. Throughout the *Agricola*, the main character is presented as the modest, upright, loyal and hard-working Roman promagistrate whose years in Britannia represents the ideal type of provincial government. In Tacitus' version, Agricola took over a province which after years of abuse and mismanagement was on the edge of revolt. One of the tribes had successfully defeated Roman cavalry and the province was raised in their support. Agricola is at first presented as the determined governor, keen to re-establish Roman control, moving out right away to defeat the Ordovices on their own territory. Immediately then Agricola consolidated Roman rule by the conquest of Mona, which over the years had caused a succession of Roman governors much concern (*Agr.* 18).

Having regained full control and created what is presented as a more stable situation through the use of determined military intervention, Agricola appears as a fair and attentive governor, who was as keen not to provoke or abuse the provincial community, as he had been to bring down the riot (*Agr.* 19–20). In order to establish a larger degree of coherence between Britanni and Romans, Agricola made an effort to create a respect-

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<sup>16</sup> It has been argued that Appian used the speeches to express personal views on the event or characters treated, which makes the speeches interesting evidence of the author's attitude to Roman imperialism: Gowing 1992, 240–241.

ful atmosphere and set an example by demanding strong discipline both in his household and in his administration.

It is important to Tacitus that Agricola did not allow slaves and freedmen to serve in administrative posts and thereby ensured that the provincial population was not subjected to men of lower social status. Another quality was his focus on his staff's competence. According to his biographer, no one was appointed or promoted out of sympathy or recommendation but on qualification alone. As a governor, Agricola was well informed of the situation in the province but did not intervene in every case. Tacitus also describes him as a fair judge, who often forgave rather than punished offenders, but also as one who was ready to act if needed. Finally, Agricola lowered the collection of corn, taxes and other burdens; and to have put an end to the disgraceful treatment of the provincial population, who had previously been forced to wait in line to buy their own corn at exaggerated prices from corrupt officials (*Agr.* 19). This mixture of military determination and just treatment of the provincial population created, according to Tacitus, an atmosphere of trust where the provincial population, in large part, gave up resistance and turned towards a life in accordance with Roman norms. Agricola promoted and encouraged the provincials to establish temples, civic architecture and houses. Roman customs were finding their way into various parts of the provincial community. Latin was adopted and the sons of the élite were offered Roman education (*Agr.* 21).

Even though the adoption of Roman way of life is presented as the enslavement of the Britanni, it is equally clear that Tacitus is neither questioning Agricola's methods nor Rome's right to rule Britannia. The efforts made to govern more justly than some of his predecessors had done are presented as a better way of serving the interests of the Empire. Agricola simply did a better job. As such, Agricola did not ease the burden on the Britanni because he was particularly keen to represent the provincial population. Instead, Tacitus' presentation of Agricola's modest, uncorrupt and thoughtful character and his fair and respectful government idealises the promagistrate who loyally put the interests of the Roman state before his own.

A similar focus on the empire's interests is found in Pliny's letters to Trajan. Gallia Cisalpina or Gallia Togata, Pliny's home region, had been part of Italy since 42 BC and Pliny was therefore not strictly a member of the provincial élite. Yet, as illustrated by Claudius' speech in the Senate, the Cisalpine élite were still regarded as newcomers in the middle of the 1st Century AD. In collaboration with Rome's first emperor of provincial

background, Pliny as governor of Pontus and Bithynia was determined to represent the interests of the empire. Trajan was ready to go a long way towards accommodating local traditions and often decided that local laws should be observed, a strategy no doubt to the benefit of the population in Pontus and Bithynia. But the interests of the province were not the emperor's or the governor's prime concern. Rome's provincial administration left the cities with an extended autonomy, allowing the local élite a large influence on how laws, edicts and rulings from Rome were interpreted and followed.<sup>17</sup>

Still, Pliny's correspondence reveals that Trajan followed a strategy which challenged the cities the right to decide on local matters, as for example when the construction of public baths and aqueducts in Prusa and Sinope, the improvement of sanitary conditions in Amastris, or the right to form a fire brigade in Nicomedia were to be approved by the emperor (*Ep.* 10.34). It is true that, from time to time, Trajan desisted from intervention in cases where Roman law had not been followed. When the *lex Pompeia* was not respected in the local law against double citizenship within Pontus and Bithynia, Trajan asked Pliny to make sure that the *lex* was upheld but did not abolish the individuals' additional citizenships. Seen together, the letters offer the impression that in order to maintain stability Trajan made room for local laws and accepted local interpretation of Roman ruling. But it is equally clear that Roman interests in economic and political stability were prioritised through restrictions on local rights to rule on political and economic matters.

That an emperor of Spanish origin and a governor eager to show his affiliation to Rome set the interests of Rome before those of a Greek province of medium size and importance is perhaps not surprising. But what in the case of Greek governors serving in Greek-speaking provinces? Were they particularly patriotic on behalf of the interests of their province or were they equally keen to represent Roman interests against fellow-Greeks or Hellenised people?

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<sup>17</sup> There are in the letters of Pliny several examples of what may be deferment to a very local interpretation of Roman law and rulings. Men convicted to the arena or the mines served in the public administration (Pliny, *Ep.* 10.31–32); P. Servilius Calvus had been evicted by a former governor Iulius Bassus but had never left the province (10.56–57); the élite in the Pontic and Bithynian cities appointed under-age members of the élite who had not reached the required age, to prevent members of the *plebs* from entering the council (10.79–80). And finally, at the time Pliny served in Pontus and Bithynia it was not uncommon that members of the élite had a seat in more than one of the cities in the province even though this was prohibited by the *lex Pompeia* (10.114–15).



One example is the intellectual L. Flavius Arrianus from Nicomedia. Arrian was appointed to the Senate, under the reign of Hadrian, as a *novus homo* and later sent as governor to Cappadocia, a strategically important province in the heart of Anatolia, where he served as *legatus Augusti* between 131 and 137. In his writing, Arrian was dedicated to Greek literary traditions and wrote more about Greek themes and older history than he did on his own age in the Roman empire. One of Arrian's works, the *Periplus Ponti Euxini*, stands out as an exception. In what is presented as a letter to Hadrian, Arrian informs the emperor about the situation in Cappadocia and the conditions of the troops. Throughout the work, he appears as the loyal governor who was keen to represent the interests of Rome and the emperor, as when he inspects the troops and decides to replace a poorly made inscription and statue on an altar set up to Hadrian (Arrian, *Peripl. PE* 1). When writing to the emperor, Arrian had to appear as a fellow-Roman. On the other hand, the *Periplus* should not too readily be seen as an official governor's report. Arrian mentions that he had sent a Latin report; the *Periplus* is therefore more than simply an account of the situation in and around Cappadocia. Writing in Greek and with a distinctive focus on Greek literature from the classical period, Arrian aimed at a Greek readership, which he hoped to impress by appearing as the emperor's loyal and competent *legatus*.

What may be drawn from our knowledge of provincial governors is that none of the provincial governors or magistrates known to us was particularly dedicated to improving provincial interests. There are examples where a Greek appointee favoured the provincial community in which they served, such as for example Herodes Atticus from Athens who, at the time he served as *corrector* of the free cities of Asia province, apparently used family money to sponsor part of an aqueduct in Alexandria Troas when Hadrian would not continue to finance the water-supply. Although the publicity in surpassing the emperor should not be underestimated, the decision of Atticus, Herodes' father, to pay for the aqueduct was no doubt an amazing act of generosity—but also one made entirely on a private initiative.<sup>18</sup>

A governor is one thing: other promagistrates of provincial background who, in order to demonstrate a sense of belonging to the Roman world, put the empire's interests before those of the provincial communities are altogether different. Different again are members of the provincial élite who

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<sup>18</sup> Philostratus, *V. Soph.* 2.54; Tobin 1997, 25–6.

may be less patriotic or impressed by Roman rule or by those who represented Roman rule or personal interests when serving in the provincial communities. There is no lack of provincials criticising Roman rule or Roman authorities working in the provinces. The Greek intellectual L. Messtius Plutarchus, from Chaeronea in Boeotia, criticises Greeks who pursued careers as procurators and promagistrates in the Roman administration, and reminded the local élite in the *poleis* that cities were placed under the authority of Roman authorities (Plutarch, *Moralia* 813E). Also Dio Chrysostom, from Prusa in Bithynia, shows great concern that internal disputes between cities in Bithynia weakened the ability to prosecute corrupt governors and warns his fellow-citizens in Prusa that internal dispute may force the governor to intervene against his own will (Dio, *Or.* 38.36).<sup>19</sup>

The last example here to be considered is the early 3rd-Century writer L. Flavius Philostratus from Athens who, through the 1st Century Greek miracle man Apollonius, presents the view that the emperor, in this case Vespasian, should allocate promagistrates to govern Greek speaking provinces to Greeks (Philostratus, *VA* 27–38). The comment is acutely relevant in the present context. The scene is set shortly before Vespasian's accession but before the census in 74, where men of Greek background were admitted to the Senate and appointed to the provinces. Philostratus, whose *nomen gentile* suggests that his family attained their citizenship from one of the Flavian emperors, leaves the reader with the impression that the strategy to enrol Greeks in provincial administration was inspired by the advice of Apollonius. But the intellectual critique of Rome and Roman authorities is not as clear-cut as this example might suggest. Dio Chrysostom is keen to highlight his friendship with Nerva and Trajan and to ensure the Prusans that he was on terms with the governor (*Or.* 40.5, 47.22), just as Philostratus was proud of his connection to Julia Domna, who asked him to write the biography on Apollonius in the first place (*VA* 1.3).

That the provincial population admired those serving in the Roman army or in the imperial administration is suggested by a local eagerness to announce their relations to men serving in the Roman administration. One example is C. Cassius Chrestus from Nicaea, who set up an inscription at the city gate claiming the governor M. Plancius Varus' friendship. Similar examples are found in the Bithynian city Prusias ad Hypium, where members of the local élite either announced their senatorial or consular family background or underlined their connection to men serving in the world of

<sup>19</sup> Plutarch's and Dio Chrysostom's critiques: Swain 1996, 177–8, 220–6; Madsen 2006, 67–9.

Roman politics and administration.<sup>20</sup> Based on the contexts in which these inscriptions appear, announcements of careers in the Roman administration and friendships or family ties to men in Roman service must have been aimed at a local audience rather than the governor or his staff, who only occasionally passed through the city. This suggests that significant prestige was attached to careers in Roman politics and administration in a Greek context. Had that not been the case, members of the local élite would have had no reason to underline their own careers as priests in the imperial cult, appointments as curators, or their connection to men in Roman service. If a Roman career was something the local community looked down upon, it would damage rather than promote the social status of those involved.<sup>21</sup>

In sum, men of provincial background were regularly admitted to the Senate from at least the middle of the 1st Century onwards, and were by the middle of the 2nd Century an integral part of Rome's political and administrative élite. Those magistrates and promagistrates of provincial background whose written accounts we possess today offer a picture of an overall loyal and patriotic group, who represented Roman interests in the provinces in which they served. Points of criticism were raised, as when Tacitus and Cassius Dio criticise governors' mismanagement of the provinces or incompetent emperors. Still, Rome's right to power is undisputed and men with Roman careers were eager to make their achievements known to the wider public—also in a provincial context. Further, the local élite in provincial communities displayed their resentment for unfair treatment, and local intellectuals particularly from the Greek provinces, criticised aspects of provincial administration—especially the relationship between civic communities and the governor. But, as in the case of Dio Chrysostom, the more critical voices were, keen to underline their connection to highest level of the Roman society. This association with the Roman élite is also apparent in the epigraphic record from Pontus and Bithynia in Asia Minor, where members of the local élite, as part of the public record, stated their friendship and family relations to men in Roman service.

The integration of the provincial élite provided a much-needed supply of human and economic resources essential for the upkeep of the Roman state. But as senators were not sent to govern their home provinces they did not have the opportunity to favor their local community, nor were they

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<sup>20</sup> Apollonius to Vespasian: Swain 1996, 389. Cassius Chrestus: *IK* 9.51; Madsen 2006, 76-7. Prusias ad Hypium: for inscriptions referring to the careers of friends and families see, e.g., *IK* 27.17; 27.19; 27.46.

<sup>21</sup> Madsen 2009, 99-102.

met by such expectation from the local population. To judge from their writing and the epigraphic record, members of the provincial élite who pursued a Roman career were proud of their achievement and were eager to parade their participation in *Romanitas*, both in an imperial and a local context.

## THE LIMITS OF POWER

*David Potter*

The emergence of the Principate neither ended nor stabilised fluid definitions of the *imperium Romanum* that had existed previously. Definitions of imperial power in Caesar reappear in Tacitus and in various Greek authors who worked during the ensuing century.<sup>1</sup> Throughout these centuries arguments favoring the infinite extensibility of Roman *imperium* coexist with the view that Roman power be measured in terms of influence as well as provinces. The primary development in the post-Augustan age would seem to be that new arguments, often linked to the state of imperial revenues, were gradually advanced in favor of limitation, while arguments favoring extensibility were increasingly linked with assertions about Roman morality. Both sides of such discussions seem to distinguish between the concept of the soft power of Rome—its hegemony—as opposed to the hard power represented by the boundaries of the provinces. This distinction was often crucial to the formulation of policy as a decided preference for ‘soft power’ emerges in the course of the 2nd Century.<sup>2</sup>

### 1. *Concepts*

The dichotomy between soft and hard power developed as relationships based upon statute came to the fore in place of or alongside of earlier definitions of Roman power in moral terms (characteristic of the 4th–3rd Centuries BC). Among the developments in adapting Greek treaty forms to the earlier *deditio in fidem* was especially the use of the unreciprocated promise of a state to defend the power, or *maiestas*, of the Roman people. The ‘*maiestas* clause’ is first attested in Polybius’ account of the treaty between

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<sup>1</sup> Hadrianic date of Tacitus: Syme 1958, 465–80; Potter 1991, 287–91; Birley 2000, 242–87 (with a good sample of opponents).

<sup>2</sup> The decision making process: Millar 1982; Isaac 1992 (against long term coherence); Luttwak 1976 (the crucial analysis of ‘grand strategy’ developments), Potter 1996 arguing for coherence greater than admitted in Millar and Isaac, but not self-evidently as strong as in Luttwak). Mattern 1999 stresses the mindset of decision-makers and the ideology of empire; compare and contrast Brunt 1990a, also crucial.

Rome and the Aetolians in 189 BC (Pol. 21.32.2-14), a treaty in which a clause relating to territorial integrity suggests that *ager publicus* may still have existed on the Adriatic coast in the wake of *deditiones* during the Illyrian War.<sup>3</sup> More than a century later this same dichotomy appears in Caesar's account of his debate with Ariovistus over the propriety of Roman intervention in the northern reaches of the Rhône valley. Significantly Caesar is attributing to Ariovistus a view that he could anticipate being argued by his political rivals at Rome (who he says were in communication with Ariovistus). Thus Ariovistus says that he had priority in Gaul on the grounds that 'never before this time had a Roman army passed beyond the borders of Gaul', while Caesar responds that

He did not think that Gaul belonged to Ariovistus rather than to the Roman people since the Arveni and the Ruteni, whom the Roman people had forgiven and had neither included within a province nor imposed tribute upon them, had been conquered in war by Quintus Fabius Maximus [cos. 121]. If it was most just to consider what time was most ancient, it would be most just to consider that the *imperium* of the Roman people was in Gaul; if it was correct to put weight upon the judgment of the Senate, Gaul ought to be free (Caes. *BG* 1.45.2-3).

The two views of empire that Caesar presents as being opposed are reconciled with seeming ease in Augustus' *Res Gestae* where both senses are shown to be of equal weight. Thus Augustus can say that he 'expanded the borders of all the provinces of the Roman empire where the neighboring peoples were not subject to our *imperium*', and also that:

when I could have transformed Greater Armenia into a province after the death of its king Artaxes, I preferred, following the example of our ancestors, to hand that kingdom to Tigranes, son of King Artavasdes, the grandson of King Tigranes, through Tiberius Nero, then my stepson. I handed that same nation, subdued by my son Gaius when it had deserted and rebelled, to be ruled by King Ariobarzanes, son of King Artabazus of the Medes.<sup>4</sup>

By joining the notion of the potentially infinite extension of Roman power to the structure of the provincial empire, Augustus established the parameters for the future development of Roman imperialist thought.

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<sup>3</sup> Täubler 1913, 62-6; Mitchell 2005, 186-91; for the formulation of the process see Potter 2010, 15-22.

<sup>4</sup> Caes. *BG* 1.44.12, 44.7; *RG* 26. 1, 27.2; Cooley 2009 *ad loc.*

## 2. Constraints

The central post-Augustan principle was that while the empire would have fixed boundaries—*termini*—these were not contiguous with those portions of the world that needed to heed the writ of Rome. Borders were important for administrative purposes—without a clear sense of territorial boundaries, administration in Roman terms was quite simply inoperable. Boundaries established the limits within which a governor could exercise his *imperium*: the phrasing of Germanicus' power when he went east in AD 17 is particularly revealing of the concept, as it states that he should have superior *imperium* to the governor of any province into which he should come. Provincial boundaries formed the basis of the imperial tax system once Augustus established the clear linkage between a provincial census and tax liabilities and *vectigalia*—import and export taxes—from people who crossed provincial borders (hence the importance of exemption from *vectigalia* for people such as professional actors or athletes, who routinely crossed such boundaries). As the *lex portoria* of Asia makes plain, such boundaries mattered even in the Republic as a province was essentially the aggregate of states contained within set customs boundaries, a definition manifest from Julius Caesar's treaty with the Lycian league in 46 BC, specifying civic territories that were being removed from Roman control and returned to the Lycians.<sup>5</sup>

On a local level, as a wide variety of documents makes clear, the precise boundaries of territories might be a matter of dispute between neighbors; these same documents make it equally clear that the central authority only concerned itself when it was called upon by the disputants. In principle local boundaries were set locally and approved at Rome. This too was hardly novel by the time of Augustus, as for instance the law on the praetorian provinces of 100 BC orders the governor of Macedonia to set boundaries where he sees fit for newly-acquired territory in the Caenian Chersonese. In the post-Augustan period, it appears that the same rule held good in places like 1st-Century AD Britain where the 'frontier' was set according to the judgment of governors. Archaeological work has revealed that military posts established at seemingly illogical locations, from the point of view of 'grand strategy', underscore the Roman view that imperial policy did not require the micro-management of fortlets in places like the Judean desert

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<sup>5</sup> Elton 1996, 7-8 notes the importance of interior as well as external boundaries; for Germanicus, *AE* 1996 no. 885,30-6; *lex portoria*, Mitchell 2009; Lycian treaty, Mitchell 2005, 209-11.

or customs posts in the Sahara, unless some crisis required higher authority to take an interest. The governing principles that ordinarily apply to the location of Roman camps is that they should be able to support each other, should ideally be located near major bodies of water to alleviate issues of transport, and there should be watchtowers at regular intervals so that the major garrisons could be notified of significant incursions—all practices that were taken over from standard practices of campaigns against enemies with dispersed settlement patterns. Indeed, Tacitus specifically mentions the construction of such watch-posts and the improvement of communications by the armies of both Blaesus campaigning against Tacfarinas and of Germanicus in AD 16. Frontinus describes similar activities in the context of Domitian's campaigns in Germany, and Dio says that Hadrian personally oversaw the relocation of some camps in the course of his construction of the new *limes* in Germany.<sup>6</sup>

Frontiers as administrative boundaries were one thing; frontiers as boundaries of economic activity were quite another. Legions required enormous amounts of food, some, at least, locally provided. There is clear evidence for foraging beyond frontier lines by relatively large bands of soldiers, even in time of peace, and for farmland beyond the Rhine held by legions. Trade with Rome apparently created networks that ran several hundred miles deep on the northern reaches of the empire, and plainly linked cities of the eastern provinces with those in Mesopotamia.<sup>7</sup>

Although the boundaries of provinces were originally set during military operations, decisions to change boundaries involved, first and foremost, deciding that whatever authority held sway beyond the frontier, be it tribal or royal, was dysfunctional. It was often a great deal easier to get the people on the ground to fix the problem themselves—the typical solution would be to appoint an imperial official to direct a local authority in straightening itself out, and this was often the method of choice (e.g., by supporting a new king or sending advisers to assist one who was there). From the perspective of peoples beyond the frontier, demanding redress of grievance worked very much for them as it did for subject communities—they could send an embassy to the governor and, if they did not like what they heard, another one to the emperor.

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<sup>6</sup> Boundary disputes: e.g. Oliver 1988, nos. 108-18; Crawford 1996, no. 12 col. iv 4-13 (Caenic Chersonese); Tac. *Ann.* 3.74; 2.7; Front. *Strat.* 1.3 with Thorne 2007, 228-32; Lepper 1948, 108-10; for Hadrian, *HA Hadr.* 12.6, Dio 69.9.1, with Birley 1997, 114-21.

<sup>7</sup> Whittaker 1994, 98-131; Elton 1996, 77-95.



The second significant Augustan development was the provincial army. Although armies had been stationed for long periods in the provinces during the Republic, the creation of an empire-wide entity with set terms of service, a coherent pay-scale, and centralised control of command defined the structure upon which the stability of the state depended. The governing principle appears to have been finance—wealthy as he was, and better organised though the state might have become, Augustus could not spend money that he did not have over the long term. Although massive armies could be summoned into existence during the civil wars, the largest of these—the forces that gathered for Philippi or Actium—were designed to exist for only a short time, supported by extraordinary measures. At Philippi, proscription supported the Caesarian forces, widespread theft those of the assassins. Antony's force at Actium was funded by Cleopatra, and the Augustan levy apparently included large numbers who understood that their term of service would be short. A long-serving army needed to be melded with the tax system.

Although the Augustan military system was long a work in progress, a rough equilibrium of men under arms as a percentage of the adult male population appears to have been reached by the time of his death. The best estimate of the population of the Roman Empire in AD 14 is 45,500,000.<sup>8</sup> At that time there were twenty-five legions with a theoretical strength of 5,600 legionaries each, for a total of 140,000; the recently constituted imperial guard, stationed in Italy, numbered 10,000 men, and it is probable that there were around 170,000 soldiers serving with in the *auxilia* (assuming that the ratio of 1.12:1 for auxiliaries to legionaries attested for the 2nd Century was inherited from the 1st).<sup>9</sup> Assuming roughly 20,000 men serving

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<sup>8</sup> Population of the empire: Frier 2000, 812, 814. Estimates of proportion of soldiers to civilians (too high in my view): Campbell 1984, 270; Speidel 2009, 475. Essentially in line with opinion offered here: Erdkamp 2002, 6-7. Reasonable estimates of cost of army and proportion of the budget: MacMullen 1984; Goldsmith 1987. Duncan-Jones 1994, 33-46, overstates army size by 20% and salary costs by nearly 100% (see his tables 3.1 and 3.2), uses figures for AD 200 rather than, as here, for ca. 150, and seems to me to underestimate the revenues of Rome, which Goldsmith sets at 3% of GDP. Goldsmith avoids problematic attempts at precision, as e.g. Scheidel and Friesen 2009, 91 (though with results not dissimilar to Goldsmith's); he would seem to me to be supported by the empirical observation that the state could pay the increased cost of Severus' expansion and salary increase, but not Caracalla's further pay-increase: Hdn. 3.8.4; *HA Sev.* 12.2, Dio 77. 9.3-4 (Severus); 78.36 (Caracalla); Dio 78.12, 78.36 on the return to pay rates under Severus, which appear to have been regarded as acceptable and not requiring additional imposts on the upper classes (a sore point with Dio).

<sup>9</sup> For this ratio: Hüttl 1936, 227, not discordant with Tac. *Ann.* 4.5.4 given Tacitus' inclusion of client kings' forces with the basic strength of the armed forces.

with the fleets at Ravenna and Misenum, the total Augustan military establishment amounted to around 340,000 men, or roughly 2.5% of the male population over the age of eighteen and roughly 4% of the male population between the ages of eighteen and thirty-eight. In the reign of Marcus Aurelius, the best estimate is that there were around 61,000,000 inhabitants of the empire. At this point the number of legions had expanded to thirty, for roughly 168,000 legionaries and roughly 200,000 auxiliaries with, again, about 30,000 men serving in the guard and fleets (though with the addition of fleets on the Rhine and Danube this number may be on the low side). The military establishment under Marcus, just before the radical, if temporary, reduction in the population resulting from the great plague, thus had a lower ratio of serving soldiers to civilians than under Augustus (roughly 2% of the adult male population or 3.2% of the military-age population).

The decline in the proportion of the male population under arms is unlikely to have changed significantly the army's proportion of the budget. Assuming that the budget expanded at the same rate as population (its main driver, since the bulk of taxes were derived from cultivable land and population) the costs would have been proportionally higher than in AD 14, both because of the 33% salary increase that Domitian granted in 84 and because, in the course of the 2nd Century, the food and equipment for which 1st-Century legionaries would have paid out of their salaries came to be included within their pay packages. It is perhaps a sign of the army's rôle in domestic politics that emperors chose to increase their soldiers' compensation rather than their numbers. This also bespeaks a fundamental decision to limit the manpower needs of the empire. If the emperors wished to make the army larger, they could have done so.

In terms of the army's mission, Dio and Tacitus both stress defense against outside threats and deterrence of domestic unrest. In Dio's more extensive view, a standing army needed to be based on the frontiers to keep enemies away and to make sure that Rome would always have adequately trained men available. He also stated that it was a good place to make use of the talents of men who might otherwise turn to domestic violence. Josephus, who had reason to know, has Herod Agrippa stress that no subject people could hope to resist the power of the Roman army. The army was a tool of both domestic and foreign policy, and, as with the mechanisms of provincial government, the same principles appear to have been outlined for its use in both spheres.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Brunt 1974, 94-8 = Brunt 1990, 193-7 on the formation of new legions; Tac. *Ann.* 4.5.1; Dio 52.27.3-4; Jos. *BJ* 2.345-404.

### 3. *Why did the empire stop expanding?*

The most obvious reason why the borders of the empire remained largely where they were for several centuries after the death of Augustus is deceptively simple. Successive emperors decided that they should. To say this may explain why Tacitus noted Augustus' advice that the empire be kept within the *termini* extant when he died. Such a premise, however, grossly oversimplifies a complex process and the very many 'rectifications' that did in fact occur as states bordering the Augustan empire were attached to neighboring provinces, and ignores the occasional dispatch of Roman troops to regions well away from any provincial boundary—e.g. the Crimea or the Caspian Sea—and the possibility of a significant change of attitude as to what constituted an appropriate or wise response to perceived threats from abroad.

Tacitus was the son-in-law of a famously swashbuckling provincial governor, Julius Agricola, himself the product of an era in which swashbuckling governors may have been more of a norm than at other times. Vespasian, who appointed Agricola to Britain, appears to have given great latitude to at least one other governor—Ulpian Traianus in Syria—and to have been the product of a generation in which some governors had initiated significant advances. In addition to allowing Traianus to act as virtual viceroy of the east, Vespasian praised the independence of Plautius Silvanus along the Danube in the time of Nero in a letter that he sent to the senate. It is Dio who notes that, as Vespasian was beginning his career as a general under Claudius, two governors, Hosidius Geta and Suetonius Paulinus, initiated the annexation of Mauretania Tingitana. Dio also says that the invasion of Britain was the brainchild of Aulus Plautius who set the operation in motion as a response to developments there. The emperor Trajan later appears to have advertised particular affection for a group of generals who served various functions during his reign (four of whom Hadrian promptly executed upon his accession). Trajan himself had annexed Dacia after his effort to reduce the region to peaceful but independent subservience failed, and only resorted to the invasion of Parthia when again, it appears, diplomacy failed to solve the inveterate issue of the Armenian succession. He rapidly realised that his initial thought of the Dacisation of what is now Iraq was a huge mistake, and was withdrawing in haste even as he suffered his final illness.

A product of the age of Vespasian and Trajan, Tacitus appears to regard expansion as a routine option, and even though the broader question of

how far Tacitus seeks to reflect specific political circumstances in his own day (e.g., the events surrounding the death of Trajan) must remain conjecture, there can be no doubt that he saw connections between patterns of past conduct with patterns in his own time. Thus he describes the allegiance of Armenia in the reign of Tiberius in words that imply a direct connection with his own time, and his reference to the *claustra imperii* ('the gateways of the empire') on the Persian Gulf is a direct comparison between the state of the empire in Tiberius' time and in his own. He attributes the end of Agricola's campaign in Britain to imperial jealousy and lists the 'loss' of Britain after its conquest as one of the sad events in his *Histories*, composed some time after Dacia and Arabia were added to the empire. In the same context it is clear that the description of Tiberius as *princeps proferendi imperi incuriosus* (an 'emperor unconcerned with extending the empire') is not intended to be flattering. In the *Germania*, he writes of Rome's relations with various German tribes from the perspective of relationships that have remained essentially stable for centuries—noting for instance that the Batavi were driven by domestic sedition to occupy lands which made them part of the empire, even though they are not subject to tribute or 'any *publicanus*.' The Mattiaci were 'in the same allegiance' as the Batavians, for 'the magnitude of the Roman people carried reverence beyond the ancient frontiers of the empire, so that, although with a seat and borders on their own bank, they act with mind and spirit with us.' Rome itself is protected by the hatred of barbarians for each other: 'in so much as the fortunes of empire drive onwards, Fortune offers nothing better than the hatred of our enemies.'<sup>11</sup>

Tacitus' reference to the driving fate of empires is an evident allusion to cyclical theories of the development of states. He uses a biological image of decline in Messalla's account of the history of oratory, and exploits the notion that his age is a lesser one—even though it might also offer *exempla* for future generations. At moments such as these, he seems to allow that the great age of conquest has passed. At other points, he offers instead a series of significant typologies for the avoidance of expansion: imperial jealousy, finance, military impracticality and cultural incompatibility. Simple incompetence may be considered as an additional factor.

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<sup>11</sup> *Ann.* 13.34.2, similarly 2.56 (Armenia); 6.32.2 (Parthia). *Hist.* 1.2.1 (Britain 'lost'); *Ann.* 4.32.2 (on Tiberius); *Germ.* 29.2-3; 33.2. Aulus Plautius and Britain: especially Dio 60.19; *PIR*<sup>2</sup> P 457. Plautius Silvanus: *ILS* 986 with *PIR*<sup>2</sup> P 480. Mauretania: Dio 60. 9.1-2; *PIR*<sup>2</sup> S 957 (Paulinus), H 216 (Hosidius Geta), cf. H 217.

Imperial jealousy is perhaps Tacitus' most commonly advanced constraint upon expansion. It is adduced to explain the recall of Agricola from Britain and the decision not to appoint him as governor of Syria. Domitian reportedly dreaded comparison between Agricola's successful adventures and his own failures against the Dacians. In Tacitus' formulation, Agricola's final campaign arose from the realisation that there could be no end to the endemic raiding of Roman territory unless the army subdued the island as a whole (and from Agricola's need to slaughter barbarians as therapy for the death of his son).<sup>12</sup>

Tacitus' further views on gubernatorial adventurism are likewise on display in both his account of the earlier history of Britain in the *Agricola* and at various points in the *Annals*. In the *Agricola*, he lauds Aulus Plautius and Ostorius Scapula for giving shape to the province, while suggesting—in the *Annals*—that Didius was too old for the job, even though he appears to have given him good press for aggressive conduct in the Black Sea region earlier in his life. Suetonius Paulinus was plainly something of a Tacitean hero, whose worthy campaign against religious fanatics was interrupted by failures in the civil administration that caused the revolt of Boudicca. Elsewhere Tacitus deplores Claudius' instruction to the governors of Germany that they not engage in operations beyond the boundaries of their provinces. In the east, he concedes that what appears to have been imperially mandated passivity towards the developing Armenian crisis at the end of Claudius' reign only made things worse. Tacitus also thought very highly of the independence of Domitius Corbulo, and, although we do not have his discussion of the great marshal's demise, it is unlikely that he would have dissented from Dio's view that it resulted from imperial jealousy.<sup>13</sup>

Hadrian was considerably less interested than his predecessor in gubernatorial adventurism. Dio seemingly found no post-Trajanic governors who could exercise such initiative and Fronto was no doubt expressing an important point when he stressed that Lucius Verus was the leader in the war with Parthia, even though, as Dio notes, he was surrounded by great soldiers. Antoninus Pius appears to have used Lollius Urbicus as a general in several areas at the beginning of his reign, permitting him to extend the frontier in Britain, and, it seems, advance into the Sahara region. It is

<sup>12</sup> Tac. *Dial.* 28–30 (Messalla); *Ann.* 3.55 (*exempla*); *Ann.* 14.37.1 (conquest age passed); *Agr.* 39 (Domitian's jealousy); *Agr.* 29.1, 33.3–4 on Agricola's final campaign.

<sup>13</sup> Plautius, Ostorius and Didius: *Agr.* 14.1; *Ann.* 12.31–39, 40.4; 14.29; 12.15. Claudius' passivity: *Ann.* 12.19–20, 48. Corbulo's death: Dio 63.17.3–6. See also Mattern 1999, 200–1.

perhaps coincidental that Britain and North Africa again seem areas where some independence could be allowed governors—the garrisons were relatively small and self-contained. By contrast the advertised ‘king given to the Quadi’ (ca. 141) does not seem to have been accompanied by a major military operation; the ‘king given to the Armenians,’ at the very same time, was well advertised as the result of negotiation; and the wall built by Lollius Urbicus may be seen as a powerful symbol that the days of open-ended adventurism by the governors of Britain were at an end. Hadrian’s wall may likewise have been intended as much to keep governors in as Scots out, just as the even more extensive *limites* built in the Rhine and Danube regions defined the zone where hard power would be exercised. The *Historia Augusta* and 4th-Century epitomators seemingly reflect contemporary panegyric when asserting that ‘no one had greater authority amongst foreign peoples than Pius who always loved peace,’ and that ‘he was venerable no less than terrible to foreign kings, so much so that many barbarian nations, putting aside arms, brought their quarrels and disputes to him, and obeyed his decrees’.<sup>14</sup>

More specific illustration of ‘soft power’ north of the frontiers, and the Roman preference for its exercise, appears in the record of treaties, sixteen in all, made with various groups in the last years of Marcus Aurelius and the first of Commodus. The usual terms include three elements: a treaty of friendship, regulation of tribal autonomy, and a statement of the terms regulating the tribe’s future relationship with Rome. Typical ingredients in the first part are a statement of the relationship, return of booty, prisoners and deserters to Rome, and the assessment of a contribution of troops to the Roman army; steps in the second part were the naming of a king by Rome, a ban on alliances with other peoples, the requirement that a Roman officer be present at meetings of the tribe, and supervision of dealings with other tribes. The definition of a tribe’s future relationship with Rome can be broken down into three categories: bans on certain activities (settlement within a certain distance from the Danube, navigation), regulation of contacts between the tribes and the province for commerce, requirement for future contributions to Rome, and the concession that the Romans will not seek to garrison the tribe’s territory. Although there is some variation in details (especially concerning how much land should be left empty north of the Danube), the pattern is consistent, and offers no

<sup>14</sup> Lollius Urbicus: *HA Ant.* 5.4; Paus. 8.43.3, with Hüttl 1936, 254–61, 311; *PIR*<sup>2</sup> L 327. King to Quadi: *RIC* 3, Antoninus nos. 619–20; Hüttl, 272; *HA Ant.* 9.6. Reputation of Antoninus: *HA Ant.* 9.10; *Eutr.* 8.2.

evidence that Marcus seriously considered the expansion of the empire. Moreover, several of these terms are attested as early as the Julio-Claudian period in Rome's dealings with Germanic peoples, which suggests that Marcus was trying to restore the situation that had obtained on his borders before the wars. They may also suggest a conscious choice on the part of Marcus to avoid following in Trajan's footsteps. He fought major wars against both the Persians and tribes of the central Balkans, but in neither case did new provinces come into being.<sup>15</sup>

It was only after his death that, it appears, controversy broke out over the northern wars, which had been concluded. The *Historia Augusta's* biography of Marcus asserts that 'he waged war for the next three years [after his return from the east in 176] against the Hermunduri, Sarmatians and Quadi, and, if he had lived for another year, he would have turned them into provinces,' a statement based upon the work of Marius Maximus writing in the 220s. Similarly, and even later, Herodian made Commodus state that soldiers should 'set in order and strengthen our position, if you finish off the remnants of the war with all your valour, and extend the Roman Empire to the ocean.' Herodian then attributes Commodus' departure for Rome to disreputable advisers, who may also have caused his shift from campaigning to negotiations and the payment of subsidies to end the fighting. The *Historia Augusta* states further that 'he submitted to the terms of the enemy and gave up the war that his father had almost finished.' Dio apparently said something similar.<sup>16</sup>

Although we cannot now know Dio's source for Marcus' northern wars, it seems likely that he drew his information on Marcus' dispositions from a work specifically on those wars (the sort of imperial war-book that Lucian earlier parodied in *How to Write History*). The consistency in the detail for both Marcus' and Commodus' treaties may well suggest that Dio's source was interested in showing that Commodus was simply doing what his father had been doing—possibly in response to precisely the sort of jingoistic rhetoric about the joys of annexation that appears later.<sup>17</sup> The image of the vigorous conqueror might well have been a standard contrast for an emperor who sought peace—and been anything but new in the late 2nd or early 3rd Centuries.

<sup>15</sup> Stahl 1989 (treaties); Potter 1992, 269–74 on earlier practice.

<sup>16</sup> *HA Marc.* 27.10; *HA Comm.* 3.5; Dio 71.33.4, 72.1.3.

<sup>17</sup> Dio 71.20.2; Hekster 2002 (Marcus favoured extension); Kovács 2009, 242–63 (excellent discussion showing why this was not so, which will hopefully put the subject to rest). Important discussion of differences between representations of warfare on columns of Trajan and Marcus Aurelius: Dillon 2006.

The controversy over Marcus' intentions appears to be very similar to a controversy with which Tacitus dealt in the early books of the *Annals*, concerning the end of Germanicus' campaigns in Germany. There can be little doubt that the original scope of Germanicus' instructions included the re-establishment of provincial government between the Rhine and the Elbe. The statement in the *Res Gestae* that Augustus advanced the empire's boundary to the Elbe indicates that he did not regard the area as lost for good after the death of Varus. In the same context, *Res Gestae* 26.2 and 26.5 starkly differentiate between expeditions that were intended to have a lasting impact and those that were not. In the former case he states simply, 'I brought under control the Gallic and Spanish provinces and similarly Germany, where the ocean forms a boundary from Cadiz to the mouth of the river Elbe,' which is quite different from where 'the Cimbri and the Charydes and the Semnones and other German peoples of the same region sent envoys to request my friendship and that of the Roman people,' or other places where annexation was not a desired end.<sup>18</sup> It is thus probable that when Augustus advised that the empire be bounded by rivers, he meant the Elbe in the west. Two years later, after a summer in which Germanicus erected trophies close to the Elbe, indicating that he anticipated the reestablishment of direct control in the area, Tiberius wrote to tell him that the costs were too great and that more could be achieved through diplomacy. Tiberius appears to have specified that military losses on Germanicus' return journeys were simply too great. Germanicus' failure to win a decisive victory led Tiberius to change the mission to one of revenge (a perfectly respectable one to the Roman mind) and forgo re-annexation. Tiberius appears already to have made the point that money was short when in AD 15 he reneged on the accelerated retirement plan that Germanicus had awarded the legions in 14, and would reiterate the point in 23 when preparing for a trip to the provinces that would never take place.<sup>19</sup>

The reign of Tiberius was not the only point at which the state apparently lacked money to pay the army and did not see looting German villages as a way of making good on the shortfall. In the course of the northern wars Marcus, to pay the army, had to resort to an auction of palace treasures to raise cash. Appian asserted that Antoninus Pius would not annex new

<sup>18</sup> Germanicus' original instructions: Ridley 2003, 196-203. Augustan expeditions: *RG* 26.2, 26.4-5; Cooley 2009, 223-4.

<sup>19</sup> Tiberius' decision: Tac. *Ann.* 2.18; 22; 26.2; 43. Military finances: *RG* 17.2; Dio 55.24.9; Suet. *Aug.* 49.2; Tac. *Ann.* 1.36.3, 52.3, 78. 2; 4.4.2, on Tiberius. Revenge: Mattern 1999, 184-94; Lendon 1997, 32, 247.



territory unless it could pay the cost of its garrison (an insistence that seemingly made significant annexation out of the question in the underdeveloped regions that bounded the empire everywhere but in Iraq). Later, Cassius Dio seems to have (correctly) connected the annexation of Mesopotamia with the Severan expansion of the army, but insisted that the act was a tremendous waste of money that exposed the empire to constant warfare.<sup>20</sup> His strategic judgment was wrong, but the argument is nonetheless of value as a sign of the sort of discussion of foreign policy that could rage. The argument would have resonated, perhaps with those used by Hadrian after 117 AD. Although Trajan may well have argued that the conquest of Parthia was suited to Rome's ambition for world domination, he appears to have realised that these ambitions were impractical and ordered a withdrawal before his death. As far as the eastern frontier was concerned, Hadrian simply continued the final policy of his predecessor—Rome's superiority had been demonstrated, neighbouring kings were more firmly within the orbit of Rome, and that sufficed. In the next generation, Aelius Aristides would state that, since Rome already controlled the best part of the world and could extend its frontiers at will, there was no need to actually do so. Tacitus was interested in cultural differences that told against the ability of Romans, or the Romanised, to exercise direct rule in Armenia and Parthia. A lesson had perhaps been learned. So too Tacitus noted that, when Roman incompetence caused the Frisians to revolt, Tiberius saw no reason to reimpose control. Although Tacitus disapproved, he also noted that the area was not readily amenable to Roman government.<sup>21</sup>

Marcus Aurelius seems to have added one final ideological dimension to the view that the empire that could dominate its neighbors need not annex them, in suggesting that he could channel divine power for dispersing rivals. The celebrated rain miracle is explicitly the act of an emperor able to call down heavenly forces in an area where he was not present. Septimius Severus offers his own reading of this event in published accounts of storms that enabled his men to win victories—while he was in Italy—over the forces of Pescennius Niger. He would later advertise a lightning strike that dispersed tribal leaders plotting against Rome north of the frontier. Even though he would expand the empire into Mesopotamia after his first Parthian expedition, it appears that he too was essentially

<sup>20</sup> App. *Praef.* 7.26; Dio 65.3.3.

<sup>21</sup> Arist. *Or.* 26.10, 28, with Brunt 1990, 476-7; Tac. *Ann.* 4.72-4 (Frisians); for eastern peoples, n. 11 above.

comfortable with the Antonine notion that the empire was as large as it needed to be.<sup>22</sup>

The ideology of restraint could be taken as a cover for institutional factors such as those that Tacitus analysed, and it is quite likely that successive emperors realised the essential economic limits to the exercise of power. The issue was present from the later years of Augustus, and there was no radical change in the empire's economic status that would allow the radical military expansion required to extend direct control into economically underdeveloped zones, or regions otherwise not amenable to Roman rule. Arabia was on the borders of a Roman province for more than a century before Trajan ordered its annexation, Osrhoene was likewise a border zone for centuries before Severus thought that annexation would actually work—and Palmyra, although long Roman, remained very much a world of its own into the 3rd Century. Dacia was annexed only when an earlier settlement failed, and Domitian's operations along the Rhine seemingly aimed simply at a better defensive line. The invasion of Britain perhaps underscored for all time the problem that could arise from ill-conceived efforts at annexation, and it is notable that the early Antonine age saw significant expenditure to change the pattern of behaviour that had led to endless violence.

The language with which policies were discussed looked to modes of expression and conceptions of imperial power that were well established by the time of Augustus. The discussions of the 2nd Century were, however, carried out within the parameters established by the existence of the imperial office. Central direction of policy is assumed, at least by contemporary writers, who see the emperor's security, and the constraints imposed by the imperial budget—the recognition that expansion could throw up rivals to an emperor whose own military talents might be limited, and the fact that garrisons cost money—as primary factors in decision-making. More than that, given that these structural limitations stemmed from conscious decisions about the deployment of resources, they indicate how emperors understood that the government's mission was now to ensure its own stability. The rulers of the empire would come to realise only in the course of the 3rd Century that there might be very different threats that would also need to be addressed. These threats involved more competent and highly motivated rivals, glacial reaction to changing circumstances, and a military system that remained wedded to the tactics of the age of expansion, now hundreds of years in the past.

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<sup>22</sup> Kovács 2009, 145-7, is excellent on the tradition.

## ROMAN IMPERIALISM: CRITICS AND ASPIRANTS

*Sophie Mills*

It's like the Roman Empire. Wasn't everybody running around  
just covered in syphilis? And then it was destroyed by the volcano!

*Joan Collins*

Lo, all our pomp of yesterday  
Is one with Nineveh and Tyre!  
Judge of the Nations, spare us yet,  
Lest we forget—lest we forget!

*Rudyard Kipling, Recessional*

We don't do Empire.

*Donald Rumsfeld*

For the subjects of the Roman empire, its existence was a simple fact, part of the conditions of their daily lives. For those considering it some two millennia later, it is inevitably a model, whether of glorious achievement or disastrous failure. Many ancient powers desired, and often achieved, imperial power; but the scale, longevity and complexity of the Roman empire give it a unique distinction, and it offers multiple points of comparison for every subsequent western power. Comparisons, increasingly hackneyed, between Roman and modern societies are ingrained in us, while in the run-up to the Iraq invasion in March 2003, George Bush and the United States were compared respectively to Caesar and the Roman empire.<sup>1</sup> The validity of such comparisons is irrelevant: the point is that Rome remains the 'gold standard' of empire.

Even the term Roman empire is ambiguous. Especially in popular culture, it often refers to the whole area and time of Rome's dominance with little distinction between the political periods of Republic and Empire. The whole of Roman history becomes a historical 'buffet', offering an array of examples to illustrate whatever the picker wishes. But where Republic and Empire are contrasted, both by ancient Romans and many moderns, the former tends to appear as a golden age, contrasting with a corrupt empire

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<sup>1</sup> Murphy 2007, 5; Ferguson 2005, 14; Wyke 2006, 305, 306-9, list commonly-drawn comparisons between Rome and modern societies.

whose demise is inevitable and deserved. The ambivalent figure of Julius Caesar, sometimes a just conqueror, but also a greedy tyrant, is frequently the pivot on which Rome turns from republican virtue to imperial vice, whether judged by the medieval Italian city states, for whom Caesar represented their own ambitious politicians, or by a nascent United States, whose Founding Fathers conceptualised England as an oppressive Caesar or empire, whose yoke they had thrown off to create a new and purer society. Republican Rome offered them the model of constitutional checks and balances, and terms such as Senate and Capitol; while architectural inspiration was provided by some imperial buildings, such as the Pantheon for the Jefferson memorial. The Republic was conceptualised as the home of the liberty which created the secular 'saints' Cicero, Cato, and Cincinnatus, with whom George Washington was often compared: Joseph Addison's 18th-Century play *Cato* greatly influenced the rhetoric of revolutionary heroes such as Patrick Henry. Their conception of the United States as a new world snatched from a decadent and decaying old world, rising from nothing to unparalleled power, resembles the construction of the new Rome from the ashes of a fallen Troy of Virgil's and Horace's conceptions.<sup>2</sup>

The fact that the Roman empire no longer exists, having either apocalyptically declined and fallen or, less dramatically, moved into the conditions of late antiquity, brings a certain frisson of fear. Rise and Fall. Decline and Fall. Such terms arise from fundamental and inescapable biological processes. Once attached to a vast and complex phenomenon like the Roman Empire, they exert a fearful fascination as we gaze at the ruins that stirred Edward Gibbon in 1764 to begin writing his *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. If something so monumental could fail, are we doomed to destruction? A moment's thought might reassure us: the British empire is long gone but hardly Great Britain itself. But the end of an empire retains power to generate anxiety because it is impossible to know, except perhaps retrospectively, when, or why decline begins. A small, static empire is a contradiction in terms, but the larger it grows, the more fragile it seems to become.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Historical 'buffet': Gummere 1963, viii-ix; Huet 1999, 56-7; Malamud and McGuire 2001, 253-4. Ambivalent figure of Caesar: Reinhold 1984, 97-8; Malamud 2006, 148-9; Murphy 2007, 6, 27-30. 'Saints' Cicero, Cato and Cincinnatus: Murphy 2007, 37. Troy and Rome: *Aen.* 12.288; *Hom. Od.* 3.3.57-60; Gummere 1963, 29-30.

<sup>3</sup> Late antique Rome: Brown 1971; Ward-Perkins 2005, 3-7, 173. Biological terms applied: Galinsky 1992, 60-1. Doom: Ward-Perkins 2005, 1. Gibbon 1784, 90 described Rome's decline as a 'natural and inevitable effect of immoderate greatness'.

And so, the Roman empire becomes inseparable from its supposed end and the supposed meaning of its end. When did Rome fall? 410 AD, when it was sacked by the Visigoths, or 476, with the forced abdication of Romulus Augustus? Or earlier? Gibbon set the origins of decline under the Antonines when improved living conditions had softened Rome's intellectual, spiritual and military vigour, but later claimed later that Rome's decline began under Nero or even the 'tyrant' Augustus. One Nazi theoretician traced Rome's decline to the 5th century BC when patricians began to marry plebeians.

In 1980 Alexander Demandt compiled a list of 210 reasons previously offered for Rome's fall, a remarkable number of which dovetail with prevalent cultural anxieties of the west. For example, judgements—by no means uniform—about racial mixture frequently shape discussions of the end of the empire. In one traditional formulation, barbarians destroyed Rome militarily and culturally, but the nature of these barbarians reflects the historical conditions in which they are conceptualised: especially after World War II, they were imagined as waves of hostile Germans, but with the rise of European unity, the waves became less hostile and their contribution to late antiquity more positive. Indeed, since Greco-Roman culture has lost its privileged status, post-Roman centuries are no longer considered such a dark age. Gibbon, in a spirit of contrarianism, claimed that barbarian incursions added vigour to the Roman spirit, which had been weakened by Christianity's enervating influence. However, this allegedly destructive ideology took over three centuries to become important, and as late as 451 Roman military power was still impressive: moreover, the eastern empire continued to exist until 1453. Others place the blame upon the Roman army for taking on duties extraneous to military operations, or enlisting barbarians. Such explanations and many others reflect some central anxieties of the modern western societies for which Rome remains an eternal model: substitute 'immigrants' for 'barbarians', compare the vast military resources of the United States and Rome, and Rome's fall easily shades into a foreshadowing of the potential decline of western society. Perhaps most alarming is Bury's postulation that the fall of the empire had no specific cause, but came about merely through a series of contingent events.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Start of decline: Griffin 1989; Gibbon 1784, 88–99. Demandt's list: Galinsky 1992, 71–3. Impact of barbarians: Rostovtzeff 1957, 532–5; Dench 2005, 227–31. Post-Rome not seen as a dark age: Ward-Perkins 2005, 178. Barbarian vigour and Roman vitality: Gibbon 1784, 91;

The Roman empire casts an inescapable shadow over subsequent societies, and like many powerful entities, its power has generated admiration, emulation and hostility. In medieval Europe, where Roman law remained a unifying presence through late antiquity, the empire retained a kind of mystical power for those seeking to control Europe as Rome's true successors: Charlemagne received a seal of *Renovatio Imperi Romani* at his coronation by the Pope in 800, and the title of Roman Emperor existed until Francis II renounced it in 1806. The monarch of the Holy Roman Empire claimed temporal and spiritual power through Rome as the seat of Christianity, while the papacy claimed power from supposed links with the Roman empire through the forged *Donation of Constantine*.<sup>5</sup>

Long after the Middle Ages, the status of the Roman empire was still an object of aspiration: any aspiring power could be dubbed a new Rome, while the term Latin America, invented in the mid-19th Century, was popularised by French overseas adventurers promoting the claims of the so-called 'Latin Races' against Anglo-Saxon imperial ambitions. Even more recently, Mussolini, as supposed descendant of the Caesars and heir to their empire, claimed the military and moral power of a highly idealised ancient Rome through *Romanità*, a quasi-mystical concept encapsulating the benefits bestowed on civilisation by Rome. It was especially useful both in promoting Italian unity and in establishing world dominance, by claiming Italy's right to 'reclaim' ancient Roman territory. Early 20th Century poets began to champion 'the return': Italy's right to (re-)annex the property in Africa supposedly bequeathed to them by their ancestors. For Mussolini, Caesar and Augustus were heroic military and civic models, and he promoted his fascist revolution as a kind of replay of the Roman revolution, purified of any mistakes originally made. Meanwhile in Germany, Hitler used Roman history, among others, as a model for his own plans of world domination, while being determined to avoid the supposedly disastrous mingling of races which led to the empire's demise. Just as imperial Britain in the 19th Century looked back to Rome as the model to match or surpass, so a century later two imperial models—the British Empire and its predecessor—still surface in the rhetoric of the West's lone superpower. In a

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Black 1997, 243; Galinsky 1992 56-8. Blaming the Roman army: Cary 1957, 779; Kagan 1978, 114-32. Contingent events: Bury 1923, 308-13; and for a sceptical view of the 'fall of Rome' and its significance for later civilisations, Haywood 1958.

<sup>5</sup> Holy Roman emperors and popes: Schulze 1996, 4-19; Wyke 2006, 95-6.

recent article, James Kurth claims the US military as the heirs of the administrators of the British empire.<sup>6</sup>

But Rome was also a negative example for anti-imperialists such as J.A. Hobson, for whom it exemplified imperialism's morally and economically deleterious effects. Each European nation prizes its anti-Roman freedom fighter: Arminius for the Germans, the French Vercingetorix, while Boadicea stands in front of the British Houses of Parliament. Cultural productions evoking, or replaying, Roman history commonly contrast an oppressive Rome with the noble forebears of their modern consumers. After 1945, the Roman empire all too easily resembled another power with pretensions to world domination through a master race. In films about Rome such as *Spartacus* and *Ben Hur* and *Quo Vadis*—in which Nero even performs a Hitler salute—the Romans are slaveholders, colonisers and totalitarians. Marching legions can easily 'be' Nazis or fascists and US cold war rhetoric 'universalises the discourse of freedom': its audience derives reassurance from knowing that such totalitarianism is ultimately unsustainable.<sup>7</sup>

An American audience can identify with Rome's victims, especially when British actors play decadent Romans oppressing heroic (American) Christians, but it will not necessarily consider potential parallels between the power of the Roman empire then and their own nation's power today. Similarly Robert Graves' *Claudius* novels were written at the end of the British Empire, during disenchantment with the old imperial order. Graves transported contemporary anxieties to his corrupt Rome, contrasting it with the purity of the ancient Britons, who were untainted by British imperialism. 'In effect the ruling class of a 20th century empire could experience itself as the colonized by evoking a fantasy of the corruption of their own ancient imperial rulers.'<sup>8</sup>

As each empire strives to surpass its predecessors, Rome's fate looms larger. In 1897, at the height of British power, Winston Churchill in Rome wondered how durable the British Empire could be. At least since 1778, the fall of the United States because of immigration (barbarians) has been

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<sup>6</sup> 'Latin' America: Habinek 1988, 31. Mussolini: Wyke 1999, 189-90; 2006, 170-89; Dunnett 2006, 224-6. For Napoleon's appropriation of an Augustan persona, see Huet 1999. Hitler and Rome: Losemann 2006, 225-30. America and the British empire: Quinault 1997b, 320; Kurth 2003.

<sup>7</sup> Hobson on Rome: Jenkyns 1992, 31. Anti-Roman freedom fighters: Hingley 2001, 91-126. Nero's Hitler salute: Winkler 2001, 53-8. Cold war rhetoric: Joshel, Malamud and Wyke 2001 in Joshel, Malamud and McGuire 2001, 7. Totalitarianism unsustainable: Fitzgerald 2001, 31.

<sup>8</sup> Graves' *Claudius* novels: Joshel 2001, 124-5.

predicted. The American painter Thomas Cole's series *The Course of Empire* (1833–6) offers a cyclical, universalising idea of history: agrarian origins, rise to empire in a city closely resembling reconstructions of ancient Rome, corruption and conquest, and an end in desolation. A cyclical view of history often provides a framework for modern Roman imperial narratives: its predictability offers reassurance that the dangers facing modern powers may be forestalled with foreknowledge. An alternative model, however, claims the possibility of transcending through unending progress the cycles of rise, decline, and fall. This is the model adopted by the proponents of US exceptionalism from the 19th Century on, for whom manifest destiny exempted the United States from traditional historical cycles: since this is in effect a claim to superiority over the Roman empire in longevity and stability, it diminishes Rome's importance as a model. Indeed, although the rise and fall paradigm shaped many Romans' attitudes to their empire, Polybius thought that Rome had managed to transcend the pattern of good shifting to bad, so as to begin a new cycle (6.10.3), by claiming that Rome's system created a balanced synthesis of good forms of power (6.18.8) which would avoid corruption.<sup>9</sup>

Many different definitions of Empire exist. Under its strictest form, that it must entail direct rule over foreign territory and plans for further annexations, it is sometimes claimed that the United States' concentration on creating a stable international régime beneficial to free-market capitalism is not imperialism. However, insistence on direct rule makes for an unsophisticated definition of empire, and such a policy is unquestionably imperial in seeking and exploiting (economic) power for its own advantage. Rome was more traditional in actively expanding its territory through conquest, but, like the United States, used the 'softer' power of culture to secure its power. While technology and missionary religion aid modern imperialism in a way obviously unavailable to the Romans, fundamental forms of technology such as roads, the army, language, and law facilitated the spread of Roman culture and brought indigenous peoples into the Roman fold.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Churchill in 1897: Quinault 1997b, 320. Diderot in 1778: Galinsky 1992, 54. Thomas Cole also intended comment on contemporary politics: Malamud 2006, 163–5. Cyclical views of history: Walbank 1953, 3–7. American exceptionalism and Rome: Malamud 2006, 166. Rome's balanced synthesis: Hardt and Negri 2000, 314, 371–2.

<sup>10</sup> Definitions of empire: Bush 2006, 1–42; 46–89. Indirect rule: Murphy 2007, 73; Ferguson 2005, 7–21 discusses the avoidance by the USA of the term 'imperialism' to describe its power.



Romans would win over, enfranchise, and thus Romanise local leaders (Tac. Ann. 11.25). Their interests were similar to those of the traditional ruling classes in Italy, so that their social status could actually be improved by submission to Rome, as their masters' backing provided opportunities for localised power through tax collection and legal administration. Local élites would often adopt certain prestigious symbols of rank delineating Romans from others, both voluntarily and under Roman encouragement, thus further enhancing Romanisation across their provinces. Tacitus (*Agricola* 21) describes the process: 'so that rough and unsettled men, ready for war, would grow accustomed by pleasures to peace and quiet, he encouraged them privately and helped them publicly to build temples, markets, and houses. He praised the speedy and reprimanded the sluggish; and so desire for praise took the place of compulsion. He gave the sons of leaders a liberal education ... and those who once rejected Latin longed for eloquence. So the wearing of our clothes and the toga became fashionable. Gradually they deviated into a taste for attractive luxuries which bring vice: porticos, baths, and fancy foods. This, from their inexperience, they termed culture, but it was actually part of their slavery.' One may compare the phenomenon of Coca-Colonisation: vulnerable nations might resent the United States' political power, but Levis, McDonald's, and Disney remain items of popular desire. The power of cultural influence makes possible Jupiter's promise to the Romans of *imperium sine fine* (Virg. *Aen.* 1.278). Some Victorian imperialists considered the Romanised Gauls a model for their Indian subjects: like Rome, Britain governed a huge territory with relatively few men; and culture, as much as or more than military might, could maintain her power.<sup>11</sup>

The power of their empire was a huge source of pride to the Romans. They created a universal citizenship—for all free members of the empire from 212 on—minimising ethnic and racial divisions through law and subordination to a divine emperor. Since all were subject to this remote and impressive figure, this created a certain general equality. Many provincials and even slaves had a real chance at bettering their lot, given the hugeness of Roman territory and the need for a continual supply of administrators, and military service offered many a path to citizenship. Race and colour

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<sup>11</sup> Élite Romanisation: Bush 2006, 122; Brunt 1990, 267-8; Miles 1990, 640. Cultural influences: Joshel 2001, 135-6 notes the isomorphism between televisual narrative of ancient empire and the power of the US-based technology through which its global reach, *sine fine*, is accomplished. Romanised Gauls and Victorians' view of India: Edwards 1999b, 85-6; Ferguson 2003, 144, 190; cf. Seeley 1883, 195.

were not criteria for enslavement: Italians and, for example, Syrians could look largely indistinguishable from one another. For later powers, however, empire is inextricably connected with racism, and the United States in particular has generally avoided laying claim to empire until recently. Indeed, George W. Bush, mindful of empire's negative associations, has claimed that the US is the only great power in history that has refused empire. However, recent neo-conservatives have championed the responsibility of the United States to promote a *Pax Americana* on the model of the *Pax Romana* for others' good as well as its own.<sup>12</sup>

In the Roman empire there were only isolated examples of rebellion, no significant literature of protest and the ideological, technological and socio-political factors fostering modern anti-colonialism were absent. Where there was resistance, it was often from those, such as Jews or Christians, whose religious beliefs and practices were hard to reconcile with proper devotion to the emperor and the state. Whereas modern empires tend to end through subjects' revolts, these were less significant in the Roman empire because, on a day-to-day level, rule was local, not foreign. Local rulers might rebel, but generally more to advance their own interests under the existing order, and while general discontent could stir local peoples to assist foreign invaders, these risings were not really national movements of subject races.<sup>13</sup>

Most provinces contained a mixture of peoples not linked by language or other identity, except the Greeks who were too weak and disorganised for concerted resistance to Rome. P.A. Brunt argues that European belief in self-government ultimately destroyed European imperialism because their practice as rulers was undermined by their principles, but the Romans had less need and less ability to reflect on the paradoxical connection of their freedom with others' subjection. The Roman world was subordinate to the emperor and no clear model of national identity existed, but in modern times, the very existence of independent states provided discontented subjects with models: colonial power and western ideals of freedom were connected, and the connection stirred the subjected to reject their subjugation. The Romans were not exactly European-style racists, but they retained the coloniser's sense of superiority, and while the colonised

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<sup>12</sup> Equality and opportunity: Miles 1990, 635-7, 641; Brunt 1990, 132. 'Pax Americana': Ferguson 2005, 6; Murphy 2007, 7.

<sup>13</sup> Absence of protest literature: Bush 2006, 38; Murphy 2007, 137. Religious resistance: even in these cases, unrest alternates with periods of tranquillity: Miles 1990, 638; Eliav 2006; Fredriksen 2006. Limited rebellions: Miles 1990, 643.

acknowledged the benefits of the empire, cultural stereotypes abounded of rulers and ruled alike. Educated Greeks often considered Romans upstarts, and Rome's subjects could point to many corrupt governors for whom Rome's power offered ample opportunities for financial and sexual exploitation. Even the generally admiring Polybius can call them barbarians (12.4b.2-3). Romans conveniently conceptualised prospective conquests as having the choice between a life of violence and chaos outside the Pax Romana or one of peace within it: Rome's panegyrist, Aelius Aristides (*Or.* 18.59-63) praises Rome's generous citizenship policies and rejoices that the bad old days of internal fighting are over (69). But for those in Rome's power, the Pax Romana, however materially beneficial, could still be characterised as slavery. (See also Chapter 20.)<sup>14</sup>

Like subsequent imperialists, especially those Americans who espouse US exceptionalism, the Romans considered that their empire flourished through divine favour and their own virtues, notably their laws and their care only to make war justly, whose most famous expression is encapsulated in Anchises' words: 'parcere subiectis et debellare superbos' (Virg. *Aen.* 6.853). For others, however, Roman power was merely a result of luck, or even greed. Educated men such as Plutarch and Josephus were essentially realists, welcoming local peace and stability, if with a certain nostalgia for times of greater freedom. One might recall Harold Macmillan's resigned claim in 1956-7: the British must become Greeks to America's Rome and Britain 'can at most aspire to civilise and occasionally influence them.'<sup>15</sup>

Many imperialists claim, implicitly or explicitly, an 'apostolic succession' of power from Rome to Britain to the United States. In 1776, William Henry Drayton wrote: 'Empires have their zenith—and their descension to a dissolution. The British Period is from the year 1758...The Almighty ... has made choice of the present generation to erect the American Empire ... [which] bids fair, by the blessing of God, to be the most glorious of any.' Justificatory imperial rhetoric commonly transforms imperial power into

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<sup>14</sup> Brunt 1990, 122-7, 131-3; *contra* Miles 1990, 631. Modern colonial discontents: Miles 1990, 632-3, 638. Sense of superiority: Bush 2006, 2, 27-9. Corrupt governors: Balsdon 1979, 30-71, 167-76. Polybius' 'barbarian' Romans: Champion 2000. *Pax Romana* as slavery: Habinek 1988, 69. Sigismund Goetze's mural 'Britannia Pacificatrix' (1921) for the Foreign Office, shows Britannia, in Roman costume, surrounded by figures and symbols representing her power: Ferguson 2003, 312.

<sup>15</sup> Luck or greed as causes of Rome's power: Balsdon 1979, 2-5. Views of Plutarch and Josephus: Plut. *Mor.* 824c; Jos. *Bj* 2.345 f.; Balsdon 1979, 207; Brunt 1990, 117. Macmillan: Sampson 1967, 65-6; cf. Haywood 1958, 29-30.

the gifts of civilisation, and beneficiaries of empire into benefactors. In one formulation, Rome civilised Britain and Britain repaid the debt in Africa. In three frescoes on the Palace of Westminster, Romans and Carthaginians civilise Britain; on the remaining three, Britain rescues others from various forms of oppression.

Subsequent imperialists contrasted their empire favourably with earlier flawed models, especially Rome. Thus Macaulay condemned Rome's exploitative and militaristic character, while J.R. Seeley in his influential *Expansion of England* claims that, unlike that of Rome, the British empire was not founded on conquest. Settlers in the US fled religious and political oppression and created a new society based on freedom and equality: thus exceptionalism is easily claimed as anti-imperialism morally superior to European imperialism. A desire to claim moral superiority over Rome even creeps into Hollywood at times: the prologue of *Spartacus* ends with an apparent reference to Lincoln's emancipation proclamation: evidently the United States could do what Rome could not, in championing universal liberty.<sup>16</sup>

Barbarian/immigrant invasions have their analogue in US border problems, but the 'exterior causes' theory of Rome's fall is arguably less alarming and therefore a little less fascinating because the cure is obvious—tighter borders, even if this is easier in theory than practice. More alarming (and intriguing) is the idea of the enemy within: hence the frequent attribution of Rome's end to spiritual torpor, excess, and above all decadence. Decadence occurs frequently, especially though not exclusively in popular accounts, because it is a nicely elastic term and provides an opportunity for horrified gazing at picturesque wickedness, best exemplified by the figures of Caligula and Nero. The supremely influential Rome of Hollywood—whether Caesar's republic or the empire of later rulers—is home to all forms of excess, encapsulated in the orgy, the decadent society whose decadence presages disaster, and whose extremes can be used to offer comment on modern society. Rome can represent the excess for which we feel a guilty desire, as the lavish resources used to portray Rome mirror Rome's own power and excess.

Moralists, ancient and modern, construct narratives of Roman decadence, tracing a progressive decline from earlier excellence. For many

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<sup>16</sup> Drayton in 1776: Ferguson 2005, 34. Westminster frescoes: Lord Lugard cited in Agnew and Corbridge 1995, 50; Edwards 1999b, 81-2. Seeley on British empire: Seeley 1883, 38, 145; cf. Ferguson 2005, 24; Bush 2006, 25. Exceptionalism in the US: Bush 2006, 148. *Spartacus* echoes Lincoln: Winkler 2001, 50, 55-6.

Romans themselves, Rome had always been declining, especially morally, and 146 BC, when Rome's last rival for power was defeated and a flood of wealth and slaves from the east began to alter centuries of traditional austerity, was often considered the watershed. Morality-based jeremiads are popular in our current imperial superpower: perhaps they have especial resonance for nations at their height, who must be ever-vigilant about endangering themselves. The fall of Rome is often cited as a warning of the supposed results of changes in social customs, especially those concerning sexuality. Already in 1798, the American clergyman David Tappan warned of the influence of virtue and vice in the rise and fall of powerful states. Flawed perception shapes such assessments: the wicked glamour of Nero's marriage to a man (*Tac. Ann.* 15.37) is infinitely more memorable than, and obscures, the normal daily life that continued for centuries, even after Rome's supposed fall: indeed, for Gibbon the century after Caligula and Nero marked the height of human prosperity, while in the 4th and 5th Centuries AD there is little evidence for the widespread acceptance of homosexuality that is a favourite cause of Rome's fall in popular culture.<sup>17</sup>

A fascinated portrayal of Roman cruelty and decadence was especially frequent in 19th Century representations of Rome, and it could be shunned or embraced, according to contemporary social and political conditions: for 19th Century Britons, France, with its political instability and supposed moral unsoundness, was assimilated to Rome as the decadent foil to the English, enabling the Irish Oscar Wilde to rebel against English imperialism by embracing Franco-Roman decadence: he is reported to have visited Paris for a haircut in the style of his favourite emperor Nero. Rome could often 'be' France, but aspiring powers could also practise rôle reversal. In Turner's paintings of Carthaginian scenes, for example, a despotic Carthage is assimilated to a France over which a noble Rome/Britain asserts its dominance, magically purged of all decadence.

Avoiding decadence offers the chance to escape decline and fall. Because Rome is a model for later empires, yet its 'meaning' depends on its alleged fall, those aspiring to equal or surpass its power need reassurance that they can avoid its fate. Later imperialists tend to distance themselves, sometimes implausibly, from any aspects of Roman imperialism that appear negative, even though they might be inherent in imperialism, dismiss-

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<sup>17</sup> Rome's attractive excess: Joshel, Malamud and Wyke 2001, 2-4, 19; Fitzgerald 2001, 27-8. David Tappan in 1798: Reinhold 1984, 156. Decadence and its absence: Galinsky 1992, 56-8.

ing them as specific, rather than general, imperial traits. At these moments, Rome is distanced from the contemporary world, generally with an appeal to centuries of progress that differentiate the society under question from Rome. For the American John Taylor, human nature had undergone a moral change and corrupt ancient governments had nothing to teach America. Gibbon reassures his readers that the barbarians are no more and that the division of Europe into multiple states ensures its security because Roman imperial unity created a loss of national freedom and military spirit. Indeed, even if barbarians were to return, he prophesies that 'the remains of civilized society' could found a new world in America.<sup>18</sup>

The easiest way to forestall anxiety about imperial fall is to deny Rome's relevance to contemporary conditions. Rome, however, is just too big and too useful as a source of examples for such a policy to be consistently followed, as becomes clear when viewing the ambivalence of the United States towards Rome. Ancient Rome seemed important to the Founding Fathers when they sought precedents for their new nation, but little of substance ended up in their constitution, and by the 19th Century, the United States had acquired its own 'ancient' history, rendering Rome less important.<sup>19</sup>

The combination of the fall of the Roman empire and its pagan associations ultimately made it problematic as anything other than a very general model, and naturally, the idea of one-man imperial rule was abhorrent. As US territory first expanded, the 'rise and fall' paradigm created concerns—expressed, for example, in Cole's *Course of Empire* series—that expanded territory would bring diminished virtue, but gradually, with expanded power came a greater sympathy with their predecessors, a diminished interest in republican virtue, and new ease with the joys of power. Movies made after 1945, as the US adjusted to its new status as leader of the free world, show Rome in a negative and Nazi-esque light, but 1964's *Fall of the Roman Empire* offers a more positive representation. Here, Rome is multicultural, peaceful and equal. Even Roman decadence can be reimagined more positively, particularly towards the end of the 20th Century, within American mass culture: the patrons of Caesar's Palace in Las Vegas are invited to be like Romans, actively enjoying the pleasures of power and

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<sup>18</sup> Oscar Wilde's Paris haircut: Vance 1999, 113, 120-3. Turner's Carthage: Edwards 1999, 11; see also Hingley 2001, 145-65. Rome's lack of innovation: Murphy 2007, 16-17. John Taylor on moral change: Reinhold 1984, 107-8. Gibbon on security against 'barbarians': Gibbon 1784, 92-9; Seeley 1883, 194-6, Murphy 2007, 181-95.

<sup>19</sup> Founding Fathers and Rome: Gummere 1963, 173-84; Reinhold 1984, 95-108.

plenty, overlaid with a veneer of classical culture.<sup>20</sup> But ever-lurking is the spectre—neither fully rational nor quite irrational, perhaps—that one day it might all be over, whether from some acknowledged danger or something new and unexpected.

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<sup>20</sup> New ease with the joys of power: Vance 1999, 54-64; Malamud 2006, 155-61. *Fall of the Roman Empire* (movie): Fitzgerald 2001, 26-30. Rome in Las Vegas: Malamud and McGuire 2001, 250, 253-4.





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